Vol. 43, no. 4: Full Issue by International Law & Policy, Denver Journal
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 43 
Number 4 Summer Article 12 
April 2020 
Full Issue 
Denver Journal International Law & Policy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
International Law & Policy, Denver Journal (2020) "Full Issue," Denver Journal of International Law & 
Policy: Vol. 43 : No. 4 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp/vol43/iss4/12 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For 
more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
Denver Journal
of International Law and Policy
VOLUME 43 NUMBER 4 SUMMER-2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARTICLES
THE IN DUBIo PRO DEVELOPMENT
PRINCIPLE: A RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT
IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
REGIMES .................... Jos6 Manuel Alvarez Zdrate 333
NEGOTIATING AN ENERGY DEAL UNDER
TTIP: DRIVERS AND IMPEDIMENTS
TO U.S. SHALE EXPORTS
TO EUROPE ................................. Ilaria Espa 357
& Kateryna Holzer
JUSTIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS FOR
ADOPTING DIVERGENT COMPETITION
POLICY AND LAW IN EMERGING
ECONOMIES ........................... Andy C. M. Chen 379
CURRENCY WARS: THE NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS ............. Alexandra Esmel 403
IN THE NAME OF FOOD SECURITY: THE
ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES OF
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE
BALI MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ......... Chingwen Hsueh 433
THE END OF HIBERNATION OF STABILIZATION
CLAUSE IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
REASSESSING ITS CONTRIBUTION TO
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT .......... Alisher Umirdinov 455
THE BRAZILIAN APPROACH TO SOUTH-SOUTH
TRADE AND INVESTMENT: THE CASE
OF ANGOLA ............. Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin 489
& Fabio Morosini
STEPS TOWARDS AN ALIGNMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN SOUTH-SOUTH EXCHANGES:
A RETURN TO TRIPS ............ Ana Santos Rutschman 515
THE INTERPRETATION OF GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
LAW: Is A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
INTERPRETIVE APPROACH POSSIBLE? .... Gabriele Gagliani 559
TRANSNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS
AND HOST STATES' EXPORT RESTRICTION
FLEXIBILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAw ...................... Gashahun L. Fura 589

THE INDUBIO PRO DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLE: A RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES
JOSt MANUEL ALVAREZ ZARATE*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is important to recall that the current International Economic Law ("IEL")
regime has been construed considering the ideas and promises of growth and
economic development for all, including developing countries, as states are bound
by such promises allegedly made in good faith.' The liberal interpretation that
progressive liberalization of access to goods, services and capital, on one hand,
whilst denying access to knowledge and technology, on the other2-absorbed into
the interpretation of IEL rules by investment arbitrators and trade panels-may no
longer deny the IEL foundational Right to Develop ("RTD") and its corollary
principle in dubio pro development. The former interpretation may reduce the
policy space 3 for developing countries to adopt developmental policies though
their local regulation.
4
There are at least three scenarios in which the adoption of developmental
policies may have interpretative problems: (i) in the political discussion, when
countries negotiate and discuss the construction of or changes to the economic
system and the models of investment and trade regimes; (ii) in the process of
* *Dr. Josd Manuel Alvarez Zirarte is a Professor of International Economic Law at the Extemado
University of Colombia. He also works as a sole practitioner in trade and investment areas involving to
local regulation. Many thanks to Markus Wagner for his helpful criticism and suggestions and to
Daniel Garcia and Maria Angdlica Prada, for excellent research assistance in the process of writing this
paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
1. Such promises can be found in the negotiating agendas, preambles, and rules of trade and
investment treaties. For some approaches to the RTD in trade and investment, see Constantine
Michalopoulos, Trade and Development in the GA TT and WTO: The Role of Special and Differential
Treatment for Developing Countries, working draft, (World Bank working draft, 2000); U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., June 2000, International Investment
Agreements: Flexibility for Development, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/1 8 (2000).
2. In the age of information and in a technological society, access to knowledge is a mandatory
requisite for acquiring development. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) contains advanced requisites for access to knowledge and technology and no mandatory
provisions for providing the transfer of technology to countries; therefore, the way in which this
agreement was written limits access to knowledge instead of liberalizing it, unlike GATT and GATS do
for goods and services respectively. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
3. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report, Global
Governance and Policy Space for Development, UNCTAD/TDR/2014 (2014) [hereinafter Global
Governance].
4. For investment rules, see Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, State Liability for Regulatory
Change: How International Investment Rules are Overriding Domestic Law, 1:5 INVESTMENT TREATY
NEwS, 3, 3 (2014).
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applying the rules by interpreting them when countries need to pursue their
economic interests, by enacting policies for their own economic development; and
(iii) before dispute settlement mechanisms, such as trade panels or investment
tribunals.
5
The above merits an economic-political debate and a legal discussion; this
paper will focus on the latter. There is a huge amount of academic literature in the
field of law and development 6 that supports the economic-political discussion and
helps us understand the strategic importance of development for emerging nations
and its relationship to trade and investment rules. However, this paper will mainly
focus on the legal aspects in the adoption of developmental policies by emerging
nations, as the arguments pleaded above and made by an IEL dispute settlement
body must be free from political considerations. 7 The IEL rules on investment and
trade, currently in force in many states, are part of the mandatory international rule
of law for states. Therefore, these rules and their interpretation are shaping states'
development ideals and have important consequences when international economic
obligations are assessed, both in trade and investment disciplines, at the point in
8which they collide with the RTD. As Markus Wagner points out, "international
trade and investment law can offer valuable insights for one another;" both systems
are apparently "twins separated at birth" and are thus sufficiently similar enough to
warrant a meaningful comparison, 9 which justifies the inclusion of both regimes in
5. Sonia E. Rolland does a good job at explaining these three concerns for trade in her book.
See SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO (2012) [hereinafter ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT]..
6. See David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: an Essay on'the Study of Law and
Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1972). See also DAVID M. TRUBEK, Introduction to DAVID M.
TRUBEK, LAW, STATE AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: CASE STUDIES 1-16 (Trubek, Alviar,
Coutinho & Santos, eds.), https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c 638/g2y2j/landsbookintro final.pdf, David
Kennedy, Laws and Developments, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 17-26 (John Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kessaris eds. 2003) ("The idea that building 'the rule
of law' might itself be a development strategy instead encourages the hope that choosing law could
substitute for the perplexing political and economic choices which have been at the centre of
development policy-making for half a century. The legal regime offers an arena to contest those
choices, but it cannot substitute for them. The hope that it might encourages people to settle on the
particular choices embedded in one legal regime as if they were the only alternative."); Laura Victoria
Garcia Matamoros, El derecho del desarrollo como base para la construcci6n del derecho al
desarrollo, INT'L L.: REV. DE COLOMB. DERECHO INT., 235-72 (2007); DONATELLA ALESSANDRINI,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADE REGIME: THE FAILURE AND PROMISE OF
THE WTO's DEVELOPMENT MISSION (2010).
7. As for investment treaty arbitration, as Susan Franck claims, systemic bias against developing
countries is unacceptable and shows that the outcomes on cases do not show any bias by arbitrators.
See Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 435, 437 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development and Outcomes]. On the contrary, the quantitative
empirical methodologies are to be taken with care, as there is a lack of data included on some studies,
and the consistency of it needs to be clear as information about what was extracted or missing needs to
be available to readers. See Gus Van Harten, Fairness and Independence in Investment Arbitration: A
Critique of "Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration," INVESTMENT TREATY
NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010), www.iisd.org/itn/tag/arbitrator-independence.
8. See Global Governance, supra note 3, at I.
9. See Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International
Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 1, 10 (2014)..
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this paper, and suggests that the RTD and the in dubio pro development follow the
same conditions in both regimes.
The question of the existence of a right for nations to develop in trade and
investment agreements is crucial and controversial, particularly when assessing
some of the economic consequences of those agreements for developing nations,
l °
and when developing countries must regulate for economic developmental
purposes. The RTD, as revealed in this paper, would grant broader policy space in
limited cases to developing countries.'1  It is not intended, however, that
developing countries would have unlimited policy space, as that would undermine
the trade and investment systems.
12
Liberal theories, which do not recognize the RTD, apply to when developing
countries rely on their own efforts to mobilize productive resources and to raise
their levels of domestic investment, human capital, and know-how. 13 However, for
this, they must have the widest possible room available to maneuver and determine
which policies work in their particular conditions, and not be subjected to a
constant shrinking of their policy space by IEL institutions originally established to
support more balanced and inclusive outcomes, 14 where indeed the RTD was
recognized.
The RTD looks as if it is circumscribed to political discourse. It is not, as
shown by its recognition in soft-law instruments such as declarations'5 and U.N.
General Assembly resolutions,' 6 or as hard-law in human rights treaties, which
recognize development as inextricably linked to economic, social and political
rights.' 7  Nevertheless, in treaty practice, development seems to have been
neglected to the point where it has become a non-enforceable right. While it is
customarily established in treaty preambles, the right to development has received
little practical application by states and dispute settlement bodies when such
10. See ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5, at 2. This paper will take the same approach
mentioned by Sonia Rolland which goes beyond the protectionism versus openness debate, where the
issue goes to development policies and to what has been called "policy space" to describe the range of
domestic economic and industrial policies, which would be WTO compatible. Jost E. ALVAREZ, THE
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 13-24 (2011).
11. Notwithstanding that from a legal perspective the RTD raises questions as to defining
development and the nature or content of such a right, here an approach is attempted in order to open a
wider debate arguing that the RTD has legal status in the IEL system.
12. See Wagner, supra note 9.
13. Global Governance, supra note 3, at I.
14. Id.at I-II.
15. See U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Hum. Rts., Rep. on its 33rd Sess., Feb. 14, 1977, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/S.R.1389 (Feb. 14, 1977).
16. See G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128
(Dec. 4, 1987).
17. For an overview of the discussion, see Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development:
Implications for International Economic Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1425 (2000); James Thuo
Gathii, The Right to Development, Human Rights and Economic Partnership Agreements, in REALIZING
THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 259 (2013); Diane A. Desierto, Development as an International Right.
Investment in the New Trade-BasedllAs, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 296 (2011).
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entities are enforcing international economic obligations.' 8 Academics have also
neglected the RTD discussion, with some ignoring the legal perspective of
developing countries, whittling it down to an ideological position 19 or deeming it
an unenforceable right before dispute settlement bodies. 20 However, a few well-
founded exceptions, where development concerns are seen as a right, have
reluctantly arisen.21  The disdain for the RTD has driven some investment
arbitrators to interpret the opposite of the in dubio pro development, i.e. when in
doubt, treaty obligations are meant to protect the rights of the investor and not the
state's rights.
II. Is DEVELOPMENT AN ECONOMIC ISSUE, AN ISSUE OF LAW, OR BOTH?
A. Development as a Right of the State
This paper does not seek to address an issue that is common in academic
research on this topic, which is whether the RTD is a human right and as such, how
difficult it may be to enforce this right before an international tribunal.23 Hence,
for the purposes of this work, the RTD is not understood exclusively as a human
right but as a state's economic right that is embedded in trade and investment
treaties. Scholars have recognized the significant problems presented by analyzing
the RTD from a human rights perspective for its recognition in trade and
24investment treaties. It may be problematic to use a human rights perspective in
an IEL case, as, due to the fragmentation of international law, a dilemma of
systemic application and interpretation of law will ultimately be faced.25 However,
applying the RTD directly to an IEL case, as an obligation embedded in the
18. A good example can be seen when developing countries are implementing a panel or
appellate body report as "they may face specific challenges due to their socioeconomic vulnerabilities
or costs associated with implementation." Sonia E. Rolland, Considering Development in the
Implementation of Panel and Appellate Body Reports, 4 TRADE L. & DEv. 150, 150 (2012) [hereinafter
Rolland, Considering Development].
19. RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 14 (2008).
20. Alvarez, supra note 10, at 95-99.
21. In the case of trade, the RTD has had some policy space. See Rolland, Considering
Development, supra note 18. Towards IIAs, the RTD matters have been left as a "jurisdictional
gatekeeping." See Desierto, supra note 17, at 296.
22. See Pro investment cases like Socidtd Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005). Van
Harten, infra note 123, showed 140 cases on legal issues on jurisdiction, that tend to be issues for which
the text of an investment treaty is ambiguous or silent, leading to disagreements about the appropriate
approach. Expansive resolutions of an issue may be said to favor claimants by expanding the authority
of investment treaty tribunals and by allowing more claimants to proceed. In general, seventy-six
percent of the decisions were expansive investor-friendly against twenty-three percent for state.
23. See Bunn, supra note 17 at 1427.
24. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5 at 28 (doubts that the RTD has not gained legal
status and "has not percolated to the WTO").
25. Rep. of the Study Group of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 58th Sess., July 3-
Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006).
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system, eliminates the need for that discussion.
In human rights discourse, it has been argued that even if the RTD exists,
governments of developing states owe it to their own populations, and thus is not
owed by foreign developed countries. This situation is not within the scope of this
paper. Nevertheless, assuming that such a claim is correct, it would not serve as an
argument against the use proposed for the RTD - in fact, it is an argument that
would strengthen its use in trade and investment cases. If developing states have
the international duty to grant and guarantee the RTD as a human right of their
inhabitants, they must not be placed in a position in which they must decide
whether to fulfill such developmental expectations or to be subject to claims
because a trade partner or an investor may challenge the country's measures
implemented for development purposes.
Thus, as will later be discussed, the RTD can be understood and identified
from within IEL's system, without direct recourse to human rights treaties. If the
rules and principles that grant the RTD can be found within the IEL system, and
thus can be applied directly in a trade or investment case, one does not need to
search for such a right in another international treaty. Therefore, this paper calls
for states and adjudicators to reinterpret trade and investment treaties26 as
developmental language can already be found there.
Another recurrent objection to the enforceability of the RTD is the non-
justiciability of the issues to which it may give rise.27 Some scholars have
concluded that the RTD is non-justiciable under international law.28 This paper
proposes a different approach. If IEL adjudicators were given broad discretion in
deciding commonly understood trade and investment disputes as well as the power
to determine their jurisdiction and merits, adjudicators would then have also the
ability to decide on matters applying the in dubio pro development principle.
For these reasons, this paper proposes to overcome such a dilemma by
acknowledging that a claim against a developed country before an international
dispute resolution mechanism is not a prerequisite for recognition of the RTD.
Rather, just as defendants may plead certain affirmative defenses in municipal law
when sued in local courts, a developing country may employ the RTD and in dubio
pro development principle as a defense in an IEL case. By recognizing that states
enjoy a right not to be declared responsible for breaching IEL obligations when
pursuing development-related goals, a state's RTD can be given normative value
within the IEL system.
26. As proposed by LISE JOHNSON & MERIM RAZBAEVA, STATE CONTROL OVER
INTERPRETATION OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 1 (2014). States could be more active in interpreting the
investment treaties as "a relatively efficient tool to achieve the objectives of adding clarity to and
reducing exposure under existing treaties." Id.
27. Desierto, supra note 17, at 316-19.
28. See Rolland, Considering Development, supra note 18.
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B. What Kind of Economic Development Must International Economic Law
Confront?
Before tackling issues of development, one must first be able to define the
concept. Scholars and international institutions have attempted to define
development in a variety of ways. 29 Questions arise about whether it should only
encompass economic growth as seen in some trade and investment treaties, 30 or
whether other factors must be analyzed when determining what contributes to a
country's development. Moreover, it is vital to determine which developmental
policies are in conformity with international obligations. Although its meaning is
deeply influenced by economic and political theories, this issue has legal
consequences, as it is important to clarify what amount of policy space is needed to
pursue development goals, taking into account the RTD and the in dubio pro
development principle.
A more comprehensive understanding of development, one that recognizes
economic growth as intrinsically tied to areas of environmental sustainability; food
security; the reduction of extreme poverty, hunger, and child mortality; access to
health; the promotion of education and gender equality,3 1 would give an idea of
how much policy space development requires in order to be fully achieved. This
definition closely coincides with the legal one given by the Andean Tribunal to
international development and human rights instruments.32
The prior definition recognizes that whilst economic growth is fundamental, it
is insufficient, and development as a concept must encompass a more wholesome
set of elements that guarantee the well-being of a state's inhabitants. Hence, for
the purposes of this paper, development-related measures will be seen as those that
a government adopts in order to foster economic growth through supporting
economic strategic areas and that promote the well-being of its inhabitants through
access to education, food security, healthcare or environmental protection.
IEL must confront the question of development in the academic arena and in
practice when states are drawing up specific policies to foster development and
throughout international dispute settlements. The question of determining the
margin of appreciation granted to governments in order to adopt public policies
that foster development for their nations arises when IEL imposes international
obligations upon states, both in Trade and Investment disciplines. National
29. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5, at 15, compiles a comprehensive overview from the
evolution, trends, and different perspectives from scholars and institutions and recognizes that "[t]he
particular processes of economic growth, industrialization, and the expansion of social and political
opportunities become encapsulated in the term 'development."'
30. The discussions have not been concentrated upon the economic growth measures, but upon
the myth of its desired consequences, which has left several serious problems unattended, including
social inclusion, alleviation of poverty, and the general wellbeing of the majority of people.
31. See Global Governance, supra note 3 at I (citing Henry Morgenthau, who insisted that,
"Prosperity like peace is indivisible. We cannot afford to have it scattered here or there among the
fortunate or to enjoy it at the expense of others. Poverty, wherever it exists, is menacing to us all and
undermines the well-being of each of us.").
32. See infra notes 97 and 98.
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development strategies that comprise all of the above will need to be accompanied
by regulatory changes; 33 therefore it is likely that states or investors would
challenge some of those regulations. Throughout the last decade, the rise in
investment disputes has posed this question and, even though in the trade
discipline the question could be considered less controversial, it persists
nevertheless.
34
IEL rules are drafted differently in the case of investment and trade, which
lead to different interpretations in each case. For investment rules, they are drafted
in such a way that their meaning is often broadly worded; while in the case of trade
rules, the undertakings are more detailed. Thus, interpretation is crucial for
determining the precise extent to which a state is responsible for a breach of an
international obligation, or whether its behavior was sanctioned by international
law. With regards to the scope of development, no single route may be used. On
the one hand, regional trade agreements ("RTAs") among developing countries
frame development as a core issue. The inclusion of asymmetric provisions to
support the less industrialized Member States is one way to recognize that the
relationship between trade liberalization and development35 is not limited to
growth. Conversely, the scope of developing provisions in RTAs among
developing and developed countries may be narrower.
Yet, as "development rights" language is included in treaties, the interpreter is
required to give extent and meaning to the definition; thus new arguments must be
made by parties, advocates, and arbitrators, to incorporate economic reasoning,
development facts, and available data into the term's meaning. Determining the
appropriate definition and extent of development is not an easy job, but it is
important that such an endeavor be carried out in order to avoid relying on
fabrications and myth.36
III. THE RIGHT To DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES
The RTD is not a right ruled by the principle "first in time, first in right."
37
33. See Global Governance, supra note 3 at VII.
34. The persistent push for a more universal, transformative, and sustainable approach to
development will play a key role in the setting of new goals and targets for policymakers, in addition to
its moral implications, growing inequality causes seriously damage to social well-being, threatens
economic progress and stability, and undermines political cohesion. See Global Governance, supra
note 3, at VI.
35. See ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5, at 57-58.
36. Different economic approaches can be used to determine the extent of development, but any
one used must rely on data and the nature of the policy and or measures, not on myths. Many myths
had been construed against developing countries, i.e. that to developing countries the pacta sunt
servanda principle did not have any meaningful force. As Jason Jackee pointed out and successfully
demonstrates: "that, contrary to the myth, a long line of international jurisprudence demonstrates that
state promises to foreign investors have been strongly presumptively enforceable as a matter of
consistent international law and practice." See Jason Webb Jackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State
Promises to Foreign Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1550, 1551 (2008).
37. A principle of law which holds that the first person to pose or use a right has the right to use it
2015
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States that had precedence in time and had acquired economic development first
indeed had the advantage with regards to the RTD, but just because such states
obtained full power over economic development does not mean they can later bar
economically underdeveloped nations from employing the RTD. The RTD is
recognized in multiple international instruments and by trade and investment
treaties for developing countries, as will be discussed later.
The promises of growth and development for all must not be forgotten when
interpreting trade treaties; as such promises achieved legal status when their words
were included in different international agreements. As Jason Jackee points out,
38
just as the law protects promises made to investors, so too must it enforce promises
to developing countries.
In 1986, in the context of settling the agenda for the Uruguay Round,
developing countries accepted the inclusion of three "new trade issues," - namely
services; intellectual property; and investment - in negotiations, in exchange for
development and growth. There was a compromise by the United States and other
countries to include the development issue in favor of developing countries, in
exchange for the inclusion of the three 'new issues' within the negotiating
mandate.39 As a result, the RTD was construed as a foundational value of
international economic trade treaties as it is imbued with commonly shared
transcendental and democratic values.40 Accordingly, growth and development in
developing countries is a goal that the IEL system must always strive to attain.
The RTD is an implicit value of the IEL system because its rules have been
teleologically formulated by a language impregnated with commonly shared values
that were formulated when negotiating agenda objectives and treaty preambles. 41
These values later served to inspire the rules of the legal system by which such
treaties must abide.
As the in dubio pro development principle is implicit in trade and investment
law and has emerged from the systemic integration of treaty preambles, Special
and Differential Treatment ("SDT") rules and negotiation purposes42 have the
in the future over the right of later users. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or
Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV. 881, 881 (2000).
38. See Jackee, supra note 36, at 1150, 1154.
39. See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) (Terence P.
Stewart ed., 1993).
40. See Markus Wagner, Taking Interdependence Seriously: The Need for a Reassessment of the
Precautionary Principle in International Trade Law, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 713, 718
(2012). Wagner addresses the Appellate Body of the WTO use of values in interpreting IEL norms in
the Brazil-Retreated Tyres: "A panel must consider the relevant factors, particularly the importance of
the interests or values at stake, the extent of the contribution to the achievement of the measure's
objective, and its trade restrictiveness." Id.at 732.
41. See Global Governance, supra note 3, at II (stating "Pursuing bold international collective
action to correct the deep inequities of the world, along with determined and innovative domestic policy
initiatives, was what motivated the participants at Bretton Woods 70 years ago and in Geneva 50 years
ago.").
42. For a deduction of principles in law, see Acosta Alvarado & Paola Andrea, The General
Principles of Law and Principle Type Rules: Its Conceptualization and Use in International Law, 25
VOL. 43:4
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power to bind treaty parties.43
Sufficient elements to support opiniojuris that an RTD and its correlative in
dubio pro development principle exists in International Economic Law include: the
constant incorporation of development language into IEL treaty preambles as a
goal; the express acknowledgement of the non-violating nature of subsidies; and
health measures that protect the environment.
Therefore, as democratically agreed upon principles on their own constitute
an autonomous formal source of international law and are not necessarily
subsumed under custom or treaties, panelist and arbitrators interpreting the RTD
and the in dubio pro development principle in a case must give it proper
consideration. 4
The in dubio pro development principle also manifests itself in the
presumption of conformity with development-related measures. In conjunction
with the bonafide principle, it is to be presumed that states act in conformity with
their international obligations,45 such that when a state adopts a measure that seeks
REv. DERECHO DEL ESTADO, 193, 193-219 (2010).
43. See Wagner, supra note 9, at 43 (citing Philippe Sands, Searching for Balance: Concluding
Remarks, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 198, 202 (2002) on the shared values of investment and trade regimes:
"those charged with interpreting and applying treaties on the protection of foreign investment need to
take into account the values that are reflected in norms that have arisen outside the context of the
investment treaty which they are applying.").
44. As for the importance of principles as an international law source in case law, see Pulp Mills
on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 142-43 (Apr. 20) (separate opinion by J.
Antonio Cancado Trindade).
45. See Appellate Body Report, US-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC- Hormones
Dispute, 315, WT/DS320/AB/R (adopted Nov. 14, 2008); Appellate Body Report, Canada-
Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, 315, WT/DS321/AB/R (adopted
Nov. 14, 2008) ("The Member required to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings may be
presumed to have acted in good faith when adopting the implementing measure."). As for investment,
see Saluka Invs. BV (Neth.) v. Czech 255, 259-60, 262-63 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006).
It is now established in international law that States are not liable to pay compensation to a
foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory powers, they adopt in a non-
discriminatory manner bonafide regulations that are aimed at the general welfare... The
Tribunal further recalls that, in an accompanying note to the 1967 OECD Draft Convention
on the Protection of Foreign Property, it is provided that measures taken in the pursuit of a
State's 'political, social or economic ends' do not constitute compensable expropriation ...
Similarly, the United States Third Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations in 1987
includes bonafide regulations and "other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as
within the police power of State" in the list of permissible-that is, non-compensable-
regulatory actions... In the opinion of the Tribunal, the principle that a State does not
commit an expropriation and is thus not liable to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien
investor when it adopts general regulations that are "commonly accepted as within the police
power of States" forms part of customary international law today. There is ample case law in
support of this proposition. As the tribunal in Methanex Corp. v. USA said recently in its
final award, "[ilt is a principle of customary international law that, where economic injury
results from a bonafide regulation within the police powers of a State, compensation is not
required"... That being said, international law has yet to identify in a comprehensive and
definitive fashion precisely what regulations are considered "permissible" and "commonly
accepted" as falling within the police or regulatory power of States and, thus, non-
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to bolster development, it must be deemed prima facie as in conformity with its
46international obligations. In this way, the challenge to an IEL obligation to such
measures should be assessed under a higher standard than challenges to measures
seeking other ends. In principle, it is not meant to be an irrefutable rule, as a
claimant may successfully prove that even when a government has adopted a pro-
development measure, it has been adopted beyond its limits.
47
A. The Right to Development in Trade
Since the origins of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),
the IEL regime held the idea that progressive liberalization of access to goods will
lead the world to progress and improved welfare.48 The same idea lay behind the
system for services and capital, after the Uruguay Round.49 As seen before, the
increase in trade, welfare and growth was one of the justifications for the
intellectual property protection contained in TRIPS. However, the agreement was
written in a way that allowed for no liberalization and limited access to knowledge
and technology.
5 0
Based on these hypotheses, interpreters including governments, arbitrators,
and trade panels, have considered, with some disdain, the application of RTD to
compensable. In other words, it has yet to draw a bright and easily distinguishable line
between non-compensable regulations on the one hand and, on the other, measures that have
the effect of depriving foreign investors of their investment and are thus unlawful and
compensable in international law.
Id.
46. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, 278,
WT/DS23I/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002) ("We must assume that Members of the WTO will abide by
their treaty obligations in good faith, as required by the principle of pacta sunt servanda articulated in
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention. And, always in dispute settlement, every Member of the WTO
must assume the good faith of every other Member.").
47. Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
296-98, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2003).
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, entitled Pacta Sunt Servanda, to which several
appellees referred in their submissions, provides that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." The United States itself
affirmed "that WTO Members must uphold their obligations under the covered agreements
in good faith"... Clearly, therefore, there is a basis for a dispute settlement panel to
determine, in an appropriate case, whether a Member has not acted in good faith. Nothing,
however, in the covered agreements supports the conclusion that simply because a WTO
Member is found to have violated a substantive treaty provision, it has therefore not acted in
good faith. In our view, it would be necessary to prove more than mere violation to support
such a conclusion.
Id.
48. See the GATT preamble which establishes that: "Recognizing that their relations in the field
of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and
exchange of goods." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I1, 55
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter GATT].
49. Id.
50. See TRIPS, supra note 2.
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the political trade sphere or to dispute mechanisms. 5 1 As mentioned before, this is
due to the misguided belief that such a right is not a part of the IEL system and
therefore, it is unenforceable.
Growth and development initiatives were on the minds of trade negotiators
hailing from 96 countries at the Punta del Este Declaration Ministerial on
September 20, 1986, when the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations was
launched. As a result, they are repeatedly mentioned in several sections of the
Declaration.52 For example, Part I establishes that the removal of trade distortions,
protectionism, the preservation of GATT's basic principles and the development of
a more open, viable, and durable multilateral trading system would promote both
growth and development. 53 It also states that the negotiations should benefit all
countries, especially the less developed contracting parties; that the principle of
differential and more favorable treatment embodied in Part IV of GATT and in the
decision of November 28, 1979, would apply to the negotiations; and additionally,
that developed countries did not expect reciprocity for their commitments made in
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade by
developing countries.
54
Part II of the Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este provides that as a result
of service-based negotiations the parties "shall aim to establish a multilateral
framework of principles and rules for trade in services, including elaboration of
possible disciplines for individual sectors, with a view to expansion of such trade
under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of
promoting economic growth of all trading partners and the development of
developing countries."
55
For purposes of this paper, the RTD can be recognized in two different ways:
(i) as a special exception to the right of access to trade, the Fair and Equitable
Treatment ("FET"), and indirect expropriation standards, or (ii) as an autonomous
rule, which must be applied as a lex specialis rule to the trade and investment
norm.
Some maintain regional and free trade agreements ("FTAs") as well as
international investment agreements ("IIAs") reduce policy space and "that
regardless of the countries involved, by signing those agreements developing-
country governments relinquish some of the policy space they have been
endeavoring so hard to preserve at the multilateral level.",56 Notwithstanding,
customary international law suggests otherwise, while preambles, rights and
obligations of RTAs and IIAs signed after 2004 have all recognized the RTD in
51. See Rolland, Considering Development, supra note 18; see also Phillip Morris Brands Sarl v.
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, (July 2, 2013), 6
ICSID Rep. 14 (2013).
52. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, GATT B.I.S.D. (33d Supp.),
at 19 (1987) [hereinafter Punta del Este Declaration].
53. Id. at Part I.
54. Id.
55. Id at Part II. See also, ALESSANDRINI, supra note 6, at 91.
56. See Global Governance, supra note 3 at X.
2015
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 43:4
one form or another, given the revival of the important role of industrial policy and
the failure of free market policies.57
One FTA objective is the promotion of development for its states' parties, as
the language used in the treaties makes clear reference to it. Most FTAs refer to
development in their preambles or in the text of the treaties. However, there is not
a single model wording. References to development range from a brief mention in
the preamble to a very detailed clause or article on development objectives. For
example, most FTAs between Canada and other countries include a number of
references to development in the preamble, such as the promotion of sustainable
development; broad-based economic development in order to reduce poverty,
while recognizing the differences in the level of development and the size of the
Parties' economies; and the importance of creating opportunities for economic
development.58
Other treaties, like the ones signed between the United States and Colombia
and the United States and Peru, refer in their preambles to the promotion of a
"broad-based economic development," the reduction of poverty, the protection of
the environment and the promotion of sustainable development.59 Treaties signed
by the European Union ("EU") contain more comprehensive clauses regarding the
concept and outcomes of development. For instance, the FTA between the EU and
Central American States ("CA") includes considerations in its preamble
acknowledging the difference in economic and social development existing
between the CA countries and the EU. 60 The preamble also recognizes the "shared
57. States have begun to add new wording to development related treaties in the last decade
thereby allocating some policy space to implement developmental policies. This has produced an
emerging opiniojuris that recognizes the RTD as an IEL rule, which is being crystalized by its constant
inclusion in treaties.
58. Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Colombia, Can.-Colom., Nov.
21, 2008,2011 Can. T.S. No. 11.
59. See Preamble,
PROMOTE broad-based economic development in order to reduce poverty and generate
opportunities for sustainable economic alternatives to drg-crop production;.. IMPLEMENT
this Agreement in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation,
promote sustainable development, and strengthen their cooperation on environmental
matters.
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, State Dep't No. 06-128. See
also, Preamble,
PROMOTE broad-based economic development in order to reduce poverty and generate
opportunities for sustainable economic alternatives to drug-crop production;.. IMPLEMENT
this Agreement in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation,
promote sustainable development, and strengthen their cooperation on environmental
matters.
U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006, T.I.A.S. 06-226.
60. See Preamble,
HIGHLIGHTING their commitment to working together in pursuit of the objectives of
poverty eradication, job creation, equitable and sustainable development, including aspects
of vulnerability to natural disasters, environmental conservation and protection and
biodiversity, and the progressive integration of the Republics of the CA Party into the world
economy;... CONSIDERING the difference in economic and social development existing
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objective of strengthening the process of economic and social development in
Central America," and states that the "agreement will create a climate conducive to
growth in sustainable economic relations between them [the two regions], more
particularly in the trade and investment sectors which are essential to the
realisation of the economic and social development and technological innovation
and modernisation." 61  The two regions were aware of the need to promote
sustainable development and reaffirmed their sovereignty to exploit their natural
resources, according to their own environmental and developmental policies to
promote sustainable development.
62
Similarly, the FTA between the EU, Colombia, and Peru includes
comprehensive references to development objectives in its preamble which
expresses a desire "to promote comprehensive economic development with the
objective of reducing poverty and creating new employment opportunities and
improved working conditions, as well as raising living standards in their respective
territories by liberalising and expanding trade and investment between their
territories. 63  Furthermore, the reference to development is also expressly
contained in a provision that enumerates the objectives of the agreement.64 The
parties are also "COMMITTED to implementing this Agreement in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development, including, the promotion of
economic progress, the respect for labor rights and the protection of the
environment, in accordance with the international commitments adopted by the
Parties., 65 Moreover, the difference in economic and social development between
the signatory Andean Countries and the EU and its Member States were
considered.66 Beyond the preamble, Article 4, which addresses the agreement's
objectives, states the promotion of trade should be conducted "in a way that
contributes to the objective of sustainable development, and [] work in order to
integrate and reflect this objective in the Parties' trade relations.,
67
RTAs in Latin America have also recognized the RTDs of its members. For
example, Articles 1 and 2 of the Cartagena Agreement,68 a founding treaty for the
Andean Community, to which Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru are parties,
promotes as its two main objectives a balanced, harmonious, and equitable
between the Republics of the CA Party and the EU Party and the shared objective of
strengthening the process of economic and social development in Central America.
Agreement Establishing an Association Between Central America, on the one hand, and the European
Union and its Member States, on the other, June 29, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 346).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, and
Colombia and Peru, on the other part, preamble, May 31, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 354) 55.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.at art. 4(j).
68. Andean Subregional Integration Agreement, May 26, 1969, art. 1,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/othertreaties/details.jsp?treatyid=393 [hereinafter Cartagena
Agreement] (founding the Andean Community).
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development of the Member Countries and an improved standard of living for the
sub-region's population. 69  There are several other provisions in the agreement
which favor development, such as Article 108, which considers the different stages
of development of the member states; Article 109, which stipulates a special
regime for Bolivia and Ecuador that grants them greater participation in order to
gradually diminish their development disparities with other Member States.7" The
Andean States have likewise agreed to act jointly before any international
organization in order to receive the technical assistance and project financing
required for Ecuador and Bolivia's development.7'
This Andean Pact also provides flexibility to Bolivia and Ecuador to improve
their possibilities for development and participation in the Andean Community's
industrialization process 72 and allows for the Agreement's Andean Community
Commission to establish better conditions in favor of those countries, than those
initially contemplated in the Agreement.
73
B. The Right to Development in Investment
An increasing number of countries include specific language in the preamble
to their HAs aimed at making clear that the objective that investment must not be
pursued at the expense of other key public policy goals, such as the protection of
health, safety, or environment.74
Contrary to the WTO-regime or the rules on trade contained in FTAs, HAs
69. Id.
70. Idat art. 109 ("Bolivia and Ecuador shall enjoy a special regime, with a view toward
gradually reducing the differences in development that currently exist in the subregion. This system
shall enable them to attain more rapid economic growth through effective and immediate participation
in the benefits of the area's industrialization and the liberalization of trade.").
71. Idatart. 118.
The Member Countries commit themselves to act jointly to secure technical assistance and
financing for Bolivia and Ecuador's development needs, particularly for projects related to
the integration process, from the Andean Development Corporation and any other
subregional, national, or international organizations. The resources for those projects shall
be allocated in accordance with the basic objective of reducing the existing differences in
development among the countries by making an attempt to favor Bolivia and Ecuador
markedly. The Member Countries, moreover, shall jointly request the Andean Development
Corporation to allocate its regular and special resources in such a way that Bolivia and
Ecuador are given a substantially larger share than they would receive if the distribution
were to be proportional to their contribution to the Corporation's capital.
Id. (emphasis added).
72. d at art. 119 ("In its periodic evaluations and annual reports, the General Secretariat shall
give separate and special consideration to Bolivia and Ecuador's situation in the subregional
integration effort and shall propose to the Commission the measures that it deems appropriate to
substantially improve their possibilities for development and increasingly expedite their participation in
the area's industrialization.") (emphasis added).
73. Id.at art. 120 ("The Commission may establish, for the benefit of any of the relatively less
developed countries, more favorable conditions and procedures than those considered in this Chapter, in
the light of the degree of development attained and the conditions for taking advantage of the benefits
of integration.") (emphasis added).
74. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 190 (3d ed. 2010).
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normally do not have a general exceptions clause equivalent to GATT's Articles
XX or XVIII. Notwithstanding, some treaties are now including these GATT-style
general exception clauses. 75 The general approach given by scholars has been to
analyze non-precluded measures ("NPM") clauses commonly found in bilateral
investment treaties ("BITs"), such as those ratified by the United States, Germany,
the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union, Canada, and India. 76 NPM clauses
contain specific exceptions for security, public order, taxation, and more recently,
environmental protection issues.
Canada is one of the countries that have started to include general exceptions
in some of its investment agreements. For example, Article 10 of its 2004 Model
BIT includes a general exception for: (i) the protection of human, animal, or plant
life or health; (ii) to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are not
inconsistent with the Agreement; and (iii) the conservation of living or non-living
exhaustible natural resources.77 BIT Models from the United States,78 Colombia,79
8 8 82France,80 Germany, and Norway fail to incorporate any general exception
clauses, but do include NPM clauses.
A new trend among IIAs is the insertion of "Not Lowering Standard" clauses,
which recognize that parties to the treaty should not encourage investment by
relaxing domestic health, safety, or environmental measures or core labor
standards.83 The 2004 Canadian Model BIT contains the following clause:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures.
Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or
offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention
75. UNCTAD Secretariat, International Investment Rulemaking, N 34, U.N. Doc.
TD/B/COM.2/EM.21/2 (22 May 2007), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/c2em21 d2en.pdf; see also ANDREW
NEWCOMBE, General Exceptions in International Investment Agreements, in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 351 (Marie-Clair Cordonnier Segger, et al. eds., 2011)
(indicating that by 2008 from more than 2800 IIAs, only a handful of 25 or 30 contained GATT like
general exceptions).
76. William W. Burke-White & Andreas Von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary
Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 318 (2008).
77. Canada Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 10, 2004,
http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf [hereinafter Canada 2004 Model BIT].
78. 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 8(3), 2012,
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text020 for%20ACIEP/20Meeting.pdf.
79. Columbian Model Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art.
viii, 2007, http://italaw.com/documents/inv model bit colombia.pdf.
80. France Draft Bilateral Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
2006, http://italaw.com/documents/ModelTreatyFrance2006.pdf.
81. German Model Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, 2008, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1025.pdf.
82. Norway Draft Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 2007,
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita103 1.pdf [hereinafter Norway 2007 Model BIT].
83. Idat art. 11.
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in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that
the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request
consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with
a view to avoiding any such encouragement.
8 4
However, these types of clauses do not have as their objective to encourage
development in the receiving state, the concern that belies them is the elimination
of the "rise to the bottom practice," which has allowed countries to compete for
investment by reducing or eliminating core health, environmental, or labor
regulations.
8 5
Although the inclusion of environmental principles has not been widely
accepted by investment tribunals, some cases have shown the importance of these
principles for the interpretation of treaty obligations. For example, in the
NAFTA/UNCITRAL case SD Myers v. Canada, the tribunal recognized that when
interpreting the treaty's content several principles that emerged from its context
should be taken into account, among them, that "environmental protection and
economic development can and should be mutually supportive."86  In the
subsequent case of Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, the
tribunal interpreted the "like circumstances" standard to include some
considerations on environmental protection, such as requirements set by the
UNESCO World Heritage Center.
8 7
The in dubio pro development principle and the RTD need to be applied at the
moment of interpreting the content of states' obligations toward foreign
investors, as part of IEL, i.e. international investment law. Principle and right
can be extracted from the text of the HAs. Most HAs include language in their
preamble that recognizes development as one of the investment regime's main
objectives. For example, the United States' HAs recognize that "treatment to be
accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the
economic development of the Parties."
8 9
84. Canada 2004 Model BIT supra note 77, at art. 11.
85. JOs MANUEL ALVAREZ ZARATE, ALCA Y TLC CON ESTADOS UNIDOS: LA AGENDA DE
NEGOCIACI6N SUS COSTOS Y BENEFICIOS FRENTE A LOS INTERESES NACIONALES 257 (2004).
86. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Can., UNCITRAL Arb., Partial Award, 247 (Nov. 13, 2000),
http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/myers-
18.pdf.
87. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 381
(Sep. 11, 2007).
88. Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar, Defining an ICSID Investment: Why Economic Development Should
be the Core Element, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Apr. 13, 2012)
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/defining-an-icsid-investment-why-economic-development-should.
be-the-core-element!.
89. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru.,
Nov. 4, 2005, T.I.A.S. No. 06-1101, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/56650.pdf; see also
Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Azer., Aug. 1,
1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-47 (2000),
http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/43478.pdf; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Bangl., Mar. 12, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-23
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Furthermore, more recent IIAs include clauses that require the investment to
be made in compliance with the laws and regulations of the state. Although the
wording of these clauses can differ in each treaty, their purpose is to prevent the
protection of investments that have been made in violation of the host country's
laws or policies toward the development of a specific economic sector.90 These
clauses may be found in several ILAs, for example, in the treaties ratified between
Spain and several Latin American countries.9 1
IV. TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND THE JNDUBIO PRO DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLE
Development is commonly expressed as a goal and an important value in
several instruments, as mentioned earlier. The question of finding a normative
value for development in treaties, where this goal is not mentioned throughout a
treaty text, would initially hinder development-related considerations when
applying the treaty. Yet, development oriented interpretations could diverge among
different trade panels and investment tribunals, but mostly among trade and
investment systems. As Markus Wagner indicates,
Divergence in interpreting different treaty language is certainly not a
new phenomenon... However, the potential of the two dispute settlement
systems deciding that countries have divergent regulatory space-
especially when it concerns a challenge to the same governmental
measure--has the potential to severely undermine the predictability for
governments to regulate... 92 upon development policies.
There is not a single answer as to what extent the RTD and the in dubio pro
development principle may reach because much would depend on treaty language.
A. The Trade Regime and the RTD
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") regime's preamble has a clear
development goal and several rules on agreements that confirm such goals, such as
Special and Differentiated Treatment ("SDT").93 The SDT is a set of GATT
provisions designed to give special treatment to developing countries when
(1986), http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/USBangladesh-e.asp; Treaty
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, US-Hond., July 1, 1995, S.
TREATY DOc. No. 106-27, (2000),
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/USHondurase.asp.
90. Salini Costruttori S.P.A. & Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 46 (Jul. 23, 2001), 42 ILM 609 (2003) [hereinafter "Salini v.
Morocco"].
91. Acuerdo entre el Reino de Espafia y la Repfiblica de Colombia para la Promoci6n y
Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, Colom.-Spain, Mar. 31, 2005,
http://www.sice.oas.org/lnvestment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/COLSpain-S.pdf; Acuerdo para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, Ecuador-Spain, Jun. 26, 1996,
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BlTs/ECUSpain-S.pdf; Acuerdo para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, Mex-Spain, Oct. 10, 2006,
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investnent/BITSbyCountry/BITs/MEXSpain-S.asp.
92. Wagner, supra note 9, at 9-10
93. See ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5, at 192-193.
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participating in the international trade of their domestic products. 94 The underlying
idea was that these economies would eventually develop through the promotion
and strengthening of trade. Unfortunately this idea failed to come to fruition, as
was expected by an array of emerging nations.
The RTD has been clearly recognized in IEL treaty practice and case law in
Latin America, as seen in the Andean Community's economic integration
agreement. The Andean Community Court of Justice (Tribunal de Justicia de la
Comunidad Andina, in Spanish, or "TJCA") 95 specified that the RTD was
established in Articles 1 and 2 of the Cartagena Agreement, the founding treaty of
the Andean Community, which establishes as the main objective of the
Community the promotion of a balanced, harmonious, and equitable development
of the Member Countries, and the improvement of the standard of living of the
sub-region's population. 96  Through its case law, the Court has developed and
applied the RTD, which has spilled over into the interpretation and application of
all rules in the sub-regional legal system.97 Therefore, any rule contained in the
legal system of the Andean Community should be interpreted in a way that
guarantees the enduring improvement in the standard of living of the population.
For example, the right to development in the TJCA should be broadly interpreted,
as a country's development should be aimed at meeting the fundamental needs of
its people through economic and social integration, the acceleration of growth, the
generation of employment, the participation in the process of regional integration,
and the equitable distribution of the benefits of this process among Member
States. 98 Through the application of this principle, the Court interpreted and
limited the rights and obligations of the states in order to protect fundamental
collective rights recognized under the sub-regional legal system, such as the right
to education, health, a healthy environment and the right of indigenous people to
prior consultation; 99 as the TJCA has recognized the link with human rights
94. Id.at 110.
95. The Court of Justice for the Andean Community [hereinafter T.J.C.A.] is the dispute
settlement mechanism of the Andean Community, created in 1979 by the Treaty Creating the Court of
Justice of the Cartagena Agreement (amended by the Cochabamba Protocol). The object of the Court is
to interpret, enforce and settle disputes between its four Members States: Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and
Ecuador. See generally, Cartagena Agreement, supra note 68.
96. Id.at art 1, see e.g., T.J.C.A., Proceso 137-IP-2003 (Mar. 10, 2004),
intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Procesos/1 37-IP-2003.doc [hereinafter Proceso 137-IP-
2003].
97. See, Proceso 137-IP-2003, supra note 96.
98. Jd.at 7 (The original text reads: "En este marco, se concibe el desarrollo de los Paises
Miembros como un proceso dirigido a procurar la satisfacci6n de las necesidades fundamentales de sus
habitantes, mediante la integraci6n y la cooperaci6n econ6mica y social, la aceleraci6n del crecimiento,
la generaci6n de ocupaci6n y la participaci6n en el proceso de integraci6n regional. Adems, de
conformidad con el articulo 2 del Acuerdo, el desarrollo debe conducir a una distribuci6n equitativa de
los beneficios de la integraci6n entre los Paises Miembros, de modo de reducir sus diferencias.").
99. T.J.C.A, Proceso 60-IP-2012 (Oct. 24, 2012),
http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Procesos/60-IP-2012.doc (protecting the right of
indigenous people in Colombia to prior consultation in cases where someone is using the community's
traditional knowledge. In doing so, the Tribunal stated:
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treaties.100
B. The Investment Regime and the RTD
1. ICSID Convention
The relationship between development and the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") convention has been a subject of
thorough academic discussion, mostly through a "jurisdictional gate keeping,"' 0'1
but it would exceed the scope of this paper to address such an issue. Rather than
focusing on whether investment contributes to development, this work draws
attention to the policy space an investment host country has in order to pursue
developmental measures.
Notwithstanding that the discussion here is different, the Salini10 2 criteria does
have valuable legal merit. Some lines may be devoted to the existence of an
investment in order to apply the standards of the IIA to such and its contribution to
development. The Salini criteria consider the importance of development and
conclude that the investment should contribute to the economic development of the
host state.' 3  After Salini, the question has fallen to unsettled discussions
considering that tribunals are reticent to recognize the development criteria as they
usually assume that investment per se contributes to the development of host
states.
The Community's rules on industrial property must be in accordance and harmony with the
protection of human rights, as these are the cornerstone for the performance of all sub-legal
operators. It is not possible understand that then Community's IP standard recedes from said
protection, especially if the fundamental basis of the process of integration is the inhabitant
of the sub-region (paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Cartagena Agreement). Based on this
considerations Article 3 of Decision 486 of the Andes Community Commission was issued,
aiming to strike a balance between the industrial property rights and the rights of indigenous
peoples and communities.
(translation by the author)); T.J.C.A., Proceso 107-IP-2008 (Feb. 4, 2009),
intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Procesos/1 07-IP-2008.doc (establishing that the
Community's regulation on trade secrets should always be interpreted in the light of the limits imposed
by collective rights of a fundamental character) (translation by the author); T.J.C.A., Proceso I 10-IP-
2007 (Dec. 4, 2007), intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Procesos/1 10-IP-2007.doc
(establishing that copyright is not absolute because they should be interpreted in the light of their social
function, which includes considerations on the right to information, access to knowledge, and
education) (translation by the author); T.J.C.A., Proceso, 114-IP-2009 (Apr. 29, 2010),
intranet.comunidadandina.orgfDocumentos/Procesos/114-IP-2009.doc [hereinafter Proceso 114-IP-
2009] (establishing that any rule under Decision 436 (regarding phytosanitary measures) should take
into account the protection of the life, health and a safety environment) (translation by the author).
100. See, Proceso 114-IP-2009, supra note 99, 23-24; T.J.C.A., Proceso 43-IP-2014 53 (Jun.
10, 2014), intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Procesos/43-IP-2014.doc.
101. See generally, Desierto, supra note 17, at 296.
102. A body of ICSID case law, which has developed around the meaning of "investment," has
come to be known as the "Salini test." "Salini v. Morocco,",supra note 90, 52. The four elements of
the Salini test are: (i) a contribution in money or other assets; (ii) a certain duration; (iii) an element of
risk; and (iv) a contribution to the host State's economy.
103. Id.
2015
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
This position, which could be true in most cases, should not be considered as
an absolute truth or a rule, because it appears subjective when tribunals do not
review empirical data or economic evidence to support such a claim. 0 4 Indeed it is
a rebuttable premise, especially when a respondent state provides evidence
demonstrating that investment does not contribute to development but in return has
a higher social cost to the host country.'0 5 As far as arbitral practice is concerned,
arbitrators tend to assume that the development-requirement criterion within the
Salini test is usually subsumed by the criteria of assumption of risk, investment
duration, and capital commitment; 106 nevertheless, arbitrators have not affirmed
this is always the case, leaving the door open for further discussion. Arbitrators
have reacted, without much analysis or empirical evidence, to respondent states
that claim that the investor did not contribute to the state's development.'
0 7
Supporting decisions based on assumptions of development, without first assessing
economic facts or empirical work in a case, justifies the investment system's
critiques of arbitrators' subjectivity. 18 Julie Maupin provides important reasons
for looking at empirical scholarship, which can enhance the pool of information
available to influence "neutrals," (i.e., arbitrators), and can help debunk myths and
challenge assumptions, as arbitrators may take "into account empirical evidence on
the operation of the IIL system when steering tribunals and drafting awards."'
10 9
A regrettable example of the above is the tribunal's decision on jurisdiction in
Philip Morris v. Uruguay,"l0 which ignored the respondent's argument regarding
the claimant's contribution to Uruguay's economy in comparison with the social
and economic cost it represents. It was an argument cleverly constructed by
Uruguay in order to discuss whether these sorts of investments are indeed
contributing to a host state's development. 1" Unfortunately, as Julie Maupin
points out about what empirical studies cannot do, "if.. . detailed case studies do
104. Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute
Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 768, 795 (2008) [hereinafter Franck, Empiricism and International Law];
Dr. Julie Maupin, Empirics and Opposition: What Empirical Studies Can (and Can't) Do for
International Investment Law Scholarship (Apr. 27-28, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (Dr. Julie Maupin was a presenter the London School of Economics Workshop on the Political
Economy of Investment Treaties).
105. See Philip Morris Brands Sdri, Philip Morris Products S.A. & Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Uru.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (July 2, 2013) [hereinafter "Philip Morris v. Uruguay"] (where Philip
Morris brought a claim against Uruguay for implementing tobacco regulations for the purpose of
improving public health).
106. Salini v. Morocco, supra note 92, 52.
107. Whenever Tribunals decide on development issues they should rely more on economic data
and empirical evidence when assessing such matters. Regarding what empirical scholarship
methodologies can do for investment arbitration see Franck, Empiricism and International Law, supra
note 104, at 795 ("Investment treaty dispute resolution could obtain useful information by using
different research methodologies (whether they be quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods) to
evaluate key questions"); see also, Maupin supra note 104.
108. See Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 7, at 453.
109. Maupin, supra note 104, at 5-6.
110. "Philip Morris v. Uruguay," supra note 105.
111. Id 176-82.
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not convince a non-believer that international investment disputes sometimes do
impact the public interest, then it is unlikely that an empirical demonstration of the
same phenomenon will do so."
112
This paper does not attempt to analyze in depth the negotiation history of the
ICSID Convention; but this example does show that the Centre was created as the
result of a compromise between investment-exporting and investment-receiving
nations, the latter comprising the bulk of nations which would eventually demand
recognition of their RTD and the application of the in dubio pro development
principle. It has been understood that behind the creation of the ICSID there was a
"grand-bargain," 113 which can be simplified as the acceptance of international
arbitration by developing nations, considering the influx of investment that would
eventually develop their economies.'14
In this way, acknowledging that not all economic activities contribute to the
development of host states, and as such they could be refused access to the Centre,
would create a standard that would be in accordance with the original compromise
upon which the ICSID was created. On the one hand, states would still have a
chance to show that certain economic activities are not worth being protected
through ICSID arbitration, due to the fact that the social and economic burden of
hosting such investment nullifies its development-related rewards." s On the other
hand, investors would not have to prove such a contribution to development every
time they attempt to access ICSID arbitration, which seems to be the situation that
has given rise to the controversy in this regard.
116
Finally, as for the merits, the RTD and its corollary in dubio pro development
principle, play an important role in knowing the limits of states to enact
developmental policies armored against investor challenges. The definition of
development would become crucial, but, as Diane Desierto discovered, none of the
31 tribunals reviewed indicated a workable definition of the RTD117 and neither of
the economic definitions have helped to reach a unified meaning."i8
Nevertheless, the ICSID Convention preamble clearly recognizes "the need
for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of private
international investment therein"'
' 19
Therefore, it is inconceivable to uphold the belief that if a developing country
needs to improve reasonable development conditions, it should be restrained. On
the contrary, as established in the preamble, it can be interpreted that the ICSID
Convention states that cooperative means among countries and investors shall
112. Maupin, supra note 104, at 7.
113. Desierto, supra note 17, at 298.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., "Philip Morris v. Uruguay," supra note 105, 176-82 (arguing that the "investment"
of Philip Morris hinders development).
116. Desierto, supra note 17, at 299.
117. Id.at301,332.
118. ROLLAND, Development, supra note 5, at 24-28.
119. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, Preamble, Mar. 18 1965,17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
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foster economic development. This is because it is inherent to international
cooperation that all actors - states and investors -make efforts to achieve the
development purpose, as there is a natural balance between investment protection
and economic development. On a case-by-case basis, the policy space to achieve
development may be reduced if measures are unexpected, arbitrary, or odiously
discriminatory. Arbitrators were given wide discretion to decide on such issues.
120
The myth that IIAs are inclined to protect investors and not safeguard the
wellbeing and interest of a state's inhabitants must be better evaluated. Arbitrators
need to keep in mind that the IIAs were not intended to be hostile to states and that
the adjudicative system was based on values and principles of legality, fairness,
and neutrality. Therefore, arbitrators must be cautious regarding an expansive
interpretation that is unsympathetic to an investor's host countries. As Gus Van
Harten remarks, "the interpretation and application of the law should reflect a
degree of evenness between claimants and respondent States in the resolution of
contentious legal issues arising from ambiguous treaty texts and should be free
from significant variation based on claimant nationality."
121
As many cases are brought to the ICSID through IlAs, the RTD will likely be
made clearer as the new generations of IIAs are provided with more RTD-related
language.
2. The IIAs
Development of the Parties is a common term that can be observed in several
IIAs, especially in FTAs and trade co-operation agreements where such
undertakings are included in the agreement. 122 Nevertheless, the extent to which it
is normative is still disputed, perhaps due to the disdain of tribunals.'23 It should
be noted that when the development language is enshrined in an IIA, the RTD has
legal space to be operationalized because the negotiators had the intention of
giving effect to such language.
124
120. See Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host State "Commitments"
and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 361, 411 (2013).
121. Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 211, 214-216 (2012) ("Two significant
tendencies were observed. The first was a strong tendency toward expansive resolutions that enhanced
the compensatory promise of the system for claimants and, in turn, the risk of liability for respondent
states. The second was an accentuated tendency toward expansive resolutions where the claimant was
from a Western capital exporting state.").
122. Desierto, supra note 17, at 323-324 (pointing out that regional trade cooperation agreements
by developing countries respond to development concerns in the context of investment protection, like
in the Investment Agreement on the COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa)
Common Investment Area, the 2009 ASEAN (Association of southeast Asian Nations) Comprehensive
Investment Agreement, and the 2009 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement).
123. See "Philip Morris v. Uruguay," supra note 105.
124. The process of negotiating any treaty is long and difficult for the public officials involved.
Every word and obligation of the treaty is carefully studied, as it is well known that an effect will be
given afterwards. Therefore, if the term "development" is included in a legal instrument such as an HA,
a legal effect must be given to it, as the principle of useful effect must be applied when the countries
enact pro developmental policies. The useful effect principle has been recognized in ILEL. MARION
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The main question is whether the adoption of public policies to foster
development may be considered a breach of IIA-derived obligations.
Most cases in investment law dealing with these questions have taken the
perspective of justifying the state's conduct. Usually states have defended
themselves from IIA claims under limited exception clauses in their respective
HAs. 125  This perspective creates a problematic situation when dealing with
justification or exceptions where one has already determined that a breach of an
obligation has occurred.
If IIA obligations such as Fair and Equitable Treatment ("FET") are
interpreted with a development-related focus, no violation of such an obligation
may occur when the measure in question is development-related. The adoption of
a measure that would, for example, foster the economic advancement of
marginalized populations or general measures that protect the environment or
public health, would have to be considered within the state's regulatory autonomy
of what is fair and equitable.
While investment law was originally a protection against abusive behaviors
by host states, it has turned out to be an external instance of the judicial review of
governmental policies, which may have been found to be legal even by their
internal review procedures. 
126
Thus, the standard of review of what is fair and equitable must be flexible
depending on the nature of the developmental measure in question and the
interpretation of this treaty-derived obligation must not only be understood in the
literal sense of the terms fair and equitable. In the case of development-related
measures, FET must be interpreted under the Neer standard: "the treatment of an
alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an
outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable
and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency." 127 This approach is
consistent with the application of the in dubio pro development principle; the
adoption of these measures must be presumed as conforming to the IIA, as part of
a state's legitimate regulatory powers. 128 Thus, a claimant must prove that there
was a gross violation to due process, legitimate expectations, impartiality, and non-
discrimination in order to show the existence of a breach of such an obligation.
129
The fact that the adoption of pro-development measures is understood not to
PANIZZON, GOOD FAITH IN THE WTO JURISPRUDENCE: THE PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS, GOOD FAITH INTERPRETATION AND FAIR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 123 (2006).
125. NEWCOMBE, supra note 75, at 6.
126. See Johnson & Volkov, supra note 120, at 380.
127. Neer v. United Mexican States, IV R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 60, 61-62 (Gen. Claims Comm'n
(U.S.-Mex.) 1926) http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/volIV/60-66.pdf.
128. The legitimate regulatory powers that a state still holds and that are not limited by the HAs, as
provided by the Neer standard. Id.
129. The Neer standard should apply to developmental policies, otherwise the in dubio pro
development principle would be violated.
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breach an obligation is fundamental. 130  When addressing justifications of IIA-
breaches, tribunals tend to differ regarding issues such as the self-judging nature of
an exception, or whether the justification regime within the IIA is self-contained,
or is to be interpreted under the necessity standard.
13
These discussions have resulted in technicalities that lead to tribunals failing
to find states "justified" and thus responsible for the breach of an international
economic obligation. 132  This situation is incongruent, both with the harmonic
interpretation of IIAs and the in dubio pro development principle. It is
inconceivable that states have been granted an RTD, but are deprived of the means
to achieve such a goal.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the RTD and the in dubio pro development principle are legally
binding within the IEL system as they are founding doctrines of a legal system that
inspired development-like language in international trade and investment treaties at
the World Trade Organization; FTAs and IIAs signed among developed states and
emerging national economies. Some critiques may arise, but they will be similar
to the criticisms given to various awards and scholarly literature on this matter that
had advanced on the development of principles and rules derived from the treaties.
Arbitrators or panelists may decide whether or not to apply the RTD and the
in dubio pro development principle in an IEL case, but they cannot completely
deny their existence in trade and investment treaties, as such panelists and
arbitrators have had created other principles and rules the same way as suggested
in this paper.
130. If the RTD and the in dubio pro development principle are not recognized as legal binding
obligations contained in the IlAs, countries in their process to develop may not take developmental
policies, as they would be fatally sued before an international body of arbitrators.
131. Julie Bdard, et. al, New ICSID Annulment Decision Exposes Possible Gap in United States
Investment Treaty Protection, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (July 19, 2010),
http://www.skadden.com/insights/new-icsid-annulment-decision-exposes-possible-gap-united-states-
investment-treaty-protection.
132. Id.
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NEGOTIATING AN ENERGY DEAL UNDER TTIP:
DRIVERS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO U.S. SHALE EXPORTS TO
EUROPE
ILARIA ESPA AND KATERYNA HOLZER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of global security of energy supply is growing in importance
with the escalation of conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Interruptions of gas
supplies to Ukraine by Russia threaten to cause devastating energy shortages not
only in Ukraine but also in those E.U. Member States, which are dependent on the
gas supplies from Russia via Ukrainian pipelines. In this regard, diversification of
E.U. energy sources may be facilitated by U.S. exports of gas to Europe in view of
breaking the Russian stranglehold on energy supplies.
Yet, this solution currently faces geopolitical, legislative and technical
barriers to energy trade between the European Union and the United States and is
associated with social and environmental costs. The European Union and the
United States need considerable investments into building the necessary
infrastructure for transporting gas from the United States (e.g. liquefied gas
terminals, regasification terminals, requalification of refineries, etc.).' Changes are
also required in the U.S. legislation to allow exports of energy resources (e.g.
elimination of various forms of export quantitative restrictions, such as bans and
non-automatic licensing procedures). Furthermore, an increasing role of the
United States as a major energy exporter faces opposition of the long-established
world energy suppliers in a context of shrinking oil prices, whereas domestically it
confronts different sectors of the U.S. society with contrasting political economy
2interests. Environmental concerns about the impacts of shale oil and gas
exploitation also figure prominently in the debate.
The on-going negotiations of a free trade agreement between the European
Union and the United States-the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
("TTIP") 3-present an opportunity to speed up the dismantling of some of these
barriers. Along with the evident gains for the European Union, the opening of
E.U. energy markets for U.S. shale gas would also benefit the United States, which
. Dr. Ilaria Espa is a Marie Curie (COFIT) Senior Research Fellow and Dr. Kateryna Holzer is a NCCR
Trade Regulation Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the World Trade Institute, University of Bern,
Switzerland. The authors wish to thank the participants to the 2014 ASIL-IEcLIG Biennial Conference
that took place at Denver Sturm College of Law on November 13-15, 2014.
1. Trevor Houser & Shashank Mohan, Kicking Off the Crude Export Debate, RHODIUM GROUP
(Jan. 7, 2014), http://rhg.com/notes/kicking-off-the-crude-export-debate.
2. CHARLES K. EBINGER & GOvINDA AvASARALA, NATURAL GAS BRIEFING DOCUMENT #2:
REVISING THE LNG EXPORT PROCESs 3 (2013).
3. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/ttip (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
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is experiencing shrinkages of shale gas prices caused by oversupplies in the
internal market.4 The mutual interests in energy trade could pave the way for the
materialization of a TTIP chapter on energy and raw materials.5  Furthermore,
given the lack of international rules on energy trade, the negotiations between the
European Union and United States create a unique opportunity to adopt a legal
framework for trade in energy products and raw materials that has never existed
before and could later be plurilateralized.
This paper explores some of the thorniest legal, geopolitical, and economic
issues that need to be taken up by TTIP negotiators for the promotion of a secure
and sustainable trade in energy between the United States and European Union. It
is organized as follows: Section II gives an account of the most recent
developments in the TTIP negotiations on energy; Section III examines the link
between a possible legal framework for energy trade under TTIP and other energy-
related regional and international fora; Section IV critically assesses the
negotiating positions of the European Union and the United States in light of their
reciprocal energy profiles and needs; Section V offers an overview of the critical
items most likely to be on top of the TTIP agenda on energy based on a
comparative analysis of energy provisions in E.U. and U.S. legislation and in light
of the both parties' interests; Section VI discusses the main driving forces and
inhibiting factors capable of facilitating or rather impeding a successful conclusion
of an energy trade deal between the United States and the European Union; and
Section VII provides concluding remarks.
II. TTIP NEGOTIATIONS ON ENERGY
In June 2013, the twenty-eight Member States of the European Union
provided the European Commission with a mandate for negotiating TTIP with the
United States.6 Since then, TTIP negotiations have been carried out in regular
rounds focusing on the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to transatlantic
trade and facilitation of mutual investments. The negotiations are closed to the
public. Yet, the parties, especially the European Union, make their positions on
major subjects of negotiations known in press releases, statements of government
7 8
officials,7 and initial position papers. Moreover, at the beginning of January 2015,
4. Houser & Mohan, supra note 1.
5. Press Release, Karel De Gucht, European Comm'r for Trade, The Future of TTIP-The
Benefits and How to Achieve Them (Apr. 10, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseSPEECH-14-
314_en.htm._See also Initial EU Position Paper on Raw Materials and Energy, EU-US Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (July 2013),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc 151624.pdf.
6. See Memo, European Comm'n, Member States endorse EU-US trade and investment
negotiations, MEMO/13/564 (June 14, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-13-
564_en.htm.
7 See Karel De Gucht, European Trade Commissioner, European Trade Comm'n, Speech at
The Aspen Institute Prague Annual Conference: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP)--Solving the Regulatory Puzzle (Oct. 10, 2013)
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc 151822.pdf.
8. See EU publishes initial 777P Position Papers, EUROPEAN COMM'N (Jul. 16, 2013),
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the European Commission published a bulk of E.U. textual proposals, which
include the legal language and binding rules the European Union is pushing for
during TTIP negotiations, but exclude sensitive documents regarding market
access, quotas and tariffs, as well as proposals on regulatory coherence and
sustainable development, which first need to be agreed with the E.U. Council and
Parliament. 9 From the available documents, it is clear that energy is an important
part of TTIP negotiations.' 0 The European Union seeks to include in the TTIP a
separate chapter on trade and investment in raw materials and energy, including
coal, oil and oil products, gas, and electricity. This proposal features prominently
in a non-paper on raw materials and energy drafted by the European Commission
Directorate-General for Trade on September 20, 2013. I1
Referring to the lack of international disciplines on trade in energy and raw
materials, the European Union supports the inclusion of legally binding
commitments regarding these issues in TTIP.12 In particular, seeking to promote
fair competition in the energy sector, the European Union proposes rules
prohibiting trading and export monopolies, preventing dual pricing, and facilitating
transit and access to energy transport facilities.13 It also proposes to ban local
content requirements in support schemes for renewable energy.14 TTIP rules on
energy would also guarantee access and national treatment to enterprises of one
party established on the territory of the other party in matters of prospecting,
exploring, production, purchase, sale, import, and export of raw materials and
energy.15 A general exception is foreseen for measures necessary for the safe
operation of the energy networks, subject to the requirement that such measures
are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination.' 6  The E.U. position is that such an open, stable,
predictable, sustainable, transparent, and non-discriminatory legal framework for
traders and investors in raw materials and energy, agreed in the transatlantic
context, could serve as a model for subsequent negotiations involving third
countries.' 7 The European Union has also declared that energy efficiency and the
promotion of renewable energy are fundamental aspects of the energy policy of the
European Union and the United States, both having a shared interest in improving
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=943.
9. See Now online EU negotiating texts in TTIP, EUROPEAN COMM'N (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=l 230.
10. See Initial EU Position Paper on Raw Materials and Energy, supra note 5.
11. The E.U. non-paper on the TTIP chapter on energy and raw materials was leaked and
published by the Huffington Post on May 19, 2014. TTIP-Non Papers on Raw Materials and Energy
(Sept. 20, 2013), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/TTIPNonPaper.pdf.
12. See Initial EU Position Paper on Raw Materials and Energy, supra note 5, at 1-2.
13. Zach Carter & Kate Sheppard, Read The Secret Trade Memo Calling For More Fracking And
Offshore Drilling, HUFFINGTON POST (May 19, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/19/trade-fracking_n_5340420.html.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17 Initial EU Position Paper on Raw Materials and Energy, supra note 5, at 2.
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global governance in the area of renewable energy. 18 The TTIP should therefore
support the promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency and guarantee
the right of each party to maintain or establish standards and regulation concerning
energy performance of products, appliances and processes, while working towards
a convergence of domestic standards or the use of international standards where
these exist.
19
While striving to fix fair competition rules in bilateral energy trade with the
possibility for their further multilateralization in the future, the European Union is
also pushing for the abolition of U.S. export restrictions on energy goods,
including crude oil and gas, in order to increase U.S. imports of energy into the
European Union.20 Exports of energy goods to the other party would be made
automatically compliant with any conditions and tests foreseen in the parties'
respective legislation for the granting of export licences. 21 Through liberalization
of the U.S. export regime for energy, the European Union seeks to increase
diversification of its energy imports and improve energy security, currently
undermined by the threats of discontinuation of gas supplies from Russia in the
midst of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It is this part of the U.S.-E.U. energy
negotiations that will be addressed in the following sections.
III. DEALING WITH ENERGY TRADE UNDER FTAs
While a recent generation of Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") covers a broad
area of issues, often additional to what is covered by the World Trade Organization
("WTO") Agreement (e.g. competition, government procurement obligations for
developing countries etc.), energy issues are usually not separately addressed in
FTAs. This may have different explanations. On the one hand, there is a
perception that as part of national security interests, the regulation of the energy
sector is traditionally in the hands of sovereign national governments, and
international trading rules have nothing to say on how energy should be traded.
On the other hand, it is argued that energy is just another good or economic sector,
and thus it falls within the scope of the WTO Agreement and is subject to the
general rules of international trade (market access, most-favoured nation treatment,
national treatment etc.) like all other goods or economic sectors.22 Accordingly,
energy trade is regulated by general FTA provisions applicable to trade in goods
23and services. At the same time, the proponents of the latter view usually also
agree that the international trading rules of the WTO are poorly designed to meet
18. Id. at 3.
19 Id.
20. Carter & Sheppard, supra note 13.
21. Id.
22. Domestic Prosperity and Global Freedom Act: Hearing on H.R. 6 Before Subcomm. on
Energy & Power of the Energy & Commerce Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of James Bacchus,
Chair, Greenberg Traurig), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF03/20140325/101953/HHRG-113-
IF03-Wstate-BacchusJ-20140325.pdf [hereinafter Domestic Prosperity and Global Freedom Act].
23. For example, provisions on national treatment, elimination of customs duties, prohibition of
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports etc.
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the current needs of the energy sector.24 The reason for this is partly the difference
between the regulatory needs of trade in energy and those of other goods and
services. While the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")/WTO
rules traditionally put the emphasis on market access (i.e. liberalisation of import
regimes), the needs of the energy sector are more on the side of supply pushing for
the liberalisation of export regimes.
2 5
A. Energy under E. U.-Signed FTAs and Sectorial Agreements
The access to energy supplies has always been an important issue for the
European Union. It is not merely coincidence that the European Union takes its
origin from an energy agreement-the European Coal and Steel Community
established by Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg
in 1951. The initial idea behind the European integration was to create a common
European market for coal and steel and thus neutralize competition between West
European countries over natural resources and thus prevent wars in the future.
26
The West European steel and coal industries were gradually united through
common industrial, social and tax policies, and anti-cartel legislation.
Later, faced with the geopolitical changes in the early 1990s, the European
Union initiated the Energy Charter Treaty ("ECT"), a pan-European energy
agreement, which was initially aimed to integrate the former Soviet energy sector
and its highly developed pipeline system with the European energy market on the
principles of free market economy. 27 The ECT extended the GATT rules to trade
in energy with Russia, which at that time was outside the WTO. The treaty covers
all energy goods, including fossil fuels, petroleum and electricity, and energy-
related equipment, but it does not cover energy-related services. Despite the fact
that the ECT promotes open markets and market rules in the energy sector, it
recognizes the principle of national sovereignty over energy resources. 28  It
therefore leaves for governments to choose how to define the structure of national
energy sectors, how to develop national energy resources and whether to open the
energy sector to foreign investors or not.29 For instance, the ECT does not impose
an obligation to privatize state-owned energy companies or to break down
24. The WTO Agreement does not contain rules that are specific to energy. See Thomas Cottier
et al., Energy in WTO Law and Policy, in THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION
211-244 (Thomas Cottier & Panagiotis Delimatsis eds., 2010).
25. Melaku Desta, The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the World Trade
Organization, and Regional Trade Agreements, 37(3) J. WORLD TRADE 523, 539 (2003).
26. KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, DIE RECHTLICHEN GRUNDLAGEN DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION
41-42 (2010).
27. The geographical scope of the treaty was later extended to include such non-European
countries as Australia, Japan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. See Members &
Observers, ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=61 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
28. The Energy Charter Treaty, art. 18, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95,
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/userupload/document/EN.pdf.
29. Yulia Selivanova, The Energy Charter and the International Energy Governance, in
REGULATION OF ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: WTO, NAFTA AND ENERGY CHARTER 376,
392 (Yulia Selivanova ed., 2011).
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vertically integrated energy companies.
Regarding the regulation of energy trade in E.U. FTAs and its broader
Economic Partnership Agreements ("EPAs"), so far there have been no provisions
that would specifically apply to energy. This basically means that all energy
matters under E.U. FTAs fall under the general provisions on trade in goods, trade
in services, and investment under those agreements.
B. Energy under U.S. FTAs
As of December 2014, the United States had FTAs in force with twenty
countries, but an FTA between the United States, Canada, and Mexico-the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")-is unique in the way it deals with
energy.31  NAFTA contains provisions that separately regulate trade and
investment in energy and trade in energy-related cross-border services. These
provisions are not only spread over different chapters in the agreement, but also
separately dealt with in Chapter 6 on "Energy and Basic Petrochemicals." 32 All
energy-related matters under NAFTA are subject to the general mandatory dispute
settlement procedure, including investor-state arbitration.33 However, similar to
the Energy Charter Treaty, which underlines state sovereignty over energy
resources, NAFTA Article 601 confirms full respect for the Constitutions of the
parties, which automatically sets limits to the regulatory leverage of the FTA with
respect to energy.
34
The disciplines contained in the NAFTA energy chapter apply to a wide range
of energy products, including diesel, gasoline, and electricity. They exclude,
however, biofuels and energy-related equipment, which are subject to general rules
35
on trade and investment under NAFTA. Many NAFTA provisions on energy are
WTO-plus, which means that they impose additional obligations to those imposed
by the WTO Agreement on WTO members.36 They include, for instance, along
with the prohibition of quantitative restrictions, the restriction on the use of export
30. It is also important to mention that a recently concluded FTA between the European Union
and Canada-the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement ("CETA"), which is considered by
many to serve as a template for TTIP-has no separate chapter on energy either. However, it foresees
an investor-state arbitration, which may influence investments in the energy sector.
31. Free Trade Agreements, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). It should be noted that the legal
framework for energy trade and investment was first developed in CUSFTA, a 1989 FTA between the
United States and Canada that was then replaced by NAFTA. CUSFTA provisions on energy were
contained in chapter 9 in part II on trade in goods.
32. North American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 6, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993),
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement.
33. See id. ch. I,§B.
34. See The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 28; see also North American Free Trade
Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 601.
35. GARY HORLICK ET AL., NAFTA PROVISIONS AND TtE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 29 (June 2002)
(background paper prepared for the Commission for Environmental Cooperation Secretariat),
http://www3.cec.org/islandora/en/item/1821 -nafta-provisions-and-electricity-sector-en.pdf.
36. Id. at 18.
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duties and the prohibition of minimum or maximum energy export- or import-price
requirements (the so-called dual pricing practice) that benefit domestic consumers
and economies.37 They also impose stricter conditions for the use of exceptions.38
In general terms, the use of exceptions cannot result in a complete interruption of
energy exports from one NAFTA party to another NAFTA party, be it for the
reasons of critical shortages, environmental protection or any other justification
foreseen under GATT Article XX.
39
In practice, however, only the United States and Canada are bound by
NAFTA special commitments on energy trade and investment. Having the
government monopoly in the energy sector, Mexico managed to pull itself out of
most of the obligations related to energy, which made energy rules of NAFTA
Chapter 6 a bilateral deal between the United States and Canada.40 One can also
point to other weaknesses of NAFTA rules on energy. Article 601 speaks only
about "gradual liberalisation" of trade in energy, thus showing certain tolerance for
non-market mechanisms with respect to energy trade and investment in contrast to
other sectors. 41  NAFTA also fails to address issues of access to energy
infrastructure. It does not provide any rules on transit fees and third party access
that would be additional to the basic ones, which are contained in the GATT for all
goods.42
As mentioned, NAFTA is the most advanced FTA regarding the regulation of
energy trade and investment. An energy agreement between the European Union
and the United States could draw on NAFTA Chapter 6 on "Energy and Basic
Petrochemicals" in many respects. At the same time, it should be noted that under
U.S. domestic legislation, all U.S. FTA partners enjoy a more liberal regime for the
exportation of natural gas from the U.S. Exports of liquefied natural gas ("LNG")
to FTA partners are presumptively considered in the "public interest" and thus are
entitled to licenses. 43 Accordingly, independently from the outcome of the E.U.-
U.S. specific negotiations on energy, the conclusion of TTIP itself would facilitate
the exports of LNG from the United States to the European Union.
VI. NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. The European Union as a Demandeur
The European Union is the third greatest world energy consumer after China
and the United States, and accounted for 13.8 percent of global final energy
37. See North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 604, 603.2.
38. See id. art. 605.
39. Roberto R. Herran & Pietro Poretti, Energy Trade and Investment under the North American
Free Trade Agreement, in REGULATION OF ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 363 (Yulia
Selivanova ed., 2011).
40. Id. at 358-64.
41. See North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 32, art. 601.
42. Id. at 336.
43. Among major natural gas importers, the only country which has not concluded an FTA with
the United States is South Korea. See Ebinger & Avasarala, supra note 2, at 4. See infra Section V.
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consumption in 201 0.44  Although primary energy production is substantially
declining in the European Union due to supplies depletion and the effects of
climate change policies discouraging the exploitation of fossil fuels, 45 the
European Union still relies on conventional energy resources to meet around three-
quarters of its total energy consumption. According to 2010 figures, oil is the
largest energy source providing 35 percent of total energy consumption, followed
by natural gas (24 percent) and coal (16 percent).46 Nuclear power accounts for 14
percent of global energy consumption, and the share of renewable energy is 10
percent (6.8 percent comes from biomass and renewable wastes, 1.6 percent from
hydropower, 0.9 percent from wind energy, 0.4 percent from geothermal, and 0.4
percent from solar energy).47
This state of things translates into a heavy, and growing, dependence on the
importation of primary energy supplies. The European Union imported almost 85
percent of its oil consumption, 67 percent of its gas consumption and more than 40
percent of its coal consumption in 201 1.4 8 Russia is by far its largest source of
fossil fuels, providing 35 percent of total oil imports, 30 percent of overall natural
gas imports, and 26 percent of global coal imports in 2011.49
The substantial dependence of the European Union upon the availability of
Russian oil and gas supplies has become a major area of concern in light of the
conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The issue of diversification
of import sources has accordingly gained prominence in the E.U. political
agenda. 50 The European Union in particular has started to explore opportunities to
44. EUROPEAN COMM'N, EU ENERGY IN FIGURES: STATISTICAL POCKETBOOK 13 (2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2013_pocketbook.pdf.
45. EUROSTAT, THE EU IN THE WORLD 2013: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 117 (2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/321 7494/5748537/KS-30-12-86 1-EN.PDF/d60278b9-dOee-
47cl-bb96-2dbb9a5b80cb?version=l.0. GHG emissions abatement has figured prominently in the
European energy agenda. The European Union adopted its first package of climate and energy
measures in 2008. This set of measures established the so-called "20/20/20 targets" (i.e. the
achievement of a 20% reduction of GHG emissions by 2020 compared to the levels of 1990, a 20%
share of renewable energy, and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency). The 2020 Climate and
Energy Package, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index-en.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2015). While the European Union is projected to fulfil and even surpass the 20/20/20
goals, a new set of E.U. targets was proposed within the context of a renovated European policy
framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030. See Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions, A Policy Framework for Climate and Energy in the Period from
2020 to 2030, at 2, COM (2014) 15 final (Feb. 22, 2014), http://eur-lex.europa.eullegal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0015&from=EN.
46. EUROPEAN COMM'N, MARKET OBSERVATORY FOR ENERGY, KEY FIGURES 11 (2011),
https://feb.kuleuven.be/public/nO7048/EU%20Energy.pdf.
47. See EU Energy in Figures: Statistical Pocketbook 2013, supra note 44, at 20. In 2012, the
share of renewable energy reached 13 percent. A Policy Framework for Climate and Energy in the
Periodfrom 2020 to 2030, supra note 45, at 2.
48. EU ENERGY IN FIGURES: STATISTICAL POCKETBOOK, supra note 44, at 22.
49. Id. at 24.
50. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council:
European Energy Security Strategy, COM (2014) 0330 final (May 28, 2014).
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facilitate the conclusion of supply contracts with alternative reliable suppliers.
Significantly, the United States has been identified as a potential strategic partner
in this respect. 51 The on-going TTIP negotiations are therefore critical for the
European Union in view of securing privileged commercial relations in the energy
sector with the United States and therefore achieving the diversification of the
energy supply.
B. The U.S. Interests and the Case for Changes in its Current Energy Exports
Regime
The United States is a relatively richly-endowed country with a long history
of self-sufficiency in the energy sector. However, as from the second half of the
twentieth century, the country started to increasingly rely on the importation of
energy resources from the Middle East.52  The Arab oil embargo of 1973
confronted the United States with the vulnerability linked to import dependency
and marked the beginning of a decisive turn in the energy policy of the country.
53
Since then, the U.S. has consistently looked for ways to relieve its dependence on
foreign energy supplies.54 Accordingly, it radically reformed the export regime
applicable to primary energy supplies.
55
It should be noted that the U.S. was the top world energy consumer until the
end of the 2000s and thereafter the second global energy consumer after China,
56
remaining for a long time a major net importer of energy supplies. Still in 2006,
the U.S. was by far the biggest net importer of crude oil in the world, with over
13.4 million barrels imported per day.57 The shale revolution has, however,
sensibly changed the picture. As of September 2013, the U.S. is no longer the
leading net oil importer, as it has been surpassed by China.58 At the same time, the
U.S. has recently become the top world producer of crude oil, ahead of Saudi
Arabia and the Russian Federation.5 9  According to the Brookings Institute,
"[s]hale oil will also emerge as a route to self-sufficiency for the U.S., as the shale
51. Id. at 15.
52. MARIAN RADETZKI, A HANDBOOK OF PRIMARY COMMODITIES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
43-44 (2008).
53. Tim Boersma & Charles K. Ebinger, Lift the Ban on U.S. Oil Exports, Memorandum to
President Barack Obama, BROOKINGS (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/lift-ban-us-oil-exports-boersma-ebinger.
54. Konrad Yakabuski, The Downsides of U.S. Energy Independence, GLOBE & MAIL (May 13,
2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/the-downsides-of-us-energy-
independence/article 11869851.
55. Boersma & Ebinger, supra note 53.
56. EU ENERGY IN FIGURES: STATISTICAL POCKETBOOK, supra note 44 at 13.
57. EDWARD L. MORSE ET AL., ENERGY 2020: OUT OF AMERICA: THE RAPID RISE OF THE UNITED
STATES AS A GLOBAL ENERGY SUPERPOWER (2014),
http://www.investorvillage.coml/uploads/44821/files/CitiUSenergyPowerhouse2020.pdf.
58. Candace Dunn, Today in Energy: China is Now the World's Largest Net Importer of
Petroleum and Other Liquid Fuels, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfn?id=1553 1.
59. Countries with Highest Primary Energy Production, SHIFT PROJECT DATA PORTAL,
http://www.tsp-data-portal.org/TOP-20-Producer#tspQvChart (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
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oil revolution taking place in the United States could result in the tripling of shale
oil output to five million barrels a day by 2017."60 Moreover, projections also
indicate that the shale gas revolution will transform the U.S., currently the largest
world consumer of natural gas, into a major gas exporter.6'
The shale revolution notwithstanding, the United States still has in place a
comprehensive export regime that dates back to the 1970s, the time of the reaction
to the Arab oil embargo. With respect to crude oil exports in particular, a number
of new acts were concluded in these years: the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act (1973),62 which substantially amended the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920;63 the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (1975);64 and the Naval
65Petroleum Reserves Production Act (1976). Since then, a complex regime
applicable to crude oil exports from the United States to a foreign country has been
developed and administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security ("BIS"), an
agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The cardinal points of such regime
are contained in Part 754 of the BIS Export Administration Regulations ("EAR")
on Short Supply Controls. 66 Under the BIS regulations, depending on the place of
origin or the mode of transport of crude oil, its exportation is allowed only insofar
as it is granted (1) explicit presidential authorization or (2) a BIS license.
Presidential authorization is needed for the exportation of domestically
produced crude oil under specific statutory control regimes. These include: (1)
exports of Alaskan North Slope oil under §203 of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act, as found in §28 of the Mineral Leasing Act;67 (2) exports of
domestically produced crude oil transported by pipeline over rights-of-way granted
pursuant to §28(u) of the Mineral Leasing Act;68 (3) export of crude oil produced
from the outer Continental Shelf under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act;
69
and (4) exports of crude oil produced from the naval petroleum reserves under the
Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act.7° Under such statutory controls,
exports may only be approved if the president makes and publishes an explicit
finding that such exports will not diminish the total quantity or quality of
petroleum available to the United States, are in the national interest and in
accordance with the Export Administration Act of 1979.71 The president must
60. SUBIR GOKARN ET AL., ENERGY 2030: BACKGROUNDER 17 (2013), http://brookings.in/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/Energy-2030-Brookings-India-Backgrounder.pdf.
61. Id.
62. 43 U.S.C. § 1651 (2014).
63. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2014).
64. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 62-64 (2014).
65. Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act, Pub. L. No. 94-258, 90 Stat. 26 (codified as
amended in sections of 42 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C., 10 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 43 C.F.R.).
66. 15 C.F.R. § 754.2 (2015).
67. 30 U.S.C. § 185(s) (2014).
68. Id. § 185(u) (2014).
69. 43 U.S.C. § 1354 (2014).
70. 10 U.S.C. § 7430 (2014).
71. Depending on the applicable law, the presidential findings must also fulfil other specific
criteria. In the case of exports of Alaskan North Slope oil, for instance, the evaluation of whether
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submit to the Congress a report containing such findings and explaining the
reasons for justifying crude oil exports. 72 The Congress has sixty days to veto the
presidential permission.73 Finally, under the Export Administration Act, the
president has also the authority to restrict refined petroleum products exports.7 4
This authority has however not been exercised since 1981.75
The BIS automatically approves exports that are consistent with findings
made by the president under specific applicable statutes.76 Different kinds of crude
oil export transaction are moreover generally approved by the BIS: (i) exports from
Alaska's Cook Inlet; 77 (ii) exports to Canada for consumption or use therein; 78 (iii)
exports in connection with refining or exchange of strategic petroleum reserve
oil;79 (iv) exports of heavy California crude oil;80 (v) exports that are consistent
with certain international agreements; 81 (vi) export that are consistent with findings
made by the president under an applicable statute;82 (vii) exports of foreign origin
crude oil, provided that the oil has not been commingled with oil of U.S. origin. 83
All other applications are reviewed by the BIS on a case-by-case basis and only
approved if BIS determines that they are consistent with the national interest and
the purposes of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.
84
A very stringent export-licensing regime is also imposed in the United States
on natural gas. Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, as subsequently amended, 85
the Department of Energy ("DoE") is responsible for administering natural gas
exports licences. 86 As already mentioned, a different regime applies depending on
whether the natural gas is exported to FTA partners or to non-FTA countries.
Applications to export natural gas to FTA partners are presumptively considered in
the "public interest." 87 Natural gas exports to non-FTA countries are approved by
exports are in the national interest needs to also take into account the results of an appropriate
environmental review and "whether exports of this oil are likely to cause sustained material oil supply
shortages or sustained oil prices significantly above world market levels that would cause sustained
material adverse employment effects in the United States or that would cause substantial harm to
consumers, including non-contiguous States and Pacific territories." 30 U.S.C. § 185(s) (2014).
72. See 30 U.S.C. § 185(u), 43 U.S.C. § 1354(c), and 10 U.S.C. § 7430(e). This requirement does
not apply, however, in the case of exports of Alaskan North Slope oil. 30 U.S.C. § 185(s).
73. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 185(u) and 43 U.S.C. § 1354(c).
74. 50 U.S.C. § 2406(e) (2014).
75. John Kemp, History of Controls on U.S. Oil Exports, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/23/usa-oil-export-controlsno-kemp-idUSL6NOS137X20141023.
76. 15 C.F.R. § 754.2(b).
77. Id. § 754.2(b)(i).
78. Id. § 754.2(b)(ii).
79. Id. § 754.2(b)(iii).
80. Id. § 754.2(b)(iv).
81. Id. § 754.2(b)(v).
82. Id. § 754.2(b)(vi).
83. Id. § 754.2(vii).
84. Id. § 754.2(2).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2014).
86. Id.
87. Among major LNG importers, the only country which has not concluded a FTA with the
United States is South Korea. Ebinger & Avarsarala, supra note 2, at 4.
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the DoE only insofar as they are in the "public interest." The guiding criteria to
determine whether the natural gas exports are in the public interest or not have not
been laid out in any relevant instrument. The 1984 DoE Guidelines affirm that
market considerations should govern the evaluation; 88 however, the DoE has
declared that the applications are prioritized in the order that they were received
and having due regard to their "cumulative impact" on the gas market and prices.
8 9
Other criteria the DOE listed are "domestic need, adequacy of supply, the
environment, geopolitics, and energy security." 90 Another relevant factor taken
into consideration is whether the prospective exporter has already completed the
pre-filing process before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"),
which is responsible for the siting and construction of LNG import and export
facilities. 91
Since the shale gas revolution in the mid-2000s, the DoE has approved only
two applications of LNG exports directed to non-FTA countries: the Cheniere
Energy Sabine Pass terminal in 2012 and the Freeport LNG terminal in 2013.92
Currently, there are fifteen projects awaiting approval, which represent over 40
percent of U.S. daily consumption of natural gas.93 The lack of clarity surrounding
the timing of approval determinations has ignited the debate over whether more
expedited licensing procedure should be ensured to LNG export applicants. To
this end, the Export American Natural Gas Act was introduced in the U.S. Senate
on December 12, 2013.94 It provides for a two-month limit for the DoE to approve
LNG export applications. 95 On October 7, 2014, the North Atlantic Energy
Security Act was also introduced in the U.S. Senate with the aim to automatically
grant a license to LNG exports directed to Ukraine, NATO allies, and Japan.
96
The existing U.S. legislation applicable to crude oil and natural gas exports
represents a major obstacle in view of realizing a full liberalization of energy
resources trade between the United States and the European Union. Furthermore,
it presents many incompatibility problems with WTO law and, in particular, GATT
provisions. Export bans, such as those applied on U.S. crude oil, are outlawed by
88. Id. (citing Freeport LNH Expansion, L.P., et al, Order Conditionally Granting Long-Term
Multi-Contract Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas by Vessel from the Freeport LNG
Terminal on Quintana Island, Texas to Non-Free Trade Agreement Nations, DOE/FE Docket No. 3282,
Docket No. 10-161 -LNG, 6, 112 (May 17 2013),
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/authorizations/Orders-Issued-201 3/ord3282.pdf.)
89. Id.
90. See MICHAEL RATNER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42074, U.S. NATURAL GAS
EXPORTS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES, UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES 13 (2013).
91. See FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N: LNG,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/Ing.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
92. See FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N: NORTH AMERICAN LNG IMPORT/EXPORT
TERMINALS APPROVED, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/lng-approved.pdf (last visited
Jan. 12, 2015).
93. Ebinger & Avarsarala, supra note 2 at 4.
94. H.R. 3760, 113th Cong. (2013).
95. See id.
96. See S. 2592, 113th Cong. § 108 (2013).
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Article XI: 1 GATT.97 The same is true for non-automatic export licensing regimes
which create uncertainties or affect investment plans by delaying the
determinations as to whether a license is to be granted or not, as it is the case in the
U.S. natural gas export licensing regime.98 Moreover, this system differentiates the
treatment of like natural gas exports depending on whether they are directed to
FTA and non-FTA partners thus running counter to the most-favored nation
("MFN") principle under Article 1:1 GATT. 99 The general exceptions recognized
under Article XX GATT, finally, seem only partially of use, as the determinations
of the 'national/public interest' by the BIS and the DoE do not respond to relevant
public policy goals, such as, for example, the protection of public health or the
conservation of natural resources, but rather take into account the impact of
increased exports on the domestic oil/gas markets and prices.
0
VI. TOWARDS AN E.U.-U.S. ENERGY SUPPLIES DEAL
In light of all the foregoing, the existing U.S. legislation restricting the
exportation of crude oil and natural gas will likely be targeted by the European
Union during the TTIP negotiations process. In its FTAs, the European Union has
in fact traditionally concluded rules on export restrictions that contain at least the
same prohibitions as those of the GATT. Very often, the European Union has
aimed for the inclusion of WTO-plus obligations on export restrictions in its FTAs,
mostly in the form of limited recourse to GATT exceptions available for Article
XI: I GATT-inconsistent measures. It has also negotiated WTO-plus obligations in
the form of a general prohibition of export duties-admitted under Article XI: 1
GATT-with several FTA partners.' 0' Yet, in this respect it has frequently
allowed for some forms of flexibility, either in the form of a progressive phasing
out (as accepted by the European Union with countries such as Chile, Colombia
and Peru, and South Korea for targeted products) or in the form of a product-
specific exception (e.g. the agricultural products exception negotiated by the
European Union with neighboring countries such as Albania, Bosnia, Croatia and
Macedonia). However, this avenue would be pre-empted in the TTIP negotiations
because the U.S. Constitution's Export Clause bars Congress from imposing export
taxes in all circumstances.'
0 2
The practice of the European Union concerning the rules on export
restrictions contained in its FTAs indicates that the European Union is likely to
advocate a complete removal of export barriers in the E.U./U.S. bilateral trade
relations along the lines of its fully liberalized export regime on energy
97. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XI(1), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
98. Domestic Prosperity and Global Freedom Act, supra note 22 at 4.
99. GATT, supra note 97 at art. I(1).
100. Id.
101. See J. Korinek & J. Bartos, Multilateralising Regionalism: Disciplines on Export Restrictions
in Regional Trade Agreements, (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Trade Policy Papers No. 139,
17, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k962hf7hfnr-en.
102. U.S. Const., art. I, § 9; See E. M. Jensen, The Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 6-75 (2003).
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resources. 10 3  It is, however, uncertain whether these E.U. initiatives will be
supported by the United States. In a non-paper'0 4 on energy and raw materials,
circulated by the European Union on May 27, 2014, it is noted that the United
States has so far been hesitant to discuss a solution for U.S. export restrictions on
crude oil and natural gas in the TTIP through binding legal commitments. 0 5 As
will be discussed below, such reluctance by the United States can primarily be
explained by its concerns that the increased energy exports would drive the
domestic energy prices up, thereby putting its oil refineries, petrochemical and
other energy-dependant industries and consumers at a competitive disadvantage.
The document further reports that the United States has shown only limited
openness towards considering energy-specific provisions on transport and transit
as well as cooperation provisions on off-shore safety, and that a clear agreement to
discuss a comprehensive chapter on energy and raw materials is still lacking.
It should also be noted that the negotiations of energy-specific rules on export
restrictions is a major element of novelty for the European Union, whereas the
United States already has the NAFTA model as a precedent. While the
liberalisation of the U.S. energy export regime could immediately serve the energy
security interests of the European Union, its consequences in the United States are
much more mixed. As we shall see below, different categories of producers and
consumers are going to be affected by the economic effects of a lift of export
barriers on crude oil and natural gas. These various conflicting interests may serve
at times as driving forces or inhibiting factors in the conclusion of a deal between
the United States and the European Union on the treatment of energy export
restrictions. External factors such as oil prices may further influence the outcome.
VII. DRIVING FORCES AND INHIBITING FACTORS FOR AN E.U.-U.S. ENERGY
SUPPLIES DEAL
A. Geopolitical Situation and Global Oil Prices
The prospects of an energy trade agreement between the United States and the
European Union are likely to be influenced by geopolitical developments. The
current geopolitical tensions between the Russian Federation and Ukraine over the
Ukrainian course toward the European integration poses the risk of energy
blockade for the large territory of Eastern and Central Europe. When disagreeing
on gas prices with Ukraine, Russia stopped supplies of gas through the Ukrainian
103. Council Regulation 1061/2009, Establishing Common Rules for Exports, 19 Oct. 2009 O.J.
(L 291/1) repealed, among others, Article 10 of Regulation (EEC) No. 2603/69, as amended by
Regulation (EEC) No. 1934/82 of 12 July 1982, and Regulation (EEC) No. 3918/91 of 19 December
1991. Under this Article, E.U. Member States could maintain under certain conditions export
restrictions on petroleum oil products, oils obtained from bituminous material and other varieties of oil.
104. Non-papers are documents prepared by E.U. institutions with the aim to stimulate discussion
on a particular sensitive issue to be decided in the future. Non-papers have no official status.
105. Simon McKeagney, LEAKED: Proposal Reveals EU Pressure on US to Lift Ban on Crude
Oil Exports-TTIP, GREENS EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE (July 9, 2014), http://www.ttip20l4.eu/blog-
detail/blog/WP%201eak%20TTIP%20energy.html.
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pipelines in the winter of 2008-2009.106 This stoppage affected not only Ukraine,
but also Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Croatia, Romania and other Central
European countries. 107 Taking into account the special needs of these countries for
heating in winter, as well as the energy needs of their industries, the current
situation presents a serious threat for the national security of Europe and pushes
the European Union to diversify its energy supplies, particularly through supplies
of LNG from the United States.
At the same time, energy supplies have long been a key determinant of the
world politics.'0 8 The history of the Soviet Union presents a remarkable account of
how energy resources influence the international position of a country. The
economic growth and political power of the Soviet Union was based on its energy
resources. The Soviet Union developed into a superpower in the 1960-1970s,
when the world prices for oil were high; accordingly, the collapse of the Soviet
economy and eventual breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991 was accompanied
by the drastic decrease in oil prices in the 1980s.'0 9 While the reason for the recent
drop in oil prices from US$115 in June 2014 to US$50 in January 2015 is not
entirely clear, the current geopolitical situation is most likely part of it." 0 Low oil
prices could serve as a non-military tool to deter Russia from violating
international law, inasmuch as the Russian economy heavily depends on oil and
gas as the main sources of state revenues. In 2013, for instance, Russia needed an
average of US$117 per barrel to balance its state budget, which has been
considerably increased in the last years to finance social programs, the army and
salaries for state employees."'
The dumping of oil prices might also be part of a strategy of leading energy
exporters aimed at making the U.S. exports of LNG to the European Union and
other countries economically unfeasible.' 12 OPEC countries are not willing to lose
their high shares in the E.U. and Asian energy markets to the U.S. shale oil and gas
106. Robert Lea, Europe plunged into energy crisis as Russia cuts off gas supply via Ukraine,
DAILY MAIL (last updated Jan. 7, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1106382/Europe-
plunged-energy-crisis-Russia-cuts-gas-supply-Ukraine.html.
107. Id.
108. See BRUCE JONES ET AL., FUELING A NEW ORDER? THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL AND SECURITY
CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY 11 (2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/iles/papers/2014/04/14%2 0geopolitica%
2 0security% 2 0co
nsequences%20energy%20jones/14%20geopolitical%20security% 2 0energy%2 0jones% 2 0stevenfixed.
pdf.
109. See Gail Tverberg, Oil Prices and the Fall of the Soviet Union, OILPRICE.COM (Aug.11,
2011), http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/Oil-Prices-And-The-Fall-Of-The-Soviet-Union.htm.
110. Anjli Raval & Neil Hume, Oil Markets: A New Chapter for OPEC, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov.
24, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/64c2485e-70a4-11e4-8113-00144feabdc0.html#slide0. It should
be noted, however, that the OPEC leaders persistently deny the geopolitical component of the sharp
drop of oil prices stating that they "do not seek to politicize oil... it's purely business" and that oil
prices fall because supply of oil exceeds demand.
11l. Craig Mellow, Drop in Crude Oil Prices Could Pressure Russia's Budget, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3385857/banking-and-capital-
markets-banking/drop-in-crude-oil-prices-could-pressure-russias-budget.html.
112. Raval & Hume, supra note 110 at 7.
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over the next decade.'1 3 They are also interested in winning back their U.S. market
shares, where the profitability of drilling is undermined with prices below US$80
per barrel." 
4
Irrespective of the reason behind the plunge of oil prices, the current level of
prices and the refusal of OPEC countries to cut the production to bring the prices
up may influence the outcome of E.U.-U.S. negotiations on U.S. energy exports to
the European Union. How big the impact will be depends on how low the oil
prices fall. Experts argue that the U.S. shale oil production growth is robust in the
face of low oil prices and that U.S. rigs will only stop drilling if prices fall below a
level of US$30 per barrel and only after some time. 115 Moreover, a recent study
shows that lower oil prices may speed up the decision of the U.S. government to
lift its crude oil export ban, as "there will be increasing pressures, and an increased
national interest, in allowing exports of larger volumes of condensate and even of
light tight oil" for which the refinery facilities in the United States are limited,
while importing heavy crude oil at lower prices. 16
In conclusion, the geopolitical situation is currently conducive to launching
supplies of U.S. LNG to Europe, while the impact of falling oil prices is not
straightforward and will depend on the persistence of low prices and the ability of
markets to adjust.
B. Infrastructural Problems
Due to the peculiarities of sectorial energy infrastructure, the removal of
existing U.S. export barriers on crude oil and natural gas could either be beneficial
for both the European Union and the United States or rather constitute an obstacle
to the conclusion of an energy deal between the U.S. and the E.U.
With respect to crude oil, the case for lifting the U.S. ban lies in the current
location and configuration of U.S. refineries. Prior to the shale oil boom, U.S. oil
companies invested massively in world-class refineries located in the Gulf of
Mexico (so-called PADD III) that can process heavy, higher sulphur (i.e. sour)
crude coming from the Middle East and Venezuela. 17 Since the U.S. shale oil
revolution in 2008, however, the shale formations in North Dakota, Texas, New
Mexico, and other midcontinent formations are producing lighter and low-sulfur
(i.e. sweet) crude. 18 The existing U.S. refining capacity configured to process
113. ENERGY 2020, supra note 57, at 31, 52.
114. Andrew Critchlow, US Oil Production Surge to Break Saudi Arabia's Grip on World Energy,
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 9, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/1 1215412/US-oil-production-surge-
to-break-Saudi-Arabias-grip-on-world-energy.html.
115. Patti Domm, OPEC Won't Stop US Oil Production Growth, CNBC (Dec. 3, 2014, 6:31 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102234051 (Fadel Gheit, senior energy analyst at Oppenheimer discusses U.S.
shale production).
116. ENERGY 2020, supra note 57 at 86.
117. Houser & Mohan, supra note 1. PADD III refineries account for half of the total refining
capacity of the United States.
118. Id.
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sour crudes can only partially process sweet crudes. As a result, local oversupply
situations have arisen and light crudes have been under-priced compared to
internationally-traded heavier crudes. 119  Because of this mismatch between
domestic prices and global light oil prices, the U.S. oil industry would gain from
exporting light crudes to refineries located elsewhere, while still importing heavy
crudes and thus capitalizing the investments made in the Gulf of Mexico. This is
even more so considering the nosedive turn of global oil prices at which U.S. oil
refineries could import heavy crudes.
120
In the case of natural gas, the terms of the debate are more mixed. On the one
hand, the surge in natural gas production imposes a redesigning of existing U.S.
natural gas infrastructure because it occurs in areas of the country where no
production had taken place in the past (e.g. Pennsylvania).' 21 The U.S. Congress
has recently passed the Natural Gas Pipeline Permitting Reform Act with the aim
to expedite the federal approval for interstate natural gas pipelines. 122 However,
the long-term paybacks of such investments combined with the fact that it may not
always be economical to construct such pipelines 123 may still prevent the additional
production from being adequately transported and consumed in the domestic
territory, leading to areas of local oversupply and thus lower prices and areas of
higher prices.124 Moreover, long-term investments and planning would also be
needed in the United States to accelerate structural changes in sectors, such as
transportation or electricity, which have not traditionally relied on natural gas in
the United States. 125 In principle, exports could thus provide an alternative avenue
for U.S. natural gas, which will help to avoid domestic oversupply and low prices
and will stimulate shale gas production benefitting from higher prices in the
international market.
119. Id. Although there are projects to expand existing mideontinent refineries and also build new
ones, the envisaged additional refining capacity would still remain largely insufficient to cover the
expansion of light oil production in that area of the country.
120. See id.
121. TIM BOERSMA & CHARLES K. EBINGER, NATURAL GAS BRIEFING DOCUMENT No. 3:
DEBATES RELATED TO NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE: INVESTMENTS AND EMISSIONS 3 (2013),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2014/natural-gas-infrastructure-investments-
emissions/debates-natural-gas-infrastructure-investments-emissions-boersma-ebinger.pdf.
122. Natural Gas Pipeline Permitting Reform Act, H.R. 1900, 113th Cong. (2013).
123. This is the case, for instance, of New England. Based on the configuration of existing natural
gas pipelines, New England is not well-served, leading to higher prices of natural gas in that part of the
country. However, the problem of higher prices may not likely be solved through the construction of
new pipelines because it mainly relates to winter times, when demand for natural gas peaks.
Companies may therefore not be keen to construct a pipeline just for facilitating this period of peak
demand. NATURAL GAS BRIEFING DOCUMENTNO. 3, supra note 121 at 3.
124. Another important issue is whether, in case exports of natural gas from the United States
continue to be restricted, domestic shale gas prices in areas of surged production would allow for the
full recovery of costs and a reasonable profit. THOMAS L. BREWER, THE SHALE GAS REVOLUTION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 2, 7, 15, 21 (2014),
http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2014/03/the-shale-gas-revolution-implications-for-sustainable-
development-and-intemational-trade.pdf.
125. Id. at 4-6.
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However, the exportation of LNG to Europe would also require additional
investments on the part of both the United States and the European Union in export
and import LGN terminals respectively (i.e. additional U.S. liquefaction terminals
and additional E.U. regasification terminals). Investing in such facilities could
represent a means for the European Union to strengthen its bargaining position
with the Russian Federation in view of renegotiating existing contracts and
lowering prices. 12 6 Realistically, building the missing regasification facilities in
Europe for the purpose of intensifying E.U.-U.S. LNG flows would require some
three to five years. It could thus potentially not be of use for solving the energy
security problem in the short-term. Moreover, the uncertainties surrounding the
medium to long-term productivity of shale rock formations may disincentivize
companies to invest in such an operation, as it would require massive capital
injections against long-term payback revenues. 127
C. Political Economy Interests
The discussions concerning the possible removal of the U.S. export barriers
on crude oil and natural gas has fuelled the domestic debate over the potential
winners and losers in the United States and around the world-especially in the
European Union. In the United States, the immediate beneficiaries of the crude oil
ban and the stringent licensing regime imposed on natural gas exports have been
the downstream processing producers, which have enjoyed abundant energy supply
at a relatively cheap price. The U.S. energy "renaissance" triggered by the shale
revolution has, however, led to a boom in domestic production, which in turn
translated into a wide disconnect between international and domestic crude prices
due to the export restrictions in place.' 28 The question is now whether allowing
U.S. exports into (at least) the E.U. market could bring benefits, in terms of
production and economic growth, capable of outweighing the negative impacts
expected to affect some economic players.
In the case of oil, analysts seem to agree that the export ban has so far brought
advantages to midcontinent refineries, which have benefited from local oversupply
of tight oil. The price of refined petroleum products such as gasoline, however,
has not decreased for consumers as a result of the export restrictions in place. 129
Moreover, it is generally considered that the current export restrictions, by
126. See JASON BORDOFF &TREVOR HOUSER, AMERICAN GAS TO THE RESCUE? THE IMPACT OF
US LNG EXPORTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 3 (2014),
http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/energy/CGEP-Ameican%2Gas%20to%20the%20
Rescue%3F.pdf.
127. NATURAL GAS BRIEFING DOCUMENT NO. 3, supra note 121 at 2-3.
128. This effect was also amplified by the infrastructural gaps experienced by the U.S. oil and gas
industry after the explosion of shale oil and gas production. See Houser & Mohan, supra note 1. See
supra Section V(B).
129. Houser & Mohan, supra note 1. Yet, the gasoline prices have fallen sharply in the last few
months in the United States, following the collapse of oil prices in the international market. Henning
Gloystein, Oil Prices Fall to Six-Year Low on Supply Glut, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 14, 2015),
http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/oil-prices-brent-crude-extends-loss-on-supply-glut-jan-
14/l/214565.html.
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preventing a realigning of domestic U.S. oil prices and global oil prices, would
ultimately dampen U.S. shale oil production.130  By contrast, macroeconomic
analyses and projections show that allowing U.S. exports of crude oil would be
beneficial for the U.S. economy as a whole, as it would incentivize crude
production, increase new investments in the expansion of U.S. energy
infrastructure, and boost income, domestic employment and taxes along the
production chain. 31 Furthermore, while the domestic prices are expected to rise
only to a limited extent,' 32 gasoline prices are projected to decrease following the
lifting of the ban due to the effects of an expansion of global crude supply to the
benefit of both American and European consumers.'
33
Similarly, in the case of natural gas, opponents to the removal of export
restrictions are mostly a nucleus of dominant industrial consumers of natural gas
(e.g. Dow Chemical and the Industrial Energy Consumers of America, who fear to
lose the competitive advantage arising from the provision of low-cost supply of
natural gas). 134 However, not only the increase in natural gas prices domestically
is projected to be marginal and inconsequential on domestic manufacturing,'3 5 but
also the effects associated with the removal of export barriers on U.S. natural gas
are generally considered to be beneficial when assessed from a macroeconomic
perspective, due to the positive impacts of increased domestic gas production on
infrastructure investments (e.g. liquefaction plants, pipelines, etc.) and domestic
employment. 136 Ultimately, the case for lifting U.S. export barriers on crude oil
and gas will very much depend on how well organized the winners and losers
fronts would be.
D. Environmental Concerns
The energy-related initiatives of the European Union, especially those
regarding export restrictions, provoked strong criticism on the part of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and green parties on both sides of the
Atlantic. In a critical report, Earthjustice highlighted the dangers of the E.U.
proposal on energy, arguing that it would expand fossil fuel exploration, while
130. See Blake Clayton, Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 34: The Case for Allowing U.S.
Crude Oil Exports, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 8, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/oil/case-allowing-us-
crude-oil-exports/p31005.
131. Boersma & Ebinger, supra note 53.
132. Id.
133. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-807, CHANGING CRUDE OIL MARKETS:
ALLOwING EXPORTS COULD REDUCE CONSUMER FUEL PRICES AND THE SIZE OF THE STRATEGIC
RESERVES SHOULD BE REEXAMINED 11-15 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666274.pdf.
134. Ebinger & Avarsarala, supra note 2, at 3.
135. Charles Ebinger, Director of the Energy Sec. Initiative, Booking Institute Panel on Liquid
Markets: Assessing the Case for Liquefied Natural Gas Exports from the United States, at 19 (May 2,
2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/events/2012/5/02%201ng%20exports/20120502_lngexports.pdf.
136. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF LNG EXPORTS FROM THE
UNITED STATES 16 (2012), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/20l3/O4/fO/neralngreport.pdf.
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restricting investment in renewable energy. 137 The NGO is particularly concerned
about a likely increase in the U.S. production of shale gas and oil, which is
associated with environmental risks because of the use of hydraulic fracturing. 138
A growing sense of unease is also being felt with respect to the proposed
competition rules in the energy sector. 139 The fear is that competition rules for
energy trade might hamper the promotion of renewable energy in the European
Union, as such rules could impose constraints on national policies supporting
renewable energy producers. 140 Moreover, applying the principle of "freedom of
transit" to energy transport via pipelines and transmission grids may limit the
ability to regulate the environment and prevent climate change. 141
Although concerns regarding the threats to the promotion of renewable energy
may be warranted and need thorough examination, the advantages of natural gas
over coal for the abatement of emissions, particularly in the short and medium
term, should also be considered. It needs to be examined to what extent the U.S.
imports of natural gas into the European Union may replace the consumption of
coal, which, if combusted without carbon capture and storage facilities, is more
carbon-intensive than gas, even if the latter is delivered to consumers in a liquefied
form. 142 At the same time, it should also be examined to what extent the declining
consumption of coal in the United States, and thus the reduction of domestic
carbon emissions would be offset by carbon emissions derived from increasing
consumption of coal imported from the United States abroad. 143 The situation
however can be different if the United States becomes a leading exporter of natural
gas too. While the U.S. shale revolution has so far led to increased coal imports
into the European Union, replacing the import of coal by natural gas from the
United States could lead to the reduction in the E.U. levels of carbon emissions.144
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
TTIP negotiations present an opportunity to negotiate a legal framework for
bilateral trade in energy, which could serve as a model for future negotiations at a
multilateral level. A key interest of the European Union in the energy negotiations
with the United States is the removal of U.S. export barriers for crude oil and
137. EARTHJUSTICE, TRADE IN ENERGY IN THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT
PARTNERSHIP: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EU "NON-PAPER" ON RAW MATERIALS AND ENERGY 18-19
(2014), http://action.sierraclub.org/site/DocServer/Analysis of EU EnergyProposalforTTIP_14-
05-19_FINAL .pdf?doclD=15741.
138. Id. at 11-19.
139. Carter & Sheppard, supra note 13.
140 Id.
141 EARTHJUSTICE, supra note 138, at 19.
142 See Joint Research Ctr. Ref Report: Liquefied Natural Gas for Europe-Some Important
Issues for Consideration, at 3, EN 23818 (2009),
http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/scientific-publications/209/eur-23818-en.pdf.
143. BREWER, supra note 124, at 13-14.
144. Factsheet on Energy and Raw Materials in TTIP, at 2 (Jan. 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/anuary/tradoc_153015.2%20Energy%20and%20raw%20ma
terials.pdf.
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natural gas, which would enable it to diversify its energy sources in light of the
uncertainties surrounding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. While the European Union
is evidently a demandeur in this respect, the liberalisation of the U.S. energy
export regime and the increase in external trade in shale oil and gas would
generally be beneficial also for the United States when assessed from a
macroeconomic perspective.
Yet, the conclusion of a shale deal between the European Union and the
United States will ultimately depend on the interplay of different factors, including
geopolitics and oil price dynamics, existing infrastructural deficiencies, political
economy interests and environmental concerns. The recent geopolitical
developments in Eastern Europe seem to be conducive to the opening of U.S. shale
supplies to Europe. Uncertainties however exist as to the medium- and long-term
behaviour of oil prices. Furthermore, the lifting of export restrictions could in
principle mitigate the imbalances produced in the U.S. domestic oil and gas
markets due to inadequacy of existing U.S. infrastructure. In particular, allowing
U.S. exports would correct the mismatch between domestic prices and world prices
to the benefit of U.S. producers, while at the same time making consumers in the
United States and around the world better off due to the expected decrease in
global oil prices. The intensification of E.U.-U.S. trade will, however, require
considerable investment in infrastructure on both sides. Moreover, a shale deal
between the European Union and the United States will need to take into account
environmental concerns over fracking technologies and possible negative effects
on carbon emissions.
Finally, independently from the outcomes of E.U.-U.S. specific negotiations
on energy, the conclusion of TTIP would itself represent a first step towards the
liberalisation of the U.S. energy export regime. The European Union will benefit
from its status of FTA partner enabling U.S. producers to export natural gas
through the automatic granting of an export licence. More liberalized trade under
the TTIP in general would likely pave the way for relaxing the U.S. energy export
restrictions in the future.
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JUSTIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS FOR ADOPTING DIVERGENT
COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
ANDY C. M. CHEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Regardless of the failure to become part of the World Trade Organization
("WTO") agenda,' competition law and policy and its relevance to economic
development continue to interest researchers and have been documented in-depth
by international organizations. 2 In addition, certain fundamental principles in
competition law, such as eliminating entry barriers, promoting broader market
access, or controlling market power that has been unfairly garnered, have been
incorporated into several envisioned trade treaties, including the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP") and the Transpacific Partnership
("TPP"). 3  Those developments highlight the value of an active policy of
competition law enforcement as a complement to the process of trade liberalization.
To enhance the living standards in poor countries, it is typically insufficient to
simply make the people in those countries wealthier. If the business environments
*Professor Chen is currently the Chair and Professor of Law in the Department of Financial and
Economic Law at Chung Yuan Christian University in Taiwan. He has a Bachelor's degree in Law
from National Taiwan University, and a Master's degree in Law (LL.M) from Soochow University in
Taiwan. He obtained his other LL.M degree from Duke University, and a Doctor of Juridical Science
(SJD) degree from Northwestern University in the United States. His major fields of academic interest
are antitrust law and policy, economic regulations, IPRs and antirust, and law and economics. He has
published widely on antitrust and related issues in Chinese and English, mainly from the perspective of
economic analysis. Professor Chen served as Commissioner of the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission
from 2007 to 2010 before resuming his academic career. He regularly provides testimony in lawsuits
and advises the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission, regulatory agencies as well as private business.
1. Distrust between emerging and developed economies regarding the form and manner in
which competition law would be enforced was partly responsible for this failure. See David J. Gerber,
Competition Law and the WTO: Rethinking the Relationship, 2007 CHI. -KENT C. L. FAC.
SCHOLARSHIP 269, 272-73, http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/facschol/220.
2. For recent literature, see R. S. KHEMANI, COMPETITION POLICY AND PROMOTION OF
INVESTMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(2007), https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/uploads/FIAS+Competition+Policy+final.pdf; SUSAN
JOEKES & PHIL EVANS, COMPETITION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE POWER OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS 24-
31 (2008) (enumerating the successful stories of how a well-functioned competition policy could assist
emerging economies to achieve economic growth).
3. For the objectives of TTIP, See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP): TTIP EXPLAINED (2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152462.pdf; SHAYERSH ILIAS AKHTAR &
VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43387, TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT
PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) NEGOTIATIONS (2014). For U.S. perspective on the objectives of TPP, see Trans-
Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives, USTR.GOV, http://www.ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-
objectives (last visited June 26, 2015).
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in developing economies are characterized by highly asymmetrical information
available for market transactions, or are inundated with unscrupulous business
practices because of market power protected by cronyism, any increases in income
may be substantially offset by unjustified price augmentation. For example,
studies have shown that cartels have been associated with price increases of 10%
to 45% in developing economies. 4 Potentially aggravating the problem,
approximately 3.7% of total imports to developing countries in 1997 originated
from cartelized industries.5 Therefore, how to make markets an "asset" for the
poor, including the formulation of a sound competition policy and law that fits the
needs of the emerging economies, is becoming increasingly critical for economic
development.
Various approaches have been suggested in the literature to accommodate
developmental variances into the design of competition policy in emerging
economies. For example, emerging economies may need to prioritize their
scrutiny of market misconducts in the industries crucial to their development, such
as food supplies and health care, and continue to advocate for increased
competition to stimulate popular interest in improving competition. This paper
elaborates further on the likely responses to the challenges of incorporating
developmental variances into competition policies and rules tailored to the needs
of emerging economies. 7 The paper categorizes the features that might prompt
emerging economies to adopt rules distinct from those of developed economies
into economic (e.g., smaller market scale) and noneconomic (e.g., corruption or
cronyism) features. The unique competitive problems caused by these features are
discussed in the following section. In particular, the paper examines how
developmental variances could influence the formulation of competition policies
and substantive rules and standards in emerging economies. For example, it has
been suggested that more prevalent corruption or cronyism in emerging economies
may cause cartels in those states to be more stable and market-dominating power
less likely to be challenged.8 Therefore, emerging economies should rely less on
4. Markus Kitzmuller & Martha Martinez Licetti, Competition Policy: Encouraging Thriving
Markets for Development, VIEWPOINT, Sept. 2012, at 1, 6,
https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/results/upload/Encouraging-Thriving-Markets-for-
Development Competition-PolicyViewpoint.pdf.
5. Id. at 7 n.10.
6. See Matt Fellowes, Making Markets an Asset for the Poor, I HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 433,
445-55 (2007) (proposing schemes that allow governments in emerging economies to curb price
increases due to higher supply costs, unreasonable business conducts, and less transparent business
environment).
7. For the definition of emerging economies or developing economies, see Data: Country and
Lending Groups, WORLD BANK GROUP, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last
visited Jan. 17, 2015).
8. See D. Daniel Sokol & Andreas Stephan, Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in Developing
World Competition Agencies, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 137, 144 (D. Daniel Sokol et
al. eds., 2013) (arguing that in many developing countries, a competition agency may "lose funding or
an agency head if the agency enforces the competition law against a politically well-connected family
firm."); Philippe Brusick & Simon J. Evenett, Should Developing Countries Worry About Abuse of
Dominant Power?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 269, 279 (2008) ("[E]ven if the competition law provides for a
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potential market entrants to address inefficiency from anticompetitive business
arrangements.
This paper concludes by raising certain limitations for the preliminary
findings. From a policy perspective, continual efforts of competition advocacy by
governments to make free competition a more widespread and favored value is
crucial for the resolutions of the competitive problems caused by the unique
features of emerging economies. The key to success is professionalism in
persuading skeptics and a transparent enforcement environment that allows public
discussion and dissemination of information. Otherwise, competition policies in
emerging economies could be misleadingly characterized by politicians as pro-
business and laissez-faire to serve their unfounded populist agendas. With respect
to the reviewing rules and standards for evaluating violations, the consideration of
developmental variance in antitrust investigations could gradually lead to a
regulatory landscape with increased focus on conduct-based reviews of the
investigated cases in emerging economies. This development benefits resource-
strapped competition agencies in emerging economies by reducing the need to
undergo the onerous effect-based evaluation process frequently required by the
rule of reason. 9 However, this could also misguide agencies to treat certain
competitively neutral conducts in developed economies as illegal per se.
Therefore, this paper proposes the following suggestions.
First, the connection between developmental variances and the unique
competitive harms to emerging markets needs to be substantiated before divergent
legal proposals are introduced. Otherwise, the emphasis on divergence could
entail the risk of over-deterrence. The probability of over-deterrence increases as
the enforcement landscape becomes more conduct-based.
Second, emerging economies have relied on their developmental variances
and domestic policies resonating with those variances to justify conduct or
arrangements that would be deemed serious violations in developed economies,
such as cartels. For example, competition law in Tunisia broadly exempts from
antitrust liability of cartels that (1) promote technical or economic progress and (2)
allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits.'0 Similarly, the Kenya
certain degree of independence for the competition officials, there can be a de facto dependence on the
wishes of politicians who might want to favor certain enterprises including state firms, firms owned by
relatives, or foreign multinationals with strong links to the political elite.")
9. In general, the rule of reason standard in competition law, particularly under U.S. antitrust
law, refers to a judicial process of determining the "reasonableness" of the suspicious anticompetitive
conduct. Under this reviewing standard, the court is required to consider and balance both the
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects from the investigated business conduct or arrangement
before declaring it illegal. When applying this standard, the court is typically required to assess the
likely competitive harm from the conduct or arrangement, review its nature and duration, counteracted
by the evaluation of the alleged business justifications. Compared with the per se rule, which
establishes a violation simply by its implementation, the rule of reason requires more sophisticated
analysis of the market impacts of the conduct and is considerably more time-consuming. See EINER
ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 74-75 (2d ed. 2011).
10. Graceila Miralles Murciego, Cartel Exemptions in Developing Countries: Recent Work from
the World Bank Group, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, 2013, at 1, 7
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Competition Act allows prohibited cartels to be exempted if "exceptional and
compelling reasons of public policy" could be shown.11 In making exemption
decisions, the Kenya Competition Authority considers whether a cartel would (1)
maintain or promote export; (2) improve or prevent decline in the production or
distribution of goods or the provision of services; (3) promote technical or
economic progress or stability in any industry; and (4) provide benefits for the
public that outweigh or would outweigh the decrease in competition that would
result from the operations of the cartel. 12 This "positive" application of
developmental variance could challenge the goal of pursuing a more coherent
global application of competition law.
Finally, if complicated analytical techniques, such as market definition or the
measurement of efficiency, can be flawlessly operated, it is irrelevant whether
competition rules are based on an overly optimistic view of the self-correcting
function that potential market entrants could provide. Economic and noneconomic
features would be evaluated with substantial precision through the preference-
revealing function inherent in the "substitutability" test for market delineation.
Viewing this observation in context, equating the lack of capacity or resources to
implement sophisticated techniques employed by the developed economies with
the advantages of divergent competition policy and rules for emerging economies
may be premature. Convergence in the form of regional technical assistance to
improve the accessibility of analytical techniques and to enhance the ability of
emerging economies to implement those techniques may still be preferable. This
is particularly evident when the costs from business uncertainty occasioned by an
increasingly fragmented international enforcement structure are accounted for.
II. UNIQUE FEATURES UNDERLYING EMERGING ECONOMIES
Certain scholars have asserted that emerging economies, because of their
unique economic and institutional features, are more vulnerable to anticompetitive
activities than developed countries. '3 Default antitrust standards or rules
developed by advanced economies are frequently based on an overly optimistic
view of the degree to which the market can self-correct the competitive problems
caused by the economic interactions taking place inside it. Consequently, such
unique features of emerging economies might render those standards and rules
ineffective in emerging economies. This paper classifies those features into the
https://www.competitionpolicyintemational.com/cartel-exemptions-in-developing-countries-recent-
work-from-the-world-bank-group/.
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id.
13. See Robert D. Anderson and Anna Caroline Muller, Competition Policy and Poverty
Reduction: A Holistic Approach 5 (WTO Econ. Res. & Stat. Div., Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-02,
2013), http://www.wto.org/english/rese/reser e/ersd2Ol3O2_e.pdf (summarizing the causes of high
entry barriers because of poor business infrastructure; unnecessary regulatory and licensing
requirements that prevent the entry and success of new entrants; inadequate investment and support for
competition law policy and advocacy; asymmetries of information in both product and credit markets;
and a greater proportion of nontradable markets).
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following two groups: economic and noneconomic features.14
A. Economic Features 1S
First, in comparison with developed countries, emerging economies typically
have higher minimum efficient scale ("MES") requirements.16 Because individual
firm sizes on average tend to be smaller than those in advanced economies, the
sales required for efficient operations are also greater.1 7 This further leads to
higher market concentration ratios in emerging economies. 1 Second, industries in
emerging economies are also characterized by higher entry barriers, which result
from increased regulations and market-control measures implemented by the
governments in those countries. 19 It is still popular for governments of emerging
economies to establish tariffs that are three to four times as high as those adopted
in developed economies. 20  In small emerging economies, constraints on the
supplies of resources and skilled labor can increase the cost of market entry.
Lower population and demands make the higher MES requirements more likely to
become obstacles for potential entrants.2 1 Additionally, a higher concentration
ratio in one market could force competing entrants in a vertically related market to
enter two markets simultaneously to engage in competition.22 Capital markets in
emerging economies typically being far less vibrant than in developed economies
indicates the increased costs for entry into emerging markets.23 Namely, entry
barriers could be leveraged by existing firms to hinder competition in other
markets. From a macroeconomic perspective, emerging economies tend to be low-
income economies; therefore, the adverse effects on consumers and economic
growth from price-fixing arrangements or unilateral misconduct in emerging
economies are also larger.
B. Noneconomic Features
In addition to their unique economic features, emerging economies also vary
with developed economies in social, political, and institutional designs that could
14. This is a general classification. Fox and Gal further divided the noneconomic features into
institutional, political, and cultural/social characteristics. See Eleanor M. Fox & Michal S. Gal, Drafting
Competition Law for Developing Jurisdictions: Learning from Experience 11-18 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ.
Working Paper 374, 2014), http://Isr.nellco.org/nyu lewp/374.
15. The analysis in this section is adapted from MICHAEL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR
SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 15-35 (2003).
16. Seeid. at 15-6.
17. See id. at 16-8.
18. Id. at 18.
19. See IMF Staff, Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries, IMF (Nov. 2001),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001/110801.htm#i.
20. Id. § III.
21. GAL, supra note 15, at 15, 32-33.
22. Id. at 22.
23. Eleanor M. Fox, Competition, Development and Regional Integration: In Search of a
Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries 11 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 11-
04, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstract = 1761619 [hereinafter Fox, Competition].
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directly or indirectly affect the regulatory landscape of competition policy in those
states. State-owned enterprises are generally more prevalent in emerging
economies. 24 The number of regulated industries is also higher and franchise
rights are frequently granted based on cronyism.25 Therefore, connections and
social networking may be at least as valuable as entrepreneurship in securing
successful business operations. A byproduct of this phenomenon is that bribery
and corruption are more prevalent in emerging economies. 26 A society where "a
marginalized majority [is] shut out of participation in the economic life of the
community" could thereby emerge in the long term.27
Institutionally, competition enforcement agencies in emerging economies
often lack the resources and skills to effectively enforce competition law. Those
agencies are typically understaffed, inexperienced, and ineffectively governed. : s
The lack of skilled personnel results in the inability to swiftly and correctly
identify offenses or to manage complex antitrust problems.2 9 For example, civil
service systems in many countries rely on a relatively frequent rotation of staff
rather than on more stable assignments, which in turn creates the risk of
inconsistent enforcement. 30 Competition agencies in emerging economies are also
more vulnerable to political intervention, risking loss of their independence.
31
Their role as the principal government institution responsible for safeguarding
market competition may be constantly challenged and compromised by the
demands from the state to protect other policy goals that are incompatible with the
fundamental principles of competition law, but that are required to be implemented
based on political considerations. 32 In addition, the effective enforcement of
competition policy and law relies also on a judicial branch willing to protect
legitimate competitive gains from being exploited by unfair competitive means.
33
Therefore, the protection of property rights by the courts, including intellectual
24. See Fox & Gal, supra note 14, at 27.
25. Id. at 44.
26. See e.g. KLAUS SCHWAB, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013-2014, at 412-13
(Klaus Schwab ed., full data ed. 2013),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFGlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf (cross-country
survey showing people in emerging economies are more likely to think that public funds are transferred
to individuals or companies due to corruption and politicians have lower ethical standard); see also
Data on Corruption, WORLD BANK GROUP: ENTERPRISE SURVEYS,
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Data/ExploreTopics/corruption#-7 (last visited June 21, 2015).
27. Fox, Competition, supra note 23, at 11.
28. SUBGROUP 2, ICN COMPETITION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION WORKING GROUP, LESSONS TO
BE LEARNT FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUNG COMPETITION AGENCIES 27, 33-34 (2006),
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc369.pdf.
29. Id. at 27.
30. Vivek Ghosal, Resources Constraints and Competition Law Enforcement: Theoretical
Considerations and Observations from Selected Cross-Country Data, in COMPETITION LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 90, 101.
31. Seeid. at 101.
32. Seeid at98-101.
33. See Sokol & Stephan, supra note 8, at 152.
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properties and financial assets, are weaker in emerging economies.
34
III. How DEVELOPMENTAL VARIANCES AFFECT THE FORMULATION OF
COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
How developmental variances described in the previous section affect
emerging economies to make competition policies or legislation that differ from
those of developed economies can be understood from the following two
perspetives: (a) the impacts on the formulation of competition policy, and (b) the
implications for the developments of reviewing rules and standards.
A. The Impacts on Formulating Competition Policy
The aforementioned unique economic features affect the market structure and
performance of competitors in emerging economies and would generate
competitive concerns dissimilar to those of developed economies. For example,
higher MES requirements could induce firms to assert more frequently the need to
protect their status as a natural monopolist during antitrust reviews of mergers or
abusive misconduct.35 By contrast, higher concentration ratios and entry barriers
could facilitate collusion among competitors and shield a monopolist from being
challenged by potential market entrants.36 Additionally, societies with lower
incomes are typically more vulnerable to anticompetitive activities, which in turn
would aggravate problems that stem from poverty in emerging economies.37
Therefore, from a policy perspective, it would be advisable that competition
agencies in emerging economies focus more on industries that would most harm
the poor, such as anticompetitive arrangements in markets for necessities,
infrastructure, or health care.3 8
Noneconomic features, such as more prevalent cronyism, bribery, and
corruption increase the risk of distorting the application of law and unnecessary
market intervention.39 The constraints of enforcement skills and resources on
34. SCHWAB, supra note 26, at 410-11.
35. Cf The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], Session I of the
Global Forum on Competition, Imagine: Pro-poor(er) Competition Law 10, OECD Doc.
DAF/COMP/GF (2013) 4 (Feb. 14, 2013) (by Eleanor M. Fox),
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpd?cote=DAF/COMP/GF(20l 3)4&doc
Language=En.
36. Id at 9.
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. at 4.
39. By taking bribes, government officials are "captured" by bribing parties. The officials would
be pressed to return the favor by sub-optimally proposing new or adjusting existing regulations or
policies to the bribing parties' benefits. In this context, corruption aggravates the problem of regulatory
capture caused by information asymmetry between the regulatory agency and the regulated industries.
As it is highly unlikely that the regulatory agency will acquire all the information required for making
optimal regulations but held by the regulated industries, "the results of regulation, in terms of outputs
and prices, remain 'second best' to those of a perfectly competitive market." Hossein Jalilian, Colin
Kiripatrick & David Parker, Creating the Conditions for International Business Expansion: the Impact
of Regulation on Economic Growth in Developing Countries-A Cross Country Analysis, in
REGULATING DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA 11, 14 (Edmund Armann
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competition agencies could exacerbate problems of ineffective or inefficient
enforcement. One of the frequently mentioned solutions to contain cronyism and
corruption is for emerging economies to continue advocating for competition to
activate popular interest in competition issues and to engage public discussion.4 °
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of competition advocacy depends on the structural
and operational problems in various countries. For example, it depends on the
scope and design of a country's competition law and the degree of power entrusted
to the competition agency that performs the advocacy.41 Advocacy effectiveness
also hinges on the structural design of competition oversight. For example, in
countries where the power of competition oversight is shared between a
competition agency and a ministerial department, the ministerial department may
be in a more influential position and able to assist the agency in performing more
effective competition advocacy.42
Additionally, to employ limited resources more effectively, competition
agencies in emerging economies may need to set priorities for investigation.
Prioritizing enforcement targets does not mean that emerging economies should
forego certain types of anticompetitive arrangement to save enforcement costs. As
Vivek Ghosal argued, emerging economies benefit from competition legislations
that cover all types of antitrust violations because their competition agencies could
thereby realize institutional scale and scope economies.43 However, this requires
the competition authorities to establish the sequence of the types of violations they
intend to investigate. For example, D. Daniel Sokol and Andreas Stephan
proposed a set of criteria for selecting the cartel cases that require more immediate
investigation and dispositions.44 Under their criteria it might be preferable for
emerging economies to prioritize domestic over international cases because of the
investigation costs assocated with prosecuting international cartels.45 Alternatively,
bid-rigging cases warrant a government's primary attention because such
investigations typically evoke more public discourse and attract broader media
coverage than other types of cartel cases.46 Strategically, competition agencies in
emerging economies could leverage this opportunity to engage in more active
competition advocacy to entrench the culture of free competition.47
ed. 2006).
40. See Susan Ross-Ackerman, Redesigning the State to Fight Corruption: Transparency,
competition, and privatization, World Bank, VIEWPOINT, Apr. 1996, at note no. 75 ("In general, any
reform that increases the competitiveness of the economy helps reduce corrupt incentives."); Frederic
Jenny, Competition Authorities: Independence and Advocacy, in THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION
LAW 158, 167 (loannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2012.) ("Competition authorities are seen as
among the few public bodies (or sometimes the only one) that are not 'captured' and can counteract
economic lobbies [and corruption].").
41. Jenny, supra note 40, at 168.
42. Id.
43. Ghosal, supra note 30, at 97.
44. See Sokol & Stephan, supra note 8.
45. Id. at 152.
46. Id. at 153.
47. Id. at 154.
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Because low-income emerging economies would be affected by
anticompetitive practices more severely than developed economies would be,
Eleanor Fox suggested that competition authorities should set their priority for
investigation to cases that can promote social mobility and facilitate reductions in
poverty, such as those involving food, transportation, or utilities industries.
48
Moreover, because a substantial portion of the anticompetitive practices in
emerging economies are facilitated or patronized by the governments, Fox and
Deborah Healey further proposed that competition authorities should extend the
coverage of competition law and limit the scope of immunity to state actions.
49
The avoidance of market harms by unjustified state restraints should be a priority
for emerging economies.
50
B. The Implications for Constructing Reviewing Rules and Standards
Higher entry barriers and concentration ratios render the force from potential
competition that could constrain the formation of cartels and abuses of monopoly
power much weaker or even nonexistent.51 Similarly, in societies where state-
owned enterprises are widespread, legislation aiming to justify or exempt
anticompetitive activities is more likely.52 Prevalent corruption and cronyism
would also induce firms to engage more frequently in inefficient rent-seeking
activities, and thereby enlarge the welfare losses from market monopolization.
Once "networking" and "connections" with competitors and governments become
crucial to successful business operations, firms will be incentivized to seek a less
competitive environment. In other words, deviating from the agreed collusive
arrangements is not profitable for cartel members and is not expected to occur as
frequently as in developed economies. In this context, some of the successful
mechanisms for detecting cartels, most notably the leniency program,53 may not be
effectively implemented in emerging economies. Finally, a resource-constrained
enforcement agency lacking the capability and skills to investigate and prosecute
anticompetitive practices could exacerbate the aforementioned problems. In sum,
these unique economic and noneconomic features may challenge the application of
reviewing rules and standards established by developed economies on emerging
economies.
48. See Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: the Other Path, 13 Sw.
J.L. & TRADE AM. 211,219-20 (2007) [hereinafter Fox, Economic].
49. Eleanor M. Fox & Deborah Healey, When the State Harms Competition-the Role for
Competition Law, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 812 (2014).
50. Id. at 814.
51. Compare Fox, Economic, supra note 48, at 213 n.6, with Fox & Healey, supra note 49, at
769.
52. A number of countries, including Hungary, China, Lithuania, Malaysia, have laws aiming to
replace partly or entirely the application of competition law. Fox & Healey, supra note 53, at 779 n.44.
For a cross-country comparison of the extent to which state-owned enterprise and government activities
are exempted from competition law. See id at 784.
53. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/O091.pdf; Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines
and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases (EC), 2006 O.J. (C 298) 11.
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This section highlights how the unique economic and noneconomic features
affect the reviewing rules and standards for specific competition problems in
emerging economies. In particular, this section focuses on the following four most
commonly discussed anticompetitive practices: vertical restraints, merger review,
abuse of market power, and cartels.
1. Vertical Restraints
The predominant standards in developed economies for reviewing vertical
restraints, such as arrangements on resale price maintenance, allocation of
distribution markets, or tying arrangements, are substantially influenced by
considerations of efficiency. 54 The economic theory behind the efficiency
approach stresses the contribution that vertical restraints might make to address the
incentive-disparity problems inherent in a vertical relationship. In such a
contractual relationship, downstream distributors have the incentive to increase
their own profits by using strategies that could decrease the benefits of the
upstream suppliers. 55 For example, the distributors may try to evade their duties to
provide presale services to save promotional costs. However, this evading
behavior deprives suppliers of the opportunities to assist customers to be more
informed of their products or services, and thereby enhance the market demands
for suppliers' products or services. 56 As the efficiency approach has argued, the
failure to control the incentive-disparity problem may lead to diminishing
promotional efforts by distributors, which limits the availability of useful presale
product information for buyers. 7 This harms consumers, whose welfare is the
predominant interest that competition law aims to protect, including within the
United States. 58 Therefore, vertical restraints are illegal only when their market-
foreclosing effects outweigh the benefits of assisting the upstream suppliers to
54. It is fair to argue that the efficiency hypothesis of vertical restraints is attributable to a series
of theoretical and empirical studies by scholars from the camp of the so-called "Chicago School." For a
summary and analysis of those studies, see Andy C. M. Chen & Keith N. Hylton, Procompetitive
Theories of Vertical Control, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 573, 575-76 (1999).
55. Id. at 578.
56. Id. at 575-76, 601-02.
57. For the economic theory on using vertical restraints to avoid this downstream "free-riding"
behavior, see Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? 3 J. L. & EcoN. 86, 91
(1960).
58. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (accepting the view that the legislative
intent of the Sherman Act was to design the Sherman Act as a "consumer welfare prescription."); Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) ("A restraint
that has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer preference in setting price and output is not
consistent with this fundamental goal of antitrust law."). Despite the support from the Supreme Court,
the genuine goal of U.S. antitrust law is still an unsettling issue in academia. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande,
Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 874 (1999) (arguing that "'unfair' transfers of wealth from
consumers to firms with market power" should be the primary congressional concerns when the
Sherman Act was enacted."); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, 53 B.C. L. REv. 551,
624 (2012) (the legislative intent of the Sherman Act was to "secure political, economic, and individual
freedoms...").
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control the incentives of the downstream distributors to evade product quality or to
free ride on the promotional efforts provided by other competing distributors.
59
Even if vertical arrangements imposed by a specific brand supplier lead to
anticompetitive actions, the efficiency approach further suggests that the
competitive harms could be neutralized if upstream competition is maintained or
strengthened. In this context, vertical restraints are contractual profit-sharing
arrangements between a supplier and a distributor to encourage "interbrand"
competition through the restriction of "intrabrand" competition.
60
The incentive-disparity and the "interbrand vs. intrabrand competition"
hypotheses have been questioned by researchers for neglecting the market structure
in which commodities are distributed in emerging economies. 61 Unlike developed
economies where the retailing markets are typically dispersed with competing
outlets, the retailing markets in emerging economies are more likely to be
controlled by several powerful distributors that are frequently large multinational
firms. 62 For example, Bruno Dorin demonstrated how local traders of cocoa in
Ivory Coast were replaced by large multinational firms who entered the local
market by merging local exporting and processing companies. 63 As a result, local
cocoa growers had to face new transacting counterparts with increased buying
power.64 Dorin's study exposed the likely shortcomings of the efficiency approach
when applied to emerging economies. The efficiency approach evaluates the
competitive effects of vertical restraints primarily through the supplier-customer
relationship, but neglects the harms associated with an overly concentrated
intermediate market. Implicitly, the existence of interbrand competition
counteracts any anticompetitive harm from implementing intrabrand restrictions
may be too optimistic a view for emerging economies.
2. Merger Review
The economic and noneconomic features of emerging economies have several
implications for merger review.
First, a comprehensive effect-based analysis of mergers as are practiced by
developed economies may not be in the interest of the emerging economies.
59. Telser, supra note 57, at 99-105.
60. Put simply, by imposing vertical restraints, such as exclusive sale areas on distributors
belonging to the same distribution chain (intrabrand competitors), the supplier shares part of its
wholesale profits with the distributors to motivate them to compete with other chains (interbrand
competitors). The justification for employing vertical restraints to promote interbrand competition
gained judicial recognition in the widely discussed case of Sylvania decided by the US Supreme Court
in 1977. Cont'l Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1977).
61. ELEANOR M. Fox & DANIEL A. CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION
LAW 298-300 (2010).
62. Id. at 298.
63. See Brumo Dorin, From Ivorian Cocoa Bean to French Dark Chocolate Tablet: Price
Transmission, Value Sharing and North/South Competition Policy, in UNCTAD, THE EFFECTS OF
ANTI-COMPETITIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT
PROSPECTS 237, 319-20 (Hassan Qaqaya & George Lipimile, eds., 2008).
64. Id.
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Rather, as was suggested by Fox and Michal Gal, several presumptions based on
clear and objective criteria may be needed to simplify the reviewing process for
mergers in emerging economies.65 How the presumptions should be determined
require policy makers to achieve a balance between the benefits of legal certainty
attained by these presumptions and the error costs from making inappropriate
presumptions. It may still be necessary for emerging economies to use economic
analysis to formulate these presumptions, and the enforcement experience of
developed economies may be helpful in implementing this analysis. 66 However,
emerging economies are cautioned against presuming mergers to be
procompetitive, as has been advocated by developed economies.67 The rationale of
presuming mergers to be legal is based on the hypothesis that any harm from
mistakenly approving an anticompetitive merger can be corrected by the force of
potential competition.68 As the unique economic feature of higher entry barriers
would imply, it is less realistic to expect this self-correcting market function to
occur in emerging economies.
Second, the limit to properly conducting economic analysis due to the lack of
enforcement skill and resources may also imply that emerging economies should
use business turnover rather than market share as the threshold for filing premerger
notifications. The market-share approach requires competition authorities to
accept the complicated task of delineating relevant markets for merger.69 The
approach is time-consuming and increases the uncertainty of merger reviews, as
well as causes substantial delays for completing the reviewing procedure.7 °
Similarly, lacking the enforcement skill necessary to conduct sophisticated
economic analysis may justify the tendency of emerging economies to rely more
often on "behavioral" rather than "structural" remedies as conditions for clearing a
merger.71 Structural remedies, such as divesture of the corporate assets of merging
65. Fox & Gal, supra note 14, at 49-50.
66. Id. at 50.
67. See id. at 19.
68. Intellectually, this view reflects a policy suggestion originating from the error-cost analysis of
antitrust enforcement. Given the vulnerability to error of antitrust enforcement, this policy suggestion
argues that "false negatives" caused by under-enforcing competition law should be preferred to "false
positives" from over-enforcing it. Central to this observation is the belief that pro-competitive business
arrangements mistakenly condemned represent a permanent and irreversible loss to the market.
Alternatively, anticompetitive behavior erroneously allowed will be self-corrected by the market if the
competitive force, including force from potential competition, in subsequent market interaction is
maintained. This proposition has substantially changed the views of the United States judiciary toward
several types of competitive activities initially considered illegal in the past several decades. See Alan
Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 79, 83-85 (2010).
69. ICN MERGER WORKING GROUP NOTIFICATION & PROCEDURES SUBGROUP, SETTING
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS FOR MERGER REVIEW 4-5 (2008),
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/do326.pdf.
70. Id.
71. MASSIMO MOTTA, MICHELE POLO & HELDER VASCONCELOS, MERGER REMEDIES IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: AN OVERVIEW 11 (2002),
ftp://ftp.igier.unibocconi.it/homepages/polo/RemediesMPVI 0.pdf.
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parties, impose a heavy burden on competition authorities.72 The agency is
required to evaluate the scope of the assets that need to be divested and whether
the divesture could restore the market competition that is likely to be reduced after
the merger. 73  Structural remedies are typically irreversible, and thus entail
substantial sunk costs if wrongly implemented, which causes the implementation
of this mechanism to be even more challenging for emerging economies.
74
Third, buyer power as a countervailing factor for assessing the competitive
effects of a merger is less critical for emerging economies than it is for developed
economies.75 The existence of market power at the buyer's market may force
suppliers to lower their prices to more competitive levels, which benefits buyers
and final consumers.76 In particular, when only several suppliers dominate the
upstream market, the exercising of this buyer power against monopolistic or
oligopolistic suppliers may benefit efficiency and consumer welfare. 77
Nevertheless, buyer power being a countervailing force against the potential
increase of seller's post-merger market power is less credible if the entry barrier at
the seller's market is high. In an upstream market where potential suppliers face
insurmountable entry barriers, concentration-increasing mergers would also
increase the costs of a powerful downstream buyer if they refused to interact with
the merging firms because fewer alternatives would be available to the buyers to
leverage the countervailing force on the merging firms.78
72. The burden from implementing structural remedies such as corporate divesture originated
mainly from the problem of informational asymmetries and incentives of the parties not in line with the
objective of restoring competition. MOrTA, POLO & VASCONCELOS, supra note 71, at 6.
73. 1d. at 3, 7.
74. The complexity of implementing divesture remedies could be evidenced by the promulgation
of remedy guidelines issued by both the U.S. Department of Justice and E.U. Commission. See, e.g.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST DIvISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER
REMEDIES (2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf; Commission Notice on
Remedies Acceptable Under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and Under Commission Regulation
(EC) No 802/2004 (EC), 2008 O.J. (C 267) 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008XC1022(01)&from=EN.
75. For buyer power being used as a countervailing factor in merger review, see U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 8 (2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/attachments/merger-review/100 8 19hmg.pdf; Guidelines on the
Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings (EC), arts. 64-67 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5, 12, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02)&from=EN.
76. John B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REv. 1485, 1494
(2012); see also Peter Carstensen, Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive
Effects ofDiscrimination among Suppliers, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 271, 330-31 (2008).
77. Kirkwood, supra note 76, at 1500-01.
78. See CATALIN STEFAN RUSU, EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL: THE CHALLENGES RAISED BY
TWENTY YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT EXPERIENCE 180 (2010) ("[T~he Commission will regard buyer
power as being sufficiently strong and providing adequate countervailing force if purchasers have the
ability to develop alternative suppliers.... The key factor in this assertion is the sufficiency of the
countervailing power as embodied in the relative degree of dependence of one party on the business of
the other.") In addition, the effectiveness of using buyer power as a countervailing force depends also
on whether the brand of the merging firm is strong. If the merging firm holds a brand that is highly
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3. Abuse of Market Power
The first and immediate implication is how the economic and noneconomic
variances may affect the view toward the reviewing standards for abusive cases in
emerging economies. In most jurisdictions, unilateral abusive conducts by a
monopolist are not illegal per se. Antitrust reviewers would need to conduct a
tradeoff between the pro- and anticompetitive effects arising from this conduct to
evaluate the overall market impacts, and to reach final legal conclusions. In
antitrust literature, a debate exists regarding the standards for conducting this
tradeoff. The total welfare test investigates the aggregated welfare changes caused
by abusive conduct on the premise that the law treats all members in a society
equally.79 Therefore, a price being increased because of a monopolist exercising
its market power may not immediately justify the prohibition of this conduct
insofar as the efficiency gains from the conduct, such as cost reduction to the
monopolist, outweigh the associated deadweight loss to the society.80 The harm
incurred by consumers from higher prices is treated as a wealth transfer to the
monopolist, and would not be factored into the analytical process by using the total
welfare test.81 By contrast, the consumer welfare test asks whether efficiency
gains could be realized without diminishing the benefits or "surplus" initially held
by consumers.8 2 The standard assumes the interest of the consumer to be the
ultimate goal pursued by competition legislations. 83 It further suggests that
exclusionary conduct violates antitrust laws "if it reduces competition without
creating a sufficient improvement in performance to fully offset these potential
adverse effect[s] on prices and thereby prevent consumer harm., 84 Namely, if
consumers are worse off because of the implementation of an alleged practice, the
practice should thus be prohibited, even though it would generate net welfare-
enhancing outcomes.
Although each of the reviewing standards is theoretically persuasive, none of
recognized and favored by consumers, it would be more difficult for a powerful buyer to threaten to
switch to other suppliers. See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 809-10 (2005).
79. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 110-
12 (1978). Although Bork used the term "consumer welfare" to describe his idea regarding the
legislative goal of the Sherman Act, the major American antitrust legislation, he was not referring to the
"protection of consumers" or the maintenance of a "consumer surplus." Rather, it was the overall net
effect from the alleged practices that he deemed crucial. Id.
80. This is the famous "Williamson Tradeoff' in antitrust economics, initially proposed by
Williamson to evaluate the welfare effect of mergers. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an
Antitrust Defense: the Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18, 22 (1968).
81. Id. at 22,28.
82. Although the term "consumer welfare" has been widely used by antitrust commentators, what
constitutes a "consumer" using this test has never been precisely defined. See Gregory J. Werden,
Consumer Welfare and Competition Policy, in COMPETITION POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC APPROACH:
FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 11, 13-15 (Josef Drexl, Wolfgang Kerber, & Rupprecht Podszun eds.,
2011).
83. Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-
Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 329 (2006).
84. Id. at 330.
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them are analytically perfect for all types of abusive or exclusionary conduct. A
more pragmatic and realistic view might be to treat the selection of reviewing
standards as a dynamic process that varies with the conduct and market structures
involved in individual cases.8 5 Under this dynamic view, it is the error costs from
the application of the selected reviewing standard that are decisive for the
determination of selection. 6 For example, the consumer welfare standard may
neglect the efficiency gains realizable by a monopolist who is incentivized to
innovate more aggressively by the additional market shares it will gain from
innovation. Accordingly, the consumer welfare standard has the potential to over-
deter welfare-enhancing conduct.8 7 Nevertheless, this concern of over-deterrence
is minimized when market power is predominantly gained through cronyism and
rent-seeking activities, and is less likely to be challenged by potential competitors
because of the protection of state-granted franchises. Therefore, it may be
justifiable for emerging economies to adopt the consumer welfare standard.88
Additionally, the prevalence of anticompetitive harms associated with the
problems of limited enforcement resources and skills may also imply that
emerging economies should adopt revised and, preferably, simpler antitrust rules.
A comprehensive rule-of-reason analysis involving the delineation of relevant
markets and assessment of exclusionary effects is not only unnecessary, but also
often beyond the enforcement capacity of emerging economies. For example, the
current U.S. rule on predatory pricing requires the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant is capable of recouping the predatory losses in the post-predation
period.8 9 This requirement imposes an onerous burden of proof on the plaintiff and
has in reality made it extremely difficult for the plaintiff to prevail in price-
predation cases. The theory underpinning the recoupment test is based on an over-
optimistic view towards the degree to which potential entrants in the post-
predation period could eventually make the recovery of the losses incurred during
the predation period unlikely.90 Therefore, predatory pricing is an unprofitable and
irrational strategy. Nevertheless, it may not be necessary to undergo this
complicated reviewing process if the entry barrier in emerging economies is high
and post-predation recoupments are more likely to succeed. Similarly, U.S. courts
tend to be more reserved in intervening in refusal-to-deal cases, particularly in
cases involving regulated monopolists. 91 The rationale for this enforcement
85. See Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and
the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 441 (2006) ("[Clourts do
not implement Section 2 through a single legal test. Rather, Section 2 courts often apply different
liability tests to different conduct.").
86. Id. at 448-49.
87. Id at 465.
88. Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Monopolization Standards, in ANTITRUST LAW
AND ECONOMICS 82, 105-06 (Hylton ed., 2010).
89. See Fox, Competition, supra note 23, at 9; Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 210 (1993); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardware Lumber Co.,
549 U.S. 312, 312 (2007).
90. Fox, Competition, supra note 23,at 9.
91. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409-10
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tendency is the concern that overactive intervention by competition tribunals to
impose the duty to deal may reduce firms' investment incentives in the future.
92
Again, such a rationale might become less relevant if market power is gained
mainly through cronyism and inefficient rent-seeking activities in emerging
economies.
4. Cartels
Studies have shown that the competitive harms caused by cartels to emerging
economies may be more damaging than those to developed economies, and that the
enforcement of competition law could effectively reduce anticompetitive effects.
93
However, because of the restraints on enforcement skills and resources, the
enforcement rules for cartels should be as clear and straightforward as possible.
One likely approach is to adopt a "white-and-black" list enumerating the type of
conduct that would be considered illegal, and make this known to businesses.
94
This approach is particularly necessary for emerging economies to successfully
resolve the problem of establishing the existence of a collusive agreement among
competitors. The methods developed by developed economies may be too
complex to be implemented by emerging economies. This is particularly true when
collusive agreements can be inferred only from economic circumstantial
evidence.95 The degree of complexity of the economic analysis involved in this
determination is frequently beyond the professional capacity of the competition
authorities in emerging economies.
IV. LIMITATIONS FOR FORMULATING DIVERGENT COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW
IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
The previous analysis demonstrated how developmental variances interact to
foster unique market conditions and structures in emerging economies. The
implications for the formulation of divergent competition policies and laws in
those countries should be duly acknowledged. In particular, they caution against
an uncritical acceptance of the enforcement philosophy and rules for market
(2004).
92. Fox, supra note 23, at 10.
93. See Fox & Gal, supra note 14, at 39.
94. Id.
95. In practice, direct evidence, such as documents that identify an agreement and the parties
involved in it, or oral or written statements of cartel participants describing the operations of the cartel
are typically unavailable. As a result, circumstantial evidence, such as communications among cartel
participants or economic evidence concerning the market structure in which concerted actions are
taking place, as well as the conduct undertaken by participating members suggesting collusion, may
play a crucial role in proving the existence of collusive agreements. However, economic circumstantial
evidence can be difficult to interpret and can be ambiguous, consistent with either concerted or
independent action. It requires careful and detailed economic analysis to reduce the probability of
making incorrect inference by competition authorities. For a succinct summary of the approaches used
to determine collusive agreements from circumstantial evidence, see Organization for Co-operation and
Development [OECD], Policy Brief: Prosecuting Cartels without Direct Evidence of Agreement (June
2007), http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/38704302.pdf.
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competition established by developed economies. However, implementing those
suggested divergent policies and reviewing rules and standards requires paying
attention to certain limitations inherent in the suggested proposals.
A. Transparent Enforcement Environment, Political Support, and
Competition Policy
From a policy perspective, continual efforts in competition advocacy by
governments to transform voluntary market transaction to a more widely accepted
culture is crucial to resolving the competitive problems caused by the unique
economic features of emerging economies. The key to its success is not only
professionalism to persuade skeptics, but also a transparent enforcement
environment that allows public discussion and dissemination of information.
Otherwise, competition policies in emerging economies could be misleadingly
characterized by politicians as pro-business and laissez-faire to serve their
unfounded populist agendas.
Successful advocacy also requires support from the top of the political
hierarchy to "ensure that the [competition] agency can undertake investigations
into some of the most economically powerful actors in the country or large
international investors." 96 This is critical when policy implications from unique
economic features can be symmetrically drawn to maintain policy or legislations
with anticompetitive potential. Regulatory agencies in emerging economies may
be more likely to advocate that unique economic features, such as the need to
realize scale economies, justify the implementation of some regulatory measures
that entail anticompetitive potentials. Those regulatory policy proposals are
frequently implemented through the "immunity" or "exemption" clauses in
competition law. For example, the Antimonopoly Law of the United States Virgin
Islands exempts "formal agreements between small entrepreneurs engaged in the
retail sale of the same or similar commodities for the purpose of bulk purchase of
those commodities in order to meet in good faith, competition of businesses with
substantially larger sales volumes." 9 7 To ease the likely tension between
competition and regulatory agencies in emerging economies, it is the responsibility
of the person who is politically authorized to conduct interagency coordination to
make the final decisions on interagency policy conflicts.
B. Simpler Reviewing Rules and Standards and the Costs of Over-
Deterrence and Uncertainty in Compliance
Justifying the adoption of distinct, simpler, or stricter competition rules for
emerging economies, based on the consideration of their unique economic or
noneconomic features, requires in-depth investigation of the following
preconditions.
First, the causal connection between developmental variances and the unique
competitive harms to emerging markets must be empirically substantiated before
96. Sokol & Stephan, supra note 8, at 152.
97. JOEKES & EVANS, supra note 2, at 35.
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divergence proposals are introduced. Otherwise, divergent applications of
competition law could be counterproductive and over-deterring. Simpler
competition rules to respond to unique market features and competitive problems
frequently lead to a regulatory landscape in favor of conduct-based reviewing
standards and the rule of per se illegal in emerging economies. 98 Although simpler
rules could enhance the preditability of law, they could also aggravate the risks of
over-deterrence. Striking an appropriate balance between these two competing
effects may not be simple. This potential problem is illustrated in a study by
Richman on how the diamond industry has relied on informal arbitration to ensure
contracts of diamond sales are honored by association members.99 At the core of
this self-enforcing mechanism is the penalty of group boycott, which diminishes
the reputation of the defaulting parties, as well as forecloses their future business
opportunities.100 In emerging economies where the public institutions may not be
competent or willing to properly resolve contractual disputes, the self-enforcing
function provided by the cartel-like mechansim could be particularly valuable for
the economic developments in those countries.
A more controversial problem regarding the need to apply distinct
competition rules to counteract corruption and cronyism is the beneficial effects to
market competition that corruption may unexpectedly create. Similar to the
welfare effect of rent-seeking activities, government action influenced by
corruption and cronyism may not be viewed entirely as a deadweight loss to
society. On certain occasions, governmental measures based on the consideration
of cronyism may, in effect, facilitate the entry of more efficient firms into those
markets inefficiently protected by domestic law.101 For example, a government
may grant a franchise right to enter a rigidly controlled local market to a highly
competitive international firm in exchange for its political financial support. Such
98. See Fox & Gal, supra note 14, at 32 (using Mongolia law as an example); Pamela Sittenfeld,
Advantages and Limitations of Costa Rica's Experience in Competition Policy: A Benchmark for the
Rest of the Countries of the Central American Region, in COMPETITION POLICIES IN EMERGING
ECONOMIES: LESSONS AND CHALLENGES FROM CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO 145, 159 (Claudia
Schatan & Eugenia Rivera Urrutia ed., 2008).
99. Barak D. Richman, Contracts and Cartels: Reconciling Competition and Development Policy,
in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 158-59.
100. Id. at 163-64.
101. The idea that corruption may sometimes be efficient is an anathema in most policy
discussions; however, the "grease the wheels" hypothesis of corruption, in which bribery can act as a
means to address bureaucratic inefficiency, has been proposed by Leff& Bayley. See Nathaniel H. Leff,
Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption 8 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 8 (1964); David H.
Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 W. POL. Q. 719 (1966). For a more
recent empirical study supporting the "grease the wheels" hypothesis, see Pierre-Guillaume Mdon and
Laurent Weill, Is Corruption an Efficient Grease? (BOFIT Discussion Papers 20/2008),
http://www.suomenpankki.fi/pdf/160134.pdf. Economists who held more reserved views towards the
hypothesis had also recognized the potential contribution by corruption to economic efficiency. For
example, a theoretical study by Daron Acemoglu and Thierry Verdier had discovered the
"unavoidability of corruption" and proposed that corruption "should be observed as part of an optimal
allocation" when certain regulatory conditions were met. Daron Acemoglu & Thierry Verdier, The
Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 194, 196 (2000).
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competitive benefits are particularly evident in emerging economies with sluggish
legislative procedures to make the required legal changes occasioned by new
market events. By presenting this observation, we are not endorsing a type of
"bribery competition" in emerging economies; however, as the reviewing rules and
standards become increasingly conduct-based and in favor of the per se rule, the
potential to neglect incidents with such unintended competition-friendly
consequences also increases.
Second, it is worth mentioning that the assessment of the competitive effects
from the unique economic and noneconomic features in emerging economies may
not under all circumstances be a separate and static process. Both unique features
may have conflicting policy implications that render the choice of reviewing rules
in emerging economics less straightforward. Alternatively, they may sometimes
interact in complementary ways to aggravate competitive problems. Consider first
the problem of conflicting policy implications. For example, lowering the market-
power threshold may be viewed as necessary in emerging economies to increase
the possibility that exclusionary conduct protected by cronyism would be reviewed.
However, smaller markets and the persistent need for the realization of scale
economies could make raising the market-power threshold for initiating merger
review or for allowing more exemptible exclusionary conducts in monopolization
and cartel cases reasonable in antitrust rule making. In addition, to address the
problem associated with high entry barriers, it may be advisable for emerging
economies to prefer "behavioral" to "structural" remedies because the latter may
deter new entrants, particularly foreign investors. 102 However, behavioral
remedies also require the competition authority to engage in post-merger
supervision on whether the merging parties have complied with the remedies.
10 3
This type of supervision frequently involves a substantial degree of discretion by
the competition authority, and would increase the occurrence of corruption. °4 Fox
and Gal suggested that emerging economies should minimize exemption from
competition law, particularly for industries that are treated with priority, such as
food or utility. 05 Using banking as an example, they further argued that
encouraging more banks into the market to provide loaning services can improve
competitive problems, such as a lack of vibrant capital markets in emerging
economies. 1°6 However, the reasons why governments need to control the bank
entry into capital markets is likely based on information asymmetry between banks
and investors being a more prevalent and urgent market failure in the banking
sector. Because of the general lack of sufficient investment knowledge of
depositors or investors, introducing increased levels of competition may confuse
102. SHANKER SINGHAM, A GENERAL THEORY OF TRADE AND COMPETITION: TRADE
LIBERALISATION AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS 114 (2007); see also MARCO BOTTA, MERGER CONTROL
REGIMES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES: A CASE STUDY ON BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA 344 (201 1).
103. See, e.g., OECD Policy Roundtables: Merger Remedies 1, 192, DAF/COMP(2004)21 (2003),
http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/34305995.pdf.
104. Id. at 17.
105. Fox & Gal, supra note 14, at 20.
106. Id.
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rather than enlighten them when making investment decisions.
With respect to the problem ofjoint aggravation of competitive harms, several
noneconomic features, such as cronyism and corruption, are frequently practiced
by states in a subtle manner, resorting to the unique economic features as the
justifications for their actions. A corrupt government may justify its favors
unlawfully granted to an enterprise by manipulating economic theories or studies
to support the "uniqueness" of its market and the necessity for permitting such a
favor. Taking corruption as a fact and then designing mitigating mechanisms to
implement around it may not be an effective method of counteracting corruption.
Rather, we may still need skill and professional knowledge on how to conduct
solid economic analysis to expose the distorted uses of economic theories to
prevent the competitive harms of corruption. In this regard, experiences of
developed economies may still be helpful.
Finally, although the prevailing rules and standards applied by developed
economies fail to appropriately address the anticompetitive problems facing
emerging economies, it may still be advisable to consider whether those problems
may be more effectively addressed by alternate regulatory means. For example,
the enforcement costs from proving market effects of cronyism, or the potential
risk of over-deterrence caused by removing or reducing the threshold for proving
these effects, may make anticorruption legislation rather than a reshaped
competition law the more preferable policy choice to tackle the competitive harms
generated by corruption.'0 7 Similarly, the legal compliance costs for businesses
increase as the enforcement structures of global competition law become more
fragmented. 10 8 Therefore, it is necessary to investigate in detail whether the
current reviewing rules and standards are genuinely inadequate for solving the
competition problems unique to emerging economies. In this context, George L.
Priest argued that years of experience of enforcing antitrust law in developed
economies has established a well-defined set of competition law principles that, if
appropriately implemented, could be universally applied to enhance economic
growth across societies. 10 9 If a uniform enforcement structure could reduce the
cost of legal compliance for business, then the competition law should not be
harmonized by "compromise allegedly among separately valid approaches to
107. JOSH GOODMAN, The Anti-Corruption and Antitrust Connection, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2
(Apr.2013),http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust-source/aprl 3_goodman.a
uthcheckdam.pdf.
108. Multijurisdictional merger review provides a good example of how significant and inefficient
compliance costs would need to be incurred by merging parties when a merger is required to be
reviewed by various competition agencies with different procedural and substantive reviewing
requirements. See ICN MERGER WORKING GROUP NOTIFICATION & PROCEDURES SUBGROUP,
SETTING NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS FOR MERGER REVIEW 4-18 (November 2004)
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc332.pdf.
109. Those principles include (a) prohibiting price fixing and market division among competitors;
(b) prohibiting mergers with monopolists; (c) prohibiting exclusionary practices through contracts or
governmental regulation; (d) adopting policies of free entry to all industries. George L. Priest,
Competition Law in Developing Nations, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at,
85-86.
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competition law, but harmonized substantively because there is a single best-
defined competition law to improve societal welfare."
' 1 0
Based on this premise, Priest further argued that a uniform competition law
serves as a template against which explanations or proposals of competition law
could be more seriously evaluated."' In addition, legal transplants by emerging
economies from the competition rules of the developed jurisdiction offer benefits
of increasing legal certainty, reducing compliance costs for businesses, and
facilitating the resolutions of cross-border trade problems among competition
authorities from countries with various degrees of development. 112 This
observation further implicates the need for re-examining the extent to which the
unique features of emerging economies could be factored into the current
analytical framework established by developed economies. It is undeniable that
high concentration ratio, infrequent market entry, high entry barriers, or rampant
corruption and cronyism deprive consumers in emerging economies of the
alternate choices that are available in developed markets. However, fewer
alternatives means that consumers in emerging economies are less likely to switch
to substitutes in response to a price increase by firms with market power either
protected by high entry barriers or unduly gained through cronyism. In other
words, unique economic or noneconomic features in emerging markets could in
theory be integrated into the market definition process, in particular the SSNIP
approach," 3 to make the relevant market narrower and the market power held by
the actors more dominant. Accordingly, identical anticompetitive practices by
dominant firms in emerging economies are no less likely to be investigated and
punished than in developed economies." 4 In this context, even if a reviewing
standard is based on an unrealistic confidence in the market's self-correcting
abilities it may not affect the overall reviewing results. Neither will the debates
regarding the reviewing standards for unilateral misconducts decisive for effective
enforcement of competition law. Exclusionary conduct by a monopolist holding
formidable market power gained through favoritism in a narrowly defined market
typically indicates less innovative or cost-saving activities in the market. This
further implies that consumers' interest will be at the center of the reviewing
process regardless of what reviewing standard is applied. Namely, the "total
welfare" standard will converge with the "consumer welfare" standard.
Various challenges can be raised against the aforementioned suggestions. For
example, the current approach for defining a relevant market and market power is
110. Id.at8l.
111. Id. at 80.
112. See Michal S. Gal & A. Jorge Padilla, The Follower Phenomenon: Implications for the
Design of Monopolization Rules in a Global Economy, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 899, 904-07 (2010).
113. SSNIP ("Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase of Price") refers to a methodology
in competition law that seeks to find the product and geographic boundaries subject to competition by
testing the substitutability among products and competing regions in response to a price change within a
specific time period. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES §1.1 (1992).
114. Id.
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criticized as being flawed and is not an appropriate benchmark for assessing
market power and competitive harms. 1 5 However, this is a problem common to
both emerging and developed economies. It may also be premature to equate the
lack of enforcement resources and skills to conduct the sophisticated techniques
employed by developed economies with the advantages of applying divergent rules
in emerging economies. Convergence in the form of regional technical assistance
to improve the accessibility and workability of those techniques for emerging
economies may still be preferable. 1 16 Other venues, such as the International
Competition Network ("ICN"), through its recommendation of best practices for
competition law, also offer a platform for designing a uniform analytical
framework more adaptable to the needs of countries with divergent levels of
economic development." 7 Similarly, the regular annual meetings and the "peer
review" procedure of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") Competition Committee offer member states the opportunity to discuss
and debate the effects of divergent economic and noneconomic features on the
formulation of competition policy and law." 8 Consensus regarding the most
appropriate form of market regulation may thereby be formed.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper discussed and analyzed how developmental variance might limit
the application of prevailing competition rules established by developed
economies. First, the paper described how the unique economic and noneconomic
features in emerging economies have shaped the market structures and
performance differently from those of developed economies. Recently, those
differences have been recognized and studied by antitrust researchers. Various
proposals for formulating competition policy and law in emerging economies have
115. See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets? 124 HARV. L. REv. 437 (2010).
116. The objectives of technical assistance programs include assisting emerging economies in
resolving problems concerning institutional designs, dealing with international business and legal
practices, and providing educational and consulting programs that enable staff and officials to more
efficiently and consistently implement competition policy and law. Michael Nicholson, D. Daniel
Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, Technical Assistance for Law and Economics: An Empirical Analysis in
Antitrust ICampetition Policy, (Food Sys. Res. Grp. Working Paper Series FSWP2006-07, 2006),
http://www.aae.wisc.edu/fsrg/publicationsWP2006-07.pdf. The effectiveness of technical assistance
depends on several factors that are closely related to the unique economic and noneconomic features of
emerging economies. Fox & Gal, supra note 14, at 63-64. The effectiveness also varies with the
political power that has been assigned to the competition agencies in emerging economies. For
example, one of the critical findings of an empirical study conducted by Sokol and Stiegert is that
agencies with a leader that ranks as minister or higher and that enjoy prosecutorial discretion most
effectively accept assistance. D. Daniel Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, Exporting Knowledge Through
TechnicalAssistance and Capacity Building, 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 233,250(2010).
117. For a comparison of the similarities and differences of the ICN and the OECD Competition
Committee, see Frederic Jenny, The International Competition Network and the OECD Competition
Committee: Differences, Similarities, and Complementarities, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
NETWORK AT TEN: ORIGINS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND ASPIRATIONS 93, 102-04 (Paul Lugard ed.,
2011).
118. OECD, Peer Review, http://www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/ (last visited June 21, 2015).
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been made to address the competitive problems attributable to these unique
features. Those proposals suggest that the competition policies and laws in
emerging economies be simplified to reflect the prevalence of competitive harm
and constraints on the enforcement capabilities in those countries. We noted at the
end of this paper that the suggested proposals could render the regulatory
landscape for competition law in emerging economies more conduct-based and
move it toward per se rule. While divergence between emerging and developed
economies should be duly acknowledged, policy makers should also be alert to the
possibility that simpler and stricter rules increase the risks of over-deterrence.
Therefore, this paper pointed out the limitations and conditions that must be
assessed before implementing these proposals, and emphasized that the value of a
uniform competition rule should not be discounted simply because of the existence
of certain economic or noneconomic features in emerging economies. Arguments
for formulating distinct competition rules or standards based on those
considerations should be tested against the feasibility of factoring those unique
features into the existing framework. Otherwise, costs from business uncertainty
could offset the benefits realized through the divergent application of competition
law.

CURRENCY WARS: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL
SOLUTIONS
ALEXANDRA ESMEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the context of globalisation, economic development has become a priority
area of cooperation and, it goes without saying, that sovereign states must make
the most of the international market for that purpose. The international market has
created an interconnectedness of states' economies beyond borders, and that
interconnectedness also takes into account their respective currencies. In the
current "globalised market," it is a matter of common sense that after an
international transaction must follow an international payment. That international
payment cannot occur without taking exchange rates into account. The exchange
rate determines the ratio at which a unit of the currency of one country can be
exchanged for that of another country, and thereby, the value of the currency
relative to another or to a certain value.
In international monetary policy, there are three main types of exchange rates:
a floated exchange rate, a fixed exchange rate, and a pegged exchange rate.' By
the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates (currencies being
pegged to the value to the gold), the floated exchange rate regime became the
reference.2 The floated exchange rate system, also known as the flexible exchange
rate, is the system in which the value of the currency keeps fluctuating in
accordance with the foreign exchange market led by the forces of supply and
demand.3 Nowadays, however, there is no such "perfect" floated exchange rate
system. The main currencies of the world all apply a managed float, i.e., it is usual
for states to intervene in the foreign exchange market to influence the value of their
currency. 4  Governments can interfere with the exchange rate and maintain a
" Alexandra Esmel is an International Economic law postgraduate of the University of Maastricht and a
Civil and Common Law graduate of the Universitd of Toulouse I. Her legal career led her to working
with International Economic issues in Germany, France, and the U.K. She acknowledges the
outstanding support of her family and thanks Maximilian Steinhoefel for his comments and inputs in the
realization of this paper.
1. IMF, Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks,
(June 30, 2004), https://www.imf.org/extemal/np/mfd/er/2004/eng/0604.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2015).
2. Benjamin J. Cohen, Bretton Woods System, USCB,
http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/faculty/cohen/inpress/bretton.html (last visited June 19, 2015).
3. For an overview of exchange rates, see generally IMF, Fixed or Flexible? Getting the
Exchange Rate Right in the 1990s, 13th Economic Issues (Apr. 1998),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issuesl 3/issue 13.pdf adaptedfrom IMF, Exchange Rate
Arrangements and Economic Performance in Developing Countries, World Economic Outlook (Oct.
1997), https://www.imf.org/extemallpubs/ft/weo/weo1097/pdf/octweo04.pdf.
4. Libby Rittenberg & Tim Tregarthen, MACROECONOMICS PRINCIPLEs 633 (vol. 1 2012).
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currency value through the action of its central bank. The rate at which the
domestic currency can be exchanged determines the price of products abroad.
Exchange rates are therefore of utmost importance in price competition.
Accordingly, the determination of an exchange rate policy will set the strategy
for the growth of the domestic economy. An exchange rate regime, whether fixed
or floated, impacts the economy of the country in the following ways: "(a) price
stability; (b) domestic financial stability and robustness; (c) external and internal
balances; and (d) economic growth/)development." 6
Articles 1 and 2(1) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
1974 states that "every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its
economic system . . ." and "every State has and shall freely exercisefull permanent
sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural
resources and economic activities." 7  One may naturally infer that such "full
permanent sovereignty" includes the monetary sovereignty of that state.
The International Monetary Fund ("IMF") defined monetary sovereignty of
one country by the right to issue currency, that is, coins and banknotes that are
legal tender within its territory; the right to determine and change the value of that
currency; and the right to regulate the use of that currency or any other currency
within its territory." 8 In this definition, the second right-the right to determine
and change the value of that currency-reflects the role of the state in interfering
with its currency value and that is the whole essence of currency valuations and
exchange rates. 9 In a fixed or pegged exchange rate system, the government fully
exercises that right to determine the value of its currency.' 0 The question arises
when a country acts upon the valuation of its currency (undervaluation or
overvaluation relatively to other currencies)" to boost its economy to the detriment
of other countries. That sovereign right is also exercised by countries when they
intervene in the foreign exchange market.
One the one hand, when a state exercises its monetary sovereignty and
purposely undervalues its currency, it protects its domestic industries-especially
those exporting-from foreign competition. It attracts foreign direct investment
and influences the market prices of its goods and services. Due to the reduction of
the production costs relatively to that of other countries, the exchange rate
5. For the purpose of this article, a "central bank" shall refer to the monetary institution that
monitors the money supply and the state's currency.
6. ROBERTO FRENKEL & MARTIN RAPETTI, CONCISE HISTORY OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES IN
LATIN AMERICA 3 (CEPR 2010), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/exchange-rates-latin-
america-2010-04.pdf.
7. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281(xxix), UN GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, ch. 2, art. 1 & 2, at 4 (1974).(emphasis added).
8. Frangois Gianviti, Current Legal Aspects of Monetary Sovereignty, in CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 3, 4 (International Monetary Fund 2008).
9. Id.
10. See JOSEPH E. GAGNON WITH MARC HINTERSCHWEIGER, FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES FOR A
STABLE WORLD ECONOMY 12-3 (2011). See also IMF, supra note 3.
11. See FRENKEL & RAPETTIsupra note 6.
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interferes with the market value the product.' 2  Consequently, it might give a
significant boost to its economic development. On the other hand, one must keep
in mind the interconnectedness of the international market, as the undervaluation
of one currency is the overvaluation of another, bringing along all of its economic
detrimental effects.
The raison d'etre of a state is to bring peace and security of life to the people
under its realm. 13 Economic development has always been a priori, the legitimate
goal of every state. That being said, can one criticize a country for pursuing an
economic policy it considers best suited for the interest of its country, but
damaging to that of another? What keeps a country from devaluing its currency
for the sole purpose of gaining a competitive edge, whether because of an
"imposed" overvalued currency or simply to improve its economy? Past currency
wars were all triggered by domestic economic crisis, bad domestic policies, or
weak domestic monetary reserves that ended up having an effect on other
countries. 14  They all started within the realm of one state before having
consequences for the global monetary system.'
5
This paper focuses on the existence of solutions that International Economic
Law is currently able to bring to this recurring problem. Its structure shall be
twofold. The first section shall identify the problems of currency wars, i.e.
monetary sovereignty and its influence on economic development. Evidence
clearly suggests that an undervalued currency is beneficial to the economy of a
state. This section will pinpoint the competitive aspect of currency values via a
comparison of undervalued and overvalued currency, and their respective use of
monetary sovereignty. The second section of this paper will put forward the claim
that multilateral institutions must circumscribe the maneuvering of currency
values, whether legally or politically.
II. CURRENCY VALUATION AND MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY
International payments are only made possible thanks to the convertibility of
one currency into another in application of the exchange rate. That exchange rate
is the primary tool used by traders across the world to identify their real profits or
losses when they buy or sell products on an international level with prices set in a
12. Marc Auboin & Michele Ruta, The Relationship between Exchange Rates and International
Trade: A Review of Economic Literature 3 (WTO Econ. Research and Statistics Div. Working Paper
No. ERSD-2011-17, 2011).
13. Benedict de Spinoza, THEOLOGiCO-POLITICAL TREATISE 70 (1670) (explaining the notion of
"pax vitaeque securitas").
14. See Barry Eichengreen, The British Economy Between the Wars, ECONOMETRICS
LABORATORY UC BERKELEY (2002),
http://eml.berkeley.edu/-eichengr/research/floudjohnsonchaptersep 16-03.pdf (covering England in
1927 and 1964); James Rickards, CURRENCY WARS: THE MAKING OF THE NEXT GLOBAL CRISIS (2011)
(discussing the Great Depression in the U.S. and across Europe in the 30s).
15. Justin Kuepper, Currency Wars and How They. Start, ABOUT MONEY,
http://intemationalinvest.about.com/od/foreigncurrencies/a/Currency-Wars-And-Hw-They-Start.htm
(last visited June 21, 2015).
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different currency. 16 The balance of payment of a country registers the country's
transactions with the rest of the world. 17 It is composed of the current account
(international transactions) and the capital account (in and out financial flow of the
state). 18 The capital and current accounts must balance each other, and when they
do not, the state faces a trade deficit or trade surplus.
In practice, a country will run a trade deficit if it imports more than it exports,
or spends more than it earns. Similarly, a country will run a trade surplus if it
exports more than it imports or earns more than it spends. Due to the fact that the
international market is one single market, a country's trade deficit is always
mirrored with another country's trade surplus. In the foreign exchange market, a
currency value is "weak" or "strong", "overvalued" or "undervalued" only
relatively to another currency.
A product price on the international market 19 is influenced by relative
currency values. From that follows that currency values are paramount in
determining a country's export competitiveness. This competitive aspect of
currency values is perfectly illustrated by the undervaluation of the Chinese
Renminbi ("RMB"), the overvaluation of the African CFA Franc in the 1990's,
and the use of their respective monetary sovereignty in that matter.
A. China
China has taken a progressive turn after the economic reform of 1978, from a
typical socialist, centrally planned economy to a liberalised economy characterised
by a significant export market. Since 2013, it is the world's second largest
economy and the world's largest trading power, with a total international trade
value of US $3.87 trillion.2 °
Before the economic reform of 1978, China restricted foreign exchanges to a
large extent.21 The economic reform introduced a market exchange rate alongside
a fixed exchange rate. It was only in 1994 that China abolished the dual system and
officially established a managed floating exchange rate, which equated a peg to the
U.S. dollar (the US dollar being subjected to a floating exchange rate).22
In July 2005, China moved from a managed floating exchange rate to a
gradual managed valuation, whereby the exchange rate is determined with
16. See GAGNON, supra note 10.
17. Thomas Oatley, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 224 (4th ed. 2010).
18. See Gianviti, supra note 8.
19. The author's personal deduction is that a product prince is a price at which it will be sold by
the trader and bought by foreign consumers.
20. Garry White, China trade now bigger than US, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10, 2013, 11:03 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/9860518/China-trade-now-bigger-than-US.html.
21. Clem Tisdell, Thirty Years of Economic Reform and Openness in China: Retrospect and
Prospect I (School of Econ., Univ. Of Queensland, Working Paper No. 51, 2008).
22. Jingtao Yi, Changes in China's exchange rate policy and future policy options, 2 CHINA
POL'Y INST. 2, 8 (2005).
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reference to a basket of currencies.23 China's Central Bank, the People's Bank of
China, influences the exchange rate to adjust the position of the balance of
payments and the level of international reserves. The RMB is adjusted vis-a-vis
inflation differences with major trading partners: differences between inflation
target, expected inflation in major trading partners, and so forth.24 This control of
the currency value was key to their success as, in 2008, it resulted in a RMB dollar
value increase by roughly 20%, a bilateral monthly trade surplus of US$17.5
billion with the United States, and accumulated foreign reserves of U.S. $1.9
trillion, equating almost 20% of the United States' public debt.25 By gradually
allowing an exchange rate flexibility, China succeeded in stimulating foreign
exchange activities and adapted it to its own economical and institutional
readiness.
For many developing countries, pegging a currency to a certain value is very
appealing, as it allows the control of the inflation rate and brings stability to the
value of the currency. It is therefore no surprise to see that the U.S. dollar, the
Euro, and the Pound Sterling, presumably strong and stable currencies, are
frequently used as referential currencies. 26 The People's Bank of China managed
to artificially undervalue the Chinese RMB using currency controls and
sterilization operations (i.e. when monetary authorities try to offset the impact of
capital flows). 27 It is widely recognized that the market can never be perfect and
the government via the Central Bank must intervene to correct it. However,
considering the current account of China, a standard fixed exchange rate model
could have never given those results. It is the policy of buying foreign assets that
gave rise to the U.S. $2.4 trillion of foreign currency reserves in China. In the
absence of the sterilization of the foreign exchanges inflows, such an
undervaluation of the exchange rate could result in an increase in the domestic
money supply, which could undo the inflation protection and with it the trade
surplus.
2 8
23. See Rittenberg, supra note 4, at 842-3.
24. Rupa Duttagupta et al., MOVING TO A FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE: How, WHEN AND How
FAST? 3 (2006).
25. Christoph Herrmann, Don Yuan: China's 'Selfish' Exchange Rate Policy and International
Economic Law, EUR. Y.B. INT'L ECON. L. 1,33 (2010).
26. See Hu Xiaolian, Three Characteristics of the Managed Floating Exchange Rate Regime,
PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA (Jul. 22, 2010, 9:45),
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/956/2010/20100727144604944489252/201007271 44604944489
252 .html. For examples of currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar, the Euro, and the Pound Sterling, see,
e.g., United States Dollar, OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/currency/iso-currency-codes/USD (last
visited Sept. 2, 2015); Euro, OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/currency/iso-currency-codes/EUR (last
visited Sept. 2, 2015); United Kingdom Pound, OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/currency/iso-currency-
codes/GBP (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
27. Christopher J. Neely, The Difference Between Currency Manipulation and Monetary Policy,
5 ECON. SYNOPSES 1, 1 (2011).
28. Brian Scarfe, China's monetary and exchange rate policy and the global economy,
EASTASIAFORUM (Oct. 15, 2011), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/10/15/china-s-monetary-and-
exchange-rate-policy-and-the-global-economy/.
2015
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The IMF confirmed in its Report for the 2006 Article IV consultations29 that
"movement in the renminbi's real value over a considerable period of time has not
been in line with most fundamental factors that are generally considered to be
important in determining the exchange rate's real value... All of these
developments point to the currency as being undervalued.
30
Undoubtedly, China's engine of growth is the export of its goods and
services. International trade and exports, in particular, have been recognised as the
weapon of choice for developing countries to gain economic growth.3' In this
regard, the undervalued exchange rate and the attraction of foreign direct
investment ("FDI") have brought many benefits to their economy since 2005. The
lower is the value of the RMB, the better it is for exports denominated in RMB.
The importance of exchange rate takes all its sense here.
As explained above, buying goods in country A where the currency is
overvalued is more expensive than in country B where the currency is
undervalued. That is because it requires more units of currency A (overvalued
currency) to buy the same product in country B (with the undervalued currency).
Therefore, the cheap exports of Chinese products in the world market have
tremendously helped the economic growth of the country but also decimated the
international and regional competition.
In this regard, states' economies based on exports, and in particular exports of
manufactured and processed goods, have suffered a decrease in demand in their
countries. The costs of production in China are cheaper and manufacturers make
profits from exports and the sale of goods and services, which explains the
expansion of their export market. Conversely, in the United States, the
overvaluation of the dollar (relatively to the RMB) makes the exports and the sale
of goods and services competitively harder. The undervaluation of the Chinese
currency is consequently directly transposable in international competition matters.
The link between their monetary policy to artificially keep the RMB undervalued
allow them to lower their firms' cost of production in key industries relatively to
the world prices and flood foreign markets of their exports.
Besides, this currency valuation also has a political dimension. As explained
above, the sterilization of the foreign market inflows while maintaining a desired
ratio with the U.S. dollar has contributed to the very large Chinese current account
surpluses. The undervaluation is determined in accordance with the balance of the
current account, yet a trade surplus occurs when the value of exports is higher than
that of imports.
In terms of figures, China recorded a trade surplus with the rest of the world
of U.S. $49.8 billion in August 2014.32 China has had a bilateral surplus with the
29. IMF, People's Republic of China: 2006 Article IV Consultation, at 17, IMF Rep. No. 06/394
(2006).
30. Id.
31. Millennium Development Goals: Trade and Development, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoE/coher e/mdg_e/development e.htm (last visited June 21, 2015).
32. Mark Magnier & Richard Silk, China's Trade Surplus Hits New High: Trade Surplus
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United States since the late 1980's, and since 2003, it has become the largest
source of the trade deficit of the United States.33 In theory, a justifiable trade
surplus represents three months equivalent of imports, and clearly China (and
many others) has exceeded that limit.34
Having excess reserves in its current account allows China to buy the assets
of other countries, including the United States, from which it owns the most
debts.35 Purchasing the debt of other countries gives the buyer a degree of political
influence, and indeed, when China is buying U.S. bonds, by definition it is a debt
security.36 The excess reserves correspond to a certain freedom of choice (reinvest
in labor forces or the economy in general) that debtor nations do not necessarily
have because of their debts and inherent obligations to repay.
It results from the foregoing developments simply that the valuation of one
currency in an international monetary system will have consequences on the
currency of other states. States that need to expand their exports must improve
their competitiveness with regards to China, and that can also be done by
depreciating their currencies value against the RMB (keeping in mind that the
RMB is somewhat pegged to the U.S. dollar).
In February 2008, the Managing Director of the IMF, Dominique Strauss-
Kahn, stated that, "On exchange rate policy, we welcome the authorities' objective
of allowing greater flexibility over time. However, we encourage a faster pace of
appreciation that would be helpful for addressing China's key economic challenges
and would also contribute to preserving global economic stability." 37 Clearly, it is
no easy thing to require a country to change the exact policy that resulted in its
economic rise. Keeping strict control of the exchange rate has been very
advantageous for China, to the detriment of other countries; they have exercised
their monetary sovereignty to the fullest. The IMF recommends China move back
to an equilibrium exchange rate, but the unilateral attempts of the Unites States
expresses the absence of multilateral actions on the issue. 38
Nevertheless, as I will develop in the following section, weak financial
Widened to Record of $49.8 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-
exports-grew-9-4-in-august- 1410143041.
33. Center for Strategic & International Studies, China Balance Sheet: Trade Imbalance,
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080916cbs1tradeimbalance.pdf.
34. See IMF, Assessing Reserve Adequacy, (Feb. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Assessing Reserve
Adequacy]; see also import Cover, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 12, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/16793524.
35. Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, U.S DEPT. OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/ticdata/Publish/mfh.txt (last visited June 15, 2015).
36. See What Is a Bond?, WALL STREET JOURNAL, http://guides.wsj.com/personal-
finance/investing/what-is-a-bond/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) adapted from DAVE KANSAS, COMPLETE
MONEY & INVESTING GUIDEBOOK (wall Street Journal ed., 2005).
37. Press Release, Statement by IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss Kahn
at the Conclusion of his Visit to China, IMF No. 08/26 (Feb. 15, 2008),
https://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pr/2008/prO826.htm
38. Michael Mussa, IMF Surveillance over China's Exchange Rate Policy, PETERSON INST. FOR
INT'L ECON. 1, 62 (2007), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/mussal007.pdf.
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capabilities and little monetary sovereignty, can substantially affect their
competitiveness and economic development.
B. CFA Franc Countries
The CFA Franc is the currency of fourteen African countries, it was officially
created on December 26, 1945 when France ratified the Bretton Woods
Agreements, with the view of restoring the French monetary authority.39 CFA
Franc formerly stood for Franc des Colonies Franqaises d'Afrique (Franc of the
African French Colonies), in reference to the colonial ties between France and
those countries.40  In 1958, it became Franc de la Communaut Franqaise
d'Afrique (Franc of the French Community of Africa) and after the process of
decolonization, it became widely known as the Franc de la Communaut
Financibre Africaine (Franc of the African Financial Community).4 1  More
precisely, the Franc CFA is actually the title of two distinct currencies: the Central
African CFA franc and the West African CFA franc.42 While they both have legal
tender in their respective regions, they are not interchangeable.
The Central African CFA franc zone is composed of six independent states:
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, and Gabon.43 These countries have all been members of the same
economic union since 1964: the Communaut Economique et Mon~taire de
l'Afrique Centrale (Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States
or "CEMAC").44 The Central African CFA Franc is issued by the Banque des
Etats d'Afrique Centrale (Bank of the Central African States or "BEAC"). 4 5
Likewise, the West African CFA Franc zone is composed of eight independent
states: Benin, Burkina Faso, C6te d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal,
and Togo.46 These countries have all been members of the same economic union
since 1962 (reformed in 1994): l'Union iconomique et monitaire ouest-africaine
(the West African Economic and Monetary Union or "UEMOA").47 The West
39. Jean-Claude Tchatchouang, The CFA Franc Zone, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AFRICA
AND ECONOMICS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 114, 114, n. 1 (Celestin Monga & Justin Yifu Lin eds.,
2015); Kazuhiko Yago, The IMF and France (1944-1960): A "Cooperative Game" in the Bretton
Woods System, in HISTORY OF THE IMF: ORGANIZATION, POLICY, AND MARKET 147, 147, 149
(Kazuhiko Yago et al. eds., 2015).
40. PETER KENEN & ELLEN MEADE, REGIONAL MONETARY INTEGRATION 93 n.39 (2007)
41. Id.
42. IMF, What is the CFA franc zone ?, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fabric/backgmd.htm
(last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
43. Central African Economic and Monetary Community, INT'L DEMOCRACY WATCH,
http://www.internationaidemocracywatch.org/index.php/central-african-economic-and-monetary-
community (last visited June 21, 2015).
44. Knowing the CEMAC, ECON. AND MONETARY COMM. OF CENTRAL AFRICA,
http://www.cemac.int/apropos#apropos (last visited June 21, 2015).
45. History BEAC, BANQUE DES ETATS DE L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE,
https://www.beac.intlindex.php/beac/organisation/128-histoire-de-la-beac (last visited June 21, 2015).
46. Convert United States Dollar to West African Franc, THE MONEY CONVERTER,
http://themoneyconverter.com/USD/XOF.aspx (last visited June 21, 2015).
47. West African Economic and Monetary Union, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP.,
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African CFA Franc is therefore issued by the Banque Centrale des Etals d'Afrique
de l'Ouest (Central Bank of the West African States or "BCEAO"). as The CFA
Franc zone worked as a currency union with a peg to the French Franc until
January 1, 1999, and has been pegged to the Euro since that time.49
The monetary cooperation between those fourteen African countries and
France follows four principles:
(1) [a] fixed exchange rate parity between the CFA Franc and the
Euro...; (2) [a]n unlimited guarantee by the French Treasury for the
convertibility of the CFA franc into euro at the fixed exchange rate at
the Paris Stock Exchange. . .; (3) [t]he centralisation of the members'
net foreign reserves at the two central banks and the obligation to
deposit half of these reserves in an operations account ("compte
d'opirations") at the French Treasury; and (4) [f]ree capital movements
within the CFA franc zone and with France.
50
This currency regime is simply an exchange rate arrangement between those
fourteen countries and France. It is important to recall that these arrangements are
based on a legal, institutional, and political framework meant to create a currency
union, France not being a party to it. France, however, has seats on the Boards of
Governors of the Regional Banks and thereby participates in the monetary policies
of these two currency unions. 5' More importantly, the monetary policies with
regards to the exchange rate are set up by the Regional Banks, the BCEAO, and
the BEAC, but these institutions are totally independent from the national
authorities while they are linked to France.52Consequently, and in contrast to what
was previously seen with China, which also uses a "fixed" exchange rate (pegged
to a basket of currencies), the member countries of the UEMOA and CEMAC do
not have monetary policies of their own.
5 3
Still, the peg to a strong and stable currency can be beneficial for a
developing economy. The parity between the French Franc and the CFA Franc
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/west-african-economic-
and-monetary-union-uemoa (last visited June 21, 2015).
48. History CFA Franc, BCEAO, http://www.bceao.int/Histoire-du-Franc-CFA,55.html (last
visited June 21, 2015) [hereinafter History CFA Franc].
49. The CFA franc and the euro: Give Us our notes, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2002),
http://www.economist.com/node/977304.
50. Martin Hallet, The Role of the Euro in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the CFA Franc Zone, 347
EcoN. PAPERS 1, 6 (2008).
51. Patricia Pollard, A Look Inside Two Central Banks : The European Central Bank and the
Federal Reserve, 85 FED. RES. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REv., 11, 13, n. 7 (Jan./Feb. 2003),
https:/research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/03/0 l/Pollard.pdf.
52. Edgardo M. Favaro, Using Regional Institutions to Improve the Quality of Public Services,
WORLD DEV. REP. 2011 1, 3 (2010),
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01306/web/pdf/wdr%2Obackground%20paperfavaroO.pdf.
53. Antoine Roger Lokongo, How France Fincancially Enslaves 14 African Countries, THE
REUNION BLACK FAMILY (May 1, 2012, 1:50 PM),
http://www.reunionblackfamily.com/apps/blog/show/14615033-how-france-financially-enslaves-14-
african-countries.
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remained constant from 1949 until 1994. In 1994, it was devalued by 50% to 1
FF=100 FCFA, which corresponds to 1 EUR=655.957 FCFA, since the Euro
replaced the French Franc ("FF") at the beginning of 199954The fixed exchange
rate regime, and thereby the convertibility of the CFA Franc, has provided the
region with currency stability against other strong currencies and price stability
with very low inflation in the long term, compared to countries outside of the
currency union and the monetary arrangement. This is all the more relevant in
countries with an economy strongly based upon the exports of agricultural
products.55 Moreover, the fixed exchange rate has been critical to attract foreign
investors (higher investment per GPD in these countries than any non-CFA Franc
African country) impacting positively the current account balance.
Thus, over two decades, from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, the CFA Franc
zone has brought higher growth and development in these regions compared to that
of non-CFA Franc zone of the continent. To give a point of impact, the growth of
C6te d'Ivoire was above that of Korea in the 1960s. 6 Unfortunately, this very
well organized and structured fixed exchange rate system turned against its
participants by the early 1980s. Changes in the world markets at that time, such as
the 1973 oil price crisis, the depreciation of the French Franc against the dollar,
and general fluctuations in the foreign exchange market while the currency value
remained the same in accordance with the fixed exchange rate, have led the
Members of the CFA Franc zone to a protracted overvalued currency, especially
with regards to the purchasing power of the currency.57 Due to the fixed exchange
rate system, they could not adjust to the international changes and keep in pace
with their competitors.
The currency value of the CFA fluctuated independently of the choice of the
members of the monetary union. On January 12, 1994, the French Franc was
devalued and CFA Franc consequently lost 50% of its value. 58  The sharp
devaluation, although necessary in those developing countries, led to significant
price changes that they were not ready to welcome.
The absence of adjustment of the CFA Franc countries towards foreign
markets changes led to an overvaluation of the CFA Franc, which severely affected
their competitiveness and led to an economic recession. According to many
specialists, "[t]he CFA Franc's fixed exchange rate is pegged to the euro and
overvalued to shield French companies from euro depreciation." 59  Similarly,
54. See History CFA Franc, supra note 48.
55. Shengenn Fan et al., Setting Priorities for Public Spending for Agricultural and Rural
Development in Africa, 12 IFPRI POLICY BRIEF 1, 3 (2009),
http://cdmI5738.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/pl5738coI12/id/28249/filename/28250.pdf.
56. Aloysius Ajab Amin, Long-Term Growth in the CFA Franc Zone Countries 29 (UNU-
WIDER, Working Paper, 2000).
57. Lucio Sarno & Mark P. Taylor, Purchasing Power Parity and the Real Exchange Rate, 49
IMF STAFF PAPERS 65, 65 (2002).
58. David Leland Dibley Exchange Rate Arrangements in the CFA Franc Zone: Alternatives to
Fixed Parity 26 (Apr. 8, 1997) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Michigan State University).
59. Sanou Mbaye, Time for franc zone to overhaul currency system, TAIPEI TIMEs (Apr. 11,
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during the 2008 financial crisis, and especially in regards to the Euro, the risk of
sudden devaluation was on everybody's lips in West Africa.
60
There is a general consensus that an overvalued exchange rate regime
impedes growth on the long term.61 In the CFA Franc countries, the overvalued
currency rendered exports much less competitive, especially with neighboring
African countries. One must keep in mind that the geopolitical map changes over
time, and while it was true that France-and Europe in general-were at one time
the number one economic partner of these countries, nowadays trade with Asian
countries and non-CFA Franc countries is increasing.
63
The currency's overvaluation had a major impact on the competitiveness of
the Franc-zone countries, especially with developing economies, which
performances depend on very few parameters. 64 The difficulty in diversifying their
economies (mostly based on primary product export) was worsened by the
currency overvaluation, which impeded them to create value to their products and
develop.65 While they all experienced high rate of growth in the 1960s and 1970s,
the fixed exchange rate system did not provide the necessary framework to face
external shocks.66
Simply, CFA Franc members could not depreciate their currency alone. The
absence of independent monetary policies meant to fix the issues particular to these
economies made it even worse. The interaction of the shocks with internal policy
response is much more important than the shocks themselves.67 Clearly, not being
able to make this exchange rate regime work for the specificity of their economies
led the CFA Franc countries to suffer from their own monetary policy.
It is a widely accepted conclusion that an overvalued exchange rate leads to
loss in economic efficiency, higher inflation, and lower GDP growth. This being
said, should the CFA Franc zone countries have adopted a mercantilist monetary
policy? Adjustment of the exchange rate was much needed even necessary, in the
legal sense, considering that eminent economists compared the overvaluation
period to the Great Depression of 1929.68 In terms of political power, mostly
drawn from the importance of foreign reserves as it has been demonstrated before
with China, the continent has very little. At the end of 2002, Africa, as a whole,
2012), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2012/04/11/2003530030.
60. Howard J. Shatz & David G. Tarr, Exchange Rate Overvaluation and Trade Protection, in
DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO, 17, 17 (Bernard M. Hoekman et al. eds., 2002).
61. John Williamson, Do DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS MATTER FOR EXCHANGE RATE
POLICY?, IN CURRENT ACCOUNT AND EXTERNAL FINANCING (Kevin Cowan et al. eds., 2007).
62. Dibley, supra note 58, at 25.
63. Hallet, supra, note 50, at 4.
64. MICHIEL KEYZER ET AL., WTO, AGRICULTURE, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF
ETHIOPIA 19 (2000) ("The EU imports almost all agricultural products from Africa free of duty, and for
minerals and metals the tariffs are very low.").
65. Mbaye, supra note 59, 7.
66. Dibley, supra note 58, at 28.
67. See Rupa Duttagupta et al. Moving to a Flexible Exchange Rate: How, When and How Fast?"
38 Economic Issues 1 (2005), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues38/ei38.pdf.
68. Shatz, supra note 60, at 4.
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held reserves of U.S. $69 billion, which corresponded to 3.1% of global holdings.69
The current account diagram of the CFA Franc States shows a trade deficit,
meaning these countries are debtors.7 ° Moreover, the CFA Franc States have to
surrender 50% of their foreign exchange reserves to the French Treasury as a
guarantee of the CFA franc's limited convertibility. 71 Conversely, Nigeria, which
is not part of the CFA Franc zone, recently changed its foreign reserves in the
Chinese currency. 72 This move was welcomed by trading partners and reflects the
use monetary sovereignty as a trade strategy.73
A rapid understanding of the situation in China and in the CFA Franc
countries can lead one to assume that an undervalued currency is to be preferred
for developing countries seeking growth. While that holds true to a certain extent,
a comparison of these two situations highlights even more the importance of
adjusting the exchange rate to the fluctuations of the foreign exchange market and
the particularities of its own economy.
Consequently, there are a certain number of countries that are tempted to
intentionally touch upon their currency value simply to prevent their appreciation
in response to competitive weak foreign currencies. As stated earlier, currency
devaluation is another relative appreciation of another currency and its inherent
detrimental effects. The general consensus seems to be that an overvalued
currency impedes growth on the long term 74 and that reciprocally an undervalued
currency is beneficial to an export-led growth. 75  The latter propounds
consideration of the importance for a country to be able to adjust its currency
value, e.g. through its exchange rate to the fluctuations of the foreign exchange
market and the particularities of its own economy.
A currency value is an important component of monetary sovereignty and a
state's economic independence. All the same, one can never deny the sovereignty
of a state. However, 192 states, all exercising their sovereignty on an international
component, will cause some hurdles on the international scene. For example, since
2009, Brazil has been at the center of capital movements that hindered its
69. Hallet, supra note 50, at 2.
70. Average current accounts of the communities: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon & Benin, Burkina Faso, C6te d'Ivoire, Guinea
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, Between Jan. 2006 and Jan. 2012,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/[ADD COUNTRY NAME]/current-account.
71. Sanou Mbaye, Decolonizing the Franc Zone, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Apr. 5, 2012),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/decolonizing-the-franc-zone [hereinafter Decolonizing].
72. Maria Levitov, Nigeria Central Bank to Move More Currency Reserves in Yuan, BLOOMBERG
BuSINESS (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-28/nigeria-central-bank-
to-shift-reserves-into-yuan-from-dollars.
73. Fion Li & Sophie Leung, Nigeria Plans to Buy Yuan as Soon as Possible, Sanusi Says,
BLOOMBERG BusINESS (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-09-07/sanusi-
says-nigeria-plans-to-get-yuan-to- 10-of-reserves-soon-as-possible.
74. Williamson, supra, note 61, at 480.
75. Ho-don Yan & Cheng-lang Yang, Does an Undervalued Currency Merit Economic Growth ?
- Evidence from Taiwan, 1 PANOECONOMICUS 37, 38 (2011), http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/1452-
595X/2012/1452-595X1201037Y.pdf.
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competitiveness. Low interest rates in Europe and the United States led to an
increase in foreign direct investment as well as portfolio investment in Brazil.77
Investors were allured by the higher interest rates in Brazil to engage in carry
trades with the Brazilian Real (selling a currency with a lower interest rate and
using the gains from that sale to invest in the Brazilian Real, which has a higher
interest rate).78 The monetary expansion policies of the United States and Europe
led the Brazilian Real to appreciate, up to 37% against the dollar in 2009.79 A
strong Brazilian Real affected Brazilian exports towards the United States, but also
with China (as the Chinese RMB maintains a currency peg with the U.S. dollar).8 °
Brazil's bilateral trade balance with the United States collapsed in the same
period. 81 In 2010, Mr. Guido Mantega, Finance Minister of Brazil, started talking
of a "currency war.'82 In 2012, the President of Brazil used the podium of the
U.N. General Assembly session to express, in the same line of her Finance
Minister, that
Central banks in developed countries have continued to make use of
expansionist monetary policy, which causes imbalances in exchange
rates. The ensuing artificial appreciation of the emerging countries'
currencies makes them lose market space, which further deepens the
global recession.
83
The sharp decline of the Brazilian competitiveness, largely due to objective
economic fundamentals, led the country to implement capital controls to regulate
the appreciation of their currency.84  Various programs followed to support its
76. See MARCOS CHAMON & MARCIo GARCIA, CAPITAL CONTROLS IN BRAZIL: EFFECTIVE? 6-
10 (2014), https://www.imf.org/extemal/np/res/seminars/2014/arc/pdf/chamongarcia.pdf.
77. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Foreign Investment in Brazil
and the International Financial Markets, 6, LC/BRS/DT.0 14 (Feb. 1998),
http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/0/6730/lcbrsdt014.pdf.
78. SPECIAL Report: EMERGING MARKETS 23 (BYN Mellon 2014),
http://www.bnymellonwealthmanagement.com/Resources/documents/perspectives/fullhtmi/emerging-
markets-special-sept-2014.pdf.
79. Matthew Bristow & Benjamin Bain, Brazil Real Posts Longest Losing Streak in 8 Weeks After
Tax, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 0-10-
19/brazil-steps-up-action-in-currency-war-even-as-mantega-seeks-ceasefire; See also, MONETARY
POLICY REPORT 17 &22 (Banco Central de Chile 2009),
http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/publications/policies/pdf/mpr 22009.pdf.
80. WAYNE MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CHINA'S CURRENCY: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND
OPTIONS FOR U.S TRADE POLICY 16 (Congressional Research Service 2008),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL3 2165.pdf.
81. Trade in Goods with Brazil, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/foreign-tradebalance/c35 I0.html#2008 (pointing out the collapse in April,
May, June, and July of 2008) (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
82. Brazil Warns of World Currency War, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 28, 2010),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/fnance/economics/8029560/Brazil-wams-of-worid-currency-war.html.
83. H.E. Dilma Rousseff, President, Federative Republic of Brazil, Opening of the General
Debate of the 67" Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 25 2012).
84. Anton Korinek, Capital Controls and Currency Wars, 4-5 (University of Maryland 2012). See
also Andrew Flowers, Capital Controls Gain Currency in Today's Global Economy, 13 EconSouth 32
(2011), https://www.frbatlanta.org/regional-economy/econsouth/llq3/l1 q3-summary-capital-
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exports, one of them being the Bigger Brazil Plan, which clearly consists of
protecting the national industry and its market from foreign competition.85 The set
of measures adopted by Brazil are certainly protective in nature, but necessary
(according to the Brazilian government) to defend its automobile industry, which
was affected by the appreciation of the Real against the dollar.86 In 2013, the
European Communities requested consultations with Brazil regarding tax
advantages provided to domestic industries. 87 The "currency war" of Mantega
turned into a trade dispute-and it will not be the last.
III. THE "LAWS OF CURRENCY WAR"
There have already been two waves of competitive devaluations in the past,
also known as currency wars in 1931-1936 and 1967-1987. ss
The "Tripartite Agreement," an agreement between Great Britain, the United
States, and France, resolved the first currency war.89 Interestingly, the United
States' version of the text states that
[i]t [The U.S. government] trusts that no country will attempt to obtain
an unreasonable competitive exchange advantage and thereby hamper
the effort to restore more stable economic relations which it is the aim
of the three Governments [The United States, England and France] to
promote.
90
However, it must be noted that the text also includes an exception to this
pledge of mutual respect of the international monetary system:
The Government of the United States must, of course, in its policy
toward international monetary relations take into full account the
requirements of internal prosperity, as corresponding considerations
will be taken into account by the Governments of France and Great
Britain; it welcomes this opportunity to reaffirm its purpose to continue
the policy which it has pursued in the course of recent years, one
constant object of which is to maintain the greatest possible equilibrium
in the system of international exchange and to avoid to the utmost extent
the creation of any disturbance of that system by American monetary
controls.aspx.
85. Measures Announced under the Bigger Brazil Plan,
http://www.jmcti.org/kaigai//Latin/2011/2011_10/201 110 BOI.pdf.
86. Joe Leahy, Brazil hits imported cars with tax increase, THE FINANcIAL TIMES (Sept. 16,
2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/d051 c68c-e086-11 eO-bdOl-00144feabdc.html#axzz3eCFh357c.
87. Request for Consultations by the European Union, Brazil - Certain Measures Concerning
Taxation and Charges, WT/DS472/1 (Jan. 8, 2014).
88. Rickards, supra, note 14, at ch. 4 -5.
89. Elliott Orsillo, Exporting Unemployment Through Currency Wars, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 31,
2013, 1 :03 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/114718 1-exporting-unemployment-through-currency-
wars.
90. Monetary Stabilization; September 25, 1936, 5 LILLIAN GOLDMAN LAW LIBRARY (2008),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th-century/usmu001 .asp.
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The requirement of internal prosperity to respect the newly established system
is pivotal because it subjects the respect of this international agreement to domestic
considerations. It was an armistice, a cessez-le-feu,92 not a solution to competitive
devaluations.
All the same, the second currency war was resolved by the Plaza Accord of
1985, under which Central Banks of the state parties agreed to take coordinated
actions on the currency markets to the betterment of international trade and the
international monetary system as a whole.
9 3
The past two currency wars were triggered by domestic factors, which lead
one state to disrupt the "normal" flow of international economics and trade.
Competitive devaluations might help the economy of a state in the short-term, but
in the long-term, it harms the global economy and encourages protectionism and
other trade barriers.94 More importantly, greater currency volatility deteriorates the
predictability and security of international trade, which in turn reduces benefits for
importers and exporters around the world.
Clearly, currency valuation matters for growth and exchange rates affect
international trade whether it is directly, indirectly, positively, or negatively. Some
argue that while it may be selfish to purposely devalue its currency, it is lawful and
in the case of China, the State is pursuing the economic policy it deems appropriate
for its country for the time being.
95
The question is to know whether or not such an important element of trade is
circumscribed by rules-meaning restricting the right to determine and change the
value of the currency (although enshrined in the concept of monetary sovereignty)
for the purpose of gaining unfair advantages. International law allows each state to
91. Id. 2 (emphasis added).
92. Commission Decision Relating to a Proceeding under Art. 81 of the EC Treaty (Sept. 29,
2004), Case COMP/C.37.750/B2, 10,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decdocs/37750/37750 87_1 .pdf
93. WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SURVEY BY THE STAFF OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND 53-9 (International Monetary Fund 1989).
94. See Puneet Pal Singh, What is a currency war and are we heading for one?, BBC NEWS (Feb.
15, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-21469301 ("[C]ompetitive devaluation of currencies, a
scenario where various nations try to devalue their currencies in an attempt to gain an advantage over
each other."); Mehreen Khan, Global currency wars: why China's devaluation is a peace offering
misunderstood by the world, (Aug. 22, 2015)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/I 1813076/Global-currency-wars-why-Chinas-
devaluation-is-a-peace-offering-misunderstood-by-the-world.html ("... 'competitive devaluation' where
major economies jostle to steal export shares, export deflationary pressures, and pull up their barriers.").
95. Christoph Herrmann, Don Yuan: China's "Selfish" Exchange Rate Policy and International
Economic Law, EUROPEAN Y.B INT'L ECON. L. 31,32 (2010),
https://www.google.com/url?sa-t&rct--j&q=&esrc=s&source-web&cd=1&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url=htt
p%3A%2F%2Fwww.springer.com%2Feda%2Fcontent%2Fdocument%2Fcdadownloaddocument%2F
9783540788829-cl.pdfo3FSGWID%3D0-0-45-835315-
p173815045&ei=3PyNVaulI86xogSq4LjYCQ&usg=AFQjCNFBJHQA6KrJyQ355xaII7dSB7pWgw&
sig2=lVDEAzBgk2IcOr2AXedPsw&bvm=bv.96783405,d.cGU.
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change the value of its currency;96 if it is true that every international transaction is
followed by an international payment, an unregulated international monetary
system can lead to substantial imbalances and bring us back to the geopolitical
games of the last century. Regulations are much needed when currency valuation
affects trade partners.
As this paper shall demonstrate, these institutions do not lack the competence
to deal with this issue; however, their respective powers on exchange rate
manipulation go as far as what the Member Countries endowed them with.
A. The International Monetary Fund
The IMF is an international organization created pursuant to the Bretton
Woods Conference in 1945. 97 Today it has a membership of 188 countries.98
According to its establishing agreement: the IMF Articles of Agreement, the main
purpose of the IMF is to promote international monetary cooperation through a
permanent institution that provides the machinery for consultation and
collaboration on international monetary problems. 99 The IMF is undoubtedly the
specialist when it comes to balance of payments, exchange arrangement, exchange
rate stability, the liberalisation of payments, and more generally, the surveillance
of the international monetary system. 1°° Hence, the exchange rate issue is clearly a
subject matter the IMF was meant to deal with.
Members of the IMF have accepted the obligations set in the Articles of
Agreement, which includes obviously their monetary sovereignty.' 0' They do so
as a party to the international financial system.
Besides, the IMF Articles of Agreement in its Article VIII imposes "General
Obligations" on its members that include among others, the ability to touch upon
their currency value. 10 2 Precisely, Article I (iii) of the IMF Articles of Agreement
96. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX) Art. 2, 2(a), U.N. Doc A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974). See also
Gianviti, supra note 8.
97. Cooperation and reconstruction (1944-71), INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
https://www.imf.org/extemal/about/histcoop.htm.
98. See IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx.
99. IMF, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. I(i) (Apr. 28, 2008),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf [hereinafter Articles of Agreement].
100. Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspect of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund's Articles of
Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 561 563 (2002),
https://www.imf.org/extemal/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/siegel.pdf.
101. UNCTAD XIII Pre-Conference Event: Policy Dialogue: Redefining the Role of the
Government in Tomorrow's International Trade, Session 2, 30 (Mar. 26-27, 2012),
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ditc dir 2012d2_deLima-Campos.pdf.
102. See Articles of Agreement, supra note 99, at art. VIII. §§2-3 & 7.
Section 2. Avoidance of restrictions on current payments
(a) Subject to the provisions of Article VII, Section 3(b) and Article XIV, Section 2, no
member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of
payments and transfers for current international transactions.
(b) Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to
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states that the maintaining of orderly exchange arrangement among members and
the avoidance of competitive exchange depreciation is one of the objectives of the
institution.1
0 3
Regarding exchange arrangement, the Article VI: 1 (iii) of the IMF Articles of
Agreement states that Members shall "avoid manipulating exchange rates or the
international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments
adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members."
10 4
Clearly, the aforesaid article governs unilateral exchange rate intervention. This is
a "hard"' 1 5 obligation at the center of the IMF Articles of Agreement.
Undoubtedly, that provision applies the Chinese case and it is also what the
African CFA Franc Countries were not able to do for their own competitive
advantage.
To establish the violation of Art IV:l(iii) of the IMF Articles of Agreement,
there first must be a manipulation of exchange rates.t 0 6  Second, the currency
policy must be pursued in order to gain an unfair competitive advantage.'
0 7
Manipulation is by definition an action by which a person or a situation is
controlled or influenced in a skillful manner. 108 In casu, manipulation occurs via
the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with
this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member. In addition, members
may, by mutual accord, cooperate in measures for the purpose of making the exchange
control regulations of either member more effective, provided that such measures and
regulations are consistent with this Agreement.
Section 3. Avoidance of discriminatory currency practices
No member shall engage in, or permit any of its fiscal agencies referred to in Article V,
Section I to engage in, any discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency
practices, whether within or outside margins under Article IV or prescribed by or under
Schedule C, except as authorized under this Agreement or approved by the Fund. If such
arrangements and practices are engaged in at the date when this Agreement enters into force,
the member concerned shall consult with the Fund as to their progressive removal unless
they are maintained or imposed under Article XIV, Section 2, in which case the provisions of
Section 3 of that Article shall apply.
Section 7. Obligation to collaborate regarding policies on reserve assets
Each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and with other members in order to
ensure that the policies of the member with respect to reserve assets shall be consistent with
the objectives of promoting better international surveillance of interational liquidity and
making the special drawing right the principal reserve asset in the international monetary
system.
Id.
103. Id. at art. I(iii).
104. Id. at art. IV(1)(iii).
105. Assessing Reserve Adequacy, supra note 34.
106. Articles of Agreement, supra note 99, at art. IV(1)(iii).
107. Id.
108. Manipulate, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american-english/manipulate?q-manipulation#manip
ulate_23.
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the actions of the Central Bank buying or selling foreign currencies to influence
the value of their own currency, e.g. quantitative easing.
10 9
It is very important to understand the link between an undervalued exchange
rate regime and a trade account. For example, in cases of exchange rate
undervaluation, a government's central bank purchases foreign currencies at an
undervalued rate but does not engaged in the sale of the local currency.11l As a
result, it accumulates a trade surplus.
The manipulation criterion set in Article IV:l(iii) must remain an objective
assessment of the actions of the government. The Annex of the 2007 Decision of
the Executive Board of the IMF clarified the concept of manipulation of the
exchange rate as actions "only carried out through policies that are targeted at-
and actually affect-the level of an exchange rate.""' Moreover, in the landmark
decision of 1977,112 the Executive Board of the IMF set guiding rules regarding
currency manipulation, namely that "'protracted large-scale intervention in one
direction in exchange markets' might constitute evidence of currency
manipulation."" 3 In that sense, a currency valuation that does not reflect the
economic and financial conditions of the country might fall under the scope of the
Article IV(iii) if it transpires a behavior of the exchange rate that appears
unrelated to underlying economic and financial conditions.114 Therefore, a country
can be found manipulating its currency when its central bank is intervening in
foreign exchange markets to stimulate exports.
Secondly, it will be very difficult to prove the intent to gain unfair
competitive advantage, and therefore to find a member in violation of Article
IV(1)(iii) of the IMF Articles of Agreement. As discussed previously, the currency
valuation has impacts on development and economic growth. The legitimacy of
engaging in the manipulation of its own currency seems countered by the legality
of monetary sovereignty under the IMF policy rules. Members of the IMF have
restrained their monetary sovereignty with regards to currency valuation and only
to the extent that it is unfair."
15
The IMF Articles of Agreement does not prohibit currency manipulation to
109. Robert E. Scott, Stop Currency Manipulation and Create Millions of Jobs, ECONOMIC POLICY
INSTITUTE (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/stop-currency-manipulation-and-create-
millions-of-jobs/.
110. Enzo Cassino & Michelle Lewis, Currency Intervention: The Profitability of Some Recent
International Experiences RES. BANK N.Z. ANALYTICAL NOTE SERIES 1, 4 (June 2012),
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research-and_publications/analytical-notes/2012/AN2012_3.pdf.
111. IMF Executive Board Adopts New Decision on Bilateral Surveillance Over Members'
Policies, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (June 21, 2007),
http://www.imforg/extemal/np/sec/pn/2007/pnO769.htm.
112. Id.
113. JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CURRENCY MANIPULATION: THE IMF AND WTO 2 (Congressional
Research Service 2011), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS2265820110128.pdf.
114. Review of the 1977 Decision on Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies- Preliminary
Considerations, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (June 28, 2006),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/pc.pdf.
115. Articles of Agreement, supra, note 99, at art. IV(1)(iii).
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gain competitive advantages; Article IV: 1 (iii) of the IMF Articles of Agreement
sets a threshold-the unfairness of such manipulation."16 From the start, it is a
subjective assessment; the intent behind a currency policy is therefore very
difficult to prove. According to Friedman's Profits Test, the combination of
"buying low and selling high" implies that if the central bank succeeded in
stabilizing the exchange rate, then its operations would be profitable. 17 However,
in a case of currency misalignment, the government not only searches to stabilize
the exchange rate, but also to undervalue its own currency. 18
The IMF plays the role of the watchdog of the international monetary system.
To do so, it implements a "surveillance" of the exchange rate policies of its
member countries in accordance with Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement.
The IMF Decision 1977 decision of the Executive Board on Bilateral Surveillance
comprises the core principles on exchange rate policies.119  There are five
principles: Principles A to C were adopted in 1977, Principle D was added in 2007,
and Principle E was added in 2012, stating
A. A member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates or the
international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of
payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over
other members.
B. A member should intervene in the exchange market if necessary
to counter disorderly conditions, which may be characterized inter alia
by disruptive short-term movements in the exchange rate of its currency.
C. Members should take into account in their intervention policies
the interests of other members, including those of the countries in whose
currencies they intervene.
D. A member should avoid exchange rate policies that result in
balance of payments instability.
E. A member should seek to avoid domestic economic and
financial policies that give rise to domestic instability.
120
Special attention should be given to Principle E, dated from 2012, as it
includes domestic considerations and the decisions taken by a state within its
jurisdiction, affecting its financial stability.' 21 By doing so, the IMF attacks the
origins of domestic policies targeted at influencing the international trade and the
international monetary system.
116. Id.
117. Cassino, supra note 111 ; Michelle Lewis, Currency Intervention: The Profitability of Some
Recent International Experiences, RES. BANK N.Z. ANALYTICAL NOTE SERIES ISSN 2230-5505, 1, 4
(June 2012).
118. Idat9&18.
119. IMF Executive Board Adopts New Decision on Bilateral and Multilateral Surveillance,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND (July 30, 2012),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2012/pnl1289.htm.
120. Id. at part II, 14.(emphasis added).
121. Id.
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Furthermore, the Annex of the 2007 decision of the Executive Board of the
IMF observed that the intent is proved when "the member is engaged in these
policies for the purpose of securing fundamental exchange rate misalignment in
the form of an undervalued exchange rate and the purpose of securing such
misalignment is to increase net exports."
' 122
The wording of the decision does not seem to be meant for legal proceedings;
"[T]he purpose of securing fundamental exchange rate misalignment" and "the
purpose of securing such misalignment is to increase net exports" can hardly be
proven beyond reasonable doubt as required by the IMF, 123 all the more since the
effect and intent of a measure must be disassociated. Indeed, the IMF political
nature is made to put the stress on "dialogue and persuasion," nothing coercive per
124
se.
Still, in a pragmatic business world, it cannot be denied that, in this case the
two are intertwined, one must always keep in mind that the main component of a
violation of Article IV(1)(iii) of the IMF Articles of Agreement is the
"manipulation." Therefore, the intent of gaining unfair competitive advantages
must take into account the effects of the so called governmental measure but also
the circumstances surrounding it. It is not surprising that a developing country
artificially devalue its currency to address economic imbalances while it is, at the
same time, defacto granting it competitive advantages.
The IMF Articles of Agreement are definitely the "lex specialis" on the
subject matter; however, the decisions of the IMF are political not legal-the
voting system is based on the proportion of the financial contributions of its
members, a majority between 70% and 85% is required to take sanctions., 2 5 The
financial institution is not a judicial body, and therefore does not provide an
enforcement mechanism.
B. The World Trade Organisation
1. Jurisdiction and Competence
As developed before, international trade in recent history has been the
principal tool of development, but more importantly, the tool to bond sovereign
countries through fair economic relations. That bond is also translated by
interdependency between sovereign countries, which makes it difficult for them to
resort to irreversible and violent means to settle their disputes. The WTO was
122. ld .at Annex Article IV, Section (1)(iii), 2(b) (emphasis added).
123. Id.
124. What We Do, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
https://www.imf.org/extemal/about/whatwedo.htm; see also Integrated Surveillance Decision,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Sept. 30, 2013) ("The ISD continues to emphasize the
collaborative nature of surveillance, the importance of dialogue and persuasion, the need for candor and
evenhandedness, and the importance of paying due regard to country circumstances.").
125. ALuISIO DE LIMA-CAMPOS, A CASE FOR MISALIGNED CURRENCIES AS COUNTERVAILABLE
SUBSIDIES, 33 (UNCTAD 2012),
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ditc-dir2012d2_deLima-Campos.pdf.
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created in this context, and more than an international forum of negotiations, it
fulfils the expectations of bringing security and predictability in international
economic relations via the rule of law. The idea of reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements between the contracting parties is at the core of the
organisation.'26
Not only that, the preamble of the WTO agreement sets as one of its objective
to develop and maintain an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading
system. 127  According to Article 2 "the WTO shall provide the common
institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in
matters related to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the
Annexes to this Agreement."' 128 These Annexes include among others the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994"), the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("ADA Agreement"), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
("SCM Agreement"), the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on
Safeguards, and so forth. They are referred to as the covered agreements.
129
The WTO is known for having the most effective enforcement system in
international law.' 30 The dispute settlement system of the WTO allows each of its
members to abide by the rules or force other members to do so in virtue of the
covered agreements. 13  It follows from the foregoing that the WTO should be the
forum to cope with exchange rates tribulations.
The dispute settlement system of the WTO plays an important role in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The
Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members
126. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] (stating "Resolved, therefore, to develop an
integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system encompassing the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.").
127. Id.
128. Id. at art. II, 1 (stating "The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the
conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements and associated legal
instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.").
129. See Marrakesh Agreement supra note 126, at Annex IA.
130. Pascal Lamy, WTO Director General, Address before the Eur. Soc'y of Int'l L.: The Place
and Role of the WTO (WTO Law) in the International Legal Order 1, 3 (May 19, 2006),
https://www.wto.org/English/news-e/sppl e/sppl26_e.htm.
131. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 1, 3,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to
the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to
this Understanding (referred to in this Understanding as the 'covered
agreements'). Recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a
satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this
Understanding and under the covered agreements.
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under the covered agreements.132
Ignoring the threat of currency manipulations on fair international trade would
be fatal to the multilateral system. The United States is already making moves on
its own to effectively tackle the currency issue. The negotiations on the regional
mega agreement between the United States and the European Union will probably
tackle the issue, as United States' representatives call for "strong and enforceable
foreign currency manipulation disciplines" in the trade agreement. 133 Some even
propose to include exchange rate provisions in United States' trade agreements.'34
It is true that the Tokyo, Uruguay, and Doha Rounds of the organization
failed to address the issue of currency misalignment and their effects on trade in
the WTO covered agreements; therefore, they do not refer to the monetary
sovereignty of its members. Nevertheless, the second currency war left the
contracting parties with no choice but to acknowledge the important link between
trade and currency values. Following the Tokyo Round in 1973, an official
declaration stated that:
[T]he policy of liberalizing world trade cannot be carried out
successfully in the absence of parallel efforts to set up a monetary
system which shields the world economy from the shocks and
imbalances which have previously occurred. The Ministers will not lose
sight of the fact that the efforts which are made in the trade field imply
continuing efforts to maintain orderly conditions and to establish a
durable and equitable monetary system.135
Moreover, there are provisions of the WTO that can be directly applied, or be
interpreted to apply, to the impacts of exchange rates manipulation on trade. For
example, the WTO Appellate Body in the Shrimp case had to decide whether or
not the term "exhaustible natural sources" in Art. XX of the GATT 1994 was
limited to "mineral or non-living natural resources" only.' 36 The WTO Appellate
Body in this case interpreted the treaty in an evolutionary manner and stated that
"the words of Article XX(g), 'exhaustible natural resources,' were actually crafted
more than 50 years ago. They must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and
132. Seeid. atAnnex 2, art. 3, 2.
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify
the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law.
Id.
133. C. Fred Bergsten, Addressing Currency Manipulation through Trade Agreements, PETERSON
INST. FOR INT'L ECON. 1, 1 (2014).
134. WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CHINA'S CURRENCY POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 15 (Congressional Research 2013).
135. The Tokyo Declaration, Sept. 14, 1973, GATT/1134 (1975).
136. Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, 127-8, 131, WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp].
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conservation of the environment."
137
Moreover, the WTO can work in pair with the IMF and rely on the IMF
expertise on the international monetary system as prescribed in Art XV:2 of the
GATT 1994.138 The jurisdiction or the competence of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Board ("DSB") is therefore not an obstacle.
In case of a currency war, the best defence is still the attack. Exchange rate
fluctuations have an impact on trade, and the profits driven by international trade
are the one reason states decide to touch upon their currency values. The WTO has
jurisdiction if the currency valuation discussed above can be identified in its
covered agreements.
2. The GATT 1994 in conjunction with the IMF Articles of
Agreement
Article XV of the GATT 1994 concerns exchange arrangements. Exchange
arrangements are understood as "the multilateral rules on currency exchange
systems that are administered by the IMF and codified in the Articles of
Agreement of the IMF, as well as arrangements that may be made between the
WTO and one of its Members if that is not also a member of the IMF."' 39 That
defimitely includes exchange rate arrangements. The IMF Annual Report on
exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions stated that theses exchange rate
arrangements are classified on the basis of the degree to which the exchange rate is
determined by the market rather than by official action.
40
Article XV is the most explicit provision regarding currency valuations in the
GATT 1994 and it creates the bridge between the IMF and the WTO.' 4' With
regards to currency valuation, two provisions of Article XV are of particular
relevance: Article XV:4 and Article XV:9.
The Article XV:4 of the GATT 1994 states that, "[c]ontracting parties shall
not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement,
nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund."'' 42  The application of this Article is therefore
twofold; it depends on the classification of the measure at hand. Such
classification has never been established in practice by a WTO Dispute Panel. The
member states never decided on how to distinguish between trade and exchange
actions. 143 For the purpose of the reasoning of this paper, trade and exchange
actions will be interpreted in line with their ordinary meaning as well as with
137. Id. T 129.
138. Exchange Arrangements I A(2), Oct. 30, 1947, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art.
XV, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT EA].
139. Andrew Mitchell & Elizabeth Sheargold, GATT Art. XV: Exchange Arrangements, 5
GEORGETOWN Bus., ECON. & REG. L. RES. 1,3 (2009).
140. ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 4
(International Monetary Fund 2012).
141. See GATT EA, supra note 138.
142. ld. 4.
143. Id. (providing no distinction between trade and exchange actions).
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definitions given by other international organizations. 144
With regards to exchange actions, when a member chooses an exchange
arrangement that involves pegging its currency to the currency of another member,
it has also been understood that the "exchange arrangement" includes not only the
currencies being used, but also the rate being used for this purpose.1 4 5 Moreover,
an exchange action encompasses the monetary policy of the WTO Members to fix
its currency value at a certain level, and therefore applies to the exchange rate.
146
In that sense, the actions of the government upon exchange rate could constitute
exchange actions. Trade actions concern the domestic or cross-border flow of
goods and services, so there is no doubt that the actions of the government upon
exchange rate leading to an undervalued or overvalued currency, a trade deficit, or
a trade surplus have an impact on the cross border flow of goods and services.
Hence, Article XV:4 possibly refers to currency valuation. The violation of that
article of the GATT 1994 is contingent upon the frustration of the GATT 1994 or
and the IMF Articles of Agreement.
147
According to the preamble of the GATT 1994, the purpose of the Agreement
is the "substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination
of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis."148 The reduction
of tariffs and non-tariff barriers are at the core of the GATT 1994. In this regard,
John Maynard Keynes stated in 1931 with regards to the Gold Standard that
subsidies and tariffs altogether have an equivalent effect to currency devaluation:
"Precisely the same effects as those produced by a devaluation of sterling by a
given percentage could be brought about by a tariff of the same percentage on all
imports together with an equal subsidy on all exports."'
149
Subsidies are regulated under WTO Law by the GATT 1994 and the SCM
Agreement. The GATT 1994 expressly refers to the danger of subsidization of
exports to which currency valuation leads. Indeed, the Second Report on Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties states that "the word 'subsidy' covered not
only actual payments, but also measures having an equivalent effect."' 150  The
Article XVI of the GATT 1994 states that
144. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 340 (stating
"A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.").
145. Sean Hagan, Article IV of the Fund's Articles ofAgreement: An Overview of the Legal
Framework, INT'L MONETARY FUND 1, 5 (2006),
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pp/eng/2006/062806.pdf.
146. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (Lexis Law 1969).
147. GATT EA, supra note 138, 4 (stating "Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action,
frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions
of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.").
148. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 126, at pmbl.
149. John S. Chipman, Protection and Exchange Rates in a Small Open Economy, 11 R. DEV.
ECON. 1, 1 (2007) (quoting John Maynard Keynes's Addendum to the Macmillan Report to the British
Parliament).
150. Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties 3, Oct. 30, 1947, General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade art. V1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT ACD].
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[t]he contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting
party of a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful
effects for other contracting parties, both importing and exporting, may
cause undue disturbance to their normal commercial interests, and may
hinder the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement. 151
A currency misalignment can be a financial contribution for the purpose of
the SCM Agreement when the government's practice involves a direct transfer of
funds or potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities.152 Moreover, if one looks
upon Article XVI of the GATT 1994 dealing with subsidies 53 it results that the
classification of a purposely undervalued currency as a subsidy goes against the
efforts of the Members of the WTO to achieve a balanced trading system and
respect the provisions of the GATT 1994.
Similarly, an undervalued exchange rate will have an influence on the export
price of the product. According to Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
a product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the
commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export
price of the product exported from one country to another is less than
the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like
product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.1
54
In a similar vein, Article II of the GATT 1994 states in its point b. that:
[t]he products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any
contracting party, which are the products of territories of other
contracting parties, shall, on their importation into the territory to which
the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or
qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary
customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein. 1
55
There are possible identifications of a currency undervaluation as a practice of
dumping or as a subsidy as it appears that they involve the similar trade distorting
consequences. Moreover, according to the addendum of Article XV, the word
"frustrate is intended to indicate, for example, that infringements of the letter of
any Article of this Agreement by exchange action shall not be regarded as a
violation of that Article if, in practice, there is no appreciable departure from the
intent of the Article.' 56
Nevertheless, Article XV:9 of the GATT 1994 states that "nothing in this
151. Subsidies 2, Oct. 30, 1947, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XVI §B 2, 55
U.N.T.S.194 [hereinafter GATT Subsidies].
152. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. I, 3, Oct. 30, 1947, General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT SCM].
153. GATT Subsidies, supra note 151.
154. GATT ACD, supra note 150, at 2.1.
155. Schedules of Concessions art. II, l(b), Oct. 30, 1947, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade art. It, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT Schedules].
156. GATT EA, supra note 138, B(l).
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Agreement shall preclude the use by a contracting party of exchange controls or
exchange restrictions in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF."',
57
In other words, Article XV:9 works as an exception clause and minimize the
GATT 1994 or the IMF Articles of Agreement as set in Article XV:4 of the GATT
1994. As such, the country involved in exchange controls and exchange restriction
would have to prove that it is not violating the provisions of the IMF Articles of
Agreement. 158 This shift of the burden of proof might be beneficial to the injured
party. However, it supports the idea that the GATT 1994 does not touch upon the
monetary sovereignty of its members.
All in all, there is more than one argument supporting the frustration of the
intent of the GATT 1994. Despite the subjective terms employed, it is a matter of
common sense that if a purposely undervalued exchange rate sets other members in
an unfair, nonreciprocal competitive position, it will deny the years of negotiations
done to reach an effective and reliable international trade system. Still, the
question whether or not the GATT 1994 or the WTO as a legal institution requires
its members not to competitively influence the value of their currency remains
unanswered.
3. Enforcement
It results from the foregoing that a WTO adjudication could be based on
Article XVI of the GATT 1994 along with the SCM Agreement, as well as Article
VI of the GATT 1994 along with the ADA and secondly on Article XV:4 of the
GATT 1994. However, no matter which legal provision it is based on, such a case
will bring about issues of international monetary policies, issues over which the
Panel may seek the advices and expertise of the IMF.
The need for consultations with the IMF in affairs related to the international
monetary system highlights the competence schism between the IMF and the
WTO. The consultation duty stems from Article XV:2 of the GATT 1994 which
states that:
In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon to
consider or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, balances
of payments or foreign exchange arrangements, they shall consult fully
with the International Monetary Fund. In such consultations, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall accept all findings of statistical and
other facts presented by the Fund relating to foreign exchange,
monetary reserves and balances of payments, and shall accept the
determination of the Fund as to whether action by a contracting party in
exchange matters is in accordance with the Articles ofAgreement of the
International Monetary Fund, or with the terms of a special exchange
agreement between that contracting party and the CONTRACTING
PARTIES."' 59
157. Id. A(9).
158. Articles of Agreement, supra note 99, at art. I-XXXI.
159. See GATT EA, supra note 138. (emphasis added).
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Moreover, according to Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
("DSU"), "Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice
from any individual or body which it deems appropriate."'1 60 These two articles do
not mention an obligation of the Panel to seize to consult the IMF. Article XV:2 of
the GATT 1994 refers to the "CONTRACTING PARTIES" duty to consult the
IMF.161 It would be very illogical that a political institution comes to decide a
legal outcome over legal texts to which it is not a party.
The case law of the WTO on several occasions considered the IMF
participation as discretionary but not dispositive of the legal dispute at hand. In the
India Quantitative case, regarding trade restriction to safeguard the balance of
payments (i.e. in the scope of expertise of the IMF), the WTO sought information
and advice from the IMF based on Article 13 of the DSU. 162  As required by
Article 11 of the DSU, the Panel "critically assessed," as it would do in an amicus
brief, the information given and compared it to those provided by the Reserve
Bank of India, another expert in the field. 163  All the same, in the Argentina-
Footwear case, Argentina contented that the Panel breached Article 11 of the DSU
by not making an objective assessment of the matter before it; the Panel did not
consult the IMF. 164 The Appellate Body in that case found that the decision to
consult the IMF was under the discretion of the Panel.
165
Therefore, the Panel ought to seek information and advice whenever it is
appropriate to do so. In casu, the IMF being the expert of the international
financial or monetary system, it must be involved in the proceedings. However, its
role remains discretionary and can never supersede that of the WTO Dispute
Panel. 166 The same goes for adjudications based on Article XV:4 of the GATT
1994, as it expressly mentions a frustration of the IMF Articles of Agreement as
constitutive of a breach of the GATT 1994.167 Therefore, if a member of the WTO
decided to bring a claim against another member based on the provision of the
GATT 1994, it should not be slowed down procedurally or hampered by the IMF;
it can only be aided by the expertise of the IMF. As long as the currency
undervaluation is identifiable through the provisions of the GATT 1994, the WTO
160. DSU, supra note 131, at art. 13.
161. See GATT EA, supra note 138.
162. Panel Report, India- Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and
Industrial Products, 93, WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999) [hereinafter India - Measures Affecting Imports].
163. Id. at 111.
164. Appellate Body Report, Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,
Apparel and Other Items, 13-14, WT/DS56/AB/R (adopted Apr. 22, 1998).
165. Id. 84.
166. India - Measures Affecting Imports, supra note 162, at 133-4 (Panel considering IMF
consultation discretionary, not dispositive).
[W]hether or not the provisions of Article XV:2 extend to panels, the Panel has the
responsibility of making an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the conformity
with GATT 1994, as incorporated into the WTO Agreement, of the Indian measures at issue,
in accordance with Article 11 ofthe DSU.
Id
167. GATT EA, supra note 138, A(4).
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ought to play its role as an effective enforcement system.
A WTO Dispute Panel can only innovate in introducing these issues in the
provisions of the GATT 1994, as it has done in the past with the preamble of the
WTO Agreement. Nevertheless, it must be highlighted that the provisions of the
GATT 1994, whether about the dumping practice or the export subsidy, were
hardly meant to apply to exchange rate misalignment. It is also worth noting that
overvalued currencies are not mentioned even tacitly in the covered agreements. A
currency undervaluation can be identified "through" some provisions of the GATT
1994, but not directly. Subsidies and dumping are one of the consequences of a
currency undervaluation, but these can only be solved having a holistic approach to
the currency undervaluation issue and that is whether a country can or not exercise
its monetary sovereignty to that extent.
The loophole in the GATT 1994 is appalling especially since this is the
challenge of the future,1 68 the WTO as the multilateral democratic institution ought
to "take the bull by the horns" and deal with the pragmatism of the world
economy.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are three observations to take away from this paper.
First, currency valuation as embedded in the monetary sovereignty of a state
is the backbone of economic prosperity. As it has been demonstrated in the case
study of China and the CFA Franc countries, the ability to control or to adapt to
currency valuations is of paramount importance for developing economies. The
case study established that China is exercising to the fullest its monetary
sovereignty by artificially maintaining the RMB at an undervalued rate while the
African CFA Franc countries are subjected to the fluctuation of Franc/[Euros.
China succeeded in using this currency valuation to develop its economy while
African CFA Franc countries, by reason of a weak international monetary policy
and monetary sovereignty, had to suffer the consequences of an overvaluation.
Developed economies are presumably strong enough to balance those external
shocks. Some monetary policies as the use of protracted quantitative easing can
only be implemented if the state has the capacity to do so. As a result, the
monetary sovereignty of a state is at the core of any reasonable economic policy.
Second, while the monetary sovereignty of a country is at the core of any
reasonable economic policy, it must be reckoned that engaging in competitive
devaluations is a downward spiral that the world should prevent and not trigger.
Currency manipulation in the form of competitive currency devaluation is
deleterious to the world economy. Increasing the volatility of currencies will
undermine the predictability and security of international trade relations, which in
turn have serious adverse consequences on all sides.
Third, international economic law does tackle the issue of currency
168. Pascal Lamy, WTO Director General, Opening Address for WTO Seminar: We Need an
International Monetary System which Facilitates International Trade 1, 3 (Mar. 27, 2012).
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manipulation and deals with the consequences of a protracted currency
undervaluation. Some are identifiable through the legal provisions of the GATT
1994, however, the right to do so per se, is not a notion tackled by the GATT 1994.
The WTO does not touch upon the monetary sovereignty of its members.
Subsidies and dumping are facets of a currency undervaluation; therefore, the
covered agreements can only deal with the tip of the iceberg but that could send a
message on the legality of the policies of origin.
Exchange rate valuations as unilateral measures threaten international trade
relations and can impair a state's benefits from its WTO membership. Disputes
should be adjudicated under the modem international economic law, particularly
under the auspice of the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO. The IMF is the
international political institution, and even though it cannot meet the demands of
an member injured by an undervalued currency via an enforcement mechanism, it
covers substantially exchange arrangements. The IMF's Article IV expressly
mentions the "manipulation of exchange rate to gain unfair competitive
advantages." '1 69 The IMF Articles of Agreement and the IMF Board of Executive
decisions on exchange rates touch upon the monetary sovereignty of its members.
Better, it prohibits the abuse of such monetary sovereignty and attempts to avoid
situations leading to currency manipulation.
The IMF economic literature and more importantly the Decision of the
Executive Board 2007 and 2012 have clarified that sentence. 170 The presence of
such provisions -Article IV and Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement-
means that there is a limit to the intervention of one state upon its exchange rate:
unfairness.' 71 However, and again, it does not reach the point where it is possible
to engage with certainty in the identification of such manipulation especially with
regards to the "intent to gain unfair competitive advantages."' 172  The IMF
expressly mentions in its Articles of Agreement the interdiction to manipulate its
own currency for unfair competitive purposes but it does not give the means to go
towards a successful legal proceeding.
173
Therefore, as far as state's monetary sovereignty is concerned, as long as
nothing efficiently and expressly affects that right to determine and change the
value of their currency, currency wars are bound to happen. International
economic law has not failed to develop solutions to deter the use of currency
devaluation for unfair competitive purposes. These solutions exist and can be
developed further; their enforcement is, however, yet to be seen. Quod erat
demonstratum.
169. Articles of Agreement, supra note 99; at art. IV.
170. IMF Executive Board Adopts New Decision on Bilateral and Multilateral Surveillance Over
Members' Policies, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (July 30, 2012),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2012/pn 1289.htm.
171. Articles of Agreement, supra note 99, at art. IV.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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IN THE NAME OF FOOD SECURITY: THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND
FAILURES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE BALI
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
CHINGWEN HSUEH*
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the 2013 estimate of the Food and Agriculture Organization,
842 million people suffered from chronic hunger in 2011-2013.1 In other words,
approximately one out of every eight people in the world is undernourished.
Developing countries account for most of these people, 827 million in total. 2 The
international community is highly aware of the famine and numerous international
organizations, including the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), exert efforts to
solve the problem from their perspective. According to the preamble of the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO
Agreement"), trade is not an end in itself but rather a means of "raising standards
of living." 3 Furthermore, members of the WTO noted nontrade concerns in the
preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture ("AoA"), including:
food security and the need to protect the environment; having regard to
the agreement that special and differential treatment for developing
countries is an integral element of the negotiations, and taking into
account the possible negative effects of the implementation of the
reform programme on least-developed and net food-importing
developing countries.
4
In addition, Article 20 of the AoA emphasizes that there is much to
accomplish to complete the reform of agricultural trade, which considers food
security. 5 These provisions show that the WTO considers food security essential
in the trade legal system, especially in developing countries. Additional attention
on food security in liberalizing the trade of foodstuffs can be assumed.
* Assistant Professor, School of Law, National Chiao Tung University. Dr. iur., University of Cologne,
Germany. Email:chingwenhsueh@nctu.edu.tw
1. U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. ("FAO"), UN. World Food Programme ("WFP"), & Int'l Fund for
Agric. Dev. ("IFAD"), The State of Food Insecurity in the World 8 (FAO 2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3027e/i3027e.pdf. Note that this was a projection, but a decrease from
the number in 2008-10.
2. Id.
3. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement],
https://www.wto.org/english/res_efbookspe/agrmntseries Iwtoe.pdf.
4. Marrakesh Agreement, Annex IA: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods-Agreement
on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal-e/14-
ag.pdf [hereinafter AoA].
5 Id. at art. 20.
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The Doha Development Agenda ("DDA") was established to provide a
framework to avoid the negative effects of free trade on food security in
developing countries. 6 However, fruitless and endless negotiations cause the
objective of the DDA to seem more an illusion than a possibility. The setback of
the "draft modalities" 7 in 2008 rendered the DDA even further from achieving its
aim. In 2013, the opportunity to complete the DDA reemerged in the Bali
Ministerial Conference. After five days of intensive discussions, the ministers of
members adopted the decisions known as the "Bali Package," which was a result
of the United States trading food security proposals for the Agreement on Trade
Facilitation. 8 The decisions concerning agriculture primarily followed the draft
proposed by developing countries. 9 In other words, the Bali declaration and
decisions concerning agriculture considered more needs of developing countries
than those of developed countries.
This study assesses the extent of which the Bali Package can ensure food
security in developing countries. Part II presents a discussion on the policy options
for developing countries to ensure food security. The discussion focuses on the
adverse effect on other developing countries and attempts to determine the policies
that contribute to food security at the global level. Part III presents an analysis the
implication of the WTO rules on food security and identifies the concerns of
developing countries. Part IV presents an examination of the improvement that the
Bali Package can contribute to the food security in developing countries and the
world. A preliminary observation of whether developing countries have achieved
food security in trade is provided in the conclusion.
II. POLICY ORIENTATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO ACHIEVE FOOD SECURITY
Determining the needs of developing countries for achieving food security is
difficult because of two reasons. First, the concept of food security has evolved
constantly in previous decades, reflecting the changes in the considerations for
food security, which involves more than mere famine. 10 An effective strategy for
food security should solve numerous concerns such as those of hunger, economic
6. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 13, WT/MN(01)/DEC/1, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002), https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0l_e/mindecl_e.htm.
7. WTO Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture,
TN/AGIW/4/Rev.4 (Dec. 6, 2008),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/agrice/agchairtxtdec08_ae.pdf.
8. See Christian Hliberli, After Bali: WTO Rules Applying to Public Food Reserves 7 (prepared
for the Expert meeting on reserves/stocks and specifically their potential role in market/price
stabilization from 30-31 Jan. 2014) (last visited Mar. 31, 2015),
http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/userupload/wti.org/news/140130-Haeberli-Stockpiles-Final forFAO.
pdf.
9. See Briefing note: Agriculture negotiations-the bid to 'harvest' some 'low hanging fruit', 9th
WTO Ministerial Conference, BALI, 2013 (2013),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/mc9_e/brief-agnege.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
10. See FAO COMMODITIES AND TRADE DIvISION, TRADE REFORMS AND FOOD SECURITY:
CONCEPTUALIZING THE LINKAGES 25-26 (2003), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4671 e/y467I eOO.pdf
[hereinafter FAO, TRADE REFORMS].
VOL. 43:4
IN THE NAME OF FOOD SECURITY
development, and the environment. Prioritizing all the various concerns of food
security might be difficult for developing countries. Second, food security is not
defined at a single level but can be defined at different levels such as the
household, national, and global level." I Food security at one level does not
guarantee it at another level. Moreover, the strategy for food security in one
country might have a negative spillover effect in another. For instance, a country
in a food crisis might impose an export restriction on a produce, causing the world
price of that product to increase and putting poor countries that rely on imported
food at risk. The conflicts of interests among developing countries regarding food
security are not uncommon. In addition, a unilateral strategy might not be
effective without the cooperation of other countries. For the common good,
pursuing food security at both national and global levels instead of only at the
national level is preferable.
A. The definition offood security
The term "food security" was first mentioned in the mid-1970s when the
World Food Conference was held to discuss the global food crisis. The focus was
on food supply and the price stability of foodstuffs at international and national
levels. 12 The conference defined food security as the "availability at all times of
adequate world supplies of basic food-stuffs ... to sustain a steady expansion of
food consumption in countries with low levels of per capita intake and to offset
fluctuations in production and prices."' 13 In the 1980s, the Food and Agriculture
Organization ("FAO") emphasized the importance of access to food, which was
defined in the following goal: "all people at all times have both physical and
economic access to the basic food that they need."' 4 In 1986, the World Bank
Report on Poverty and Hunger focused on the temporal dynamics of food security.
The report differentiated chronic food insecurity from transitory food insecurity.
5
Chronic food insecurity is associated with the problem of continuing or structural
poverty and low incomes; transitory food insecurity refers to situations of
intensified pressure caused by natural disasters. 16 Food security in general was
defined as an "access by all people at all times to enough food for an active and
11. Panos Konandreas, Trade and Food Security: Options for Developing Countries 10.2. 1, in
FAO, MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE: A RESOURCE MANUAL, Module 10
(2000), http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7353e/x7353e10.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
12. Edward Clay, Food Security: Concepts and Measurement 1 (2002) (paper for FAO Expert
Consultation on Trade and Food Security: Conceptualizing the Linkages),
http://ieham.org/html/docs/food_securityconcepts-and-measurement.pdf.
13. World Food Conference, Rome, Italy, Nov. 5-16, 1974, Res. XVII, E/CONF.65/20 (1975).
14. FAO, Director General's Report, World Food Security: a Reappraisal of the Concepts and
Approaches (1983).
15. WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND HUNGER: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR FOOD SECURITY IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (July 31, 1986) http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/17/000178830_981019014
55676/Rendered/PDF/multi-page.pdf.
16. Id.
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healthy life."'
17
The most widely accepted definition of food security was provided in the
World Food Summit, 1996. According to the World Food Summit Plan of Action,
"[flood security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food
preferences for an active and healthy life.' 8
The concept of food security comprises four dimensions: food availability,
access to food, utilization, and stability. Food availability refers to "[t]he
availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through
domestic production or imports."'19 Access to food refers to the "[a]ccess by
individuals to adequate resources (entitlements) for acquiring appropriate foods for
a nutritious diet., 20 Stability exists when "population[s], household[s] or
individual[s] ... have access to adequate food at all times.",21 The concept of
stability overlaps with the concepts of food availability and access to food, except
that stability focuses on the risks of losing food availability or access as the
consequences of sudden crises or cyclical events. Utilization is defined as
"[u]tilization of food through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health care
to reach a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met.",22
According to this definition, nonfood aspects enhance the concept of food security,
which aims for not only the survival of human beings but also for healthy lives.
B. Increasing food availability
Food availability concerns the quantities of foodstuffs, which are determined
by supply and demand. Generally, food insecurity at the global level is caused
more by the lack of access to food than by an insufficient supply of food.23 Food
insecurity regarding food quantities at the national level can be alleviated by trade
or food aids. In other words, enough food is available for everyone, but not
everyone can afford the price. However, the world is not guaranteed food
availability because of the potential increase of food demand and the uncertainty of
the food supply. The demand of food is expected to increase because of the
population and income growth of developing countries.24 The increased income
will raise the per capita calorie demand in developing countries to higher than a
17. Id. at V.
18. World Food Summit, Rome, Italy, Nov. 13-17, 1996, Rome Declaration on World Food
Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action, 1, WFS 96/REP (Nov. 17, 1996),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e0O.HTM.
19. FAO, 2 POLICY BRIEF ON FOOD SECURITY 1, 1 (June 2006),
ftp://fitp.fao.org/es/ESA/policybriefs/pbO2.pdf [hereinafter FAO POLICY BRIEF].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Amartya Sen, Famines, 8 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 613, 614 (1980).
24. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. ("OECD"), Trade & Agric. Directorate, Global Food
Security: Challenges for The Food and Agriculture System 69, TAD/CA/APM/WP(2012) 18/FINAL
(Apr. 23, 2013) [hereinafter OECD, Global Food Security].
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healthy level.25 According to these two factors, the global agricultural production
should increase substantially, at least by sixty percent compared with 2005-2007.26
However, increasing the food supply is challenging because of climate change.
Although the negative effect of climate change on agriculture is difficult to
estimate, the risk of increased food price is evident.27
To ensure food availability, developing countries should either limit the food
demand or increase the food supply. Developing countries have lower productivity
than that of developed countries. The yield gap can be closed by changing farm
sizes, improving management capacity, increasing access to input and output
markets, and increasing the effectiveness of input use. Improving productivity
requires national investment in agricultural research, technological development,
29
and agricultural education, which enables farmers to manage their farms and
outputs efficiently. In addition, expanding the land for agricultural use sustainably
can increase the supply of food. However, little or no room is found for the
expansion of arable land. 30 Arable lands are also subject to nonagricultural uses,
pollution, and erosion. Economic incentives are believed to resolve these
problems to some extent.
3 1
Much can be achieved toward reducing the excessive food demand, such as
minimizing supply-chain losses, biofuel consumption, and consumer wastes.
Developing countries have considerable food losses because of poor storage
facilities, inadequate infrastructure, and weak technical ability.3 2 Government and
private sectors are suggested to invest in the general infrastructure, harvest
techniques, and storage facilities.33 Governments, especially those of developed
countries, should remove the subsidies for biofuels, which are composed of raw
25. See FAO, WFP, & IFAD, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 17 (FAO 2012),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3027e/i3027e.pdf.
26. Sen, supra note 23.
27. See Gerlad Nelson et. al., The Role of International Trade in Climate Change Adaptation,
ICTSD-IPC PLATFORM ON CLIMATE CHANGE, AGRICULTURE AND TRADE 8-9 (Dec. 2009),
http://www.agritrade.org/documents/IssueBrief
4
.pdf.
28. Sen, supra note 23, at 27.
29. See Robert E. Evenson & Keith 0. Fuglie, Technology Capital: The Price ofAdmission to the
Growth Club, 33 J. PROD. ANAL.173, 189 (2009).
30. See generally Nikos Alexandratos & Jelle Bruinsma, World Agriculture Towards 2030/2050:
The 2012 revision, ESA Working Paper No. 12-03, FAO, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DIVISION (June 2012), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/esa/
Global_persepctives/worldag_ 2 0 30_50_2012_rev.pdf; Gilnther Fischer, World Food and Agriculture
to 2030/50: How Do Climate Change and Bioenergy Alter the Long-term Outlook for Food, Agriculture
and Resource Availability? (presented at the FAO Expert Meeting on How to Feed the World in 2050,
June 24-26, 2009), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/O12/ak972e/ak972eOO.pdf.
31. Sen, supra note 23, at 30.
32. See JENNY GUSTAVSSON ET AL., GLOBAL FOOD LOSSES AND FOOD WASTE: EXTENT, CAUSES
AND PREVENTION 11 (2011), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/suistainability/
pdf/GlobalFoodLosses andFoodWaste.pdf.
33. See GOV'T OFFICE FOR SCI., THE FUTURE OF FOOD AND FARMING: CHALLENGES AND
CHOICES FOR GLOBAL SUSTAINABiLITY, FINAL PROJECT REPORT 89 (London, 2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment-data/file/288329/1 1-546-future-
of-food-and-farming-report.pdf.
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materials competing with food.34 Regarding consumer wastes, developed countries
have a substantial responsibility to raise public awareness through campaigns and
advertising.35
In brief, developing countries can contribute to food availability by investing
in agricultural research and development ("R&D"), general infrastructure,
education, and the preservation of arable lands.
C. Ensuring access to food
Assuming that the quantities of food remain sufficient for the global demand,
access to food is the primary cause of food insecurity. 36 Access to food is limited
because of low income or high food prices, rather than an insufficient supply.3 7
Food aids can provide access to food; however, dependence on the courtesy of the
international community is not reliable in the long term. Two intuitive options
exist for developing countries: (1) reduce food prices or (2) increase incomes.
Suppressing food prices can secure access for consumers, but reducing producers'
income limits their access to food and reduces their incentive to invest in
production. A mutually beneficial strategy is to increase incomes in developing
countries, particularly the incomes of people living in rural areas.
In numerous developing countries, the agricultural sector causes growth and
developments in other sectors. Increasing the incomes in agricultural sectors might
be the most feasible way to reduce poverty. To achieve this, the competitiveness
of farmers must be improved; this requires investments that are specific to the
agricultural sector for research, infrastructure, and human capital.38 In addition,
diversifying the sources of incomes of farm households is an effective coping
strategy. The earnings outside the agricultural sector could be higher and more
stable. Moreover, policies must create opportunities outside the agricultural sector
for the farmers who cannot have a competitive future in this sector, and for those
who can earn more in other sectors. 39 In addition to the reforms for economic,
social protection can be provided to support access to food by protecting incomes
and increasing food security in the short term.4 ° Price support and input subsidies,
although prevalent in numerous countries, are ineffective at raising incomes.41
Similar to improving food availability, investments in the agricultural sector
can increase incomes and therefore ensure access to food. The social security net
can support access to food in the short term.
34. Sen, supra note 24, at 33.
35. See GUsTAvsSON ETAL., supra note 33, at 14.
36. See FAO POLICY BRIEF, supra note 19, at 1.
37. See id. at 4.
38. See OECD, Policy Framework for Investment in Agriculture 1, 4 (Mar. 2013),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/PFIAApri12013.pdf.
39. See Sen, supra note 23, at 63-64.
40. See Jonathan Brooks, Policy Coherence and Food Security: The Effects of OECD Countries'
Agricultural Policies, 44 FOOD POLICY 88, 93 (2014).
41. See OECD, MARKET EFFECTS OF CROP SUPPORT MEASURES 1, 32 (2001).
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D. Maintaining stability
The concept of stability focuses on the temporal dimension of food security.
The concerns with stability are the risks of losing food availability or access
because of sudden crises or cyclical events. The policy orientations of developing
countries are to increase the resilience to price volatility and the short-term
shortage of food supply. Several options exist; the first is trade liberalization.
Instability occurs mostly at the domestic level, and trade can be a stabilizing
mechanism.42 Compared with the agricultural output of individual countries, the
world output is substantially less variable; therefore, international trade can
maintain balance in global supply fluctuations. Some countries do not accept this
perception and fear that relying on trade would expose the domestic market to the
vagaries of the world market.43 However, analysis revealed the opposite: small
volumes of trade in agricultural products can cause increased price volatility at the
global level, because a small variation in supply can have a substantial impact on
the market as a result of a large share of world trade.44 For example, a two percent
decline in milled rice production constituted twenty-eight percent of the world
trade of rice in 2010.4 5 The impact on volatility would have been magnified if
there were a concentration on market suppliers.46 Furthermore, trade restriction
can be ineffective at protecting the domestic price from the negative impacts of
world price volatility and can only transfer the risk to others;47 therefore, trade
restriction is a typical beggar-thy-neighbor policy. To utilize trade for food
security, reducing import barriers and trade-distorting domestic supports and
prohibiting export subsidies are recommended.48
The second option for reducing price volatility is to provide transparency of
market information. Information on the current and future market situations can
substantially assist the market in functioning efficiently. Providing timely and
accurate data on food production, consumption, and stocks is suggested.49 The
third option is that future markets provide instruments to transfer the risk of
volatility and attract financial investors who are not in the agricultural
commodities market. Although speculators can have a negative impact on
42. Phil Abbott, Stabilisation Policies in Developing Countries after the 2007-08 Food Crisis, in
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES FOR POVERTY REDUCTION 109, 157(Jonathan Brooks ed., 2012).
43. See FAO, TRADE REFORMS, supra note 110, at 128.
44. See Sen, supra note 23, at 48.
45. Jonathan Brooks & Alan Matthews, Agricultural Trade and Food Security: Choosing
Between Trade And Non-Trade Policy Instruments, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1, 22, http://www.ictsdsymposium.org/wp-content/uploads/bsk-pdf-
manager/ 3 lBrooks-Matthews-Trade-Policy-and-Food-Security.pdf.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Will Martin & Kymn Anderson, Export Restrictions and Price Insulation During
Commodity Price Booms, 94 (2) AM. J. AGR. ECON. 422, 426-27 (2012).
48. FAO et al., Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets. Policy Responses 1, 26 (2011),
http://www.amis-
outlook.org/fileadmin/templates/AMIS/dcuments/InteragencyReport-to-the G20_onFoodPrice_V
olatility.pdf.
49. See id. at 21.
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stability, an appropriate regulatory scheme can ensure the function of future
markets as intended in terms of hedging and price discovering.50 The fourth option
is to use food stocks as a buffer for the adverse effect of volatility. Food stocks are
more prevalent in developing countries than developed countries despite the high
expenditure caused by the cost of appropriate storage infrastructure and of
purchasing foodstuffs.5' Compared with public food stocks, private food stocks
are believed to be more efficient.52 To encourage the investment in private
stocking in developing countries, providing credits for storage improvements by
the private sector is recommended. 3 To encourage the investment in private
stocking in developing countries, providing credits for storage improvements by
the private sector is recommended.54 Emergency reserves and social safety nets
are both fair options for helping those who are most vulnerable to price volatility in
the short term. 5
Finally, risk management is the long-term option to cope with the volatility.
Risk management primarily involves three types of activities, namely mitigation of
the risk, transfer of the risk, and coping with the impact of the realized risk.56 For
instance, a drought risk can be avoided using drought-resistant seeds. Insurance
and derivatives can assist farmers in transferring the risks to a third party. Disaster
risk financing provides ex ante protection for those affected by the realized risks.5 7
In developing countries, farmers with smaller businesses and even the
governments might not have the knowledge, assets, technology, and financial
instruments for risk management. Governments of developing countries and
private sectors should be provided with assistance in facilitating commodity
hedging, advisory services to strengthen in-country financial risk management
capacity, disaster risk financing, and assistance in modernizing meteorological
services.
58
E. Improving the utilization offood
The utilization of food focuses on the "state of nutritional wellbeing." 9 This
emphasizes the nutritional quality of diets and healthy food consumption.
Increasing the food supply or incomes cannot guarantee the utilization of food.
Cost-effective and efficient options are nutrition-specific interventions such as
information and education programs, the provision of health care services, and
clean water and sanitation infrastructures.60
50. See id. at 22.
51. See id. at 28.
52. See id. at 29.
53. See id. at 29.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 30, 65.
56. Id. at 67.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 36.
59. FAO POLICY BRIEF, supra note 19, at 1.
60. See GOV'T OFFICE FOR SC., supra note 33, at 116.
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In summary, three policy orientations exist that can contribute to food
security. First, poverty is the primary cause of food insecurity in developing
countries. Increasing the incomes of individuals can substantially secure access to
food. Second, regarding productivities, governments and the private sector are
encouraged to invest in agricultural R&D, education, and the rural institutional
environment. Third, additional resources should be deployed for the availability of
risk management tools.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WTO RULES ON FOOD SECURITY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
It is generally agreed that trade has a substantial impact, whether positive or
negative, on food security at national and global levels. Ideal trade rules can
increase the positive effects of trade and mitigate its negative effects on food
security. 61 The bottom line is that trade rules are to not prevent countries from
taking measures to ensure food security, such as the aforementioned strategies.
Trade in agriculture is closely associated with food security, a concern with
nontrade factors; therefore, trade in agriculture is different from the trade in other
sectors. The AoA provides the legal framework of trade in agriculture, which aims
to establish "a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system." 6' This
objective is pursued through "substantial progressive reductions in agricultural
support and protection." 63 The AoA comprises three essentials, namely market
access, reductions in domestic support, and reductions in export subsidies.
64
Supplementing the AoA, the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Measures
Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-
Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries ("NFIDC decision") 65 is
part of the legal framework. Another relevant provision is Article XI: 2(a) of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), which established an
exemption for the prohibition of export restrictions. 66 This section examines the
implication of the WTO rules on food security in developing countries and their
concerns.
A. Market access
The AoA requires members to convert all nontariff trade barriers ("NTBs")
67into tariffs. Furthermore, the tariffs, which converted from the NTBs, shall be
61. FAO, Food and International Trade, 3.4,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w2612e/w2612e12.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
62. AoA, supra note 4, at pmbl.
63. Id.
64. Id. at arts. 3 and 4.
65. Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme
on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement, at 60 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Decision on Measures].
66. GATT 1994, art. XI, para. 2(a), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT].
67. AoA, supra note 4, at art. 4(2).
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progressively reduced over the course of six years (1995-2000). The obligations
of developed countries are to reduce the tariffs by an average of thirty-six percent
and by fifteen percent for each tariff line,68 whereas the minimum reduction rate
for developing countries are an average of twenty-four percent and ten percent for
each tariff line.69 The amount of reductions is provided with precise percentages in
the members' individual tariff schedules. 70 To prevent the high tariffs converted
from the NTBs that might preserve or even further constrain the market access,
members are required to maintain the current market access or to provide the
minimum market access. 71 The current market opportunity must not be less than
the average annual import quantities for 1986-1988.72 Where there were no
significant imports, minimum market access opportunity is provided by the tariff
rate quotas ("TRQs"). The TRQs are applied to imports equivalent to five percent
of the domestic consumption in the base period of 1986-1988. 73 Because the
special safeguard provision does not require an "injury test," it provides members
more flexibility compared with the safeguard in Article XIX of GATT.74 The
requirement for the special safeguards is the trigger amount of imports or the
trigger price of imports and is less strict than that for ordinary safeguards.
75
However, the measures adopted under the special safeguard provision include no
quantitative restrictions.
As mentioned in the previous section, open markets can contribute to food
security in developing countries in two ways. First, importing products in demand
increases the availability of foods. Second, exporting agricultural products
increases incomes and therefore secures access to food. However, the AoA does
not guarantee fully open domestic markets. Committed members open their
domestic markets, but the extent of openness depends primarily on the willingness
of the members. In reality, the implementations of market access are criticized to
be disadvantageous for developing countries. Developing countries are provided
with limited market access to developed countries because developed countries
have adopted "dirty tariffication" that overestimate the tariff equivalences of
NTBs. 76 In addition, the obligation of tariff reductions for developed countries are
68. GATT Secretariat, Modalities for The Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under
the Reform Programme, 5, MTN.GNG/MA/W/24 (Dec. 20,1993).
69. ,Paola Fortucci, An Overview of the International Trade Policy Framework for Sugar, FAO
Cuba Conference (1999), http://www.fao.org/3/a-x4988e/x4988e08.htm (Last visited April 19, 2014).
70. Ian Sturgess, The Liberalisation Process in International Agricultural Trade: Market Access
and Export Subsidies, in NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES: AGRICULTURAL
TRADE AND THE MILLENNIUM WTO ROUND 135, 147 (Sanoussi Bilal & Pavlos Pezaros eds., 2000).
71. Id.
72. Decision on Measures, supra note 65, Annex 3, at 430.
73. Song Soo Lim & Ronald A. Babula, How Much is it Worth to Protect Sensitive Products with
Tariff-Rate Quotas- A Korean Case, 35 J. RURAL DEV. 83, 87 (2012).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 4, at 19-20; Dale E. Hathaway & Merlinda D. Ingco,
Agricultural Liberalization and the Uruguay Round, in URUGUAY ROUND AND DEVELOPING
ECONOMIES, 307 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS 15, 24 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds.,
1995).
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set at an average of thirty-six percent, with a minimum fifteen percent reduction
for each tariff line. 7 This modality enables the members to minimize the tariff
reduction of their most valued products, which are likely those produced or
consumed domestically in large amounts. Moreover, there were and still are
tariff escalations in several vital product chains;79 which could cause the foods
produced in developing countries to be less competitive in price, thereby impeding
their development. Furthermore, the minimum market access is modest and does
not require any imports. The members are not required to open their market to
new entrants because they can use the existing agreement of commodities on
concessionary terms, such as the agreements between the EU and ACP countries
on sugar parchments, to satisfy the requirement of the minimum market.80 Finally,
some developed countries abuse the special safeguards by setting a trigger price
81higher than that provided in the AoA. Most agricultural products in developed
countries are subject to the special safeguard provision, which is easily abused .8
Compared with developed countries, developing countries have adopted an
open attitude toward imports. The applied tariff rates are approximately fourfold
lower than the bound rates.83 Developing countries maintain this gap not merely
because they are cautious about committing large tariff cuts. A more substantial
reason is that they do not find maintaining high domestic food prices to be
politically feasible because of a large poor population, or that foreign loans are
conditional on low applied rates.84 If developed countries remain parsimonious
about the market access, developing countries would continue to be disadvantaged
and thus lose the opportunity to increase incomes from exports.
85
B. Export subsidies
Export subsidies are proven to distort trade and are prohibited except for trade
in agricultural products. The AoA prohibits the export subsidies, which are subject
to a reduction obligation, but it did not exist during the base period (1986-1990).86
77. Joseph F. Francois et al., Assessing the Uruguay Round, in URUGUAY ROUND AND
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, 307 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS 140,150-51 (Will Martin & L. Alan
Winters eds., 1995).
78. See Paper No. 4: Issues at Stake Relating to Agricultural Development, Trade and Food
Security, 27 (Symposium on Agriculture, Trade and Food Security) (Sept.1999),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x4829e/x4829e04.htm#TopOfPage [hereinafter Paper No. 4].
79. See id. at 28.
80. Joseph Francois et al., supra note 77, at 137.
81. AoA, supra note 4, art. 5.
82. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture,
Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL L.433, 463 (2002).
83. See FAO Commodities & Trade Division, Implementation ofAoA and other WTO
agreements, in WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: THE IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE-
DEVELOPING COUNTRY CASE STUDIES, tbl. 3 (2003),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4632e/y4632e04.htm#bmO4 [hereinafter FA0, Implementation of
AoA].
84. See id§ 2.1.
85. See OECD, Global Food Security, supra note 24, at 55.
86. AoA, supra note 4, at art. 3(3).
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Certain amounts of export subsidies are permissible. The AoA requires developed
countries to reduce the expenditures for export subsidies by thirty-six percent of
those expended in the base period, and to reduce the quantities of subsidized
exports by twenty-one percent. 87 According to the special and different treatment,
developing countries are provided with the leniency of reduction levels of twenty-
four percent and fourteen percent, respectively. The implementation period is
extended to ten years, which is four years longer than that allowed for developed
countries. 88 In addition, reduction obligations are limited to six types of export
subsidies. 89 Although members can adopt the export subsidies not listed in the
AoA, they should be applied in a manner which results in, or which threatens to
lead to, circumvention of reduction obligations. Neither should food aid be used to
disguise export subsidies.
90
The requirements for export subsidies are insufficient to mitigate the adverse
effects of export subsidies. Export subsidies of any type are detrimental to food
security in developing countries in several aspects. First, access to food might be
limited as a result of low incomes. The import surges caused by the export
subsidies reduce farmers' domestic market share. The increase of imports leads to
a decrease in local production, which is provided mostly by smallholder farms.
91
Losses in domestic market share substantially reduce the incomes in rural regions;
consequently, households in those areas might not afford the food bills. Although
imports can produce downward pressure on agricultural products, this tendency
does not necessarily compensate the loss of incomes. Furthermore, the developing
countries that depend on their exports of agricultural products would suffer from
the price reductions caused by export subsidies.92 The increased food price would
also benefit NFIDCs in the long term because substituting imports with domestic
produce would be economical, thereby causing domestic production to increase.
93
Second, export subsidies enable the exporting countries, most of which are
developed countries, to dump leftovers in developing countries. 94 The doubtful
nutritional quality of imported food raises concerns for the utilization of food. The
AoA provides little leverage if any, for developing countries to counter the
problem of export subsidies. It cannot require the WTO to prohibit export
subsidies because the export subsidies are permissible under a certain level. Nor
can developing countries rely on their own export subsidies because they cannot
afford the expenditures. Even if they could, the permissible amounts of export
87. GATT Secretariat, supra note 68, at Annex 8, 5(a).
88. Id. 15.
89. AoA, supra note 4, at art. 9(1).
90. Id. at art. 10.
91. James Thuo Gathii, Food Sovereignty for Poor Countries in the Global Trading System, 57
Loy. L. REv. 509, 526-27 (2011).
92. Mark Ritchie & Kristin Dawkins, WTO Food and Agricultural Rules: Sustainable Agriculture
and the Human Right to Food, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 9, 24 (2000).
93. See Tashi Kaul, The Elimination of Export Subsidies and the Future of Net-Food Importing
Developing Countries in the WTO, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 383, 398 (2000).
94. Ritchie & Dawkins, supra note 94, at 16-17; OECD, Global Food Security, supra note 24, at
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subsidies would be modest because they have granted almost no subsidies during
the base years, 95 and therefore the base for calculation is low or equal to zero.
Regarding the stability of food, the requirements of export subsidies are too
strict for developing countries to manage public stockholding schemes. In the case
of a high level of stock, governments prefer to sell the stocks to save the
expenditures of keeping it. 96 However, they are unlikely to do so to avoid
substantial price reductions in the domestic market that might lead to a decrease in
production in the long term.97 According to the AoA, they also cannot export the
stocks at prices lower than the domestic level, 98 which might be higher than the
international level because of public stockholding schemes. Some developing
countries encounter difficulties in disposing the surplus of stocks.
9 9
C. Domestic supports
It is widely agreed that domestic support can distort trade. However, instead
of prohibiting domestic supports, the AoA requires members to reduce domestic
supports to a certain extent. 100 The amount of domestic supports is expressed as
the aggregate measurement of supports ("AMS"), which is considered trade
distorting and is called "amber box subsidies."' 01 A developed country is obliged
to reduce twenty percent of its total AMS during the base period (1986-1988) over
six years, whereas a developing country is obliged to reduce it by fourteen percent
over ten years. 10 2 The precise amount of reduction is provided in the member's
schedule.' 
03
Four types of domestic supports can be exempted from the AMS and thereby
free from the obligation of reduction. The first type is exemptions particularly for
developing countries. Developing countries are allowed to provide domestic
support for agricultural and rural development, investment subsidies, input
subsidies for poor producers, and diversification from growing illicit narcotic
crops. 10 4 The second type is known as the "blue box," which covers direct
payment under production-limiting programs. 10 5 The third exemption is the de
minimis threshold. For developing countries, the threshold for product-specific
subsidies is five percent of the total value of the production of subsidized
products. 10 6 In the case of non-product specific subsidies, the threshold is five
95. FAO, Implementation ofAoA, supra note 83, at § 2.3.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Tashi Kaul, supra note 93, at 397.
99. FAO, Implementation ofAoA, supra note 83, at § 2.3.
100. AoA, supra note 4, at art. 6(1).
101. Agriculture Negotiations: Background Fact Sheet, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/agric_e/agboxese.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) [hereinafter
Agriculture Negotiations].
102. GATT Secretariat, supra note 68, 5, 8, 11, & 15.
103. AoA, supra note 4, at art. l(h)(i).
104. Id. art. 6(2).
105. Id. art. 6(5); Agriculture Negotiations, supra note 101.
106. AoA, supra note 4, at art. 6(4)(a)(i).
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percent of the value of the total agricultural production in the subsidizing
country.10 7 The threshold for developing countries is ten percent of the value of
their individual total agricultural production.10 8 The fourth type of reduction-free
domestic support is enumerated in Annex 2 of the AoA, which is referred to as
"green box" subsidies.109
Domestic supports are not always detrimental to food security. They could be
as harmful as export subsidies are to the food security in developing countries if
the subsidized product exports or the imports from developing countries must
compete with those that are subsidized. By contrast, the domestic supports for
agricultural R&D and rural development are beneficial to developing countries in
food availability and food access.'" From the perspective of developing countries,
the AoA limits their policy space on subsidies but cannot efficiently reduce the
subsidies in developed countries. First, the developed countries seemed to design
the requirements of domestic support so that they can maintain existing subsidies
to the maximum."' For instance, the blue box subsidies are used mostly by
developed countries and they account for a large portion of the domestic
supports. 12 Developing countries must still contend with problems caused by
heavily subsidized products. Second, the domestic supports in the green box
probably are not less trade distorting and neutral for production as they are
required to be. In addition, numerous developing countries have limited financial
ability to provide such supports, whereas developed countries avoid their reduction
obligation through the green box. It might be desirable for developing countries to
clarify, and perhaps tighten, the definition of supports in the green box.' Third,
many developing countries cannot use de minimis threshold for the amber box
subsidies, which are defined in Article 6 but do not fall within the blue or green
box, because they did not claim domestic supports during the base period." 4 In
other words, they cannot grant domestic supports in excess of the de minimis
level.1 5 Finally, the domestic supports of developing countries easily exceed the
de minimis level because they have high inflation rate and the baseline AMS is
calculated based on fixed prices during 1986-1988. 116 The depreciation of
exchange rates further aggravates the problem." 7 From the perspective of
developing countries, the AoA increases the negative aspects of domestic supports.
107. Id.
108. Id at art. 6(4)(b).
109. Agriculture Negotiations, supra note 101.
110. See supra Part II.
111. See Gonzalez, supra note 82, at 455.
112. See id at 464.
113. See Paper No. 4, supra note 78, 18.
114. See Panos Konandreas & Jim Greenfield, Policy Options for Developing Countries to Support
Food Security in the Post-Uruguay Round Period, 15 CANADIAN J. OF DEV. STUD. 141, 149 (1998).
115. See Paper No. 4, supra note 78, 14.
116. GATT Secretariat, supra note 68, 8.
117. SeePaperNo. 4, supra note 78, § 2.2.
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D. Export restrictions
The GATT exempts the export restrictions "temporarily applied to prevent or
relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs" ' 1 8 from the obligations of quantitative
restrictions. Regarding shortage of foodstuffs at the domestic level, an intuitive
solution is to restrict exports if the food production cannot satisfy the short-term
demands. However, export restrictions cannot always help the domestic market to
meet food demands. Export restrictions are effective only if the productions of the
country with the restrictions can meet the demands, and if that country is a medium
or large economy.1 9 Furthermore, the export restrictions implemented by a large
economy can cause a price surge that will affect other countries. 120 Studies have
shown that export restrictions amplified the price increase in food crises.' 2 ' To
some extent, export restrictions are therefore responsible for the distrust in relying
food availability on trade.'
22
Export restrictions are detrimental to food availability and increase price
volatility in food crises. Export restrictions have substantial implication on food
security in both developed and developing countries. The optimal option is to ban
such restrictions. The shortage in food can be countered by direct and targeted
supports for financially vulnerable people.'
23
E. NFIDC decision
In the Uruguay Round negotiations, the negotiators were concerned that the
reform required by the AoA could have negative effects on least-developed
countries and NFIDCs. They worried that the reform would increase the prices of
basic foodstuffs and that the food aid would decrease simultaneously. In other
words, the concern was the availability of basic foodstuffs from external resources
on reasonable conditions and terms.124 To respond to the concerns, the NFIDC
decision provides four mechanisms: (1) food aid, (2) short-term financing of
normal levels of commercial imports, (3) favorable terms for agricultural export
credits, and (4) technical and financial assistance in improving agricultural
productivity and infrastructure. 125 All these mechanisms can substantially
contribute to food security. However, the NFIDC decision was not implemented
satisfactorily. 1
26
In summary, the WTO rules have positive and negative effects on food
118. GATT, art. XI (2)(a), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 1-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
119. Antoine Boudt & David Laborde Debucquet, The Economics of Export Taxes in the Context
of Food Crisis, in ECONOMIC IMPACT OF EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON RAW MATERIALS 59, 62-63
(OECD, 2010).
120 Id. at 65.
121. Id. at 67-72.
122. See Price Volatility, supra note 48, 25.
123. See id.
124. See Decision on Measures, supra note 65, 2
125. Christine Kaufmann & Simone Heri, Liberalizing Trade in Agriculture and Food Security-
Mission Impossible?, 40 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1039, 1047 (2007).
126. Id. at 1048.
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security as a result of compromises among members. The implementations of the
market access are criticized to favor developed countries. Compared with
developed countries, developing countries have adopted an open attitude toward
imports. Developed countries should provide adequate market access. Otherwise,
developing countries will continue to be disadvantaged and therefore lose the
opportunity to increase incomes from exports. Export subsidies of any type are
clearly detrimental to the food security in developing countries. Export subsidies
should be prohibited in any event. Regarding the stability of food, the
requirements of export subsidies should provide additional policy space for
developing countries to manage public stockholding schemes. Domestic supports
are not always detrimental to food security. From the perspective of developing
countries, the AoA limits their subsidies but cannot efficiently reduce the subsidies
in developed countries. The situation should be changed. Export restrictions are
detrimental to food availability and increase the price volatility in food crises.
Export restrictions should be banned. The NFIDC decision provides mechanisms
that can substantially contribute to food security. Implementation of the decision
should be improved.
Iv. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE BALI DECISIONS TO FOOD SECURITY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
The rules for the trade in agriculture are incomplete and the negotiations must
continue as instructed in Article 20 of AoA. The Doha Ministerial Declaration
provided that the members commit themselves to improving market access,
removing all forms of export subsidies, and reducing trade-distorting domestic
support. 127 In addition, the members committed to provide developing countries
special and different treatments that enable them to address the concerns of food
security and rural development.' 28 In the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, the
members reiterated the goals of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and further
clarified the approaches. Regarding domestic supports, the members agreed that
members with higher levels of permitted support should have more reductions.
129
Regarding export subsidies, members committed to ensure the elimination of
export subsidies by the end of 2013.130 There were promises for tariff cuts. The
developing countries were granted the "flexibility to self-designate an appropriate
number of tariff lines as Special Products guided by indicators based on the criteria
of food security, livelihood security and rural development." 131 They were
promised to "have the right to have recourse to a Special Safeguard Mechanism
based on import quantity and price triggers, with precise arrangements to be
further defined."' 132 Because the "draft modality" failed to be adopted in 2008, the
127. See Haberli, supra note 8, at 4.
128. See id
129. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, 5, WT/MN(05)/DEC/1, (2005)
[hereinafter Doha Work Programme].
130. Id. 6.
131. Id. 7.
132. Id.
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progress for developing countries seemed to diminish.
Despite the setbacks, the developing countries continued to mention concerns
in the negotiations on agriculture. 133 The developing countries are in groups and
submitted the G-33 proposal134 and G20 proposals, 135 which were the basis for
discussion and were partially adopted in the Bali Package. The issues discussed
are the tariff-rate quota ("TRQ") administration, green box exemptions, and further
restrictions on export subsidies. The critical concern in this section is whether the
Bali decisions can contribute to food security as expected by developing countries.
A. Market access
For food security, market access should be available to developing countries
because the increase of exports can increase incomes, thereby ensuring access to
food. No commitments were made to grant increased market access, except the
soft appeal for improvement as provided in the Ministerial Decision on Duty-Free
and Quota-Free Market Access for Least Developed Countries. Developed
countries and some developing countries are not obliged but encouraged to provide
duty-free and quota-free market access to least-developed countries, as they have
committed, before the next Ministerial Conference. 136 Regarding agricultural
products, the members did not commit to providing further tariff concession;
instead, the focus was on the "fill rates" of tariff quota. When the tariff quota is
under-filled with no apparent commercial reason, the members shall relocate the
unused tariff quota to the holders who would actually import. 13' The Bali
decisions have accomplished little in increasing market access. The problems of
the implementation of the AoA remain unsolved.
B. Export subsidies
Export subsidies are detrimental to food security because the artificially low
prices as a result of export subsidies decrease the incomes of farmers and
discourage investments in agriculture. There was a proposed deadline for the
elimination of export subsidies, which has been expired and for that the members
showed some regrets. 138 The Declaration on Export Competition attempted to
133. See generally Biswajit Dhar & Roshan Kishore, Prospects of the Bali Ministerial Conference
(working paper for Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade) (Nov. 2013),
http://www.ris.org.in/images/R1S_images/pdf/wpl 3613.pdf.
134. See generally Committee on Agricultural Special Session, G-33 Non-Paper, JOB/AG/25 (Oct.
3, 2013) [hereinafter G-33 Non-Paper].
135. See generally Committee on Agricultural Special Session, Ministerial Decision of 21 April
2013, JOB/AG/24, (2013), http://www.onuperu.org/wto/wto/g20_2.pdf [hereinafter Duty-Free and
Quota-Free, April 2013]; Committee on Agricultural Special Session, Ministerial Decision of 7
December 2013, WT/MIN(13)/39, WT/L/914 (2013) [hereinafter Understanding on Tariff Quota
Administration].
136. See WTO, Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, WT/MIN(13)/44, WT/L/919 (2013)
[hereinafter Duty-Free and Quota-Free, December 2013]
137. Understanding on Tariff Rate Quota Administration, supra note 135, 9.
138. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 7 December 2013, WT/MIN (13)/40, WT/L/915 2 (2013)
[hereinafter Export Competition].
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recover the efforts by including the draft modalities for agriculture as an
imperative basis for a final agreement.' 39 Increased commitment was made as "we
shall exercise utmost restraint with regard to any recourse to all forms of export
subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect.' 140 Hence, the members
agreed to eliminate the export subsidies, to keep the level of subsidies lower than
members' commitments on export subsidies and to discipline use of all export
measures with equivalent effect of export subsidies. 141 The members also
committed to enhance transparency and monitor export subsidies. Furthermore,
they agreed to discuss the concerns annually.
142
Although some progress seems to have been made, the commitments are
superficial rather than substantial. In the final paragraph of this decision, the
members emphasized that the terms of this declaration do not affect members'
rights and obligations. 143 Nor shall they be used to interpret their rights and
obligations. In other words, the constraints on export subsidies depend on the
good will of the members; which might be unpractical. The members could have
inserted stronger obligation in the declaration if they had intended to reduce or
eliminate export subsidies.
C. Domestic supports: Green box exemptions
Domestic support has both positive and negative impacts on food security.
The subsidies for R&D, rural development, and risk management mechanism can
improve productivity, increase incomes, and increase stability, all of which
contribute to food security at national and at global levels. 144 However, subsidies
on products or price supports distort the market and are as harmful as export
subsidies. The Bali Package contains two decisions concerning the green box
exemptions, which are described as the triumph of developing countries for food
security. 145 This observation is true according to the Ministerial Decision on
General Services. The members clarified that the list of general service programs
provided in paragraph two of Annex 2 in the AoA is only illustrative. 146 The list
includes programs related to land reforms and rural livelihood security for rural
development and poverty alleviation. 147 This decision could provide substantial
flexibility for developing countries to fulfill the policy suggestions proposed by the
FAO, which are known as the "twin-track approach"' 148 for alleviating hunger
139. Id. 3.
140. Id. 8.
141. Id.
142. Id. 10-1.
143. Id. 13
144. See supra Part II
145. See, e.g., Historic WTO Deal on India's Terms, Food Security StandPrevails, NDTV, Dec. 7,
2013, http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/historic-wto-deal-on-indias-terms-food-security-stand-prevails-
543628.
146. See WTO, Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, WT/MIN (13)/37, WT/L/912 (2013)
[hereinafter General Service].
147. See generally, id.
148. The FAO explains the content of the two tracks: "[T]he first track addresses recovery
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combined with sustainable agricultural and rural development with targeted
programs for enhancing direct access to food for the most needy. This could also
satisfy the measures for risk management tools used to increase the resilience to
price volatility and the shortage of supply. If the term "rural livelihood security"
could be interpreted to allow increased policy flexibility, the decision could
substantially harmonize the potential conflicts between disciplines on domestic
supports and the need for food security.
Optimism should not be excessive regarding the potential achievements of the
Ministerial Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purpose. This
decision altered no existing rules provided in the AoA. The public food
stockholding program for food security purposes are obligated to follow the
criteria set forth in Annex 2 as well as its footnotes, particularly the procurement
price at the current market price. 149 However, the advantages of the public food
stockholding programs are derived from a higher and more predictable price than
that available in the open market. By providing a higher price, farmers can obtain
increased incomes and are therefore encouraged to invest in the improvement of
production. 150 The implication of paragraph two would be that developing
countries might exceed their AMS ceilings, which are low, as a result of the public
food stockholding programs. The ministerial decision provides only the "peace
clause,"' 5 1 which provides developing countries a four-year time out, expiring on
the eleventh ministerial conference, for exemption from the dispute settlement
challenges. 152 A public food stocking program is eligible for the peace clause, if it
is notified to the Committee of Agriculture with the required information, meets
the requirements in Annex 2, and does not distort trade and adversely affect the
food security of other members. 153
Comparing this ministerial decision with the G-33 proposal, the peace clause
seems to be agreeable for developing countries. The members agreed only to
refrain from bringing the claim before the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). If
any member insists to raise a claim, the DSB has no choice but to commence the
measures for establishing resilient food systems. Factors that affect food system resilience include the
structure of the food economy as a whole, as well as its components such as agricultural production,
technology, the diversification of food processing, markets and consumption. [The second track]
assesses the options for providing support to vulnerable groups." FAO, POLICY BRIEF, supra note 18,
at 3.
149. WTO, Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, 2, WT/MIN (13)/38, WT/L/913 (2013)
[hereinafter Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes].
150. See Christophe Bellmann et al., G-33 Proposal: Early Agreement on Elements of The Draft
Doha Accord to Address Food Security, ICTSD PROGRAMME ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, INFORMATION NOTE, 1, 4 (Sept. 2013),
http://www.ictsd.org/themes/agriculture/research/g-33-proposal-early-agreement-on-elements-of-the-
draft-doha-accord-to.
151. G-33 Non-paper, supra note 136, at 2.
152. See FAO, POLICY BRIEF, supra note 18.
153. G-33 Non-paper, supra note 136; Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, supra note
149, 2-4.
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procedures. 154 Furthermore, it might be difficult for the public stockholding
programs to fulfill all the conditions for the peace clause. They have a large
possibility of either distorting trade or affecting the food security of others in a free
trade market.1 55 A more constructive statement is the promise to commence a
Working program that strives for a permanent solution for public stockholding.
The implication of the public food stockholding on food security is still under
debate, and further discussion is warranted. 156
V. CONCLUSION
Some policy orientations can increase food security in developing countries.
Developing countries can contribute to the food availability by investing in
agricultural R&D, general infrastructure, education, and the preservation of arable
lands. Similar to the improvement of food availability, investments in the
agricultural sector can increase incomes and therefore secure access to food. The
social security net is a complement that can support access to food in the short
term. To utilize trade for food security, recommendations include reducing import
barriers and trade-distorting domestic supports and prohibiting all export subsidies.
Regarding utilization of food, the cost-effective and efficiency options are
nutrition-specific interventions such as information and education programs, the
provision of health care services, and clean water and sanitation infrastructures.
The WTO rules have positive and negative effects on food security as result
of compromises among the members. The implementations of the market access
are criticized to favor developed countries. Compared with developed countries,
developing countries have adopted an open attitude toward imports. Developed
countries should provide adequate market access. Otherwise, developing countries
will continue to be disadvantaged and therefore lose the opportunity to increase
incomes from exports. Export subsidies of any type are clearly detrimental to the
food security in developing countries. Export subsidies should be prohibited.
Regarding the stability of food, the requirements of export subsidies should
provide increased flexibility for developing countries to manage public
stockholding schemes. Domestic supports are not always detrimental to food
security. From the perspective of developing countries, the AoA limits their
subsidies but cannot efficiently reduce the subsidies in developed countries. The
situation should be changed. Export restrictions are detrimental to food
availability and increase the price volatility in food crises. Export restrictions
should be banned. The NFIDC decision provides mechanisms that could
substantially contribute to food security. However, implementation of the decision
should be improved.
The Bali decisions and declarations have made some but limited progress in
regards to food security. The Bali decisions have accomplished little in increasing
154. See FAO, TRADE REFORM, supra note 10, at 9.
155. See Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, supra note 149, at 6.
156. FAO, The Bali Package-Implications for Trade and Food Security, FAO Trade Policy
Briefs No. 16, http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/i3658e/i3658e.pdf.
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market access; therefore, no improvement of incomes can be expected in the rural
areas of developing countries. The problems of the implementation of the AoA
remain unsolved. Regarding export subsidies, there seems to be some progress,
but the commitments are superficial rather than substantial. Regarding domestic
supports, developing countries have obtained the advantage by extending the green
box exemptions for rural development and poverty alleviation. Optimism should
not be excessive regarding the potential achievements of the Ministerial Decision
on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purpose, because the peace clause might
not have substantial function. In summary, developing countries have gained
progress but remain disadvantaged. In general, the Bali decisions and declaration
regarding agriculture are repeating the past agreements and promises to work on
for a balance between trade and food security. It seems too early for developing
countries to feel safe about food security.

THE END OF HIBERNATION OF STABILIZATION CLAUSE IN
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: REASSESSING ITS CONTRIBUTION TO
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
ALISHER UMIRDINOV*
I. INTRODUCTION
An unending quest for legal stability in a host country through balancing an
investor's legitimate expectation and enough policy space for a sovereign state to
legislate and regulate the formers' activity' is endemic in the developing world.
The zeal of foreign investors in exploring untapped reserves of host countries and
the need for attracting foreign direct investment into potential economic sectors of
the economy have forced both foreign investors and host countries to attempt to
reach a consensus somewhere. The insertion of a stabilization clause2 into an
investment contract is where the consensus of both parties meets.3 The once hotly-
debated stabilization clause that could often be seen in state contracts between host
" Alisher Umirdinov is a designated assistant professor at the Institute of Advanced Research, Nagoya'
University.
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1. Kamal Hossain, Chapter 14 Preface: Are Stabilization Clauses a Threat to Sustainable
Development?, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 329 (Marie-Claire
Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2011).
2. The literature is abundant and continuing to increase. Some of these are as listed below in
chronological order. See generally Samuel K. B. Asante, Stability of Contractual Relations in the
Transnational Investment Process, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 401 (1979); Thomas W. Waelde & George
Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law Versus Contract
Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 215 (1996); Margarita T. B. Coale, Stabilization Clauses in
International Petroleum Transactions, 30 DENV. J. INTL'L L. & POL'Y 217 (2002); Bertrand
Montembault, The Stabilisation of State Contracts Using the Example of Oil Contracts: A Return of the
Gods of Olympia?, 6 INT'L BUS. L.J. 593 (2003); A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, The Pursuit of Stability in
International Energy Investment Contracts: A Critical Appraisal of the Emerging Trends, 1 J. WORLD
ENERGY L. & BUS. 121 (2008); Andrea Shemberg, Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights: A
Research Project Conducted for IFC and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Business and Human Rights (2008) [hereafter U.N. IFC report]; Lorenzo Cotula, Pushing
the Boundaries vs Striking a Balance: The Scope and Interpretation of Stabilization Clauses in Light of
the Duke v. Peru Award, 11 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 27 (2010); Peter D. Cameron, Reflections
on Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Enforcement of Stabilization Clauses, in YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2011-2012 311 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2013).
3. See Cameron, supra note 2, at 334 ("Indeed, in many cases a government's refusal to accept a
stabilization clause will be sufficient to persuade a company or lender to withdraw from the proposed
investment."). See also Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389, 450-52
(1977); Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 56 I.L.R. 258, 276 (1978)
(showing how international arbitration tribunals underlined the importance of providing stabilization to
investors in order to persuade investors to invest for both developing countries).
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states and foreign investors entered a long period of hibernation beginning in the
1980s. 4 Several factors-such as the end of a nationalization wave in the third
world, the collapse of the Soviet Union, fierce competition for foreign investment,
and tribunals' continuous supportive approach for its validity-might be
considered decisive for this temporal pacific period.5
After almost twenty years of inaction, in the wake of resource nationalism,
the stability clause has again emerged in investment arbitration. However, this
time around the problem was not whether the stability clause had legally binding
force against states' contractual undertakings, but rather, in defining the legitimate
scope of states' discretionary powers vis-A-vis the foreign investor. This paper will
argue that a stabilization clause has accomplished its investment protection task
excellently. First and foremost, the host countries believed the stability clause to
be an indispensable and persuasive tool for attracting necessary foreign investment
in risky environments. Second, investors relied on the stabilization clause even
more so due to the fact that investment tribunals in the twenty-first century have
unanimously considered it valid and legally binding, with compensation necessary
upon its breach. Though there are some open-ended questions, which remain to be
answered, the stability clause contributed enormously to the "sustainable
development" of host states6 by stabilizing host states' legal regimes and giving
confidence to foreign investors who are very vulnerable to political and legal
risks. 7 Hence, there is a strong belief, which exists in host states, that legal
stabilization tools have given significant contribution to the host state's economy.8
4. The word "hibernation" in this article refers to the disappearance of disputes on stabilization
clause in arbitration tribunals' decisions.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. Although the soft law concept of sustainable development is widely recognized by states, no
consensus has been reached on its precise meaning. For a detailed discussion on the various definitions
of sustainable development, see JENNIFER A. ELLIOTT, AN INTRODUCTION TO SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 6-14 (Tony Binns ed., 3d ed. 2006). The most frequently cited 1987 Brundtland Report
defines it as a "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs." GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND, REPORT OF THE WORLD
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: OUR COMMON FUTURE, ch. 2, para. 1 (1987).
However, this definition is far from clear to help understand the connection between foreign investment
and host states' development. For the author and the purposes of this paper, the Monterrey Consensus
best illustrates the relationship between foreign investment and development. See Monterrey
Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mex., Mar. 18-
22, 2002, Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, 20, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 198/11, quoted in Markus Gehring & Andrew Newcombe, An Introduction to Sustainable
Development in World Investment Law, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW,
supra note 1, at 9 ("Private international capital flows, particularly foreign direct investment, along with
international financial stability, are vital complements to national and international development efforts.
Foreign direct investment contributes toward financing sustained economic growth over the long
term.").
7. Cameron, supra note 2, at 316 (noting that as an instrument "for mitigating political risk,"
these clauses are currently in wider use compared to any preceding periods).
8. See Paushok v. Mongolia, Ad hoc/UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 226
(Hague 2011), http://www.italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf, UN. IFC report, supra note 2,
21; Camilo A. Rodriguez-Yong & Karol X. Martinez-Mufloz, The Andean Approach to Stabilisation
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A correctly drafted state contract neither limits a state's bona fide public policy
measures, nor does it put investors under the pressure of arbitrary actions of the
host state. 9 In particular, this new type of stabilization clause, namely, an
economic equilibrium clause or renegotiation clause ("EEC") leaves enough room
for both parties to maneuver the stabilization clause according to its own needs.
10
Despite the fact that no known arbitral award intensively dealt with EEC to date,'
I
recent cases have begun exploring this new type of stabilization clause. For
instance, in a landmark case in 2012, an ICSID tribunal judged the obligatory
nature of correction factors in EECs.12 That investment arbitration jurisprudence
has also strengthened EECs' role in mega-projects.
This paper is organized as follows. After a short introduction in Section II,
Section II will present an overview of the stabilization clause, its rationale,
validity, and effect, its long hibernation period, and what factors led it to end this
phenomenon. Section III will deal with an emergence of a completely new
generation of stabilization clauses, namely EECs in practice and also in investment
arbitration. The paper will also explore its legal content, analyze two
unprecedented empirical surveys on stabilization clauses, and some investment
arbitration cases. Section IV will indicate other factors that widely strengthened
acceptance of stabilization clauses briefly. By way of an example, the unique legal
contribution of Latin American countries-their legal stability agreements,
Clauses, 6 INT'L J. PRIVATE L. 67, 74 (2013) (showing how Columbian and Peruvian Constitutional
Courts perceived Legal Stabilization Agreements as a tool for fostering economic development through
promoting foreign investment flow into those countries).
9. This has been pointed out in past research several times. See, e.g., Lorenzo Cotula,
Reconciling Regulatory Stability and Evolution of Environmental Standards in Investment Contracts:
Towards a Rethink of Stabilization Clauses, 1 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 158, 172-75 (2008);
Evaristus Oshionebo, Stabilization Clauses in Natural Resource Extraction Contracts: Legal, Economic
and Social Implications for Developing Countries, 10 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 1, 30-31
(2010); Antony Crockett, Stabilization Clauses and Sustainable Development: Drafting for the Future,
in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 516, 531-37 (Chester Brown & Kate
Miles eds., 2011); Antoine P. Martin, Stability in Contemporary Investment Law: Reconsidering the
Role and Shape of Contractual Commitments in Light of Recent Trends, 10 MANCHESTER J. INT'L
ECON. L. 38, 52-58 (2013). For the paper that analyzed the stabilization clause from the perspective of
protection of foreign investors' rights, see A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, Drafting Stabilisation Clauses in
International Energy Contracts: Some Pitfalls for the Unwary, 5 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L.
INTELLIGENCE, 1 (2007).
10. See Linnet Mafukidze, Legislative Drafting Tools for Stabilization Provisions and Economic
Balancing Provisions, 12 EUR. J. L. REFORM 58, 60 (2010).
11. Indeed, this fact is acknowledged and to some extent expected by many writers in the field.
Cameron, supra note 2, at 342 ("Modem stabilization clauses of whatever variety or combination are
much more likely to be tested in disputes about the applicability of fiscal measures to investments rather
than ones in which the host country intends to confiscate the entire investment or most of it."); ERKAN
MUSTAFA, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INVESTMENT LAW: STABILITY THROUGH CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES
220 (2011) ("[A]s far as this author is aware, equilibrium clause have yet to be tested in arbitral
tribunals or in the courts, so it is a bit early to comment on the effectiveness of such clauses.").
12. Burlington Res., Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Liability
(Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl 094_0.pdf.
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stabilization norms in a domestic law of host states, and international investment
treaties' relevant substantive norms will also be surveyed. This paper will also
show how investment tribunals abandoned discussing validity of stabilization
clauses, moving surprisingly towards the examination of content of stabilization
clauses and interpreted them in unprecedented depth. As a reminder, the author
wishes to confess that since natural resource foreign investors often employ this
tool, the absolute majority of past research related to the stabilization clause is also
on natural resource foreign investment. Although the stabilization clause is also
widely used in other fields of economic activity,1 3 frequent referral to the natural
resource sector is unavoidable.
II. TRADITIONAL STABILIZATION CLAUSES
In this section, the content of traditional stabilization clauses, their validity
and effectiveness, and their historical trajectory is examined. The brief history
covers issues like the scope of coverage of the stabilization clauses, the rationale
behind host states' consent, and the main types of classical forms of a stabilization
clause. 14 This section will briefly pay attention to the hotly debated legal issues
surrounding the stabilization clause which center on its validity and effectiveness.
Next, in subsections B and C, the factors resulting in a long hibernation are
presented, followed by the end of hibernation.
A. Short Overview
As one of the techniques for stabilization of the contractual relationship, a
stabilization clause indicates the contractual clauses in private contracts between
foreign investors and host states that address the variety of issues with changes in
law-from amendment of the host state's laws to changes of interpretation of laws
by judicial bodies in the host state during the terms of the contract. 15 It may cover
all areas of regulation or limited to certain types of issues. 16 It may take the shape
13. See U.N. IFC report, supra note 2, 16, 47 (holding that in addition to extractive industry,
the stabilization clauses often can be seen in long-term private contracts for public infrastructure and
essential services, such as public transportation, water, and power industries).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See Host Government Agreement Between and Among the Government of Georgia and [the
MEP Participants], app. 1, art. 7.2(x), HOU03:648165.19 (Apr. 28, 2000)
Georgia defined "Change in Law" as follows:
changes resulting from the amendment, repeal, withdrawal, termination or expiration of
Georgian Law, the enactment, promulgation or issuance of Georgian Law, the interpretation
or application of Georgian Law (whether by the courts, the executive or legislative
authorities, or administrative or regulatory bodies), the decisions, policies or other similar
actions of judicial bodies, tribunals and courts, the State Authorities, jurisdictional
alterations, and the failure or refusal of judicial bodies, tribunals and courts, and/or the State
Authorities to take action, exercise authority or enforce Georgian Law...
Id. This can be considered one of the most elaborate types of stabilization clause to date. Similar
provisions can be found in the Turkish and the Azeri Host Government Agreements as well. See Host
Government Agreement Between and Among the Government of the Republic of Turkey and [the MEP
Participants], app. 2, HOU03:560379.41 (Nov. 16, 1999).
16. For the detailed survey on taxonomy of stabilization clauses, see Montembault, supra note 2,
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of a special clause in a contract or it may be concluded as an entirely distinct
agreement. Indeed, a recent investment treaty arbitration case defined it (in the
context of Mongolia) as "an agreement between a State and an investor for the
purpose of stabilizing (freezing), at least to a certain extent and for a certain period
of time, the taxes payable by an investor and/or other legislative, regulatory or
administrative measures affecting it." 17 The beginnings of the usage of a
stabilization clause by Anglo-American lawyers' 8 can be tracked to the 1930s in
private contracts or concessions between U.S. firms operating in Latin America.
19
Nowadays, it is very widely used by foreign investors in not only the developing
world, but in some Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") countries as well.20
A recent U.N. International Finance Corporation ("IFC") study of the
stabilization clause argued that not many OECD countries consent to the adoption
of stabilization clauses in their contracts with foreign investors because of their
internal constitutional orders, which do not let a former government conclude the
agreements that bind the next government.2 1  For instance, developed market
economies do not see themselves to be bound by contract with a foreign investor,
since it is opposite from their constitutional framework.22 Then why do developing
and transitional countries widely consent to insertion of a stability clause in private
contracts? Scholars enumerate several reasons, such as fragile and weak legal
systems of most of the developing world; 23 high political risk;24 investors' and
at 617-40.
17. Sergeu Paushok v. Mongolia, Ad hoc/UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 97
(2011), http://www.italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf.
18. See Montembault, supra note 2, at 595.
19. Arbitration Tribunal: Award in the Matter of an Arbitration between Kuwait and the
American Independent Oil Company, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1051-52 (1982) (G. Fitzmaurice, Arb., opinion).
20. See Daniel E. Vielleville & Baiju Simal Vasani, Sovereignty over Natural Resources Versus
Rights Under Investment Contracts: Which One Prevails?, 5 TRANSNAT'L DISPUTE MGMT., 11 (2008)
("most foreign investors today demand the inclusion of contractual guaranties aimed at maintaining the
legal status in force at the time the investor made its investment."); Montembault, supra note 2, at 595
("At the dawn of the 21 st Century, stabilisation clauses are more than ever becoming an essential legal
tool in the management of political risks which far from having disappeared, seem rather to sometimes
extend to areas formerly viewed as stable.").
21. ERKAN, supra note 11, at 110-11 (noting that several countries adopted English common law
as part their of national laws have invalidating effect of stabilization clause, since "the state cannot be
prevent.. from performing functions essential to its existence.").
22. See PETER CAMERON, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INVESTMENT LAW: THE PURSUIT OF
STABILITY 15-17 (2010) (describing how western market economies such as UK gave investors
somehow soft-law methods of assurances).
23. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 223; DELOITTE, STABILISATION CLAUSES IN
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CONTRACTS: ILLUSION OR SAFEGUARD? 5 (2014) ("[T]he IOCs demand
for stabilisation clauses in the developing countries is premised on suggestions that rule of law is either
not firmly entrenched or simply does not operate in the way the IOCs would expect. It is further
suggested that Latin America, Africa and the Middle East are also laden with deep and long-lasting
legacies of anti-colonialist sentiments or populist suspicion of foreign investment.").
24. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 223; Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Reducing
Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
lenders' concerns; 25 a relative weakness of developing countries in terms of
bargaining power,26 lack of financial resources or technological knowledge,27 and
competition for foreign investment. 28 In sum, Abdullah Faruque aptly notes the
purpose of a stabilization clause is to seek to provide protection from political
risk,29 ensure legal certainty, and encourage foreign investment.30
By virtue of its name, a stabilization clause is an invention of investors to
stabilize host state's actions, which have a negative impact on the economics of a
project; however, its content and shape is no more constant, unified, and static. As
state contracts are concluded in a quid pro quo basis, such typology is not
absolute31 and it is constantly evolving. When the states' political and legal regime
has in the past been subject to frequent changes or volatility, then it is reasonable
for such states to agree to stabilization clauses in order to attract foreign direct
32investment ("FDI"). A stabilization clause would require the host state not to
alter its general legal regime for the area addressed in the clause.3 3 For instance,
taxation, "the principal threat to contract stability, '34 is one of the most common
areas and key issues that a stabilization clause will address. 35  Labor, free
transferability, property, export-import provisions, or even far-reaching general
& OPIC Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 1, 2 (1994); Kyla Tienhaara,
Unilateral Commitments to Investment Protection: Does the Promise of Stability Restrict
Environmental Policy Development?, 17 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 139, 146 (2008).
25. See Asante, supra note 2, at 409; PETER D. CAMERON, ASS'N OF INT'L PETROLEUM
NEGOTIATORS, STABILISATION IN INVESTMENT CONTRACTS AND CHANGES OF RULES IN HOST
COUNTRIES: TOOLS FOR OIL & GAS INVESTORS pt. 1.1 (2006); A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, Some
Reflections on Stabilisation Techniques in International Petroleum, Gas and Mineral Agreements, 4
INT'L ENERGY L. & TAX'N REV. 96, 96 (2005); Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 228-29 (noting that
"stabilization of the fiscal, foreign exchange, and repatriation terms is an essential requirement for
lenders"); U.N. JFC report, supra note 2, 18.
26. See Tienhaara, supra note 24, at 147.
27. See Roland Brown, The Relationship between the State and the Multinational Corporation in
the Exploitation of Resources, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 218, 220 (1984).
28. Ali Khalil A1-Hadithi, Guarantees and Incentives of Investment in the Third World and Iraq,
1 no. 2 DUBAI INT'L ARB. CTR. J.: J. ARB. IN THE MIDDLE EAST 5, 5 (2004) (holding that budget
constraints of many developing countries pushed to participate in wild race to attract bigger share of
FDI through investment guarantees and incentives).
29. See Abdullah Faruque, Validity and Efficacy of Stabilisation Clauses: Legal Protection vs.
Functional Value,. 23 J. INT'L ARB. 317, 321-22 (2006). For clarification, the paper adopts the
definition of political risk, which was given by Comeaux and Kinsella, as "the risk that the laws of a
country will unexpectedly change to the investor's detriment after the investor has invested capital in
the country, thereby reducing the value of the individual's investment." Comeaux & Kinsella, supra
note 24, at 1. Government instability, changes in monetary and fiscal policy, and volatility of local tax
and regulation systems, such as environmental and human rights issues, it seems, are the risks that
today's investors are most acutely faced with. See ERKAN, supra note 11, at 51.
30. Faruque, supra note 29, at 321-23.
31. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 256.
32. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 75 (2008).
33. Id.
34. See Cameron, supra note 2, at 342.
35. See CAMERON, supra note 22, at 70; Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 220.
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legislative and contractual framework are other potential areas that may be covered
by a stabilization clause.36
Turning to taxonomy of stabilization clauses, until the onset of hibernation of
stabilization clauses, the types mentioned below were the most widespread forms.
1. Freezing Clause
Such clauses aim to neutralize the project from application of newly adopted
laws to the contract.37 They are the strictest (stabilization clause in Stricto Sensu)
and once the most popular forms of stabilization clauses in investment projects. 38
The harshly criticized contract of Mittal Steel Holdings NV with Liberia included
such a clause:
39
For the avoidance of doubt, any amendments, additions, revisions,
modifications or other changes to the Tax Corpus made after the
Amendment Effective Date shall not be applicable to the
CONCESSIONAIRE. n°
2. Intangible Clause
Described as a "prohibition on unilateral changes," this type of stabilization
clause aims to prevent one party, obviously the host states, from making unilateral
changes and requires consent of both parties upon making any modification to the
41 42contract. It has a more consensual juridical nature as it provides both parties
43
with procedural mechanism for discussion. One of the typical versions of an
intangible clause is as follows:
This contract shall not be annulled, amended, or modified in any respect,
except by the mutual consent in writing of the parties hereto.44 According to
Faruque, its main difference from the freezing clause is that
while the former [freezing clause] intends to protect investors from host
state legislative intervention in the contract through changes in the
applicable law or the enactment of new legislation, the latter [intangible
36. Wolfgang Peter, Stabilization Clauses in State Contracts, 1998 INT'L Bus. L.J. 875, 878-82.
37. Abdullah Al Faruque, Typologies, Efficacy and Political Economy of Stabilisation Clauses: A
Critical Appraisal, 4 OIL, GAS & ENERGY DISP. MGMT. 2007, at 6.
38. See CAMERON, supra note 22, at 70; U.N. 1FC report, supra note 2, 22.
39. See generally GLOBAL WITNESS, HEAVY MITTAL? A STATE WITHIN A STATE: THE
INEQUITABLE MINERAL DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA AND
MITTAL STEEL HOLDINGS NV (2006). 1
40. Mineral Development Agreement, Liber.-Mittal Steel Holdings NV, at 18, Aug. 17, 2005. See
also Amendment Dated Dec. 28, 2006 to Mineral Development Agreement, Liber.-Mittal Steel
Holdings N.V., at 24, Dec. 28, 2006, cited in CAMERON, supra note 22, at 71.
41. CAMERON, supra note 22, at 74.
42. Faruque, supra note 29, at 319.
43. CAMERON, supra note 22, at 74.
44. Production Sharing Contract of Indonesia, Pertamina-Overseas Petroleum & Inv. Corp.-
Treasure Bay Enters. Ltd., art. 17.2, Dec. 31, 1994, cited in Faruque, supra note 29, at 319.
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clause] aims to protect them from the host state's exercise of
administrative power to change or modify the contract unilaterally.
45
Still, there is an intense debate, though much reduced in recent years, on the
validity and effect of a stabilization clause.46 In short, no international tribunal has
ruled that a stabilization clause is invalid or will have no legal effect. 
47
Conversely, there is strong support that a typical stabilization clause in a contract
should not be understood as a renunciation on the part of the host state of its right
to expropriate. 48 However, one thing should be clear-in the context of freezing
clauses and intangible clauses, which were the main targets of academic debate
until 2000-dissatisfaction of both sides was sustained and the debate has not
ended.49 It was clear that industry, host states, and lawyers had to work on better,
enforceable, and less-conflicting rules with Vegards to the sovereignty of host
states .5
45. Faruque, supra note 29, at 319-20.
46. On this perspective, see Jean-Marc Loncle & Damien Philibert-Pollez, Stabilisation Clauses
in Investments Contracts, 2009 INT'L Bus. L.J. 267, 290 ("The issue of the validity of the State's
commitment is no longer doubted, and the main difficulty that could be raised is that of the
unenforceability of such a clause against a State carrying out lawful nationalisations having regard to
international law."). The legal effect of stabilization clauses was also discussed in many research
papers. See Timothy B. Hansen, The Legal Effect Given Stabilization Clauses in Economic
Development Agreement, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1015, 1015 (1988); Faruque, supra note 29, at 325-32; A.
F. M. Maniruzzaman, Damages for Breach of Stabilisation Clauses in International Investment Law:
Where Do We Stand Today?, 11 INT'L ENERGY L. & TAX'N REV. 246, 247 (2007); Cotula, supra note
9, at 165-67; Maniruzzaman, supra note 2, at 139-47.
47. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 32, at 75.
48. Id.; Montembault, supra note 2, at 612 ("the controversy raised by the validity of these
mechanisms seems largely appeased"); Vielleville & Vasani, supra note 20, at 21 (mentioning the
consensus reached by states on this point:
[w]hile some States continue to ignore limits to their sovereignty and the consequences of
adopting unilateral measures in contravention of the acquired obligations and some investors
ignore the adverse actions of the State while economic profit is still to be made, the fact
remains that the New International Economic Order of today is a finely tuned balance
between the rights of developing nations, the desires of developed nations and the protections
granted to individual investors from around the globe.
(emphasis added)).
49. As Brown mentioned, remarkably, almost thirty years ago in the context of mineral
investments,
[t]he bleak experience of past conflict shows that, if instability is to be avoided, it is not
enough to preach to host governments the sanctity of contract. What is needed is a new
approach to fiscal terms which will be more sensitive to the variations in the output of
particular projects.
Brown, supra note 27, at 222.
50. For the author, the inflexibility of the freezing clause and its inability to meet the needs of
dynamic development of host state's municipal matters made it hated in third world countries. This is
because states need to legislate according to their people's needs and a collision of interests is
unavoidable in a gigantic investment projects (at least for the host country) which generates large
amounts of budgetary monies. Therefore, lawyers began to consider it unenforceable and they started
to look for the new and more compatible design of stabilization clause. For instance, see Peter, supra
note 36, at 888-89.
VOL. 43:4
2015 THE END OF HIBERNATION OF STABILIZATION CLAUSE 463
B. Start of Hibernation
After the Kuwait v. Aminoil arbitration, the stabilization clause rightly
"disappeared" as a headache for arbitrators.5 ' This disappearance is the case for at
least most of the published cases, as it is known that some of the arbitration
decisions are not published and are still kept secret.52 Indeed, in the early 1980s,
scholars begun to debate the changing atmosphere of international investment
transactions. Roland Brown says that, "[t]he traumatic events of the late 1960s and
early 1970s swept away what remained of such archaic arrangements and broke the
link with the colonial past. In consequence, there is a perceptible change in the
attitude of many Third World countries."
53
Several factors served as the key reasons for the hibernation of the
stabilization clause from the first part of the 1980s. First of all, there was the end
of the nationalization wave in the third world.54 Outright nationalization of big
investment projects in this era by host developing country tremendously
decreased.55 Secondly, there was the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union and
heated competition for foreign investment in post-soviet countries.56 Many
developing countries liberalized important industries, which they had previously
eagerly protected, and let the FDI enter.5 7 The third factor, as seen in previous
sections, is tribunals' continuous supportive approach for its validity and to some
extent its effect that may also be considered as decisive factors for this temporal
pacific period. In fact, the boom of adoption of stabilization clause in investment
51. CAMERON, supra note 22, at 90-92.
52. Regarding this point, while introducing an unpublished award involving stabilization clause
under English law in 2007 between a foreign investor and an African state, Cameron notes that "The
publicity that surrounds many treaty based cases is usually absent from such cases since they will tend
to be brought under contract and heard privately." Id. at 90-92. In addition to above mentioned points,
although ICSID Rules have improved transparency of their terms and recently UNCITRAL adopted its
final rules on transparency of investment arbitration, still as Bernasconi-Osterwalder rightly pointed
out, "other rules that have evolved from private commercial arbitration allow arbitration proceedings to
remain private and confidential." Nathalie Bemasconi-Osterwalder, Transparency and Amicus Curiae
in ICSID Arbitrations, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 1, at
195.
53. Brown, supra note 27, at 220.
54. Michael S. Minor, The Demise of Expropriation as an Instrument of LDC Policy, 1980-1992,
25 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 177, 177-78 (1994).
55. Christopher Hajzler, Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investments: Sectoral Patterns from
1993 to 2006, 148 REV. WORLD ECON. 119, 128-29 (2012). A chart from Hajzler's paper shows that
expropriation immediately fell down from the start of the 1980s, and it has never seen a revival until
2005. Id. at 129. A graph in Minor's previous paper also supports this phenomenon within its own
scope (until 1992). Minor, supra note 54, at 180 tbl.1.
56. Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 217-18 (arguing that in CIS, in the early 1990s, foreign
investment was seen as the single great opportunity still left for international companies, and
governments in this region also responded to the requirements of investors as their countries were seen
as high political risk countries).
57. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Incentives: UNCTAD Series on Issues in
International Investment Agreements, 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2003/5 (2004) [hereinafter
UNCTAD]; MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 25-26 (3d ed. 2010).
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contracts occurred in praxis. 58
C. The End of Hibernation
However, several factors have brought stabilization clauses back to wider
attention. But this time, in very different circumstances and in a very different
form. The first biggest factor is the expected re-emergence of Resource
Nationalism, where the rule of law was tested by ideological sentiments.59 In
particular, the rocketing of oil and gas prices and a strong need for natural
resources from emerging economies led to the phenomenon of increased resource
nationalism. Resource nationalism can be defined as "determination to gain the
maximum national advantage from the exploitation of national resources."' Its
features can be seen as a nationalization of FDI in extractive industry,62 contract
renegotiation or abrogation, 63 and rise of taxation burden to international oil
companies.
64
In addition to the above-mentioned factor, acceleration of investor-state
arbitration;6 5 an enrichment of developing countries with capital, necessary skill,
and technology; 66 the rise of service companies in extractive industries; 67 the re-
consideration of the very contractual clauses which can be seen very unfair 68 or
58. This is because the 1990s saw a drastic fall in petroleum prices in the global market. In such a
situation, the bargaining strength of host countries become very low and this phenomenon also lead to
favorable contractual terms and investor leverage. See ERKAN, supra note 11, at 124-25.
59. There is burgeoning scholarship on resource nationalism. See, e.g., F. Robert Buchanan &
Syed Tariq Anwar, Resource Nationalism and the Changing Business Model for Global Oil, 10 J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 241, 243 (2009); Cameron, supra note 2; George Joffd et al., Expropriation of
Oil and Gas Investments: Historical, Legal and Economic Perspectives in a New Age of Resource
Nationalism, 2 J. WORLD ENERGY L. &"Bus. 3, 3 (2009); Thomas Walde, Renegotiating Acquired
Rights in the Oil and Gas Industries: Industry and Political Cycles Meet the Rule of Law, 1 J. WORLD
ENERGY L. & Bus. 55, 55 (2008).
60. A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, The Issue of Resource Nationalism: Risk Engineering and Dispute
Management in the Oil and Gas Industry, 5 TEX. J. OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L., 79, 81 (2009).
61. Joff etal.,supranote59,at4.
62. Halina Ward, Resource Nationalism and Sustainable Development: A Primer and Key Issues
8 (Int'l Inst. for Env't & Dev., Working Paper, 2009).
63. For instance, substantial renegotiation took part in Russia, Venezuela, Algeria, Bolivia and
Ecuador. See CAMERON, supra note 22, at 10-11.
64. Peter Cameron & Graham Kellas, Wood Mackenzie & Ctr. for Energy, Petroleum & Mineral
Law & Policy, Contract and Fiscal Stability: Rhetoric and Reality 6-7 (2008).
65. AKIRA KOTERA, KOKUSAI TOUSHI KYOTE! : CHUSAI NI YORU HOTEKI HOGO [International
Investment Agreements: Legal Protection Through Arbitration], 10 (2010).
66. ERKAN, supra note 11, at 154 ("In today's business world, all technologies in the petroleum
industry are buyable. The companies that produce petroleum technology organize big international
trade shows every year. Most petroleum producer countries have enough money to buy such
technologies because of high price of oilFalse.").
67. The Unsung Masters of the Oil Industry: Oil Firms You Have Never Heard of are Booming,
ECONOMIST, July 21, 2012, Business, http://www.economist.com/node/21559358.
68. Brown, supra note 27, at 221. Bribing public officials through sham transactions and getting
more favorable contractual dealings under influential persons of the country is not rare in the
investment world. See Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic ofUzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award
(2013).
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onerous69 from the view point of new government; 70 and financial crises 71 can also
be seen as the instigating causes for the appearance of the stabilization clause in
investment arbitration.
III. AN EMERGENCE OF NEW GENERATION: ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM CLAUSE
This section turns the readers' attention to the new generation of stabilization
clause: the EEC. After reviewing its definition, taxonomy, and specific features in
Section III subsection A, this paper will query what the main factors behind the
shift from traditional clauses to EEC were in subsection B. Subsection C provides
a discussion of two unprecedented pieces of research on EEC, which furthers the
understanding of the validity and effectiveness of this type of stabilization promise.
Lastly, the Burlington v. Ecuador case-the first of its kind, which tested the
validity, and effectiveness of EEC in the ICSID Tribunal-is examined in
subsection D.
A. Definition, Taxonomy, and Specifics
In the end, with a minor exception, the stabilization clause experiences a
transformation from a freezing clause to EEC.72 At this point, a brief survey of
pertinent contractual practices of EEC is useful. As an example of EEC, Kurdistan
Model Product Sharing Agreement Article 43(3) states as follows:
If, any time after the Effective Date, there is any change in the legal,
fiscal and/or economic framework under the Kurdistan Region Law or
other Law applicable in or to the Kurdistan Region which detrimentally
affects the CONTRACTOR, the terms and conditions of the Contract
shall be altered so as to restore the CONTRACTOR to the same overall
economic position as that which CONTRACTOR would have been in,
had no such change in the legal, fiscal and/or economic framework
occurred.73
In other words, following a change in law, EEC requires the parties to enter
into negotiations in order to restore the original balance of the contract. In this
definition, Cameron referred to EECs as "balancing clauses., 74 Having said that,
EECs also differ a lot and its definition depends on each expert's (academic,
69. DELOItTE, supra note 23, at 10 ("A disproportionately favourable deal for the investor can be
counterproductive as it may spark political push-back in the host state resulting in instability that
distorts the project returns which the IOC was keen ensure .... ); SORNARAJAH, supra note 57, at 76-7.
70. See ERKAN, supra note It, at 172-73; SORNARAJAH, supra note 57, at 75-6.
71. Some of Argentine-involved cases directly link to the financial crises of that country. See for
the detailed discussion, Jos6 Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors:
A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND POLICY 2008-2009 388-90 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009).
72. Al Faruque, supra note 37, at 45. According to the some research, freezing clauses are still in
used in the mining industry where commodity prices are not so prone to change as in the oil and gas
market. U.N. IFC report, supra note 2, 25.
73. CAMERON, supra note 22, at 75.
74. Id. at 74.
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lawyer, or state official) preference. 75
It was recently stated that an EEC has mainly three types of forms, namely:
Stipulated Economic Balancing ("SEB"), Non-specified Economic Balancing
("NSEB"), and Negotiated Economic Balancing ("NEB") .76 The SEB instructs the
automatic amendment of the contract in a predetermined fashion;77 NSEB does not
specify the nature of an automatic amendment, neither does it necessitate the
mutual agreement of the parties.78 In the case of NEB, parties are also under an
obligation to meet so that they may make necessary amendments to the
agreement. 
75. For such clear differences in terminology and taxonomy of stabilization clauses, see Frank
Alexander, Comment on Articles on Stabilization by Piero Bernardini, Lorenzo Cotula and AFM
Maniruzzaman, 2 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 243, 245-46 (2009). See also U.N. IFC report, supra
note 2, at 9 (taking a rather different approach on classification of EEC through dividing them into two
group, namely "Full Economic Equilibrium Clauses" and "Limited Economic Equilibrium Clauses").
76. Maniruzzaman, supra note 2, at 127 (citing Frank C. Alexander, Jr., The Three Pillars of
Security of Investment Under PSCs and Other Host Government Contracts, in Fifty-Fourth Annual
Institute on Oil and Gas Law (2003)).
77. 2002 Model PSC of Ecuador is typical type of SEB.
In case of modifications to the tax regime, including the creation of new taxes, or the labor
participation, or its interpretation, that have consequences on the economics of this Contract,
a corresponding factor will be included in the production share percentages to absorb the
increase or decrease in the tax burden or in the labor participation of the previously indicated
contractor. This correction factor will be calculated between the Parties and approved by the
Ministry of Energy and Mines.
Maniruzzaman, supra note 2, at 125 (quoting BARROWS CO., MODEL PRODUCTION SHARING
CONTRACT OF OCTOBER 2002 FOR THE EXPLORATION OF HYDROCARBONS & THE EXPLOITATION OF
CRUDE OIL (2002)) (emphasis omitted).
78. An example of an NSEB can be seen with the Agreement Dated 19 April 1999 on the
Exploration, Development and Production Sharing for the Block Including the Padar Area and the
Adjacent Prospective Structures in the Azerbaijan Republic Between the State Oil Company of
Azerbaijan and Kura Valley Development Company Ltd. and Socar Oil Affiliate, art. 24.2 (1999)
(Azer.).
In the event that any Governmental Authority invokes any present or future law, treaty,
intergovernmental agreement, decree or administrative order which contravenes the
provisions of this Agreement or adversely or positively affects the rights or interests of
Contractor hereunder, including, but not limited to, any changes in tax legislation,
regulations, or administrative practice, the terms of this Agreement shall be adjusted to re-
establish the economic equilibrium of the Parties, and if the rights or interests of Contractor
have been adversely affected, then SOCAR shall indemnify the Contractor (and its
assignees) for any disbenefit, deterioration in economic circumstances, loss or damages that
ensue therefrom. SOCAR shall within the limits of its authority use its reasonable lawful
endeavors to ensure that the appropriate Governmental
Authorities will take appropriate measures to resolve promptly in accordance with the
foregoing principles any conflict or anomaly between all such treaty, intergovernmental
agreement, law, decree or administrative order and this Agreement.
See Maniruzzaman, supra note 2, at 125-26.
79. Such kind of EEC can be found in the current model PSC of India.
If any change in or to any Indian law, rule or regulation imposed by any central, state or local
authority dealing with income tax or any other corporate tax, export/import tax, customs duty
or tax imposed on petroleum or dependent upon the value of petroleum results in a material
change to the economic benefits accruing to any of the Parties after the Effective Date, the
2015 THE END OF HIBERNATION OF STABILIZATION CLAUSE 467
Even though categories of EECs seem to be simple, in practice they may
converge and there may be many carve-outs according to the drafting of parties
and also according to the national legislation."0 For example, a lack of compliance
by the contractor and protection of health, safety, and the environment are often
thought of as valid exceptions in terms of the scope of economic equilibrium of the
contract and in such a case, investors should not expect the re-establishment of
their original position.81 Therefore, it is practically difficult to find a unified model
of an EEC in the world and practice may differ according to the project field,
parties' needs, and geography. However, all three models of EEC have one
cohesive important point, "they do not seek to prevent a change in the law by the
host state but rather to seek to address the economic impact of such a change on
the bargain originally struck and to establish a framework in more or less detail for
its preservation."
8 2
Here, there is a need to acknowledge the fact that renegotiation is the inherent
procedure for every EEC. 3 This is due to the fact that, since the economic
equilibrium of contract cannot be achieved without re-negotiation, this procedural
mechanism therefore remains the core element of EEC necessary for keeping the
project alive.8 4 Seth Stodder and Ryan Orr have already noted that "despite
carefully negotiated and varied contractual guarantees and protections, therefore,
approximately half of all long-term infrastructure investment contracts end up
being renegotiated with a repositioning of the parties that introduces materially
significant changes to the terms of the original contractual agreement." 85
Parties to this Contract shall consult promptly to make necessary revisions and adjustments
to the Contract in order to maintain such expected economic benefits to each of the Parties as
of Effective Date.
Id. at 126 (emphasis omitted) (quoting CURRENT INDIAN MODEL PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT art.
16.7).
80. It is mentioned somewhere that EEC can exist even with freezing form of stabilization in one
petroleum contract. See Cameron, supra note 2, at 328.
81. See Maniruzzaman, supra note 2, at 127.
82. CAMERON, supra note 22, at 75.
83. As Salacuse noted, "[r]enegotiation is one of the most important theaters in which parties to
existing agreements play out the continuing struggle of life against form." Jeswald W. Salacuse,
Renegotiating Existing Agreements: How to Deal With "Life Struggling Against Form ", 17
NEGOTIATION J. 311, 312 (2001). Regarding renegotiation, see also Jeswald W. Salacuse,
Renegotiating International Project Agreements, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1319 (2000); John Y.
Gotanda, Renegotiation and Adaptation Clauses in International Investment Contracts, Revisited, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1461 (2003); Asante, supra note 2, at 416 (stating that "[r]enegotiation is thus
a main feature of modem, large-scale and long-term investment contracts in natural resources").
84. Marina De Kwant, Emerging Oil and Gas Economies: Mitigating Legal, Political and
Economic Risks of Foreign Investors in the Russian Federation (Part A), 14 INT'L TRADE & BUS. L.
REV. 174, 207 (2011) (noting that renegotiation clauses have a similar function to typical stabilization
clauses).
85. ERKAN, supra note 11, at 157 (citing Seth. M.M. Stodder & Ryan. J. Orr, Understanding
Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution Experience in Foreign Infrastructure Investment: Proceedings of
the 2
"d General Counsels' Roundtable February 10-11, 2006, Stanford University, California, 7 J.
WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 805 (2006).
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Obviously, failure of renegotiation may be reinforced by one of following two
ways: "a method of indemnity in favour of the party affected by the intervening
change of the legal environment of the oil contract, or a clause allowing arbitrators
to be substituted for the parties in order to revise the terms of the oil contract."8 6
And such detailed reinforced renegotiation may lead to the effective solution of the
problem. 7
B. Rationale of EEC
Especially after 2000, numerous articles of academics, reports from
industries, and client alerts of lawyers started to emphasize the importance of
EECs as well as the decline of traditional ones. 88 Why is that? Traditional
stabilization clauses long struggled to keep the certainty and predictability of
business between parties; however, their inherent deficiency in adapting to new
situations barred them from being the preferred type of stabilization clauses.89
Furthermore, freezing and intangible clauses directly collide with state legislative
sovereignty, often contradicting host state's constitutional framework and fettering
both parties' ability to renegotiate new terms. 90 As Asante rightly pointed out in
the late 1970s:
A major source of conflict between the host governments of developing
countries and transnational corporations derives from the preoccupation
of transnational corporations with stability and predictability in
contractual relations on the one hand, and the persistent demands of host
governments for a more flexible contractual regime on the other.
91
86. Montembault, supra note 2, at 636; Piero Bernardini, Stabilization and Adaptation in Oil and
Gas Investments, 1 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 98 (2008) (emphasizing the importance of referral of
necessary mandate to the arbitrator). But, the solution of dispute by third party is not limited to the
arbitrator. Although these are relatively rare, it may also be an expert in this field. See Alexander,
supra note 75, at 252 n.17 (quoting The Jamaica 2005 Model Production Sharing Agreement art. 15.7
(2005)) ("If any dispute shall arise between the parties as to the calculation of the Tax Stabilization
Adjustment then the matter in dispute shall be referred to an Expert appointed pursuant to clause 32.6
whose determination shall be final and binding on the parties.").
87. See Montembault, supra note 2, at 640. Cameron offers a rather different explanation to the
inclusion ofrenegotiation clause in stabilization clause. He contends that accompanying such clauses in
stabilization mechanism of contract can also be considered "as a response by investors to an inevitable
political risk and as a way of limiting its impact on the projected investment." Cameron, supra note 2, at
324.
88. In the early 2000s, Montembault informed academic society saying a striking fact that a strict
stabilization mechanism offered to oil companies is in the minority. Montembault, supra note 2, at 612.
89. Talking about extractive industry's perception from its long bitter history with host states,
Cameron states that "it would be odd for a foreign investor to consider it feasible to seek a wider
constraint on the host country or indeed to intend that by choosing this form of [freezing clause]."
Cameron, supra note 2, at 323.
90. Asante argued that sticking to stabilization clause through "a blind insistence on the
application of pacta sunt servanda to such transnational contracts betrays a lack of sophisticated
appreciation of the nature and origin of such transactions, the inherent instability in such long-term
arrangements, and the formidable difficulties posed by their administration." Asante, supra note 2, at
407.
91. Id. at 404. See also ERKAN, supra note 11, at 185.
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Evidently, traditional stabilization clauses could not only efficiently tackle
those emerging legal problems in practice, but it should be also noted that the
classic types of stabilization clauses are very open to ideological criticism. 92 In
short, traditional stabilization clauses could not meet parties' expectation, since
they give priority to investor rights upon any change.
93
Therefore, the EEC has emerged as a "consensus point," meeting the needs of
both parties. 94 Additional motives behind the fact that made EEC the preferred
stabilization clause other than the freezing provisions are, first, in case of breach of
contract by a host country, compensation is the most reliable remedy, rather than
the restitution that a freezing clause obviously requires. 95 Second, the EEC will be
seen a type of stabilization provisions that does not interfere with legislative power
of the state. Third, among other types of stabilization clauses, enforceability of
EECs remains the highest;96 and fourth, it contains two vital elements of "long-
term investment contracts, namely, stability and flexibility." 97  Finally, like a
double-edged sword, an EEC not only applies to the host state, but also equally
applies to the foreign investors. 98 It means not only the private party, but also the
state party can require re-negotiation or adjustment of terms of contract when the
balance of contract the said party sought is lost. In addition to these enumerated
factors, one can add the special character of contracts that often adopt the
stabilization clause. For instance, petroleum (oil and gas) contracts are inherently
unstable contracts.99 Due to the constant market fluctuation and unstable pricing,
92. For the discussion on how the rigid intangible clause in the LNG Law of Nigeria eventually
was declared unconstitutional by the Federal High Court of Nigeria see Bayo Adaralegbe, Stabilizing
Fiscal Regimes in Long-Term Contracts: Recent Developments from Nigeria, I J. WORLD ENERGY L. &
Bus. 239, 242 (2008).
93. It seems that from the end of 1970s, its inability and need for new more flexible mechanism
was beginning to be felt by industry. See Brown, supra note 27, at 224.
94. For more detailed study, see Zeyad A. Alqurashi, International Oil and Gas Arbitration 3
OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 227-28 (2005).
95. Although the word 'compensation' is used, parties may negotiate not only compensation, but
also other means for their satisfaction. According to the U.N. IFC report, it "can take many forms, such
as adjusted tariffs, extension of the concession, tax reductions, monetary compensation, or other." U.N.
IFC report, supra note 2, 22.
96. Examples are abundant. See, e.g., Maniruzzaman, supra note 60, at 97-100; Cotula, supra
note 2, at 28 (arguing that EECs are much more flexible and versatile compared to traditional clauses).
Montembault also agrees on this point by saying that, "[b]y its simplicity, this mechanism can provide
the oil company with a relatively efficient protection which could in addition be usefully buttressed by
recourse to an expertise procedure to determine the total adjustment in the event the parties are unable
to agree it." Montembault, supra note 2, at 625.
97. ERKAN, supra note 11, at 220.
98. Maniruzzaman, supra note 2, at 136-37.
99. In the petroleum industry context, Nakhle argues that:
fiscal regimes cannot be expected to be set in stone. Circumstances are constantly changing
in any basin. A certain degree of flexibility has to be allowed in any tax system if it is to
respond to differing conditions, such as maturity, and to evolve as a result of major changes
in the external environment.
Carole Nakhle, Petroleum Fiscal Regimes: Evolution and Challenges, in THE TAXATION OF
PETROLEUM AND MINERALS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND PRACTICE 89, 115 (Philip Daniel et al. eds.,
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both states and investors changed their minds to favor a more pragmatic approach,
and they began to focus on more project equilibrium rather than on legal
stability. 100
Of course, there are other views regarding such observations. For example,
Alexander denies that an EEC should be considered a "new approach," referring to
contracts of the late 1980s, which included EECs.'0 1 Moreover, he did not accept
the priority of EEC over traditional clauses either. According to him, it is,
misleading, as it implies that Economic Balancing provisions are a sort
of panacea according to which, in the event that the [host country]
unilaterally revises the relationship after the effective date of the
[government petroleum contract], international arbitration may be
avoided. To the contrary, there are no guarantees that the parties will,
by way of such a "renegotiation", agree upon the specifics of how the
[government petroleum contract] shall be amended - particularly in the
case of Non-Specified Economic Balancing and Negotiated Economic
Balancing. Even in the case of Specified Economic Balancing, the [host
country] may refuse to implement the provision (particularly if the [host
country] has, subsequent to the effective date, enacted a law that
abrogates any prior "stabilization provisions"). 102
Additionally, in one of his recent works, a leading scholar on stabilization
clauses, Peter D. Cameron contended that there is no real shift to the EEC. 10 3
Those counterarguments are right to some extent. The emergence of EECs
should not be taken as a panacea; however, there is sound research output that
shows the substantial decline of traditional clauses, and also facts where the latter
apparently failed to respond to a crisis between a foreign investor and a host
state. 104
C. Two Important Empirical Surveys
"Data! data! data!... I cant make bricks without clay"- Sherlock
Holmes
10 5
With this in mind, what then were the reactions of industries, academics, host
2010).
100. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 32, at 77.
101. Alexander, supra note 75, at 246.
102. Id. at 252.
103. Cameron, supra note 2, at 343 (noting that every contract stabilization clauses have inherent
flexibility and actual contractual shift is much more complex).
104. .See, e.g., Asante, supra note 2, at 412 (providing an excellent case study on how traditional
stabilization clause could not give parties enough chance to negotiate); Peter Slinn, Foreign Investment
Contracts: Host Country's Concerns, 2 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 37, 44 (1983) (arguing that, in the
example of the Bougainville re-negotiation (Zambia) in 1970s, a "flexible fiscal regime of this kind, if
introduced at the outset of a project, helps to avoid pressure for re-negotiation if the investor's rate of
return subsequently appears to reach (for the host country) unacceptably high levels").
105. ERKAN, supra note 11, at 221 (quoting 12 Arthur Doyle, The Adventure of the Copper
Beeches, in SHERLOCK HOLMES: THE COMPLETE NOVELS AND STORIES, 429, 437 (1986)).
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states, and their state-owned enterprises toward EECs? Did they accept the EEC's
validity and effectiveness? Or to put it differently, do they currently believe in its
validity and effectiveness? Do they feel that they are bound by such undertakings?
Notwithstanding the mountains of qualitative study on stabilization clauses, 0 6 until
recently there has been a lack of empirical investigations on the practice of modem
stabilization clauses. Finally, at the end of the first decade of twenty-first century,
two important empirical researches have been conducted successfully, answering
those questions that were in flux.
An important research project, Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights, was
conducted in 2008 by Andrea Shemberg for the IFC and the U.N. Special
Representative to the Secretary General on Business and Human Rights, Professor
John Ruggie. 10 7 This study addressed the following question: "Can stabilization
clauses create obstacles to applying new social and environmental legislation to
investment projects in the host state; and if so, to what extent?"' 0 8 As emphasized
in the report, it is likely
..the first empirical study on modem stabilization practice covering a
wide range of industries and regions of the world. Such studies are rare
due to the confidential nature of most investment contracts. There is no
public repository of private contracts that would allow practitioners,
host states, investors, civil society, and academics to view modem
practice for all sectors.l°9
The report was based on mainly three sources:
1) a collection of [seventy-six] modem contracts and [twelve] modem
contract models;
2) a literature review and a review of reported contract and
international state-investor disputes that may be relevant to
understanding the legal enforceability of such clauses; and
3) [I]nterviews with negotiators, lenders, lawyers who negotiate
investment contracts or litigate disputes for states and investors,
and with nongovernmental organization members who have
conducted research on stabilization clauses. 
110
Mustafa Erkan's publication in 2010, International Energy Investment Law:
Stability through Contractual Clauses, a second piece of research that overlaps in
timing with the U.N. IFC, also asks the question of how contractual tools, such as
stabilization clauses, renegotiation clauses, choice of law, and alternative dispute
resolution will help energy investors avoid such political risk and continue the
viability of projects.' 1 ' As regards methodology, in addition to in-depth literature
106. Most of the works cited in this paper are indeed qualitative ones, which concentrated either on
case analysis or survey of stabilization clauses in model contracts and municipal legislations.
107. U.N. IFC report, supra note 2.
108. Id. at viii.
109. Id. at viii-ix.
110. Id. at ix.
111. ERKAN, supra note 11. The main objective of this book, as the author mentions is:
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review, the author developed his ideas based on large questionnaire results and
interviews with various specialist lawyers in the energy field.' 12 In the case of the
former, the author received survey answers from 112 respondents who are persons
and organizations known to be active in the petroleum industry, and examined
political risks, expropriation, and the effectiveness of contractual clauses. 3 In the
case of the latter, Erkan tried to bring specialists' often rare experience and quasi
trade secrets to readers.'
14
Regarding the findings of both Shemberg's and Erkan's unprecedented works,
they both conclude that stabilization clauses, especially the EEC, are widely used
among foreign investors and host countries. 15 First of all, the U.N. IFC report
clarified that some OECD countries are currently parties to some contracts, which
include some EECs, even though they are limited ones." 6 The data in the report
"provide[d] some potential models as well as indication of underlying principles
that are useful for future efforts to design stabilization clauses aimed at protecting
investors against arbitrary or discriminatory changes in law, while also preserving
the host state's legislative capacity to introduce necessary environmental and social
laws." 117 Furthermore, the U.N. IFC report made several well-founded
recommendations for host states in order to reach much fairer outcomes." 18 But the
most important thing is that while the U.N. IFC report implicitly mentions an EEC
as the most preferred type of stabilization clause, it never questioned its validity." 9
This shows that both developed and developing countries believe in the validity of
the EEC, even though its real effect was still unclear at the time that the report was
written.
Turning to the findings of Erkan, there are other outcomes to be faced. For
instance, the author reached some surprising results: while 77.8% of international
oil companies believe that a stabilization clause has a legal and functional value in
to determine the effectiveness of contractual clauses related to the management of the
political risks faced by international petroleum investors during the life span of their projects,
concentrating how effective contractual clauses work to protect against risks associated with
expropriation and avoid investment disputes that can lead to expropriation.
Id. at 9.
112. Id. at 13-14.
113. Id. at 15.
114. Id. at 13.
115. Id. at 220; U.N. IFC report, supra note 2, at 18-19 tbls.6.1 & 6.2.
116. See U.N. IFC supra note 2, at 18-19 tbls.6.1 & 6.2.
117. Id. $ 137.
118. Id. 7 138-49 (the recommendations were: "[ildentifying [g]ood [p]ractice .... [t]he [h]uman
[r]ights [u]ndertaking .... [limited [e]conomic [e]quilibrium [c]lauses in the OECD [s]amples, ..
[o]ther [i]deas for [t]ailoring [s]tabilization for [f]airness in [r]isk (a]llocation, [and] ... [t]ransparency
of [c]ontracts").
119. See id. at v, $ 135 (demonstrating that, from the very beginning the U.N. IFC report described
stabilization clause as "a widely used risk-management device in investment contracts," but used the
word "validity" once in a different context.). See id. 109 (illustrating that although the report
discusses the legality issue of freezing clauses briefly, obviously it was discussing constitutional
frameworks in municipal legal systems, such as in common law and civil law countries, and did not go
beyond it).
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intentional petroleum contracts, 76.9% of national oil companies also believe so as
well. 120 After clarifying the limit of validity and effectiveness of traditional
stabilization clauses and in the context of the necessity for negotiation clauses that
aim at avoiding or minimizing potential conflicts in international energy projects,
Erkan's research reveals that in the petroleum industry, during windfall profits, the
majority of respondents (almost 70%) agree that the petroleum investment contract
should be renegotiated and fundamental change of circumstances requires such
change. 121 Renegotiation clauses can stand together with stabilization clauses in
one contract and their importance is they abstain from challenging the sovereignty
of a host state.' 22 The book shows that the great majority of international oil
companies (97%) are also willing to renegotiate their original contract. 123
Regarding the efficiency of EECs, Erkan found only 8.5%, where renegotiation
requests ended with unsuccessful attempts and cases were referred to arbitration.1
24
This also shows how renegotiation-plus stabilization clauses have been
successfully protecting the contracts' equilibrium and ultimately the lifespan of the
project.
What is common in both works is that they both mentioned-implicitly or
explicitly-that investors could rely on stabilization clauses when they face
political risks in the form of changes in the law.125 Moreover, both noted that it
was not clear how the EEC would be dealt with in investment arbitration, as no
publicized arbitration had ever dealt with that issue.' 26 Surprisingly, right after
Erkan's work was published, the long expected Burlington v. Ecuador award was
delivered. In this case, the tribunal upheld both the validity and effectiveness of
the EEC, 12 7 something which will be discussed below.
D. Testing EEC in Investment Arbitration: Burlington v. Ecuador
As already noted, many reports and academics have shown that no arbitration
decision has ever dealt publicly with a new type of stabilization clause. Thanks to
the re-emergence of resource nationalism and acceleration of ISDS, there is a
chance to follow-up on how arbitration has dealt with an interpretation of EEC in
the wake of expropriation action of Ecuador, one of the resource rich countries in
Latin America. At this stage, it may be helpful to briefly recall the facts of this
case and main findings of the award.
120. Such a positive attitude towards stabilization clauses is not so surprising, since many NOCs in
the world are themselves started to participate as foreign investor in many overseas projects. ERKAN,
supra note 11, at 122-23. See also JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR PUB. POLICY OF RICE UNIV., THE
CHANGING ROLE OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKETS 4 (2007).
121. ERKAN, supra note 11, at 218.
122. Id. at 199.
123. Id. at218.
124. Id. at 217-18.
125. See U.N. IFC report, supra note 2, 132.
126. See id. 128-31; ERKAN, supra note 11, at 220.
127. Burlington Res., Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Liability (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1O94_0.pdf.
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1. Background
Burlington Oriente, a subsidiary of the claimant Burlington Resource Inc.
("Burlington"), entered into Product Sharing Contracts ("PSCs") with Ecuador to
explore and exploit oil reserves in several blocks inside the country.' 28 Under
these agreements, the contractor assumed the entire risk of exploitation in return
for a share of the produced oil. 129 As international oil prices soared in 2005,
Ecuador attempted to renegotiate the terms of the PSCs with Burlington. 130 When
those renegotiations failed, Ecuador had to restore the economic equilibrium of the
contracts by implementing a package of measures.' 31
First, on April 19, 2006, the Congress of Ecuador empowered its government
to impose a windfall tax on Burlington's excess profits through Law 42.132
According to this, investors had to pay the sum of 50% of their profit, if the market
price of oil surpasses the price of oil at the time the contracts were executed. 133
Second, Decree 662 increased the tax rate of Law 42 from 50% to 99% on October
18, 2007. 134 Burlington paid both taxes under protest. 135 Foreign investors,
including Burlington, "requested PetroEcuador [national oil company] to apply a
correction factor to its oil participation share" that would soften the impact of Law
42 at 99%, reportedly following the tax modification clauses of the PSCs several
times. 136 However, Ecuador ignored these requests.
When Burlington refused to pay the taxes in 2008, Ecuador initiated
proceedings to confiscate and auction the production share of investor so as to
collect the overdue payment. 137 Burlington subsequently suspended operations on
the grounds that the investment had become unprofitable.' 38 In response, Ecuador
took the possession of Burlington's blocks and eventually terminated the PSCs. 139
In turn, Burlington brought the case to the ICSID tribunal under the U.S.-Ecuador
BIT.140 On December 14, 2012, an ICSID tribunal ruled that Ecuador expropriated
an U.S. oil and gas company's investment in violation of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT.'41
The quantum of damages was left for future decision.
2. Key Contractual Stabilizing Terms
Firstly, look at the key terms of the parties' contract on stabilization. The
128. ld. 14.
129. Id. 9.
130. Id. 28.
131. Id. 29.
132. Id. 30 (citing L. 42, Apr. 19, 2006 (Ecuador)).
133. Id. 32.
134. Id. 35 (citing Decree 662, Oct. 18, 2007 (Ecuador)).
135. Id. 36.
136. Id.
137. Id. 52-63.
138. Id. 62.
139. Id. 65.
140. Id. 67.
141. Id. 546.
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2012 Award enumerated them as follows, in three paragraphs.
142
a. The tax modification clause of the PSC for Block 7 (the
exploration area for petroleum production).
The tax modification clause included in clause 11.12 of the PSC
for Block 7 provides as follows:
Modification to the tax system: In the event of a modification to
the tax system or the creation or elimination of new taxes not foreseen
in this Contract or of the employment contribution, in force at the time
of the execution of this Contract and as set out in this Clause, which
have an impact on the economics of this Contract, a correction factor
will be included in the production sharing percentages to absorb the
impact of the increase or decrease in the tax or in the employment
contribution burden. This correction factor will be calculated between
the Parties and will be subject to the procedure set forth in Article thirty-
one (31) of the Regulations for Application of the Law Reforming the
Hydrocarbons Law...
This clause must be interpreted in conjunction with clauses 8.6 and
15.2 of the Contract. Clause 8.6 states:
Economic stability: In the event that, by the action of the
Ecuadorian State or PetroEcuador, any of the events described below
were to occur and have an impact on the economy of this Contract, a
correction factor will be applied to the production sharing percentages in
order to absorb the increase or decrease in the economic burden: a)
Modification of the tax system as described in clause [11.12]...
Clause 15.2 in turn provides that:
Contract amendments: There shall be negotiation and execution of
contract amendments, with prior agreement of the Parties, particularly in
the following cases: [ ... ] c) When the tax system [ ... ] applicable to
this type of Contract in the country is modified, in order to restore the
economy of the Contract in accordance with clause [11.12 ....143
PSC for the Block 21 (the exploration area for petroleum production) also
included identically the same clause as for Block 7. Apart from the latter, PSC for
Block 21 also included below mentioned sentence in its "tax modification clause":
"[t]his adjustment will be approved by the Administrative Board on the basis of a
study that the Contractor will present to that effect." 144 In other words, the
procedural mechanism of PSC for Block 21 was much more sophisticated.
3. The Main Controversy
The parties failed to agree on the definition of the economy of contracts, and
Ecuador denied the rights of a foreign investor to reap all windfall profits coming
142. Id. 316-19.
143. Id. 317-19.
144. Id. 328.
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from Blocks 7 and 21.145 Secondly, the parties failed to agree on whether the tax
modification clauses, which require the application of an amendment in case the
economy of the contracts is affected, are obligatory or not. 146
4. Tribunal Decision
First of all, after paying an attention to the length of contracts, cross-
examination and timing of a similar Tarapoa contract, 147 the tribunal
controversially decided the economy of Block 7 and Block 21 as follows:
This language creates a link between the economic benefits the
contractor may draw from the contract and the price of oil. If the price
of oil exceeds USD 17 per barrel, the additional revenues are
apportioned between Ecuador and the contractor on a 50/50 basis. This
apportionment does not affect the contractor's participation share in
terms of oil volumes, but it does affect the economic benefits the
contractor may draw from that share by conferring on the State half of
the revenues stemming from oil prices in excess of USD 17 per barrel.
No such Tarapoa-like clause was included in the PSCs for Blocks 7 and
21. This is particularly enlightening if one remembers that the PSC for
Block 21 and the Tarapoa Contract were negotiated at the same time.
The tribunal later goes on to state:
[flirst, while the Tarapoa Contract parties accepted a clause linking the
distribution of oil revenues to the price of oil, the Block 7 and 21
contract parties did not accept such a clause. Second, the possibility of
linking the distribution of oil revenues to oil prices was specifically
discussed during the negotiations for the Block 7 and 21 PSCs. On the
basis of these premises, it is safe to conclude that the non-inclusion of a
Tarapoa-like clause in the PSCs for Blocks 7 and 21 was not the
product of inadvertence but a deliberate choice of the contracting
parties. 149
By way of conclusion, the Tribunal determined that the parties never included
an adjustment clause into both PSCs in order to re-balance the revenue in case of
sudden jump in oil prices. Although Ecuador succeeded in negotiating for an equal
share of windfall profit in the Tarapoa contract, it seems that investors preferred to
leave this point somehow vague in Blocks 7 and 21, predicting increase of oil price
and subsequently greater profit. Taking these facts into account,1 50 the Tribunal
decided the economy of contracts that empowers investors to get oil revenue
145. See id. 262.
146. Id.
147. See id. 11 276-95.
148. Id. 1295.
149. Id. 299 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added).
150. In order to reach a conclusion, the Burlington Tribunal paid attention to three main facts: the
length (sophistication) of contracts; similar timing with other Tarapao contract and rejection of
contractors (investors) to include a clause, which lets parties to equally share the oil revenues. See id.
I 275-300.
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without any regard to price of oil or internal rate of return and left the host country
with empty handed, harshly penalizing for its defeat in contract negotiation.
1 51
Secondly, after determining what economy of PSCs is, the Tribunal reached
the conclusion that modification clauses are indeed tax stabilization clauses.'
5 2
Not surprisingly, the tribunal interpreted two-layered tax modification clause as
follows:
[f]irst, all the three provisions transcribed above contain mandatory
language calling for the parties to apply a correction factor in order to
absorb the impact of a tax increase or decrease on the economy of the
Contract. Under clause 11.12, a correction factor will be included if
there is a modification to the tax system which has an impact on the
economy of the Contract; under clause 8.6, a correction factor will apply
if there is a modification to the tax system which has an impact on the
economy of the Contract; under clause 15.2, if there is a modification to
the tax system, the parties shall negotiate and execute a contract
amendment with a view to re-establishing the economy of the Contract.
Those formulations show that the application of a correction factor is
not optional. In the event of a modification to the tax system impacting
the economy of the Contract, there must be a correction. 53 . . Second,
pursuant to the relevant clauses, the purpose of the correction factor is
"to absorb the impact of the increase or decrease in the tax" and "to
restore the economy of the Contract." The purpose is to avoid that tax
increases or decreases alter the economic foundation upon which the
parties entered into the contract. This purpose would be defeated if a
party could simply refuse to apply a correction factor in the event of a
tax increase or decrease. Hence, the purpose of the tax modification
clause suggests that the parties intended the application of a correction
factor to be mandatory. 154
According to above-mentioned reasons the Tribunal held as follows:
For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal deems that the application
of a correction factor is mandatory when a tax affects the economy of
the PSCs for Blocks 7 or 21. This correction factor must be of such
extent as to wipe out the effects of the tax on the economy of the PSC.
Otherwise stated, the correction factor must restore the economy of the
PSC to its pre-tax modification level.
155
If we remind ourselves about the types of EECs discussed in the previous
section, 156 one can understand Burlington PSC as a SEB type of EEC.
Burlington's PSC also included a precise procedural mechanism for contract
151. Id.
152. Seeid 317-35.
153. id. 321.
154. Id. 324.
155. Id. 334.
156. See supra Part III.A.
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amendment, namely a contract amendment and an administrative board.
Moreover, not only negotiation, but also the execution of a negotiated contract
amendment is designed as mandatory. This is exactly what Thomas Waelde and
George Ndi predicted about twenty years ago: "the revitalized, extensive, and
increasingly novel stabilization commitments" resurfaced in arbitration. "'
Obviously, the investor in this case took very careful measures when it entered into
contracts with Ecuador.
In sum, the Tribunal clearly determined that the above-mentioned EEC is not
merely a renegotiation clause, but that it is indeed a type of stabilization clause,
which included mandatory correction factors, since all words used in the clause
refer to the mandatory nature of contractual language.' 58 Expectedly, the award
indeed confirmed the renegotiation-plus provision as a stabilization clause. A
brilliantly crafted stabilization clause gave in the end what investors anticipated:
"the parties remain under an obligation to apply a correction factor that will
counterbalance the effects of a tax change on the economy of the contract.,159
5. Assessment
What are the main implications of the Burlington decision for the EEC? The
first is an obligatory nature of the tax stabilization clause. Nonetheless, some may
express doubt on the effectiveness of renegotiation provision in an EEC since its
simplest version is not "an agreement to agree," but rather "an agreement to
negotiate;" however, the Burlington case successfully proved how a well-crafted
contractual EEC could defeat the host state's groundless arguments. Accordingly,
the Tribunal found the two-layered EEC (application of correction factor and its
calculation process) of the Burlington PSC as mandatory and the host state liable.
Dissenting opinions of arbitrator Vicufta are also consistent with this point.'
60
While a prudent and profit-seeking investor (Burlington) intentionally left
"economy of contract" open in order to maximize the future profit, it nevertheless
took an opposite policy regarding EEC. Therefore, one can find very detailed
-mechanisms of tax modification negotiation from Burlington's PSC.
The Tribunal also must be credited for its determination for giving full effect
to the EEC in PSC of Blocks 7 and 21-Ecuador has to absorb all tax effects to the
PSCs and restore the equilibrium of contract to pre-tax level. 161 The author
157. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 218.
158. However, arbitrator Brigitte Stern found the identical clause not to be a stabilization clause,
but a renegotiation clause in another case. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of
Ecuador, ICSID Case No.ARB/06/I 1, Dissenting Opinion, 12 (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw I 096.pdf.
159. Burlington Res., Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Liability 323(Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw 1094 0.pdf (emphasis added).
160. Id. 219-21.
161. Such kind of reading of compensation for breach of stabilization clause reminds us of the
classic Chorzow Factory case between Germany and Poland. The Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.),
1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, 181 (Sept. 13). For an elaborate discussion of this case, see BORzu
SABAHI, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: PRINCIPLES AND
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believes that, in general, the Tribunal rightly read the legal meaning of the
stabilization clause, deciding that a correction factor should be calculated with the
consent of both parties in order to avoid from arbitrary calculation of tax effect.
No doubt, such an investment treaty decision provides investors with more
confidence towards the already inserted EEC for mega projects.
The second implication of this case is the lack of articulation of key
contractual provisions, which are subordinated to the stabilization clause. We
should remember that Ecuador did not lose because of a harsh EEC. The problem
lies not with an existence of EEC, but with other subordinate clauses, which were
incumbent upon parties. But when Ecuador recklessly conceded to leave a
terminology "economy of contract" without any articulation and unresponsive
fiscal regime, it was this that cost Ecuador severely, as it was totally deprived from
windfall profit tax in subsequent years.1 62 To put it briefly, what Waelde and Ndi
were worried about, did in fact occur:
[a] negotiator will also seek to maintain such advantages for as long as
possible, even through all the vicissitudes the future might bring to the
relationship. At the same time, an industry team will seek to keep all
options for itself as open as possible. Such options will include early
termination rights, watered-down exploration and development
commitments, ambiguity with respect to all obligations, and absolute
clarity and precision with respect to its rights and entitlements. 1
63
Specific definitions of key contractual clauses, such as "economy of
contract," play very important roles during dispute settlement, since vague
definitions are "prone to conflicting interpretations in different contexts."' 164 The
Burlington case reveals just how important contract drafting is as the initial step of
contracting.165
The final point from this case is the limitation of the Burlington award. It is
important to keep in mind that even though the Burlington award clarified and
confirmed the legal meaning of the modem stabilization clause, it is still a treaty-
based arbitration.166 Additionally, the calculation of host state's damages to the
investment was left for forthcoming decisions of the Tribunal with the important
point that it will be calculated not based on breach of EEC, but rather the treaty
provision-which the Tribunal based its jurisdiction on- on prohibition of
unlawful expropriation. 16 7 This is because no known published international award
PRACTICE 47-53 (2011).
162. See Burlington Res., Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 546.
163. Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 226 (emphasis added).
164. Maniruzzaman, supra note 2, at 129.
165. See Burlington Res., Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 19 (0. Vicufia, Arb., dissenting)
(arguing the necessity of applying the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus regarding the interpretation of
"economy of contract").
166. See id. 12; Burlington Res., Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, at 133 n.639, 245.
167. Burlington Res., Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 248-49, 342 (June 2, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0106.pdf.
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has dealt with the quantification of damages for the breach of EEC, 168 as present
treaty-based award cannot show the real effect of EEC. It is clear from the
Tribunal's decision that even Law 42's second effect (a 99% tax increase) has not
been considered as the breach of expropriation while there was a high probability
of getting compensation under the breach of stabilization clause if the case were
judged on contract-based arbitration. 169
IV. OTHER FACTORS FOR FORTIFICATION OF STABILIZATION CLAUSES
Even though this paper's main focus is the EEC and its contribution to the
stability of investment projects, increase in the flow of FDI to the developing
world, and eventually sustainable development, understanding current stabilization
clauses only within the scope of EEC is also not appropriate. This is because there
are other types and elements of stabilization clauses, some of which have become
extremely important in recent years. This section will pay attention to their
function as a stabilization clause. In this respect, substantive rules of BITs
(Section IV.A.), municipal laws which regulate foreign investment activity in the
host country in particular (Section IV.B.), and Latin American legal stability
agreements are discussed (Section IV.C.).
A. BITs' Substantive Treatments
BITs' substantive treatments have a significant potential to contribute towards
the reinforcement of legal value of stabilization clauses.' 70  For example, the
prohibition of expropriation and fair and equitable treatment ("FET"), national and
most favored nation treatment, and umbrella clauses' 7 1 are leading examples of
them. Since, the role of FET became truly important with its absolute nature,
172
many scholars and practitioners view BIT as one new generation of stabilization! 
73
168. See Maniruzzaman, supra note 46, at 250.
169. For a short discussion of expropriatory taxation, see Arno E. Gildemeister, Case Comment,
Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador: How Much is Too Much: When is Taxation
Tantamount to Expropriation?, 29 ICSID REV. 315, 317 (2014).
170. For a detailed analysis on the impact of BIT on contracts, see 4 JAN OLE VOSS, STUDIES ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES: THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATIES ON CONTRACTS BETWEEN HOST
STATES AND FOREIGN INVESTORS ch. 2, 5 (2011).
171. Investors may rely it on, though its jurisprudence is currently far from being clear. See
Alexander, supra note 75, at 248 n.8. Regarding this point, Waelde and Ndi left an important solution.
According to them,
The state's treaty obligation--e.g., to "observe any obligations it has entered into with an
investor"-may not directly apply to a particular state/investment contract. Nevertheless, if
both parties have negotiated a stabilization clause before the known background of such a
treaty obligation, then one should assume that the treaty's obligation to respect contractual
commitment reinforces the contractual mirror-image.
Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 254 (emphasis added); see also Al Faruque, supra note 37, at 39
(stating that umbrella clause merely codifies the principle of pacta sunt servanda as a law of treaty and
it does not raise stabilization clause in state contract to the level of BIT).
172. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 131 (2010).
173. See CAMERON, supra note 25, at 70-72; Martin, supra note 9, at 58 ("Tribunals' interpretation
of the Fair and Equitable standard of treatment is however leaving room for justified expectations and
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In particular, one of the famous elements of this opaque treatment is the protection
of a "legitimate expectation" of a foreign investor, with stabilization commitment
lending itself to the protection and scope of this element. 174 Here, it is necessary to
mention two main points regarding the relationship between FET and stabilization
clauses.
First of all, numerous BIT-based tribunals upheld the validity of the
stabilization clauses and characterized them as a legitimate expectation of the
foreign investor. For instance, in EnCana v. Ecuador the Tribunal noted that, "[i]n
the absence of a specific commitment from the host Sate, the foreign investor has
neither the right nor any legitimate expectation that the tax regime will not change,
perhaps to its disadvantage, during the period of the investment."' 175 Additionally,
Parkerings v. Lithuania176 and Total v. Argentine 77 also mentioned the importance
of stabilization commitment in the light of FET. This means that when foreign
investors bring the breach of contract claim to the BIT for arbitration, then the
stabilization clause can stand for the breach of legitimate expectation of foreign
investor.1
78
The second point is related to somehow misleading beliefs in the real legal
power of FET. After extensively surveying FET breaches in investment
arbitration, Moshe Hirsch notes an important point that:
such a conclusion does not reflect and is not supported by existing
investment jurisprudence; nor does it reflect the appropriate balance
between the interests of host states for regulatory flexibility and legal
predictability. This jurisprudence is not inclined to accept that the FET
clauses lead to outcomes similar to those flowing from stabilization
clauses; and indicates that legislative or regulatory changes alone are
insufficient for generating an obligation to compensate foreign investors
harmed by such regulatory changes.
79
predictability, offering a new role to stability commitments designed as treaty standards indicators.").
174. Michele PotestA, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots
and the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID REV. 88, 114 (2013).
175. EnCana Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No.tN3481, Award, 173 (Feb. 3, 2006),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/EncanaAward English.pdf (emphasis added).
176. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 332
(Sept. 11, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita06l9.pdf.
177. The Total Tribunal concluded that:
[i]n the absence of some "promise" by the host State or a specific provision in the bilateral
investment treaty itself, the legal regime in force in the host country at the time of making
the investment is not automatically subject to a "guarantee" of stability merely because the
host country entered into a bilateral investment treaty with the country of the foreign
investor.
Total S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARD/04/01, Decision on Liability, 17, 118-19, 164,
309 (Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/documents/TotalvArgentina DecisionOnLiabilty.pdf.
178. On this point, see generally Moshe Hirsch, Between Fair and Equitable Treatment and
Stabilization Clause: Stable Legal Environment and Regulatory Change in International Investment
Law, 12 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 783 (2011).
179. Id. at 792. Cameron had also mentioned the same point several years before. See CAMERON,
supra note 25, at 74.
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Hirsch's observation is very important, as it concludes that the stabilization
clause is still highly important' 8 and that no BIT's clauses could replace it.'
81
B. Municipal Laws Regulating Foreign Investment
The next type of stabilization clause is the stabilization clause in municipal
laws. 182 Many developing countries adopted "foreign investment laws," "foreign
investment codes," or "joint venture laws" that in effect create a special legal
regime for foreign investment.183 This legal regime defines the types of
investments that foreigners are permitted to make, the incentives they may obtain,
the controls to which they are subject, and the governmental agencies that have
special responsibility for promoting and regulating foreign investment. 184  For
instance, article 3(4) of Investor Protection Law of Uzbekistan provides as follows:
If the subsequent legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan makes worse
investment conditions, than legislation current on the date of investment
is applied to foreign investments within ten years of the date of
investment. The foreign investor has the right at his own discretion to
apply those provisions of a new legislation which make better
conditions of his investment.
18 5
Still, municipal stabilization clauses do not offer absolute effective stability'
86
180. But the importance of BIT tools lies in the absence of contract-based-stabilization clause,
where investors may turn to BIT and rely on its principles and treatments. This may be a crucial for
small-scale investors where it is difficult to get enough contractual protection in the form of
stabilization clause, because of weak bargaining power. In this regard, Hirsch says "[l]arge investors
are generally in a better position to obtain such assurances from the host government than small ones
that often have no direct contact with governmental agencies. Still, it is noteworthy that small investors
involved in non-contractual relations are protected by other rules deriving from FET clauses." Hirsch,
supra note 177, at 803.
181. Of course, BITs also may adopt similar provisions that functions like stabilization clause to
some extent. In such cases, host countries shall refrain from taking some regulatory changes. For
instance see how Italian model BIT contains partial stabilization clause prohibiting retroactive
application of changes in the law in Article XII (3): "After the date when the investment has been made,
any substantial modification in that legislation of the Contracting Party regulating directly or indirectly
the investment shall not be applied retroactively and the investments made under this Agreement shall
therefore be protected." See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, STATE CONTRACTS:
UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, at 27, 48, U.N. Doc
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/I 1, U.N. Sales No. E.05.lI.D.5 (2004).
182. For thorough study of stabilization clause in the municipal laws, see A. F. M. Maniruzzaman,
National Laws Providing for Stability of International Investment Contracts: A Comparative
Perspective, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 233 (2007).
183. SALACUSE, supranote 172, at 191.
184. Id.
185. Law on Guarantees and Measures of Protection of Foreign Investors' Rights, L. No. 611-1
(1998), http://old.uzgeolcom.uz/docs/laws/31aw-of the republic of uzbekistanonguarantees.doe.
186. Maniruzzaman, supra note 182, at 238.
The provision for a stability agreement with the State authorities bolsters the foreign
investor's legitimate expectation of stability. IOCs should try to make most of the stability
agreement they enter into with the host State authorities. However, a mere promise in the
State legislation for stabilization is not enough of a guarantee for the foreign investor in view
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though they are nonetheless widely used and some investors heavily rely on them
in the onset of their business, because they provide investors with necessary
financial holiday. 187 Such tax incentive-stabilization clauses are indispensable to
attracting small-scale investors into the country and, in turn, host governments
often use them as a "strategic weapon to their own benefit" 188 based on
conditionality.1 89 These clauses, although with some exception and more narrowly
tailored scope, guarantee some tax breaks to the foreign investors for some period
and also stabilize the laws to the investors.
There is also an inter-relationship between various stabilization clauses
between domestic law and state contracts. In other words, a stabilization clause in
domestic law contributes to the articulation of a stabilization clause.1 90 This can be
clearly seen in Burlington v. Ecuador. The Tribunal stated that:
[i]ndeed, as Ecuador itself noted, the PSCs reproduced some of the
provisions of the Hydrocarbons Law on which Burlington relies. Thus,
these legal provisions may shed light on the meaning of the contract by
the very reason that they were to be replicated in the PSCs.
Specifically, the Hydrocarbons Law may serve to establish the meaning
of the "economy" of the contracts in the tax modification clauses.
191
C. Legal Stability Agreements
The third type of stabilization guarantee is not just one article of law or
contract, but the entire legal scheme on agreement of legal stability ("LSA").
19 2
This innovation is largely a Latin American invention. The statutory regulation
may be considered one of the main characteristics of LSA. 193 Through this tool,
Latin American countries could give a strong protective and reliable pledge to
foreign investors. Indeed, there are several well-documented research projects that
of the State's right to exercise its sovereign authority in certain circumstances.
Id.
187. UNCTAD, supra note 57, at 5.
188. Maniruzzaman, supra note 182, at 240.
189. Host countries may promise tax incentives and also stability of them for a certain period to
foreign investors, who make investment to the particular underdeveloped region or infant industry of
that host country. See UNCTAD, supra note 57, at 55.
190. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 240 (aptly noting that, ... the fact that general
legislation extant at the time of an investment guaranteed contractual and tax stability could well be a
factor in ascertaining when compensation is due and in determining the quantum of compensation if the
state subsequently revokes or ignores those same legislative promises of stability.").
191. Burlington Res., Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Liability 308
(Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw 1094_0.pdf.
192. There are many papers on LSA. For short comparative study of them, see Vielleville &
Vasani, supra note 20, at 13-21; see also klvaro Pereira, Legal Stability Contracts in Colombia: An
Appropriate Incentive for Investments?, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 237 (2013). For the latest study
on the Andean experience, see Rodriguez-Yong & Martinez-Mufioz, supra note 8.
193. See Rodriguez-Yong& Martinez-Mufhoz, supra note 8, at 71-72. Decreto No. 662, 29 Augusto
1991, El Peruano, Diario Oficial, 2 Sept. 1991 (Peru), translated in 5 Inter-Am. Legal Materials 158
(1992).
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show how, for example, Chile, Columbia, and Peru became successful in attracting
targeted FDI thanks to the LSA. 194 Legal stability agreements are also adopted in
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama according to their legislation. 195 Moreover, not
only Latin American countries are currently using this mechanism of stability, but
we can observe other countries also relying on this protective tool, such as in Asia
and Africa. 
196
LSA has already started to become the target of investment arbitration from
2008. In the first published award on stabilization clause after the Kuwait v.
Aminoil dispute, was the Duke Energy v. Republic of Peru,197 which was a
contract-based dispute under the auspices of ICSID. 198 The Tribunal had to deal
with "sham transaction" of the claimant in order to receive tax benefits in the
process of privatization reforms of energy industry in the 1990s. 199 In 2000, after a
change of government and the beginning of a re-examination of privatization
policy and, subsequently, tax law was retroactively applied to the investor.20 0 In
article 5 of the relevant LSA (DEI Bermuda), legal stability was defined as
follows:
This Legal Stability Agreement shall have an effective term of ten (10)
years as from the date of its execution. As a consequence, it may not be
amended unilaterally by any of the parties during this period, even in the
event that Peruvian law is amended, or if the amendments are more
beneficial or detrimental to any of the parties than those set forth in this
Agreement.
20 1
However, the Tribunal's decision came, surprisingly so, with a wide
interpretation and a novel way of understanding the scope of stabilization of
contract, and it found liability of host state:
The guarantee of tax stabilisation applied not only to laws, but also to
stable interpretations or applications of the law. It may also be invoked
to protect the investor in the absence of a prior stable interpretation to
the extent that 'stabilized laws will not be interpreted or applied in a
194. See Pereira, supra note 192, at 269.
195. See Maria Paula Silva, Legal Stability in Colombia: An Invitation to Invest, 16 CEPMLP
ANN. REv. (2013),
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/files.php?file=cepmlp carl669452126627.pdf; Vielleville
& Vasani, supra note 20, at 14.
196. Paushok v. Mongolia, Ad hoc/UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 97, 473
(Hague 2011), http://www.italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf (explaining the negotiation
between the host country and investor for tax stabilization agreement). In Africa, Ghana also seems to
give such protection. See Oshionebo, supra note 9, at 8.
197. See generally Duke Energy Int'l Peru Invs. No. 1, Ltd. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/28, Award (Aug. 18, 2008),
http://arbitrationlaw.com/files/freepdfs/dukevperuaward2008.pdf.
198. Id.
199. Id 324.
200. See generally id.
201. Id. 187.
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patently unreasonable or arbitrary manner.' 
202
The Duke Energy Tribunal focused not only on the validity of agreement, but
also its real content, which sheds light on the unexplored aspects of the
stabilization clause. It went beyond the traditional interpretation position
(illegality of regulatory change) and found host state's regulatory action illegal
regarding the change of interpretation of taxation law (illegality of interpretative
change). The Tribunal actually went further and clearly indicated the possibility of
illegality of arbitrary interpretation when there is no older interpretation (illegality
of arbitrary change). This new development in legal interpretation points to the
possibility that retroactive changes of interpretation of tax laws might be a breach
of the stabilization clause. The Duke Energy Tribunal truly expanded the
protection scope compared to the traditional Kuwait v. Aminoil judgment's
restrictive interpretation.
20 3
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, not only the validity of the stabilization clause, but also its
effect, has been strongly recognized by all actors in the field. One of the main
factors for this is the changing of its form-from rigid and unpractical freezing
clause to a more versatile and practical option, namely, EECs. EECs found wide-
range support from all actors of the field: host states, NGOs, investment
arbitration, and academics. The Burlington Tribunal has also contributed
enormously to strengthening the EEC's role in investment projects. Through its
flexibility, it could find a consensus point between the host country that jealously
protects its sovereignty and the investor that seeks to keep the equilibrium of their
contract.
Furthermore, post-2000, cases are rare and it is not easy to deduct general
conclusions. However, those cases, which are available, are invaluable, as they
brought the practice of states and investors in the natural resource sector to our
attention and raised the level of transparency. From those cases, we can say that
freezing clauses are no longer practiced in the petroleum industry. EEC is now
dominant and highlights a very big transformation in the case of state sovereignty
pertaining to taxation.20 4 Compared to the 1960s or 1970s, states are more capable
of keeping their taxation power and they successfully replacing freezing clauses
202. Subsequent 2011 Ad Hoc committee also dismissed Peru's application for partial annulment.
See Duke Energy International Peru Investments No. 1, Ltd. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/28, Decision of the AdHoc Committee, 201 (Mar. 1, 2011) (first emphasis added).
203. Excellent critical analyses of present case can be found from Cotula, supra note 2; Peter D.
Cameron, Stability of Contract in the International Energy Industry, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES
L. 305 (2009).
204. However, we should also not forget the fact that through creating legal enclave in one
jurisdiction, especially providing tax stabilization clauses, host states' flexibility on tax policy will be
limited and the administrative burden of monitoring and enforcing by tax authority will be increased.
See INT'L MONETARY FUND, GUIDE ON RESOURCE REVENUE TRANSPARENCY (2007); Mafukidze,
supra note 10, at 88.
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with a more flexible EEC. 205
It is also true human rights advocates' and environmentalists' concerns are to
some extent valid as pertains to the constraining power of the stabilization
clause.0 6 Nevertheless, today it has not been proven that the stabilization clause
has a negative impact on the environmental regulation.20 7 Most of the criticisms
are only hypothesis and nobody has ever shown any real facts proving its negative
impact.2°8 As a matter of fact, the opposite may be true2 09 and the author strongly
believes that there is enough room for its improvement and recalibration so as to
meet the best interests of both parties.210
Finally, we need to also take into account the limits of modern stabilization
clauses. Initially, notwithstanding the significant effect of EECs in stabilizing host
state commitments and providing investor with enforceable remedies, an EEC has
its own limits and obviously it cannot stop host states from nationalizing
investment assets or unilaterally terminating contracts. 2 1 1 As many scholars and
205. Thomas Wtilde & George Ndi, Fiscal Regime Stability and Issues of State Sovereignty, in
THE TAXATION OF MINERAL ENTERPRISES 63, 68-69 (James Otto ed., 1995).
206. U.N. IFC report informs that "in a number of cases the stabilization clauses are in fact drafted
in a way that may allow the investor to avoid compliance with, or seek compensation for compliance
with, laws designed to promote environmental, social, or human rights goals." U.N. IFC report, supra
note 2, 135.
207. Those two authors argue that, "[w]e are not aware of any instance where a stabilization clause
has in fact operated as a constraint to bona fide law reform in relation to environmental or social
matters." Audley Sheppard & Antony Crockett, Are Stabilization Clauses a Threat to Sustainable
Development?, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 2, at 335;
CAMERON, supra note 25, at 407 ("Although stabilization measures in investment contracts have been
the target of critical scrutiny by third parties (and by many host states and scholars in the past), it does
not appear that they have been an obstacle to the development of more exact and enforceable
environmental standards and access to justice.").
208. In 2006, Cameron noted that regarding creeping expropriations, "environmental, health and
safety obligations although this is still a relatively untested area." CAMERON, supra note 25, at 14.
209. In this regard, reallocation of shares in the Sakhalin-2 Gas Project due to environmental
concerns between investors and Russian Government is very telling. See Nowell David Beckett
Bamberger, In the Wake of Sakhalin 11. How Non-Governmental Administration of Natural Resources
Could Strengthen Russia's Energy Sector, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 669 passim (2007) (explaining
the complete story of Russian far east Sakhalin-2 Gas Project and how Russian government selectively
manipulated its environmental laws in order to get more share from the that project).
210. We should not also forget that the host states maintain a strong armory of negotiation in the
later phase of the project. See CAMERON, supra note 25, at 23-24. In this regard, Hay notes that host
states have "a wide variety of mechanisms available to interfere with rights in private property." R.
Hay, Protecting Assetsfrom Political Risk, 3 P.C.B. 152, 153-154 (1997), cited in ERKAN, supra note
11, at 24 n. 18.
211. Elisabeth Eljuri & Clovis Treviflo, Political Risk Management in Light of Venezuela's Partial
Nationalisation of the Oilfield Services Sector, 28 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 375, 389 (2010).
On this point, notwithstanding the generally positive outlook of the author towards EEC as a contractual
risk reduction tool, see how stabilization clauses of petroleum contracts in Venezuela failed to prevent
the forced sale of investor assets. Thomas J. Pate, Note, Evaluating Stabilization Clauses in
Venezuela's Strategic Association Agreements for Heavy-Crude Extraction in the Orinoco Belt: The
Return of a Forgotten Contractual Risk Reduction Mechanism for the Petroleum Industry, 40 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV 347, 350, 358-59 (2009).
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practitioners argue, an EEC is not enough to stabilize the investment project2 12 and
investors need other kinds of additional tools. 213 Therefore, the stabilization clause
is only one part of the tools for stabilizing contracts-of course, one of the most
important ones, and needs therefore to be considered in its own capacity.
Additional tools might include investment insurance by prominent insurance
institutions like Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA"); reliance on
BITs and so on.214
But, this is not the entire story. We need to keep track of innovating new and
more appropriate designs for each country and projects. As a matter of fact, we
also have to keep an eye on the current contractual practice, since arbitral awards
and theoretical analysis that were cited in this article mainly dealt with practice of
late 1990s. 215  Having said this, a novel and also more suitable design of
stabilization clause cannot be achieved without the endeavors of all actors in the
field, namely, the host and home country and epistemic communities of world
investment. This challenge is left for future research to consider.
212. ERKAN, supra note 11, at 139-40 (noting that one of Respondent to the questionnaire
suggested that, reality is different from the perception and leading author to recommend reasonableness
of investors in their expectation in stabilization clause).
213. Stabilisation Clauses-Issues and Trends, ENERGY, INFRASTRUCTURE, & MINING
NEWSLETTER (Herbert Smith in Ass'n with Gleiss Lutz & Stibbe, Minato-ku, Tokyo), June 2010,
http://documents.lexology.com/35f7c716-7a6l-4687-ba7b-ec2la8737911.pdf (noting that although
stabilization clauses are important for investment protection, they are also often imperfect).
214. For other alternatives of legal protection, see generally Comeaux & Kinsella, supra note 24.
215. Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 219 (describing the time lag between actual contractual
practice and arbitral awards/theoretical writings on stabilization clauses).

THE BRAZILIAN APPROACH TO SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE
AND INVESTMENT: THE CASE OF ANGOLA
MICHELLE RATTON SANCHEZ BADrN** AND FABIO MOROSINI***
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a slightly changing geography for trade and
investment flows, featuring a new role for developing countries. In 2013, foreign
direct investment ("FDI") flows to developing economies, the South, accounted for
fifty-four percent (U.S. $778 billion) of global inflows.' During this same period,
FDI flows to developed countries, the North, have accounted for only U.S. $566
billion.2 In relation to FDI outflow, the South has retained resilient records, rising
by three percent and reaching a new high of U.S. $454 billion;3 while the North,
which still accounts for sixty-one percent of global outflows, have stagnated at
U.S. $857 billion in 2013. 4
The increased share of developing country participation in global trade is also
noteworthy. While the share of world exports of developed countries dropped
from sixty-six percent in 1980 to fifty-three percent in 2011, the share of
developing economies rose from thirty-four percent to forty-seven percent in the
same time period. Part of this increase is attributable to trade performed among
developing countries. According to the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), the
share of South-South trade in global trade rose from eight percent in 1990 to
. This paper is the result of a joint research project developed, since January 2014, by the Center for
Law, Globalization and Development at the School of Law in the Federal University of Rio Grande do
Sul and the Center on Global Law of FGV S~o Paulo School of Law. We thank our students for
previous research work and assistance, and to Brazilian officials, businessmen and academics that were
part of our preliminary exploratory interviews. Financial support from CNPq and FGV is gratefully
acknowledged. A previous version of the paper entitled "Contesting the model-based model" was
discussed in the panel "The interplay between trade and investment regulations in South-South
relations" of the Fourth Biennial Conference of the Society of International Economic Law, and in the
African Panel of the 2014 Biennial American Society of International Law International Economic Law
Interest Group Research Conference. We thank comments made to previous versions of this article,
especially those from Carmen Pont-Vieira and Patricia Galviio Ferreira.
" Associate professor at FGV Sdo Paulo School of Law, co-coordinator of the Center on Global Law at
FGV. Email: Michelle.Sanchez@fgv.br
... Professor and Director of the Center for Law, Globalization and Development at the School of Law
in the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). E-mail: Fabio.Morosini@ufrgs.br.
1. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014:
INVESTING IN THE SDGS: AN ACTION PLAN, at 36, U.N. SALES NO. E.14.1I.D.1 (2014) [hereinafter
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014].
2. Id.
3. Id. (explaining that according to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD"), flows from Latin America and the Caribbean declined, while those from developing
Asia and Africa increased. Developing Asia accounts "for more than one fifth of the global total.")
4. Id.
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twenty-four percent in 2011.5 While North-South share has also slightly increased
in this period, from thirty-three to thirty-eight percent, North-North trade dropped
from fifty-six to thirty-six percent.6
Today's increase in the participation of the South in trade and investment
relations, including transactions with each other, is a result of a long-standing
contestation movement lead by a group of developing countries in reaction to
inequality in the international allocation of wealth. This movement can be traced
back to 1955, when a group of twenty-nine countries from Africa and Asia
convened in Bandung 7 and drafted a Final Communiqud of the Asian-African
conference. 8 This contestation movement, 9 among others, led to the creation of the
Group of 77,10 and its feats." t In the twenty-first century, new momentum on
South-South coalition for trade and investment matters is identified in initiatives
such as the BRICS countries, 12 the G20,13 the IBSA forum, 14 and in the South-
5. WTO, World Trade Report 2013: Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade, 1,6 (2013)
]hereinafter World Trade Report 2013].
6. Id.
7. It has been argued that the Bandung Conference stands for a compromise between certain
developing countries as to the nature of South-South coalition in the context of severe South-North
contradictions and power imbalance between the strong North and the weak South. See An Chen, A
Reflection on the South-South Coalition in the Last Half Century from the Perspective of International
Economic Law-making: From Bandung, Doha and Cancin to Hong Kong, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE
201,203 (2006).
8. This document, inter alia, considered problems of common interest to these countries and
proposed ways to achieve fuller economic co-operation in matters that included: promotion of economic
development in the Asia-African region; promotion of intra-regional trade; and the need for stabilizing
commodity trade in the region. Asian-African Conference, Final Communiqu6 of the Asian-African
Conference (Apr. 24, 1955), http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/BANDUNG55.PDF..
9. Id. See Chen, supra note 7.
10. The Group presently encompasses 134 members, and it is the largest organization of
developing countries in the U.N. and aims at promoting South-South cooperation for development and
enhancing developing country capacity in international economic matters. See About the Group of 77,
THE GROUP OF 77 AT THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.g77.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2014).
11. Among its achievements, the Group of 77 promoted the partial reform of the GATT 1947
legal system, by advocating reformative guidelines on non-preferential treatment that is favorable to the
South. In addition, it pushed for the adoption of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order (NIEO), and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
(CERDS). See Chen, supra note 7, at 204. See also G.A. Res. S-6/3201, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201
(May 1, 1974); G.A. Res. 29/3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974).
12. Initially integrating Brazil, Russia, India, and China, BRIC was created in 2001 as an
analytical category for economic issues. In 2006, its members designed it as a formal arrangement,
joined by South Africa in 2011 and giving rise to the BRICS countries. See MINISTtRIO DAS
RELA 2OEs EXTERIORES, BRICS - Brasil, Rzissia, india, China 4frica do Sul,
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=3672&catid=159&ltem
id=436&lang=pt-BR (last visited June 6, 2015) [hereinafter MIE, BRIC].
13. The group of twenty developing countries (G20), created in the preparatory meeting of the
Ministerial Conference in Cancun, in 2003, focused on a common negotiation position in agricultural
matters, in opposition to the North. See Nelson Giordano Delgado & Adriano Campolina de 0. Soares,
The G-20:lts Origin, Evolution, Meaning and Prospects, 25 GLOBAL ISSUE PAPERS 10 (2005),
www.globaltemative.org/downloads/GIP25-G20-en.pdf.
14. The IBSA forum was established in 2003 as a coordination mechanism based on political
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South cooperation movements.
In the context of the contemporary South-South trade and investment
relations, this paper suspects that a variety of legal instruments have been put in
place to regulate a plethora of different arrangements. If the paper takes the
example of Brazil, which has been characterized as one of the emerging leaders of
the new political economy, it takes notice that the country has signed few regional
trade agreements ("RTAs") and that it never ratified a bilateral investment treaty
("BIT"). Although Brazil does not rely on model-based agreements 15 to regulate
its trade and investment relations, the flows of commerce to and from the country
has increased in the last decades, as well as its inward and outward investments'
flows. What is then happening in Brazil with respect to trade and investment
regulation? Are there other legal arrangements that may be promoting the
increasing flow of investment and trade of the country? If so, are they in
consonance with the models of RTAs and of BITs?
In order to answer these questions, this paper has chosen the example of the
economic relations established between Brazil and Angola. As one of the largest
economies in Africa,' 6 it should not be a surprise that Angola is the country with
which Brazil has increased its flow of investment and trade in the last ten to fifteen
years. While in 2002, Brazil's investment flows to Angola were about U.S. $18
million; in 2012 they were about U.S. $1 billion. 17  Angola exports to Brazil
increased from U.S. $11 million in 2002 to U.S. $726 million in 2013.18 Brazil's
alignment, sectorial cooperation and the creation of the IBSA Fund. Its political alignment is to be
expressed in several multilateral fora, including the WTO, and IBSA sectorial cooperation involves
sixteen working groups, including one on trade and investment. See MINISTtRIO DAS RELAoES
EXTERIORES, IBAS-F6rum de Diilogo india, Brasi e Africa do Sul,
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.phpoption=com-content&view=article&id=3673&catid=1 70&Item
id=436&lang=pt-BR [hereinafter MRE, IBSA].
15. See COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES (Chester Brown ed. 2013)
(discussing 17 model BITs and their underlying investment policies). See also Henrik Horn et al.,
Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements, 7 BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT
SERIES 1 (2009) (analyzing the content of E.U. and U.S. preferential trade agreements in comparison to
their WTO commitments).
16. Angola's GDP in 2013 was the 6th largest of the African continent, amounting U.S.$130
billion. And, during the period from 2005 until 2013 was the sole, besides Ethiopia, to have a two-digit
annual GDP growth. The data was obtained before the African Economic Outlook. African Economic
Outlook 2014: Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialization, AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/. We should also remember that Africa has been appointed as
the next market to conquer, considering its natural resources and promising consumer market, based on
its demographic outlook. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014, supra note 1; World Trade Report,
supra note 5.
17. Tabela; 2001 a 2006, Data from Capitais Brasileiro no Exterior: Estatisticas econdmicas -
2001 a 2006, BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, http://www4.bcb.gov.br/Rex/CBE/ftp/CBETab2006.xls
(last visited May 2014). Tabela; 2007 a 2013, Data from Capitais Brasileiro no Exterior: Estatisticas
econ6micas - 2007 a 2013, BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL,
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/Rex/CBE/ftp/CBE_2007-2013_results.xls (last visited May 2014).
18. MINISTtRIO DO DESENVLVIMENTO, INDUSTRIA E COMERCIO EXTERIOR, Balanga comercial
brasileira: Paises e Blocos: lntercdmbio comercial brasileiro: Paises e Blocos Econdmicos,
http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br//sitio/intema/intema.php?area=5&menu=576 (adding Angola in
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exports to Angola increased from U.S. $199 million in 2002 to U.S. $1,271 billion
in 2013.19 What justifies the choice of Angola is, then, not the volume of
economic flows, nor the margin that it takes in Brazilian overall trade and
investment flows (about 0.4 percent), but its four times increase in the last few
years. Angola-Brazil trade and investment flows have been one of the most
dynamic for the economies of both countries in the last years.
What is the role of law in promoting trade and investment between Brazil and
Angola? The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that if there was such an
increase in Brazil-Angola economic relations, they might have had legal
arrangements supporting this movement. The questions that arise are: (1) if Brazil
does not structure its trade and investment relations in RTAs and BITs?; (2) what
are the main legal instruments leading these processes?; and (3) what types of legal
institutions are each of these two countries mobilizing? This paper will look at the
characteristics of the policies supporting this movement and rules designed to
promote that increase of economic relations, and how they may blur some concepts
on international economic law ("IEL").2 ° In order to develop the proposed
analysis, we conducted a case study of Brazil-Angola trade and investment
relations, and followed it with preliminary concluding remarks.
Angola suffers from a limitation on publicly available data. Similarly,
information on Brazil and Angola negotiations is also scarce. This feature of
Angola is due to political disputes during the civil war, which lasted until 2002,
and a lack of transparency, leading to the inclusion of a confidentiality clause in
many of the agreements negotiated between Angola and Brazil. In this context,
empirical research was crucial to this project. Besides a bibliographical survey, we
also conducted a search for primary sources in historical databases and performed
eight exploratory interviews with Brazilian officials, businessmen, NGOs'
activists, and academics working on the field. None of the interviewees will be
identified at this point.
Por Pais search field) (last visited Nov. 18, 2015) [hereinafter MDIC].
19. Id. In this period, Brazil imported almost exclusively crude oil and liquefied natural gas; and
the country exported to Angola, in decreasing order, meat, sugar, and mechanical machines.
BRASILGLOBALNET, http://www.brasilglobalnet.gov.br (last visit June 2014).
20. See Federico Ortino & Matteo Ortino, Law of the Global Economy: In Need of a New
Methodological Approach?, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE State AND THE FUTURE OF THE
DISCIPLINE 89 (Colin Picker et al. eds., 2008) (discussing methods in international economic law).
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II. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ANGOLA AND BRAZIL
A. Brazil's policy towards Africa in the 1960s: Filling a "political
,,21
vacuum
Brazil was the first country to recognize Angola's claim for independence in
1975, in what was considered a dissenting move during the Cold War. 2 Ernesto
Geisel (1974-1979) was the Brazilian President at the time. Geisel became known
for promoting an independent foreign policy and, domestically, for having
promoted the strengthening of state companies, and the coordination of a new
policy for the energy sector.23 As part of the latter, we highlight the construction
of Hydropower Company of Itaipu Binacional, the creation of Brazil's National
Ethanol Program (known as "Pro-Alcohol"), the nuclear agreements with
Germany, and, above all, the search for alternative oil suppliers.24 Angola became
then one alternative at that high point of the global oil crises.
Although Geisel's pragmatic policy towards the new independent countries in
Africa had a welcome commercial effect-establishing a market to the excess of
Brazilian manufactures and guarantying the provision of oil25-- academic experts
21. "Political vacuum" is an expression applied by some Brazilian experts on the foreign policy
of the country. In the case of the African continent, the expression suggests that, although few
movements of Brazil towards Africa may be identified in the country's history, there was no structured
policy until the 1960s. There was a vacuum on the conception of a South Atlantic region that was
explored by a more independent foreign policy designed as from the 1960s, and implemented during the
1970s. See Interview with Ant6nio Azeredo da Silveira, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Braz., in
Rio de Janerio, Braz. (1978) [hereinafter Interview with Silveira] (on file with authors); AMADO LuIz
CERVO & CLODOALDO BUENo, HIST6RIA DA POLiTICA EXTERIOR DO BRASIL 397-426 (3rd ed.2010);
Jos6 Fldvio S. Saraiva, Um Momento Especial nas Relaqo6es Brasil-Angola: Do Reconhecimento da
Independ~ncia aos Desdobramos Atuais, in ANGOLA E BRASIL NAS ROTAS Do ATLNTICO SUL 225,
225-54 (1999); Encontros com a civiliza~go brasileira (Civilizagdo brasileira eds., Issue 1-4 1978).
22. UNITED STATES LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BRAZIL: A COUNTRY STUDY (Rex A. Hudson ed.,
1997),http://countrystudies.us/brazil/. When Brazil recognized Angola as an independent country, the
party in power, Movimento Popular pela Libertaqdo de Angola (MPLA), was considered a Marxist
group, and it had significant connection with the U.R.S.S at the time. On the opposite side, during the
1970s, Latin America was condemned as the back garden of the U.S. foreign politics. Saraiva, supra
note 21, at 225. This support was, however, a push in the Brazilian foreign policy to a coordination of
non-aligned countries that was supposed to incorporate the new independent countries in Africa and
Asia, besides Latin America. ELI ALVES PENHA, RELA(COEs BRASIL-AFRICA E GEOPOLiTICA DO
ATLANTICO SUL 162 (2011).
23. AMADO Luiz CERVO & CLODOALDO BUENO. HIST6RIA DA POLITICA EXTERIOR DO BRASIL
441-2 (4th ed. 2014).
24. Curiously, right before becoming President of the country, Geisel occupied the presidency of
Petrobras, the state oil company of Brazil, from 1969-1974. And from that period, Geisel followed the
success of oil prospection in Angola. See MARIA CELINA D'ARAUJO & CELSO CASTRO, ERNESTO
GEISEL (1994).
25. Brazil is considered today as auto-sufficient in oil provision, but, from 1975 to 1979, oil
imports accounted for 70% of all imports by Brazil. PENHA, supra note 22, at 171. This policy was
qualified as a "responsible pragmatism" by the minister in charge of Foreign Affairs at the time,
Ant6nio Azeredo de Silveira. See Interview with Silveira, supra note 21, at 46-7 (discussing this
turning policy); Interview by Aspdsia Alcdntara de Camargo et. al., with Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, in
Rio de Janerio, Braz., at 221 (1985) [hereinafter Interview with Guerreiro],
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and officials in Brazil concur that this policy should not be read as limited to
commercial ties.26 As in the independence process, in its relationship with Angola,
Brazil always evokes historical and cultural similarities, geographical conditions,
as well as economic and political advantages of an alliance of southern countries.27
As a consequence, the official discourse always gets back to the gracious landmark
of 1975 and its narratives.
Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa, including Angola, has been described
as cyclical.28 However, the diplomatic narrative tends to shape the perception of
continuity of the Angola-Brazil relationship. For example, after the downturn of
Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s, in 2003, President Lula, in
his first year in charge, visited Luanda and declared in the bilateral ministerial
meeting:
Angola and Brazil are long-standing partners, and these countries are
consolidating and expanding their cooperation now.... This
relationship is based upon spontaneous affinities, and mutual solidarity.
These are the reasons why Angola is, since its Independence, a priority
to Brazilian diplomacy.
29
Cooperation has been the leitmotiv of this pragmatic approach by these two
countries placed on the political South of the globe. 30 This is clear in all official
statements by Brazilian diplomatic representatives, as well as in the letter of the
legal instruments signed between Angola and Brazil.3 1 South-South cooperation,
http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/historal/arq/Entrevista841.pdf. See also CERVO, supra note 23, at 420-42;
PENHA, supra note 22, at 168.
26. See CERVO, supra note 23, at 420-42; PENHA, supra note 22, at 164.
27. See D'ARAUJO, supra note 24. For more about the recognition of Angolan independence by
Brazil in the testimony of both Ant6nio Azeredo Silveira, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge at
that moment, and Ramiro Guerreiro, Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1979 until 1985 see tnterivew
with Silveira, supra note 21, at 3-5; Guerreiro, supra note 25, at 209-19.
28. Jos6 Sombra Saraiva, considered one of the most prominent experts on Africa in the Brazilian
foreign policy context, describes this cyclical movement as composed by "opportunities, downturns,
and overturns." Jos6 Flvio S. Saraiva, Politica Exterior do Governo Lula: 0 Desaflo Africano, 45
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE POLITICA INTERNACIONAL 5, 18 (2002).
29. Ministrrio das Relagdes Exteriores, RELAT6RIO DE POLiTICA EXTERNA: POSI(OEs DO
BRASIL. Brasilia [Foreign Policy Handbook: Position of Brasil] 166 (2007),
http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/388-Repertorio-dePollticaExterna_Posicoes do Brasil.pdf.
30. From 1950, South-South cooperation-between developing countries and new independent
states, which were known as the third world at the time-was part of a movement of contestation of the
international order. The landmark of this movement is the Bandung Conference in 1955. But, the main
concerns of South-South cooperation began to be designed in 1974, when the United Nations General
Assembly "[e]ndorses the establishment of a special unit within the United Nations Development
Programme to promote technical co-operation among developing countries... with the objective of
integrating this activity of technical co-operation among developing countries fully within the
Programme." G.A. Res. A/3251 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3251 (XXIX), at 2 (Dec. 4, 1974). See
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION, Background,
http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/aboutfBackground.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2015).
3 1. See High-level Comm. on South-South Cooperation on Frame of Operational Guidelines on
United Nations Support to South-South and Triangular Cooperation on Its Seventeenth Session, U.N.
Doc. SSC/17/3 (2012) for an illustration of consolidated priniciples of South-South cooperation today,
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as a marginal and alternative movement, incorporates many elements-some of
them complementary and others even paradoxical. This cooperation intends to go
beyond Official Development Aid ("ODA"),32 having as a guiding principle the
non-conditionality of assistance.3 3 But, it is also fundamentally based on the
expansion of investment and trade between southern countries. The United
Nations General Assembly recently reaffirmed these particularities, and their
importance:
Flows of development assistance from the North and the South are
significantly different, however, and South-South cooperation is much
wider than financial and technical support; it is a broad consultative and
collaborative process engaging all developing countries, aimed at
improving their collective economic, social, and political capacity and
welfare.
34
Brazil and Angola signed about seventy agreements and protocols. 35  The
"Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement," signed on June 11,
1980, was the first-and amongst the most important agreements.36  This
agreement opened the possibility of being amended and further detailed by later
agreements and contracts between the parties, 37 and it also established a Joint
Commission to manage bilateral relations.38  The "Economic, Scientific and
Technical Cooperation Agreement" became the umbrella agreement to fifteen
complementary agreements and three protocols, signed from the 1980s until
today.39 The Joint Commission has been in charge of promoting cooperation
which
were already part of the preamble of the Acordo de Coopera ;o Econ6mica, Cientifica e T~cnica
[Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation Agreement], Angl.-Braz., June 11, 1980, http://dai-
mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1980/b 52 [hereinafter Economic, Scientific, and
Technical Cooperation Agreement] ("Taking into account the shared goal to increase the economic,
technical, and scientific development, in both countries, respecting the principles of equality, respect for
national sovereignty, and of non-interference in domestic affairs .... ) (translation by authors).
32. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., Official Development Assistance-Definition and
Coverage, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm (last
visited Aug. 6, 2015).
33. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION, What is South-South
Cooperation?, http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what-isssc.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2015).
34. G.A. Res. A/67/208, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/208 (July 30, 2012).
35. For a search database of all agreements and protocols between Brazil and Anogla, see
SISTEMA CONSULAR INTEGRADO, http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/pesquisa ato bil.
36. See Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation Agreement, supra note 31. The
agreement was ratified in Brazil in October 51h, 1990. See Decreto No. 99.559, de 5 de Outubro de
1990, DECRETO DO EXECUTIVO [D.E.C.] de 99.559 (Braz.),
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1990-1994/D99559.htm.
37. Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation Agreement, supra note 31, art. 3.
38. Id. at art. 11.
39. Brazilian Foreign Ministry classifies as "complementary agreements" (in Portuguese, acordos
de ajuste complementar) those that detail certain issues or their implementation processes, making
reference to a previous understanding between the parties. Protocols, on the other hand, are more
informal agreements. Tipos de atos internacionais, SISTEMA CONSULAR INTEGRADO, http://dai-
mre.serpro.gov.br/apresentacao/tipos-de-atos-intemacionais/ (last visited June 2014) (describing these
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initiatives and other issues of mutual interest.4 °
B. Alternative tools for trade and investment flows between Angola and
Brazil
1. Countertrade, pledged credits, and collateralized loans
The relationship between Angola and Brazil clearly took into account the
limited influence of their policies and partnerships at the global level, especially in
contesting their North-South relation. However, as described below, both
countries often tried to expand their South-South policy space, creating alternatives
to make the increase of their economic flows possible.
The Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement was signed
during a time4 1 when the model of development for most of Latin America,
including Brazil, and Africa was collapsing. The credit crisis and high interest
rates were common topics, although they affected Africa and Latin American
economies differently.42 The economic relations between Angola and Brazil in the
1970s had been structured in terms of trade flows that exchanged the manufactured
and semi-manufactured goods from Brazil with oil products from Angola.43 1979
marked the first FDI flows from Brazil towards Angola, with the investments of
the Brazilian state-owned company, Petrobras, in Angola's oil sector. 4  This
investment was a combination of access to oil sources and opportunities of exports
of Brazilian products and technology.
45
types and classification of international understandings). For a more detailed analysis about the
Agreements signed by Brazil with Angola and other African countries, see WILSON MENDON( A
JINIOR, POLITICA EXTERNA E COOPERAAO TtCNIA: AS RELA(OES Do BRASIL COM A AFRICA
DURANTE OS ANOS FHC E LULA DA SILVA 117-41(2013).
40. The last meeting that we could have access of the Joint Commission was in 2011. This
Commission still exists, but since 2010, according to the Joint Statement for a Strategic Partnership
signed by the Presidents from Angola and Brazil a second institutional space was created, called
Permanent Bilateral Commission in charge of supervising the implementation of the Strategic Plan
(Section E.27) of the Statement. See Josd Eduardo dos Santos, President of Angola, Joint Statement on
visit to Brazil (June 23, 2010), in 106 RESENHAS DE POLITICA EXTERIOR DO BRASIL, no. 112, 2013, at
491-94,
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id= 10227&ltemid=747&la
ng'-pt-BR (last access Nov. 16, 2015).
41. Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation Agreement, supra note 31; Decreto N'
99.559, supra note 36.
42. See Dharam Ghai & Cynthia Hewitt de Alcdntara, The Crisis of the 1980s in Sub-Saharan
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic Impact, Social Change and the Political
Implications, 21 DEV. & CHANGE 389, 401-3 (1990).
43. PENHA, supra note 22, at 170-71.
44. LOURDES CASANOVA, GLOBAL LATINAS: LATIN AMERICA'S EMERGING MULTINATIONALS 53
(Plagrave Macmillian ed., 2009).
45. Petrobras had launched its internationalization process in 1972, creating its subsidiary
Braspetro for investment outside Brazil. Petrobras, at that moment, had the strategy of investing abroad
in order to open and develop the market for the products and technology developed in Brazil. This was
possible due to the fact that by the middle of the 1970s Petrobras had already been able to catch up to
the international technology in the sector. The internationalization was also one of the strategies to
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From 1984 on, Brazil recognized the possibility of "countertrade" in its
relations with African countries, due to the international financial crisis, the lack of
money, and the exceeding goods and services.46 Brazil chose a selected group of
countries to promote this exchange, amongst them Angola.47 This was an
inventive solution in a critical moment for both countries' model of development.
The financial and debt crisis was not the only difficulty that Angola was
facing in the 1980s. In 1979, after the death of its first president, Agostinho Neto,
the main opposing political movement, Unido Nacional para a Independkncia
Total de Angola ("UNITA") contested the appointment of the new president, Jos6
Eduardo dos Santos from the Movimento Popular de Libertavao de Angola
("MPLA" ).4 As a result, a civil war started, lasting until 2002. 4 9 During the civil
war, the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement was amended
by a Complementary Agreement on Trade Topics ("the Complementary
Agreement")5" and a Protocol on Communication issues, which were both signed
in 1983.51 The Complementary Agreement was designed mainly for financing
purposes, establishing the framework of financial support for trade and
investments between Angola and Brazil 2
The Complementary Agreement aimed to i) on its trade facet, guarantee the
supply of food and other goods of basic needs, as well as raw materials, to Angola
during its reconstruction period; 53 and ii) on its trade in service and investment
facets, guarantee the supply of service and material to Capanda Hydropower
Project, undertaken by Odebrecht, a Brazilian private company, among others.5 4
All such operations were financed by Banco do Brasil S.A., a semi-public
company, through the Chamber of Foreign Trade ("CACEX"), created in the
overcome the limits imposed by the international oil crisis. Francisco Jose Mattoso Paiva, Proposta de
Varidveis Vriticas Para o Modelo Preliminar de Apoio A Decis~o de Aquisigio de Refinarias em Novos
Mercados 17 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ponticica Universidade Cat6lica do Rio de
Janeiro); Armando Dalla Costa & Hiiscar Fialho Pessali, A Trajetrria de Internacionalizagdo da
Petrobras na lndzdstria de Petrdleo e Derivados, 12 HIST6RIA ECONOMICA e HISTRIA de EMPRESAS
5, 17-8 (2009).
46. PENHA, supra note 22, at 174.
47. See id. Examples on countertrade in that period are registered in the interview given by
Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, of that period. Interview with
Guerreiro, supra note 25, at 10.
48. DAVID SEDDON WITH DANIEL SEDDON-DAINES, A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DICTIONARY
OF AFRICA: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF AFRICA 33 (1 st ed. 2005).
49. Adam Taylor, A 27-year Civil War, For No Reason At All, The Washington Post, Oct. 14,
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/14/a-27-year-civil-war-for-no-
reason-at-all/.
50. Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperagao Econ6mica, Cientifica e T~cnica, de
11/06/80, na Area de Comdrcio, Angl.-Braz., Apr. 12, 1983, http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-
intemacionais/bilaterais/1983/b_17 [hereinafter The Complementary Agreement]..
51. Protocolo Adicional ao Acordo de Cooperaq8o Econbmica, Cientifica e Trcnica sobre
Cooperaq8o no Campo das Comunicag6es, Angl.-Braz., Oct. 20, 1983, http://dai-
mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-intemacionais/bilaterais/1983/b_53/.
52. The Complementary Agreement, supra note 50.
53. Id. at art. I.
54. Id at art. II.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
1950s to finance exports from Brazil." Under that agreement, Brazil agreed to
provide one million U.S. dollars as credit for trade and investment operations with
Angola.56 The main innovation of this financing process was that the parties to the
Complementary Agreement-Angola and Brazil-used oil to collateralize the
loan. The Angolan government pledged to provide twenty thousand barrels of oil
per day to guarantee the loan.57 The structure of the whole operation should, then,
follow the four-level scheme below:
Figure 1: The coordination of four levels for financing trade operations
58
Level 1 Brazilian Complementary agreement to the IAngol
government cooperation framework agreement govenment
Level 2 Exporter Commercial contract Importer
Financial Finaciainstitutionin t uio
Level 3 Agreement on procedures
bank) bauk)
55. J.M. Finger & Julio J. Nogurs, Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade
Liberalization: Fighting Fire with Fire 86 (2006). CACEX, as the administrative agency for allocating
the finance governmental support, was considered the main body for the implementation of import
substitution and export promotion developmental policy from 1960 until 1990, when it was
extinguished. During that period, CACEX operated as an export credit agency (ECA) in Brazil. For
more about CACEX, and the Brazilian developmental policy of that period may be found, see Andre
Luiz da Silva Reis, Do substituiqdo de importaqdo d substituigdo de exportaqdo, Rev. Bras. Polit. Int.
vol. 48, n. 2 (2005).
56. Daniel Zirker, Brazilian Foreign Policy and Subimperialism During the Political Transition of
the 1980s: A Review and Reapplication of Marini's Theory, Latin American Perspectives vol. 21 no.],
115, 127 (1994), http://lap.sagepub.com/content/21/1/115.full.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Figure 1 was prepared by the authors, based on the 1983 Complementary Agreement on
Trade. This type of operation came to be called as "Angola model," as a reference on how developing
countries rich on natural resources may find alternatives to access financial support to their economic
promotion. In that respect, the Report of the U.N. Secretary General on South-South Cooperation in
describing the standard legal structure of the operation for China operations with Angola does it in three
levels of legal commitments:
China, the largest source of South-South infrastructure financing, follows a unique process in
taking on responsibility for infrastructure projects that are identified through bilateral
negotiations and mutual agreements. In dealing with countries that cannot provide adequate
guarantees that loans will be repaid, it follows what has come to be known as the "Angola
model", a barter arrangement under which a Government pledges natural resource supplies in
return for the infrastructure built by Chinese firms. This involves agreements at three levels.
The first is a special framework agreement between Governments outlining the principles for
cooperation. The second is agreement by banks and the supplier of raw materials. The third
step involves the African Government signing work contracts with companies recommended
by the China International Contractors Association, with labour performed by both Chinese
and local workers.
U.N. Secretary-General, The State of South-South Cooperation: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 27,
U.N. Doc. A/67/208 (July 30, 2012).
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Supply contract (serving as a
Level 4 company guarantee to the commercial contract, company
eve4 opay under the terms of the bilateral (Son a n y(Petrobras) agreement signed by the two states) I
It is hard to identify where and when the public and the private interests and
legal forms prevail in the Figure 1 coordination. Taking into consideration the
magnitude of the Capanda Hydropower project,59 the contracts signed between
Construtora Norberto Odebrecht, Technopromexport, and the Government of
Angola also established guarantees to the contracts, backed by Angola's oil
production. Odebrecht stated this was an innovative suggestion by its business
director at the time, Marc Altit, considering that Capanda's first documents were
signed in 1981 by foreign investors and the government of Angola.
61
The construction of Capanda Hydropower station started in 1984, but the
power plant became one of the main targets of attack during the period of the civil
62
war that lasted until 2002. 2 The construction was interrupted in 1992 and resumed
eight years later.63 The first part of the project-two turbines-was concluded in
2005, and the last two turbines in 2007.64 In these three decades, Odebrecht never
ceased investing in Angola, becoming the country's largest employer in that
period.65 The length of the Capanda project and the significant involvement of a
59. The Washington Post Special Report on Angola classified Capanda Project as the largest
infrastructure ever in Angola. Brazilian and Russian companies mainly constructed this project, and its
cost is estimated in more than U.S.$4 billion. Province of Kwanza Norte: Water of Life, THE
WASHINGTON POST, April 4, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
adv/specialsales/spotlight/angola/article2l.html. For more details on the joint venture by Odebrecht and
Technopromexport, the Russian state-company, see ODEBRECHT, 0 FUTURO EM CONSTRU(;,kO:
ODEBRECHT E ANGOLA 81-119 (Odebrecht ed., 2009); Carine Kiala & Nomfundo Ngwenya, Angola's
Strategic Co-operation with the BRIC Countries, 85 S. AFR. FOREIGN POLICY AND AFRICAN DRIVERS
PROGRAMME OCCASIONAL PAPER 11-2 (2011), http://www.saiia.org.za/doc-view/61 -angola-s-
strategic-co-operation-with-the-bric-countrics.
60. ODEBRECHT, supra note 59, at 84.
61. Id.
62. INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, AFRICAN DAMS BRIEFING 2010, at 2-3 (Intemational Rivers Africa
Program ed., 2010), https://www.intemationalrivers.org/files/attached-
files/afrdamsbriefingjune20lO.pdf. The civil war was the period considered since the independence of
Angola in 1975 until 2002, when Frente Nacional pela Libertago de Angola (FNLA), that was the
party in power, signed the Memorandum of Understanding of Lusaka, with the rebels representing
UNITA. For more information about these parties and the civil war, see Adriano Ibraim e Ramos de
Souza et al., Guerra Civil E 0 Desenvolvimento Econ6mico Em Angola, 7 Revista de Economia da
UEG, no. 2, at 6 (2011).
63. INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, supra note 62; see also ODEBRECHT, supra note 59.
64. ODEBRECHT, supra note 59, at 110-7. See also HYDROELECTRIC STATION POWERED UP IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA: WIRE SAWING IS CRITICAL TO NEW DAM'S SUCCESS, reprinted in 15 CONCRETE
OPENINGS no. 1 (2006),
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.csda.org/resource/resmgr/imported/March%
2 00 6 % 2OHydroelectric% 2 0
Station%20Africa%20PSC.pdf.
65. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, PONTE SOBRE 
o ATLANTICO - BRASIL E AFRICA SU
B SAARIANA:
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Brazilian private company with Angola's economy put them in a central place in
the economic cooperation between Angola and Brazil, as described below.
2. Liberal policies understating the cooperation discourse
Positive results are reported as a consequence of those initiatives on economic
cooperation and its legal framework. 66 However, by 1982-1983, both countries
started to suffer the negative effects of the international financial crisis in central
economies. 67 The fast growing interest rates applicable to the debts incurred by
developing countries, combined with the shortage of foreign currency in their local
markets, naturally, led to a trade decrease between Brazil and Angola.68 Although
the two countries made efforts to maintain the same trade levels, at the end of the
"lost decade" for both their domestic economic and financial systems, their
exchange became much less relevant. 6
9
The dark scenario of the 1980s did not inhibit Angola and Brazil from signing
a few other agreements for bilateral cooperation or a set of protocols of intent.70
Such agreements and protocols focused on transports rules and technical
cooperation in specific areas. 71 Financial constraints, however, limited the reach of
PARCERIA SUL-SUL PARA 0 CRESCIMENTO [BRIDGING THE ATLANTIC-BRAZIL AND SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA: SOUTH-SOUTH PARTNERING FOR GROWTH] 87 (IPEA ed., 2011),
http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/livros/livros/1 20113_livropontesobreoatlanticopor2.
pdf
Silveira illustrated that the trade flows with Angola had increased 550 per cent since the 1960s. More
than two hundred Brazilian companies, including banks, decided to invest in Africa, Angola included,
under different forms of investment and partnerships with local economic agents; legal instruments and
alternative financing structures were developed in order to compensate the limited economic resources
of both Angola and Brazil. Interview with Silveira, supra note 21. See also PENHA, supra note 22, at
172.
67. Interview with Guerreiro, supra note 25, at 174-5.
68. The reasons for moratorium established by developing countries - such as Brazil in 1987 that
became well known for being the country with the largest external debt at the time (107 billion U.S.
dollars) - were far beyond their control. Due to domestic concerns, governments in central economies
substantially raised interest rates - an unforeseeable measure at the period that developing countries
were borrowing the money. This justifies why some policy makers and scholars from developing
countries reframe the debt crises of developing countries as a financial crises on developed countries
with spillovers to developing countries. On this sense, see Interview with Guerreiro, supra note 25, at
174-5.
69. In 1989, the exports between Brazil and Angola were U.S. $115.562.021, while the imports
were U.S. $50.607.334, both of which were calculated values in FOB. Import Query, ALICEWEB,
http://aliceweb.mdic.gov.br//index/home (follow Import 1989-1996 NBM 10 digits hyperlink; then
search under Angola during 1989 period); Export Query, ALICEWEB,
http://aliceweb.mdic.gov.br//index/home (follow Export 1989-1996 NBM 10 digits hyperlink; then
search under Angola during 1989 period).
70. Scholars called it a selective policy towards Africa: due to its economic and political
constraints Brazil had selected a few countries in the continent that should be kept as priorities in its
foreign policy. Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa were on this list, as well as the new initiative of
the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), created in 1996. See Claudio Oliveira
Ribeiro, Relag6es Polttico-Comerciais Brasil-Africa (1985-2006) (Nov. 7, 2007) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Universidade de SAo Paulo) (on file with USP Catalog).
71. Specifically, Angola and Brazil had six agreements: Agreement on Air Transport; the
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those projects.72 Financial institutions in Brazil were not able to give the decisive
support-as in the earlier years-due to: i) Brazil's high external debt that would
culminate in the 1987 moratorium, limiting the sources of Brazilian export credit
institutions; ii) the neoliberal reforms adopted in Brazil, reducing the size of the
state and its financing capacity; iii) international commitments under the letters of
intent ruling new loans taken before the IMF reinforced neoliberal policies in
Brazil; and iv) Brazil's decision to emphasize support for the U.N.-coordinated
peace missions in Angola (United Nations Angola Verification Mission or
"UNAVEM"), to promote an end to the civil war.
73
By 1994, the government of Angola suspended all oil collaterals.74 Angola
had a debt at the time of about U.S. $800 million with Brazilian governmental
credit agencies. Such suspension contributed to a further decrease in investment
flows from Brazil to Angola. In 1995, Brazil's trade account with Angola reached
a deficit of U.S. $41 million with Angola, for the first time. 75 The recovery of
collateral agreements would be instrumental for the relaunch of the Capanda
project. 76  Accordingly, in August 15, 1995, Brazil and Angola signed a Debt
Agreement on Shipping; the Complementary Agreement on Agriculture Research and Rural Extension;
and the three Protocols of Intent i) on Technical Cooperation on Geology and Mining, ii) on Electric
Energy and Water and iii) on Educational development. See Protocolo de Inten 6es sobre Cooperaqlo
T6cnica no Dominio da Geologia e Mineravao [Protocol on Intent on Technical Cooperation on
Geology and Mining], Angl.-Braz., July 15, 1992; Protocolo de Intenq6es sobre Cooperaqto T6cnica no
Dominio de Energia Eltrica e Aguas [Protocol of Intent on Electric Energy and Water], Angl.-Braz.,
July 15, 1992; Protocolo de Inteng6es na Area de Desenvolvimento Educacional [Protocol of Intent on
Educational Development], Angl.-Braz., Sept. 10, 1991; Acordo no Dominio dos Transportes
Maritimos [Agreement on Shipping], Angl.-Braz., Jan. 1, 1989; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de
Coopera95o Econ6mica, Cientifica e Thcnica na Area de Pesquisa Agricola e Extenso Rural
[Complementary Agreement on Agriculture Research and Rural Extension], Angl.-Braz., Jan. 1, 1989;
Acordo de Transporte A6reo [Agreement on Air Transport], Angl.-Braz.,Apr. 12, 1983.
72. Interview with Guerreiro, supra note 25; Ribeiro, supra note 70, at 136.
73. There were three main peacekeeping missions organized by the United Nations during the
period of the civil war, and Brazil contributed to all of them and became the major contributor of forces
in the last phase: UNAVEM 1, (1988-1991); UNAVEM 11 (1991-1995), and UNAVEM (1995-1997).
For the establishment of the missions, see S.C. Res. 976, 50th Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/976 (Feb. 8,
1995); S.C. Res. 696, 46th Year, U.N. Doc. S[RES/696 (May 30, 1991); S.C. Res. 626, 43rd Year, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/626 (Dec. 20, 1988); and for full information see U.N. Dept. of Pub. Info., United Nations
Angola Verification Mission IIl (June 30, 1997) (unofficial document of U.N.),
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unavemp.htm. For details about the Brazilian
participation, see Exdrcito Brasileiro, Missbes de Paz [Peace Missions] (July, 2014),
http://www.eb.mil.br/unavem.
74. Saraiva, supra note 21, at 219-20.
75. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS [Braz.], Working Visit of the Minister of State of Angola, at
26 (1999) (explaining Luiz Felipe Lampreia, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Angola, visit on "trade, debt
and bilateral cooperation; interest of Brazilian companies; the CPLP and the situtations in Guinea-
Bissau and the Democratic Republic of Congo."),
http://docvirt.com/docreaderFGV/DocReader.aspx?bib=ACiLFL MRE2&PagFis=2694&Pesq=.
76. Taking into account the Presidential diplomacy in the 1980 and 1990s, it is possible to state
that this investment project (Capanda Hydropower Project) never lost its particular relevance in the
Brazilian policy. See ODEBRECHT, supra note 59, at 109-10, 134-5.
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Rescheduling Agreement.77
Cardoso's speech during the signature of the Debt Rescheduling Agreement
reinforced this perspective:
We are looking for solutions that enable us to reopen credit lines to
Angola, and then increase Brazilian investments in the country. We
state our engagement to find a solution for the bilateral debt. This is the
guarantee that we have - most importantly - a positive agenda to
manage, paving the way for increasing commerce, cooperation, and
investments flows that have been the core of our bilateral relations.78
The Rescheduling terms: i) recognized a debt of 382 million U.S. dollars by
Angola of the principal, plus 54 million U.S. dollars on interests due; 79 ii) defined a
fifteen-year term for payment;80 and iii)detailed the applicable interest rate,8 ' the
ranking of competing debts in Brazil,82 and a most favored nation clause.83 Such
terms add novelty to debtor/ creditor countries' negotiations in three areas: i)
although signed as an international agreement, it incorporates an applicable law
and dispute settlement clause, as well as enforcement actions to the bills, similar to
private contracts; 84 ii) it establishes a debt-swap provision; 85 and iii) it binds the
supply of oil to the payment of the debt, according to an additional memorandum
of understanding signed by the parties on the same date.86 Although the
Angola/[Brazil Memorandum of Understanding (MoU-1995) is not available for
public consultation, this mechanism is the most relevant to our analysis. 87
Article IX of the Rescheduling Debt Agreement stipulates that the payment of
each installment of the renegotiated debt and its interests shall be made from the
revenues of Angolan oil sales to Brazil. 8 The due amount should then be paid by
77. Acordo para Reescalonamento de Divida [Agreement for Debt Rescheduling], Angl.-Braz.,
Aug. 15, 1995.
78. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil, Speech at the siging of the Debt
Rescheduling Agreement (Aug. 15, 1995).
79. Agreement for Debt Rescheduling, supra note 77, at art. I.
80. Id. at art. II.
81. Id. at art. III, IV, VI.
82. Id. at art. V.
83. Id. at art. XIV.
84. Id. at art. XII, annex B.
85. Id. at art. IX, annex C.
86. Id. at art. IX.
87. Public access to documents supporting Brazil-Angola relations has been a hot topic in Brazil
in the last years, considering the increase of economic transactions with Angola. Even though Brazil
has recently approved a Law on Access to Public Information (Law N. 12,527, as of November 18,
2011), the 1980 Cooperation Agreement established the confidentiality as the guiding rule of the parties
understandings: "Each contracting party shall ensure confidential treatment of all documents,
information, and any other knowledge acquired during the term of this agreement, as well as their non-
circulation to a third party without previous written consent by the other party." Economic, Scientific,
and Technical Cooperation Agreement, supra note 31, at art. X (translation by the authors). See also,
Lei No. 12.527, de 18 de Novembro de 2011 (Braz.).
88. Agreement for Debt Rescheduling, supra note 77, at art. IX.
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the amount of receivables from oil exports to Brazil.89 Moreover, the payment
shall be deposited in a Grand Cayman Island account of Banco do Brasil-the
Brazilian banking institution that worked as the export credit agency in the past. 90
Additionally, twenty percent of the receivables should remain in an escrow-
account of the same bank.91 The amount of this second account could be swapped
into Brazilian public securities debts; otherwise, could anticipate the payments in
the first account. 92 The payment of Angola's debts to Brazil, based on previous
trade and investment financing, was therefore also backed by oil exports. The
"Angola model" played a role in this type of financial arrangement as follows:
Figure 2: Coordinating the four levels for debt payments
93
BrazilianAnoagovrazint Rescheduling Debt Agreement Angolan
government (1995) government
(creditor) (debtor)
Financial
institution - ECA Credit lines (FINEXA PROEX)
(Banco do Brasil)
1. Main account (receivables from
oil exports to Brazil, according to
Banco do Brasil the installments defined on the
(Grand Cayman Agreement)
Branch) 2. Escrow account (20% of all
receivables from oil sales to Brazilj
possibility of debt swap)
Petrobras Supply agreement (20 thousand Sonangolbarrels of oilA per day)
A second particularity of that debt renegotiation is that, for the first time in
Angola-Brazil bilateral relations, the figure of cooperation was not invoked in the
legal covenants. This lack of cooperation may be read as the influence of liberal
policies on Brazilian government, which was known to be strong in the first term
of Cardoso's administration.
94
Carlos Iglesias Puente distinguishes two moments in Cardoso's administration
in what concerns cooperation: i) a period marked by the lack of resources (1995-
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Figure 2 was prepared by the authors, based on the 1995 Rescheduling Debt Agreement.
94. Kamilla R. Rizzi, Relatbes Brasil-Angola no P6s-Guerra Fria (1990/2002), 15 Conjuntura
Austral 287, 289 (2008).
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1996); and ii) a second period of growth and expansion (1997-2001). 9' In the first
period, Brazil signed only three agreements with Angola - including the
Rescheduling of Debt Agreement;96 while in the second period, seven others were
signed.97 The expansion of topics and types of cooperation is the most notable
aspect. The two agreements signed in 1999 addressed two aspects connected to
foreign direct investment of Brazil in Angola in that period-considering that the
Capanda Hydropower project's works were restarted in 1997-one agreement
envisaging the cooperation for occupational training in civil construction and
others, and the other on visa procedures. 99  But, in 2000, the cooperation
perspective was definitely expanded to include topics concerning the capacity
building of the Angolan state apparatus, and included new negotiation
techniques-such as having visa standard rules being negotiated under the
Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) umbrella. 100 It is also
notable of this last period, that the number of Brazilian public agencies that were
part of the cooperation projects increased.101 These elements were further explored
during President Lula's administration.
3. Refurnishing the South-South cooperation: new legal tools, new
legal actors
Cardoso's second administration (1999-2002) relaunched the South-South
cooperation 1° 2 and placed some of the basis of a new move on Brazilian foreign
95. CARLOS ALFONSO IGLESIAS PUENTE, A COOPERACAO TtCNICA HORIZONTAL BRASILEIRA
COMO INSTRUMENTO DA POLITICA EXTERNA: A EVOLUtAO DA COOPERA(;AO TtCNICA COM PAISES EM
DESENVOLVIMENTO- CTPD-NO PERIODO 1995-2005, at 168-70 (2010).
96. See Agreement for Debt Rescheduling, supra note 77; see also Ajuste Complementar ao
Acordo de Coopera fto Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica na Area de Formaglo Profissional], Angl.-
Braz., Nov. 26, 1996 [hereinafter Agreement on Vocational Training].
97. See Agreement on Vocational Training, supra note 96; Acordo sobre a Supressao de Vistos
em Passaportes Diplomiticos e de Servigos [Agreement on Visa Suppression in Diplomatic Passports
and Service], Angl.-Braz., May. 31, 1999; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperag~o Econ6mica,
Cientifica e Tdcnica, para Atividades de Fortalecimento das Instituigdes de Planejamento do Governo
de Angola, Angl.-Braz., Sept. 4, 2000; Protocolo de Inteng6es para Cooperafo Tdcnica no Dominio da
Seguranga e da Ordem Pfiblica, Angl.-Braz., Nov. 14, 2000; Acordo sobre Supressao de Vistos em
Passaportes Diplomiticos, Especiais e de Servigo (no imbito da CPLP), Angl.-Braz., Jul. 17, 2000.
98. WILSON MENDONQA JUNIOR, POLITICA EXTERNA E COOPERAC;AO TtCNICA - As RELA4;OES
DO BRASIL COM A AkFRICA DURANTE OS ANOS FHC E LULA DA SILVA 115-26 (2013).
99. Agreement on Vocational Training, supra note 96; Agreement on Visa Suppression in
Diplomatic Passports and Service, supra note 97.
100. JUNIOR, supra note 98, at 115-26.
101. Id.
102. JUNIOR, supra note 98, at 116, 141 (registering that the policy towards Africa was retaken in
1995, during Cardoso's first mandate (1995-1998), after a downturn in Brazil's economic cooperation
in the region in the two previous decades. Junior also asserts that both Cardoso's and Lula's
governments increased in 721.21% the number of agreements signed with African countries, thirty-
three were signed by Cardoso and 238 by Lula); Paulo G. Fegundes Visentini, Africa and the Emerging
Powers: The South and the Unholy Cooperation, 3 AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and Int'l.
Relations n. 5, 41, (2014) (presenting additional evidence that President Itamar Franco's administration
(1992-1994) brought back to Brazil's foreign policy an articulated African policy. In this period,
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policy on cooperation.1l 3 They are: I) the intent to reinforce principles for South-
South cooperation, either on the rhetoric and official discourses or explicitly in the
legal documents signed; 10 4 ii) the involvement of specialized agencies inside the
federal government, but the management of cooperation programs by one of them,
the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation; 10 5 and iii) the expansion of areas for
cooperation, combining traditional topics on trade and investment with social
issues-such as health and education-and public management assistance. 10 6 The
South Atlantic agenda returned then to the Brazilian foreign policy agenda, gaining
more and more relevance in the decade ahead, as the Angola case evidences.
10 7
Cardoso's conduct with regard to South-South cooperation was immersed in a new
foreign policy paradigm known as "logistic state."'1 8 This trend distances itself
from strict neoliberal policies and aims at market liberalism with rules of
reciprocal benefits, expansion of commerce through foreign trade and
internationalization of Brazilian corporations, and increased power capacity to be
able to affect the global scene.
10 9
Franco targeted key African countries (South Africa, Angola and Nigeria) as priority, and relied on
them to reach neighbor countries. Franco's administration offered strong support, either directly or
through the U.N. to the process of peace and reconstruction of some African countries, especially
Angola).
103. See ZULEIKA ARASHIRA, NEGOTIATING THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS, 126-9
(2011).
104. Saraiva, supra note 21, at 7. See also TULLO VIGEVANI & GABRIEL CEPALUNI, BRAZILIAN
FOREIGN POLICY IN CHANGING TIMES: THE QUEST FOR AUTONOMY FROM SARNEY TO LULA, 53-
63(2012)
105. See PENHA, supra note 22; Ribeiro, supra note 70.
106. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65, at 4 (registering the following thematic distribution
of the projects in 2009: agriculture 19%, others 18%, industry 16%, health 14%, education 11%,
environment 6%, security 6%, public management 4%, energy 3%, and technical cooperation 3%).
107. See PENHA, supra note 22; Ribeiro, supra note 70; Lidia Cabral, Cooperaqdo Brasil-Africa
para a desenvolvimento: Caracterizaqdo,tenddncias e desafos, 26 TEXTOS CINDES (2011). As a
reference, the Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) from 1998 until
2003 offered credits for more than seventy-nine export transactions to Angola, having the government
of Angola in the capacity of borrower. Eleven Brazilian companies benefited from those credits,
including Odebrecht, which received about 43% of the contracts.
See generally Message from President of BNDES, Summary on the Brazilian Economy: The Strategic
Plan 2000-2005, at 24 (Feb. 26, 2002),
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes-pt/Gaterias/Arquivos/empresa/ReLAnu
al/relatoOO.pdf (explaining a funded project with Odebrecht). The amount offered for each export
operation is not open for public consultation on the terms of Law Decree N. 7,724/2012. See Lei
No.7724, de 16 de Maio de 2012 (Braz.). We thank Sarah Marinho research support on BNDES's
regulation and transactions.
108. A "logistic state" is defined as a state not limited to be a service provider (developmental
state), nor a passive observer of the market and hegemonic powers (neoliberal state); but a state that
takes over the strategic planning for development and supports actions taken by other economic and
social actors, with whom it shares responsibilities and power. CERVO & BUENO, supra note 23, at
529. See also FOREIGN POLICY AND POLITICAL REGIME 358-9 (Josd Fldvio Sombra Saraiva ed., 2003).
109. CERVO & BUENO, supra note 23, at 528. Note that the logistic state foreign policy
paradigm introduced in Cardoso's second term (1999-2002) is consolidated in Lula's foreign policy.
Id. at 525, 529; FOREIGN POLICY AND POLITICAL REGIME, supra note 108, at 359.
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With respect to Angola, the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002, the leader of
UNITA, facilitated the end of the civil war, which was formalized by the
Memorandum of Understanding of Lusaka. l l° Though Capanda's works had
resumed under severe protection of the government of Angola in 2000,111 the
Brazilian investments to this project and the supply of goods and services to it, as
from 2002, regained central place in the Brazilian foreign policy towards Angola.
Besides, the reconstruction of the state and the development of Angola's state
apparatus, Capanda became a new field for cooperation between Angola and
Brazil.' 12
Analysts argue that Lula da Silva's election as President of Brazil in 2003
intensified Brazil's foreign policy towards Africa. 1 13  Based on a strategic
partnership, Brazil-Africa relations became the focus of Brazil's South-South
cooperation. 114 This was the first year of Lula's administration and of the Labor
Party in the Presidency. The foreign policy of the Labor Party has been driven by
an active effort to strengthen the country's relations with others in the Southern
region of the globe." 5  In November of 2003, Angola and Brazil thus signed
110. Memorando de Entendimento Complementar ao Protocolo de Lusaka para a Cessaqo das
Hostilidades e Resolugo das Demais Questbes Militares Pendentes nos Termos do Protocolo de
Lusaka, Braz.-Angl., Apr. 4, 2002, United States Institute of Peace,
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace-agreements/angola-04042002.pd
f.
11. INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, supra note 62; ODEBRECHT, supra note 59. (Odebrecht, regardless
of the civil war and the suspension of Capanda's project, decided to keep and diversify its investments
in Angola). See WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65, at 87 (asserting that Odebrecht Group invests
in Angola in construction, mining, supermarkets and shopping malls, energy, agribusiness, and real
state and that the Group has been appointed the largest private employer in Angola).
112. JUNIOR, supra note 98.
113. Visentini, supra note 102 (asserting that soon after elected, Lula implemented structural
changes in the Brazilian foreign services (Itamaraty) in relation to Africa. Besides Africa's Division I
and 2, Brazil broke down the Department on Africa and Middle East to create a new department,
devoted exclusively to the African continent. In addition a new Africa Division 3 was created); Cidudio
Oliveira Ribeiro, Brazil's New African Policy: The Experience of the Lula Government (2003-6), 13
WORLD AFFAIRS (2009). See also Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini and Analicia Danilevicz Pereira, The
African Policy of Lula's Government, AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and Int'l. Relations
(2007) (sustaining that the new African policy of Lula's government is twofold: first, Brazil's
interaction with Africa contributes to increase the country's visibility in the international scene in line
with its objective of becoming a global player. Second, Brazil's African policy is justified by the fact
that several African countries are reach in natural resources already being exploited by China).
114. Visentini, supra note 102 (suggesting that there is, however, a certain degree of debate with
regard to Lula's policy on Africa: while some sustain that Brazil's new proximity with Africa is an
extension of successful social programs implemented in Brazil, others consider the foreign policy of
Lula's government in relation to Africa a waste of resources; and a third group characterizes it as
business diplomacy, different from China's approach only in its shape and intensity). See also Ribeiro,
supra note 113.
115. Tullo Vigevani et. al., Politica externa no periodo FHC: a busca de autonomia pela
integraqdo [Foreign Policy During the Cardoso Period: The Pursuit of Autonomy for Integration], 15
TEMPO SOCIAL (2003); Tullo Vigevani I & Gabriel Cepaluni, A politica externa de Lula da Silva: a
estratdgia da autonomia pela diversificag5o [The Foreign Policy of Lula da Silva: The Strategy of
Autonomy through Diversification], 29 Contexto Int'l., (2007) (applying the official discourse of the
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fourteen agreements stressing the trends appointed above."
6
During Lula's administration, for the first time, official representatives of
both Angola and Brazil finally honored the commitment (expressed at Article IX
of the 1980 Cooperation Agreement) of meeting on a two-year basis."
17
Thereafter, the parties met again in 2005, when they signed seven more
agreements;' in 2007, with eight more agreements signed; 119 and, in 2010, with
Ministry of Foreign Relations of the search for "autonomy" in Brazil's international insertion contrast
the Cardozo days of "autonomy gained by the integration" to the main trends of the world system to
Lula's era that prevailed the "autonomy by diversification of the country's foreign relations").
116. Programa Executivo de Cooperaq o Cultural para 2004 a 2006 [Cultural Cooperation
Executive Program], Angl.-Braz.; Segunda Emenda ao Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperaqto
Econ6mica, Cientifica e E6cnica na Area de Formagao Profissional, Firmado em 28 de Abril de 1999
[Second Amendment in Vocational Training Area], Angl.-Braz., Nov. 4, 2003; Protocolo de
Cooperagdo T6cnica na Area do Meio Ambiente [Protocol Technical Cooperation in the Environment
Area], Angl.-Braz., Nov. 3. 2003; Protocolo de Cooperagao sobre Cooperagao T6cnica na Area de
Agricultura e Pecudria [Cooperation on Technical Area of Agriculture and Livestock], Angl.-Braz.,
Nov. 3, 2003; Protocolo de CooperaqAo Tdcnica para Apoio ao Instituto de Formagio da Administragto
Local (IFAL) [Technical Cooperation on Support for Local Management Training Institute (IFAL)],
Angl.-Braz., Nov. 3, 2003; Memorando de Entendimento ao Amparo do Ajuste Complementar ao
Acordo de Cooperagao Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica para Apoiar o Desenvolvimento do Programa
"Escola para Todos" em sua Fase Emergencial (2004-2007) [Memorandum of Understanding to
Support Program Development "School For All" In Your Emergency Phase (2004-2007)], Angl.-Braz.,
Nov. 3, 2003; Programa de Trabalho em Matdria de Cooperagdo Cientifica e Tecnol6gica [Work
Programme on Scientific Cooperation and Technology], Angl.-Braz., Nov. 3, 2003; Ajuste
Complementar no Dominio do Desporto [Complementary Agreement in the Field of Sport], Angl.-
Braz., Nov. 3, 2003; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperaq o Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica
para a Implementa¢6o do Projeto "Reorganizagdo, Fortalecimento Institucional e Inovaq6o
Metodol6gica da Extensdo Rual Como Estrat6gia de Desenvolvimento Rural Sustentdvel em Angola"
[Complementary to Project Implementation "Reorganization, Institutional Strengthening and Innovation
Methodology Rural Extension as Strategy Rural Sustainable Development in Angola"], Angl.-Braz.,
Nov. 3, 2003; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperaqo Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica para a
Implementa 5o do Projeto "Fortalecimento Institucional dos Institutos de Investigaq.o Agron6mica e
Veterindria de Angola" [Complementary to Project Implementation "Institutional Strengthening of
Institutes Agronomic Research and Angola of Veterinary"], Angl.-Braz., Nov. 3, 2003; Ajuste
Complementar ao Acordo de CooperaVIo Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica para a Implementao do
Projeto "Fortalecimento da Educagao Ambiental em Angola"[Complementary to the Implementation
Project "Strengthening Environmental Education in Angola], Angl.-Braz., Nov. 3, 2003; Ajuste
Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperagdo Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica para as Areas do Trabalho,
Emprego e Formagdo Profissional [Complementary on the Areas of Work Employment and Training],
Angl.-Braz., Nov. 3, 2003; Memorando de Entendimento [Memorandum of Understanding], Angl.-
Braz.
117. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65(providing a compilation of all bilateral meetings
between Angola and Brazil, from 2003 until 2010).
118. Protocolo de Intenq6es sobre Cooperagdo T6cnica na Area de Administraqdo Pblica
[Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Technical Area in Public Administration], Angl.-
Braz., May 3, 2005; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de CooperaqIo Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica
sobre Cooperagao T6cnica e Procedimentos nas Areas Sanitdria e Fitossanitfria [Technical Cooperation
and Procedures in Areas of Health and Plant Health] Angl.-Braz.,May 3, 2005; Ajuste Complementar
ao Acordo de Cooperago Econ6mica, Cientifica e T6cnica nas Areas de Geologia, Minerag.o e
Tecnologia Mineral [Complementary in Areas of Geology, Mining and Mineral Technology], Angl.-
Braz., May 3, 2005; Acordo sobre Auxilio Juridico Miltuo em Mat6ria Penal [Agreement on Mutual
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nine other agreements signed. 120  During this period, credits to operations with
Legal Aid in Criminal Matters], Angl.-Braz., May 3, 2005; Acordo sobre Transfer~ncia de Pessoas
Condenadas [Agreement on Transfer of Sentenced Persons], Angl.-Braz., May 3, 2005; Acordo sobre
Extradigo [Agreement on Extradition], Angl.-Braz., May 3, 2005; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo
Bisico de Cooperago Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica entre o Brasil e Angola para Implementa Ao do
Projeto "Insergfo Social pela Prdtica Esportiva" [Supplement Agreement for Project Implementation
"Social Inclusion Practice for Sports"], Angl.-Braz., Jan. 19, 2005.
119. Memorando de Entendimento para Cooperagdo com Vistas ao Fortalecimento da
Administrag9o Pblica de Angola [Memorandum of Understanding on Views to Strengthening the
Public Administration of Angola], Angl.-Braz., Nov. 9, 2007; Memorando de Entendimento para
Incentivo A Formago Cientifica de Estudantes Angolanos [Memorandum of Understanding on Training
Incentive for Scientific Angolan Students], Angl.-Braz., Oct. 18, 2007; Memorando de Entendimento
para o Estabelecimento de Mecanismo de Consultas Politicas [Memorandum of Understanding for the
Establishment of Political Consulations], Angl.-Braz., Oct. 18, 2007; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo
Bsico de Cooperagdo Econ6mica, Trcnica e Cientifica para a Implementagao do Projeto "Escola para
Todos" [Supplement in Project Implementation "School for All"], Angl.-Braz., Oct. 18, 2007; Ajuste
Complementar ao Acordo Bdsico de Cooperagdo Econ6mica, Tdcnica e Cientifica para a
Implementagato do Projeto "Capacitago para Elaboraqto de Proposta de Reforma Curricular"
[Supplement for Implementation of the Project "Training for the Preparation of the Proposal Reform
Curriculum"], Angl.-Braz.,Oct. 18, 2007;Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo Bisico de Cooperaq~o
Econrmica, Tdcnica e Cientifica para a Implementagto do Projeto "Apoio ao Programa de Prevenq~o e
Controle da Malria" [Supplement for Project Implementation "Support Program Prevention and
Control of Malaria], Angl.-Braz., Oct. 18, 2007; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperagao
Economica, Cientifica e Tdcnica para Implementagdo do Projeto "Capacitagio do Sistema de Safide da
Repitblica de Angola" [Supplement for Project Implementation "Training of the Republic of Angola
Health System"], Angl.-Braz., July 9, 2007; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperagao
Econdmica, Cientifica e Trcnica para Implementagdo do Projeto "Formaqdo de Docentes em Safide
Pfiblica em Angola" [Supplement in the Area of "Faculty of Training Health Public in Angola"], Angl.-
Braz., July 9, 2007.
120. Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperago Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica entre o
governo da Repiiblica Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da Reptblica Popular de Angola para
Implementagao do "Projeto Piloto em Doenga Falciforme" [Supplement Agreement for Implementation
of the "Pilot Project in Sickle Cell Disease"], Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010; Ajuste Complementar ao
Acordo de Cooperagdo Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica entre o Govemo da Repiblica Federativa do
Brasil e o Governo da Republica Popular de Angola para Implementagao do Projeto "Apoio A
Implantagdo do Servigo de Sanidade Vegetal e Capacitaqao Thcnica para Inspegdo Fitossanitdria"
[Supplment Agreement for Project Implementation "Support for the Implementation of the Plant
Protection Service and Technical Training for Phytosanitary Inspection"], Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010;
Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperagdo Econ6mica, Cientifica e Trcnica entre o Govero da
Reptiblica Federativa do Brasil e o Govemo da Reptblica Popular de Angola para Implementavao do
Projeto "Apoio ao Sistema Nacional de Investigagdo Agrdria de Angola" [Supplement Agreement for
Project Implementation "Support for the National Agricultural Research Systems of Angola"], Angl.-
Braz., June 23, 2010; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperago Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica
entre o Governo da Republica Federativa do Brasil e o Govemo da Reptiblica Popular de Angola para
Implementago do projeto "Capacitago na Assistncia Trcnica e Extens~o Agriria para Tdcnicos
Angolanos" [Supplement Agreement for the Implementation of the Project "Capacity Building in the
Technical Assistance and Agricultural Extension to Angolan Technicians"], Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010;
Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperaq o Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica entre o Govemo da
Repiiblica Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da Reptblica Popular de Angola para ImplementagAo do
Projeto "Apoio A Formagilo Profissional Rural e Promoq5o Social em Angola" [Supplement Agreemnt
for Project Implementation "Support for Training Rural Professional and Social Promotion in Angola"],
Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010; Acordo de Cooperaqo entre a Repuiblica Federativa do Brasil e a
Repuiblica de Angola no Dominio do Ensino Superior e FormaAo de Quadros [Cooperation Agreement
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Angola only from the Brazilian Development Bank ("BNDES") increased up to
U.S.$3.2 billion.' 21 Trade and investment flows for this period had a significant
increase in bilateral relations, from millions to billions of U.S. dollars.'
22
Three innovations in the credit concession and cooperation process,
considerably as from 2006-2007 should be highlighted: i) the new loans were
backed by collateral agreements, as well as on the commitment of debt payments
and on the excess of these payments as guarantees for the new loans (a
combination of Figures 1 and 2 above, as per Figure 3 below), according to the
Protocol of Understanding Angola-Brazil, dated as of October, 18, 2007;123 iW
cooperation processes gained also a triangular format, integrating Northern
countries in the South-South cooperation projects and international
organizations; 124 and, iii) local private companies in Southern countries also
became part of the projects.
on Higher Education and Staff Training], Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010; Acordo de Cooperaq5o entre a
Repfiblica Federativa do Brasil e a Repfiblica de Angola no Dominio da EducaqAo Niio-Superior e
Formaq~o [Cooperation Agreement on Eduction Non-Superior and Training], Angl.-Braz., June 23,
2010; Acordo de CooperaqAo entre a Repfblica Federativa do Brasil e a Repfiblica de Angola no
Dominio da Defesa [Cooperation Agreement in Defense], Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010; Declaragao
Conjunta sobre o Estabelecimento de Parceria Estratdgica entre a Rep6blica Federativa do Brasil e a
Repfiblica de Angola [Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership], Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010.
121. BNDES, RELATORIO ANUAL 2011 [Annual Report 2011] 156 (2011),
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes-pt/Galerias/Arquivos/empresa/RelAnu
al/ra2011/relatorio anual2011 .pdf (explaining Angola approved credit worth one billion U.S. dollars in
2011); Joao Fellet, Com BNDES e Neg6cios BNDE corn Politicos, Odebrecht Ergue 'mpdrio' Em
Angola, ESTADO DE S. PAULO, Sep. 18, 2012, http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/internacional,com-
bndes-e-negocios-com-politicos-odebrecht-ergue-imperio-em-angola,932219,0.htm (As previously
mentioned, due to confidentiality reasons, data on the amounts are not regularly published. BBC Brasil,
based on the Law on Access to Information, requested the information about all BNDES concessional
credits to Angola up to 2012, receiving the information of 3.2 billion of U.S. dollars); Francisco Goes,
Brasil Quer Replicar Corn Outros Paomes da Ada es Modelo de Comrcio com Angola. VALOR
ECONOMicO, May 2, 2012, http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/2640008/brasil-quer-replicar-com-outros-
paises-da-africa-modelo-de-comercio-com-angola; Angola and Brazil's Two- Way Trade Could Reach
U.S. $2.5 billion in 2007, MACAUHUB.COM, (Oct. 22, 2007),
http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/2007/l 0/22/3915/ (explaining an agreement between Angola and
Brazil on finance that allowed for an additional pre-approved credit line on one billion U.S. dollars, for
the term 2008-2009); Guilherme Barros, BNDESAprova US$ 2 bilhaespara Angola e Negocia US$ 1
bilhdopara GANA. Isto i Dinheiro. BLOG do GUILHERME BARROS, (Oct. 5, 2012)
http://guilhermebarros.istoedinheiro.com.br/2012/05/10/bndes-aprova-us-2-bilhoes-para-angola-e-
negocia-us-l-bilhao-para-gana/(announcing that two more billion U.S. dollars had been approved to
Angola). We could confirm part of this number on the following installments, published by official
sources, the concession of 750 million U.S. dollars on credits and guarantees negotiated for the term
2006-2008.
122. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
123. See generally Angola and Brazil's Two-Way Trade Could Reach U.S. $2.5 billion in 2007,
supra note 121.
124. See generally Economic Commission for Africa, South-South and Triangular Cooperation:
Implications for Souther African Countries, ECA-SA/TPUB/SSTC/2011/1 (June 2011),
http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/sro-sa-south-south-triangular-cooperation.pdf.
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Figure 3: Credits and debts in one account 125
Level Brazilian 2007 Protocol of Angolan
1 government Understanding i government
Level Exporter Commercial Importer
2 contract
Financial
institution
(public bank) -
BNDES
Brazilian Export
Credit Insurance
Corp. - SBCE
Credit lines
BNDES-Exim
Guarantee
Financial
institution
(public
bank
! Angolan
National
Bank
BNA)
Brazilian
Level Financialinstitutions -
ECA (Banco do
Brasil; BNDES )
Banco do Brasil
(Grand Cayman
Branch)
Agreement
procedures
Escrow account
(receivables from
oil exports to
Brazil, according
to the order of
payments defined
by the Protocol)
Level Petrobras
3'
Supply agreement
(20 thousand
barrels of oilM Sonangol
day)
125. Figure 3 was prepared by the authors, based on the 2007 Protocol of Understanding Angola-
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This new structure to provide financial support for trade and investment flows
between the parties-combining and integrating the past debts and the new credits
payments and guarantees-helped to increase the credit lines to Angola from
U.S.$750 million in 2006 to U.S.$1.75 billion in 2007.126 This structure also
proved to be instrumental in the context of the creation of the Brazilian Productive
Development Policy ("PDP") in 2008,127 and its resulting Integration with Africa
Program.12  PDP provided BNDES with a certain direction and framework for
action internationally, strengthening commercial relations and investment flows
into Africa. 1
29
According to the report prepared by the Institute of Applied Economic
Research ("IPEA") and the World Bank:
This presence, guided by the government via BNDES, placed the bank
at the center of the interaction between domestic corporations and the
African market. One of the goals of the PDP was to choose a small
number of corporations-usually three-capable of engaging in
activities in Africa.
Another goal of the PDP was signing a three-year agreement (2009-12)
between BNDES and the Brazilian Agency for the Promotion of Exports
and Investments (APEX). The agreement's aim was a policy of
diversification for Brazilian exports to Africa.
130
In the case of Angola, the Companhia de Bioenergia de Angola project,
known as Biocom, illustrates such structures well. Biocom is an Angolan plant for
the production of sugar cane, bioethanol, and electric energy, based on Brazilian
technology.' 3' The project is the result of a joint venture between the Brazilian
group Odebrecht (40 percent of the shares of ownership), the state-owned company
Sonangol (20 percent), and a private Angolan company Demer Angola (40
percent). 132 The total investment was expected to be around US$400 million. 133
126. Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa et. al., Brazil in Africa: Another Emerging Power in the
Continent?, 36 POLITIKON: S. AFR. J. OF POL. STUD. 59, 76 (2009).
127. WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review: Brazil, WT/TPR/S/283 (May 17,
2013), https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tpre/s283_e.pdf. The Productive Development Policy
was created to promote long-term competitiveness for the Brazilian industry, aligning existing industrial
policy tools, and enhancing government/ private sector engagement. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra
note 65, at 79.
128. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65, at 5, 79. The Integration with Africa Program is
aimed at strengthening Brazil and Africa economic relations and increasing Brazilian institutional
presence in Africa.
129. Id.
130. dat 80.
131. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65, at 5, 72. See also About Biocom, BIOCOM,
http://www.biocom-angola.com/pt-br/a-empresa/sobre-a-biocom (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
132. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65, at 5, 72. See also Rafael Vaisman, Bioethanol
Production in Rural Angola: Benefits and Risk Associated with a Brazilian Technology Transfer
Project, 4 BIORES, March 22, 2010, http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/bioethanol-
production-in-rural-angola-benefits-and-risks-associated-with-a [hereinafter Vaisman, Bioethanol
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BNDES, the Brazilian bank, was one of the funding sources together with Angolan
banks. 134  Yet, international organizations also provided financing to Brazilian
agencies developing technical cooperation activities in Angola, to support the
project. 135 A bilateral initiative from Brazil and the United States also included
financial support for Biocom.'
36
Biocom is expected to produce 32,000 tons of sugar in its first year of
operation, starting on July 2014.137 In its full capacity, by 2018-2019, this number
shall increase to 246,000 tons, and the mill will also produce thirty million liters of
ethanol per year.' 38 This is significant to a country that has imported 225,000 tons
of sugar per year. 139 Sugar has been one of the main products that Brazil exports to
Angola,140 but Biocom is seen as one of the projects that may reduce the
dominance of raw materials exports to Angola. 14 1 The Brazilian Agency for the
Promotion of Exports and Investments has worked on figures about exports of
machines that may improve the cooperation projects undertaken by Brazil.142
According to Carlos Mathias, a director of Biocom, stated publicly that, "Biocom
was built with parts and appliances from Brazil that holds the new state-of-the-art
on this area. The whole mill was imported from Brazil. If we consider nothing
more than the appliances imported from Brazil we reach 100 U.S million
dollars."'
43
Production in Rural Angola]; Bioenergy Reporter, Angola: Brazilian Odebrecht Agroindustrial is
Starting Production of Ethanol,CONBIO (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.conbio.info/post/angola-brazilian-
odebrecht-agroindustrial-is-starting-production-of-ethanol/.
133. Id.
134. Id. at72; Rafael Vaisman, Cooperagdo Brasil-Angola na produqao de etanol [Brazil-Angola
in Ethanol Production], 6 PONTES, Apr. 21, 2010, http://www.ictsd.orgibridges-
news/pontes/news/coopera%C3%A7%C3%A3o-brasil-angola-na-produ%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-etanol.
See also lsaias Albertin de Moraes & Rodrigues Bessa Mattos, Cooperaqdo Brasil-Aifrica em
Biocombustiveis Durante a Governo Lula: uma Parceria para o Desenvolvirnento, 3 REVISTA
CONJUNTUR AUSTRAL 54 (2012).
135. See Moraes & Mattos, supra note 134, at 277; SERGIO SCHLESINGER, COOPERA(CAO E
INVESTIMENTOS INTERNACIONAIS Do BRASIL: A INTERNACIONALIZA(CAO DO ETANOL E DO BIODIESEL
(FASE ed., 2012).
136. SCHLESINGER, supra note 135, at 9-12 (referencing the involvement of the Ministry of
Energy, the Ministry of Agriculture, and EMBRAPA, having the latter received funds from the
Interamerican Development Bank, the IDRB, and from the International Fundo for Agriculture
Development.)
137. Bioenergy Reportersupra note 133.
138. Cana: Odebrecht Started Operations in Angola in July 2014, APLA,
http://www.apla.org.br/cana-odebrecht-inicia-operacoes-em-angola-em-julho-de-2014 (last visited Oct.
6,2015)
139. Id.
140. See generally Vaisman, Bioethanol Production in Rural Angola, supra note 133.
141. About Biocom, supra note 132.
142. See generally Press Release, Brazil Machinery Solutions, Apex-Brazil and ABIMAQ Renew
Agreement to Promote Segment Exports (July 3, 2015),
http://www.brazilmachinery.com/site.aspx/Detalhe-Release-ING?codNoticia=k+gS90vGjLc=.
143. Cana: Odebrecht Started Operations in Angola in July 2014, supra note 139 (translation by
authors).
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Stories in the media suggest that Biocom project also received lines of credit
from private banks in Angola, such as Banco Espirito Santo. 144 There are also
statements that Brazilian private and public-private banks have signed agreements
with Angolan private banks in the last few years. 145 These banks could be
replacing then the National Bank of Angola in Line 3 of the structures of financing
above.' 46 Such new figures can be changing and making the structures of support
for cooperation projects between Angola and Brazil and the integration of their
economies more complex.
III. CONCLUSION
Considering that South-South coalitions have implemented significant
changes in world trade and investment geography, this paper explored the main
legal instruments that have stimulated and increased the economic ties between
Angola and Brazil. The political and economic relations between these two
countries dates back to the 1970s, but as from the 2000s the flows of trade and
investment increased significantly.
The legal arrangements supporting the increase of such economic flows differ
from the models of trade and investment agreements-traditionally structured as
RTAs and BITs-and they have their own design. The main feature of these
agreements between Angola and Brazil is the pooling of complementary initiatives
dealing with trade, investment, finance, and technical cooperation. The goal is to
make the initiatives of economic integration viable. In this sense, we noticed a
current transmission system where investment flows are based on trade flows of
goods and services that also depend on financing provided by other trade flows,
and part of this is complemented or supplemented by South-South cooperation
initiatives.
During the forty years of economic transactions between the two countries,
such operations became more sophisticated, comprising a larger number of
domestic public and private agents from both Angola and Brazil. Even though
increasing in numbers and focuses of activity, these operations are still few, and
their interconnection is vital. The public development and commercial banks, the
public companies, and the few private companies, as well as the governmental
foreign policy entities, try to be in tune. Brazil-Angola economic relations are then
characterized by a close connection of public and private law instruments, and
public and private parties very often become part of the same transactions. While
these regulations rely on government-to-government commitments, they
nonetheless combine these commitments with commercial contracts between
exporters and importers, agreements on procedure between public financial
institutions, and supply contracts between state oil companies. Such arrangements
allow Brazil and Angola to address problems related to: i) lack of financing for
trade and investment, by relying on loans collateralized by oil; and ii) to the lack of
144. See Vaisman, supra note 134.
145. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65.
146. See supra Figure 3.
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technical capacity, by establishing South-South cooperation projects.1 47
In that sense, having the case of Angola and Brazil as an example, it seems
that South-South relations may have been designed by different legal arrangements
other than those that have prevailed for North-South relations-mainly the RTAs
and BITS models. The ambition of South-South arrangements may be based
firstly on overcoming the economic partners' limits to the international economic
system, such as on financing and capacity building. Secondly, their hybrid public
and private dimensions may be also in line with the constituent and operational
particularities of their own capitalist system and peripheral economies.
147. Id.
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STEPS TOWARDS AN ALIGNMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN SOUTH-SOUTH EXCHANGES: A RETURN TO TRIPS
ANA SANTOS RUTSCHMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some of the most instrumental players in shaping the course of intellectual
property policies in the South are the so-called BRIC countries.' The acronym
BRIC originally encompassed Brazil, Russia, India and China. In 2011, South
Africa formally joined the BRIC countries, which are now referred to either by the
original acronym or by BRICS.2 While categorizations like BRICS attract a fair
amount of criticism, with questions surrounding the criteria used to aggregate
disparate economies, 3 the concept of emerging economies in the Global South
seeking to advance similar development agendas has become accepted currency in
multiple fields, from institutional cooperation to financial analysis and
investment.4
*Co-Director, Global Healthcare Innovation Alliances and Innovation Fellow at the Innovation and
Technology Lab, Duke University.
1. See JIM O'NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE BRICS AND BEYOND
(2011); Robert C. Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Emerging BRIC Economies: Lessons from Intellectual
Property Negotiation and Enforcement, 5(3) NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 400 (2007) (giving an
analysis of the role of intellectual property norms in BRIC countries).
2. A more recent construct is that of MINT countries, which comprise Mexico, Indonesia,
Nigeria and Turkey. These are densely populated, strategically located developing countries with
promising recent and prospective economic growth pattems. See Jim O'Neill, Who You Calling a
BRIC?, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 12, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-
11-12/who-you-calling-a-bric-; Kyle Caldwell, How to invest in the 'Mint' emerging markets,
TELEGRAPH, (Jan. 17, 2014, 7:58 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/10580108/How-to-invest-in-the-Mint-
emerging-markets.html (showing a survey of the use of the acronym MINT in the press and in
colloquial discourse); Jackie Northam, The Global Economy: A World OfAcronyms, NPR (May 13,
2014, 3:04 AM), http://www.npr.orgIblogs/parallels/2014/05/13/311852601/the-global-economy-will-
mint-countries-be-the-new-brics.
3. This has been particularly evident in the case of MINT countries. See Roger Bootle, The
MINTs are Very Different and Might not All See Stellar Growth, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 12, 2014, 8:07 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/rogerbootle/1 0567196/Roger-Bootle-The-MINTs-are-
very-different-and-might-not-all-see-stellar-growth.html; Carolyn Cohn, BRIC or MINT? Investors
Suffer Acronym Anxiety, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2014, 7:04 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/ 2014/01/20/
emerging-investment -acronyms-idINDEEAOJODD20140120. Even if flawed, artificial categorizations
may actually yield some benefits for some of the targeted countries. For instance, in the case of
Nigeria, which is the only MINT country that is not a member of the G20, it has been pointed out that
the creation of the acronym could generate enough pressure for Nigeria to join the group. The Mint
countries: Next economic giants?, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE (Jan. 5, 2014, 19:36 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25548060.
4. Since 2009, the BRICS hold an annual summit. See VI BRICS SUMMIT: MINISTRY OF
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, http://www.brics6.itamaraty.gov.br (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); Katy Watson,
Brics Summit: Banking on a New Global Order, BBC NEWS (July 13, 2014 19:01),
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Since the first BRIC summit in 2009, the range of areas on which the BRICS
cooperate or plan to cooperate has expanded considerably.5 One of the issue areas
that gained increasing attention from BRICS policy-makers is intellectual property.
This has been particularly true since 2013, when these countries signed their first
agreement on cooperation between intellectual property offices.6 The agreement,
known as the Roadmap, focuses primarily on cooperation in patent matters, and
has the potential to trigger an alignment of patent policies in the South-or, more
accurately, in the most economically-empowered arenas of the South.
As the Roadmap comes into force, this article explores options for further
cooperation between BRICS-and, potentially, developing countries in general-
beyond the patent field. It begins by noting that patent law, in the form of
flexibilities within the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement" or "TRIPS"), 7 has consistently been at the
heart of the boldest and most controversial intellectual property measures adopted
by some of the leading economies of the South.8 It then describes the main
features of the recent Roadmap, with an emphasis on its patent-centric design. The
article proceeds to propose a set of TRIPS-compatible measures outside patent law
that countries seeking to advance development agendas have yet to explore. In an
era in which post-TRIPS and post-World Trade Organization ("WTO")
approaches 9 often relegate treaty interpretation to a residual position, these
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28235378. In 2014, the BRICS established a multilateral
development bank, the New Development Bank, headquartered in Shanghai. Agreement on the New
Development Bank- Fortaleza, July 15, VI BRICS SUMMIT MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL REL. (July 15,
2014), http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/press-releases/219-agreement-on-the-new-development-
bank-fortaleza-july-15; Raj M. Desai & James Raymond Vreeland, What the New Bank of BRICS is All
About, WASH. POST (July 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/07/17/what-the-new-bank-of-brics-is-all-about/.
5. Compare the Joint Statement produced in the 2009 summit with the Action Plans that
emerged from the 2013 and 2014 summit. First Summit: Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries
Leaders, VI BRICS SUMMIT MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL REL. (June 16, 2009),
http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/1 14-first-summit-2. The 2013
Declaration and Action Plan established the creation of the BRICS Development Bank, which would
eventually become the New Development Bank. Fifth Summit: eThekwini Declaration and Action
Plan, VI BRICS SUMMIT MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL REL. (Mar. 27, 2013),
http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/69-fifth-summit; Sixth Summit: Fortaleza
Declaration and Action Plan, VI BRIcS SUMMIT MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL REL. (July 15, 2014),
http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/223-sixth-summit-declaration-and-action-
plan.
6. BRICS TRADE AND INVESTMENT COOPERATION FRAMEWORK, art 4.5 (2013),
http://www.brics5.co.za/assets/BRICS-Trade-and-Investment-Cooperation-Framework.pdf [hereinafter
COOPERATION FRAMEWORK]; William New, BRICS Launch Their Own Plan for IP Cooperation; India
Defends Itself, IP WATCH, (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/l 1/27/brics-launch-their-
own-plan-for-ip-cooperation-india-defends-itself/.
7. Specifically, the flexibilities associated with compulsory licensing.
8. This would be the case of Brazil and India, who paved the way for compulsory licensing of
patented drugs, thus bolstering the development of domestic generics markets.
9. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 Apr. 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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measures are derived from TRIPS and have the potential to further the innovation
agendas of developing countries without increasing the overall levels of domestic
intellectual property protection.
II. CONTOURS OF A PROGRESSIVE ALIGNMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FROM
COMPULSORY LICENSING IN THE BRICS TO THE 2013 ROADMAP
A. An Overview of Compulsory Licensing in the BRICS
So far, the greatest intellectual property showdowns between the South and
the North have taken place in the patent field, specifically in the pharmaceutical
arena, with generics being at the center of most political and legal disputes.'
0
Tensions between manufacturers of patented drugs in the North and generic
industries"' fueled the first years of TRIPS implementation and continue to the
present day, amid trade threats' 2 and WTO disputes. 13 Unsurprisingly, several of
the BRICS have been at the center of these controversies. India, which grew a
globally competitive generics industry by not recognizing pharmaceutical patents
for several decades after 1972, finally amended its patent law in 2005 to comply
with TRIPS obligations. 14  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, South Africa
underwent a long war with manufacturers of patented drugs in an effort to curb its
AIDS epidemics. 15 Today, South Africa is revising its intellectual property laws to
10. See Enrico Bonadio & Carlo Maria Cantore, Seizures of In-Transit Generics at the EU
Borders: India and Brazil v. The EU, 1 EUR. J. RISK REG. 404, 404-408 (2010); Robert Ineson et al.,
U.S. Retaliates After Thai, Brazilian Decisions on Pharmaceutical IP, IHS (July 4, 2007),
https://www.ihs.com/country-industry-forecasting.htmfl?ID=l 06597914;. Compulsory License
Application No. 1 of 2011, Application for Compulsory License under Section 84(1) of the Patents Act,
1970 in respect of Patent No.215758 (Natco Pharma Limited v. Bayer Corp.) C.L.A. No. I of 2011
(2012) [hereinafter Natco], http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/compulsorylicense_12032012.pdf. The
Special 301 Reports issued yearly by the Office of the United States Trade Representative also attest to
the ideological tensions between patent policies in the South (and, in particular, within the BRICS) and
the United States. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411
11. See Amir Attaran, How Do Patents And Economic Policies Affect Access To Essential
Medicines In Developing Countries?, 23 HEALTH AFF. 155, 155-166 (2004) (discussing the role that
patents play in access to medicines throughout the South); David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic
Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REv. ECON. & STAT. 37 (2005) (discussing structural relationships within
the generics industries); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug
Patents?, 8 (4) J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613 (2011) (discussing an econometric analysis of post-
Hatch-Waxman Act competition between the generic industry and brand-name manufacturers of drugs).
12. See, e.g., Robert Ineson et al., supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India's Patent
System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REv. 491 (2007); Shamnad
Basheer, India's Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act 2005, 1 INDIAN J. L. & TECH. 1
(2005); Brenda Waning et al., A Lifeline to Treatment: The Role of Indian Generic Manufacturers in
Supplying Antiretroviral Medicines to Developing Countries, 13 J. INT. AIDS SOCIETY 35 (2010).
15. David Barnard, In the High Court of South Africa, Case No. 4138/98: The Global Politics of
Access to Low-Cost AIDS Drugs in Poor Countries, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 159 (2002); WILLIAM
W. FISHER III & DR. CYRILL P. RIGAMONTI, THE SOUTH AFRICA AIDS CONTROVERSY A CASE STUDY
IN PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2005), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf.
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position itself as a leader in generic drug manufacturing. 16
Brazil is often credited with being the savviest of developing countries in
playing the "court of public opinion" to jump-start the generics industry. 17 In
1997, a local working requirement was incorporated into Brazilian domestic patent
law. 18 In 1999, Brazil passed legislation enabling compulsory licensing for non-
commercial public uses of patents in cases of national emergency and public
interest. 19  While these legislative reforms were applicable to all fields of
technology, Brazil took advantage of the ongoing debate surrounding the AIDS
patents in South Africa to tie its patent reform both to AIDS crisis and, more
broadly, to the claims of access to medicines movements around the developing
world.20  Brazil's careful framing of the situation, which at one point acquired
human rights contours, succeeded in breaking resistance from the North, with the
United States dropping a WTO complaint about the Brazilian patent reform. 21
India, which took significantly longer to grant compulsory licenses, faced the
same kind of international pressure when it issued its first license. In 2012, the
Controller of Patents in Mumbai approved compulsory licensing of Nexavar, a
drug patented by Bayer.22 Prompt response from the United States framed the
approval as an undue restriction of intellectual property rights:
India's decision in this case to restrict patent rights of an innovator
based, in part, on the innovator's decision to import its products, rather
than manufacture them in India, establishes a troubling precedent.
Unless overturned, the decision could potentially compel innovators
outside India-including those in sectors well beyond pharmaceuticals,
such as green technology and information and communications
technology-to manufacture in India in order to avoid being forced to
license an invention to third parties. 2
3
India's first foray into compulsory licensing has contributed to the decision to
16. Tiisetso Motsoeneng, South Africa Slams Big Pharma in Generic Drugs Row, REUTERS (Jan.
17, 2014 6:57 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/17/us-safrica-pharma-
idUSBREAOGON720140117.
17. The Emerging BRIC Economies, supra note 1, at 407.
18. Id. at 406.
19. Decree No. 3.201 of October 6, 1999 (Compulsory Licenses in Cases of National Emergency
and Public Interest), WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=516 (last visited Feb. 9,
2015).
20. The Emerging BRIC Economies, supra note 1, at 407; Jane GaIvfo, Brazil and Access to
HIV/AIDS Drugs: A Question of Human Rights and Public Health, 95 (7) AM J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1110,
1110-13 (July 2005); Pascual Ortells, Brazil: A Model Response to AIDS, GLOBAL POL'Y F. (April
2003), https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/211/44923.html; Claudia Jurberg;
Brazil Declares Patented AIDS Drug of Public Interest, Could Expand Access, IP WATCH (Apr. 22,
2008), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p= 1015.
21. See Chakravarthi Raghavan, US Beats a (Tactical) Retreat over Brazil's Patent Law, THIRD
WORLD NETWORK (June 25, 2001), http://www.twn.my/title/tactical.htm.
22. Natco, supra note 10 art 15.
23. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), 2013 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 39 (2013),
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/05012013%202013%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf.
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keep the country on the higher level of the U.S. 301 Watch List (priority watch).24
Brazil, on the other hand, has moved from the priority watch list to the lower
category (watch list).2
5
Among the other BRICS, China amended its law in 2012 to enable
compulsory licensing of generics, 26 but so far no use has been made of the new
27provisions. Similarly, Russian patent law contemplates the possibility of
compulsory licensing, but there are no reports of any activity as to its progress.28
Protection of pharmaceuticals is therefore moving towards alignment among the
BRICS group. 29 All founding BRIC countries have compulsory licensing schemes
in place, albeit the regimes differ slightly from one country to another."0 South
Africa is in the process of amending its patent to bring it more into consonance
with practices in the other leading economies of the developing world.3 '
Even outside the BRICS zone, compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals has
been expanding. One of the most well-known cases is Thailand, which issued a
compulsory license for Efavirenz, a drug used in the treatment of HIV, in 2006.32
There has also been compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals throughout different
regions of the Global South, from Indonesia and Malaysia to the Dominican
Republic, to Ghana and Mozambique, to name a few examples.
33
As TRIPS reaches the end of its second decade of existence,34 the most
prominent point of convergence of intellectual property policies in the South has
revolved around compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. This convergence does
not appear to result from concerted efforts among developing countries (or even
24. Id. at 6. Since 1989, the USTR has enacted annual Section 301 Special Reports, identifying
countries that do not effectively protect intellectual property rights. Countries with intellectual property
violations considered particularly serious (in the optic of the USTR) are placed under a Priority Watch
List, whereas countries of concern but deemed less problematic are placed in the Watch List.
25. Id.
26. Lynne Taylor, China Amends Patent Laws to Enable Compulsory Licensing, PHARMA TIMES
DIGITAL (June 3, 2012), http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/1 2-06-
13/Chinaamendspatent laws to-enablecompulsoryjlicensing.aspx.
27. Although, in 2005, China's threats to issue a compulsory license eventually led to voluntary
licenses for the manufacture of generic versions of Tamiflu. JAMES PACKARD LOVE, RECENT
EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSES ON PATENTS 12 (2007),
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recentcls.pdf.
28. Maria Nilova & Vadim Chagin, A Changing Landscape: Life Sciences in Russia, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REV. (May 1, 2012), http://www.worldipreview.com/article/a-changing-landscape-life-
sciences-in-russia.
29. The Emerging BRIC Economies, supra note 1, at 416.
30. Id. at 420.
31. Lynne Taylor, S Africa Pledges Action on Compulsory Licenses, Parallel Imports, PHARMA
TIMES DIGITAL, (Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.pharmatimes.com/Article/13-1 I-
07/SAfricapledgesaction on compulsory licensesparallel_imports.aspx.
32. See Robert Steinbrook, Thailand and the Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz, 356 N. ENGL. J.
MED. 544, 544 (Feb. 8, 2007).
33. See JAMES PACKARD LOVE, supra note 27.
34. Nearly a decade and a half has passed since WTO members adopted the Doha Declaration.
See DOHA WTO Ministerial 2001, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/M1N(01)/DEC/2, (Nov. 14, 2001).
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amidst the BRICS), but rather from an informal alignment of policies (and politics)
surrounding a highly sensitive area. The situation may soon change; however, the
intellectual property offices of the BRICS have recently signed a cooperation
agreement to exchange best practices and potentially align their domestic
intellectual property procedures and policies.
B. The 2013 Roadmap: Alignment of Polices in the Patent Field
At the 2012 BRICS Summit, held in Durban, South Africa, the trade ministers
of the BRICS endorsed a Trade and Investment Cooperation Framework, 35 which
was signed in March 2013. This agreement establishes an "open-ended and
progressive" 36 framework with the primary purpose of "[p]romoting trade,
investment and economic cooperation" among BRICS members.37  While
intellectual property is not the only target of this trade-centric framework,
cooperation in "high technology areas, 38 and on IP rights is prominently
endorsed.39
As a consequence, in May 2013, the intellectual property offices of the BRIC
countries agreed on an Intellectual Property Cooperation Roadmap ("Roadmap")
in Magaliesburg, South Africa, seeking "to enhance cooperation between the
respective BRICS IP offices with a view to enhancing the value of IP and to ensure
its contribution to the economic development and growth in the member
countries. 4 °
A reading of the prongs of the Roadmap indicates that its main focus is
patentable innovation. The agreement identifies the following "cooperation
streams:"
1. Training of Intellectual Property Office Staff
2. IP/Patent processes and procedures including search,
classification and translation
35. Cooperation Framework, supra note 6.
36. Id. art. 2.2.
37. Id. art. 3.1.
38. Id. art. 4.3.1.
39. Article 4 of the Cooperation Framework, entitled "Areas of Work," expressly contemplate
inter-BRICS cooperation to promote innovation (4.3) and to enhance information exchange and
capacity building in the intellectual property field (4.5):
4.3 Innovation Cooperation: 4.3.1 Establishing project platforms to promote communication
and cooperation in high- technology areas. 4.3.2 Encouraging the expansion of trade and
investment in high value-added products. 4.3.3 Advancing dialogue and communications in
emerging industries, and promoting trade and investment in industries that are technology-,
knowledge-, or capital- intensive. [4.4 omitted] 4.5 Cooperation on Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR): 4.5.1 Enhancing information exchange on IPR legislation and enforcement
through meetings or seminars. 4.5.2 Jointly developing capacity building programmes in the
IPR area. 4.5.3 Promoting cooperation among IPR offices.
Id. art. 4.
40. BRICS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICES COOPERATION ROADMAP 3 (2013) [hereinafter
ROADMAP], http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 1/SIGNED-BRICS-IP-
OFFICES-COOPERATION-ROADMAP.pdf.
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3. Promotion of public awareness on IP in BRICS countries
4. National IP Strategy and IP Strategy for enterprises
5. Information services on IP, e.g. exchange of patent
documentation, taking account of local legislation
6. Collaboration in International Forums as required and subject to
consensus
7. Examiner exchange programme
41
Specific domestic intellectual property offices in BRIC countries have been
assigned tasks that reflect the intellectual property profile of each one of the
BRICS in the so-called post-TRIPS era. 2 For instance, South Africa, which until
recently had not seriously considered implementing patent examination
procedures, is by and large excluded from leadership roles in the patent field.
Instead, the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission of South Africa it is
in charge of creating "national IP strategies" and "IP strategies for enterprises. 43
Training of intellectual property staff will be led by INPI,44 the Brazilian
National Institute of Industrial Property ("The Institute").45 The Institute was also
tasked with supervising "IP/patent processes and procedures," an area that is
somewhat cryptically described as consisting of "search, classification [and]
translation services, among others."
46
China, through its State Intellectual Property Office, will be responsible for
"[p]romotion of [p]ublic [a]wareness on Intellectual Property in BRICS
countries" '47 and for the broad category of "[i]nformation [s]ervices on IP. ' '4s This
cooperation stream is described as targeting the enhancement of "information
exchange on [intellectual property rights] legislation and enforcement through
meetings or seminars. 49
Rospatent, the Russian patent office, will be in charge of the examiner
exchange program, which has the goal of promoting the "exchange of experiences"
and, possibly, the exchange of examiners between patent offices of the BRICS.
50
Finally, India 51 will lead "collaboration in [i]ntemational [florums as required
and subject to consensus. 52  This stream puts India in a position of acting as
liaison between the BRICS and external interest groups, institutions, and fora. It is
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id.
43. William New, supra note 6.
44. ROADMAP, supra note 40, at 6.
45. See id
46. Id. at 8.
47. Id. at 6.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 7.
51. The Roadmaps do not specify whether a particular branch of the Indian Office of the
Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks (CGPDTM) will be in charge of acting as a
liaison between the BRICS and other groups. Id.
52. Id. at 10.
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especially interesting to notice that the Roadmap establishes that the outcome of
this stream should be an "[i]mproved influence of BRICS Offices within WIPO
and other [f]orums. '53 The creation of this stream suggests that a deeper South-
South alignment of intellectual property policies will likely entail an emphasis on
increasing bargaining power in fora where Northern interests have historically
prevailed.
As the coming years will show how strong the BRICS's desired South-South
alignment might become, it is already clear that the BRICS are specifically
interested in incentivizing patent policy convergence and maximizing pro-
development strategies allowed under international patent law. The Roadmap and
the initial tasks assigned to national intellectual property offices undoubtedly set
the framework for enhanced inter-BRICS cooperation, which might possibly pave
the way towards a new understanding of South-South cooperation in intellectual
property matters. However, there is a myriad of issues beyond the sphere of
patents on which South-South dialogue has been nearly inexistent. Part III
explores some of these issues, with a focus on international copyright law. It
argues that there is neglected space under international intellectual property law for
developing countries to further their innovation agendas, particularly under TRIPS.
Finally, it suggests that adoption of these measures is unlikely to trigger the kind of
criticism and pressure from the North that patent-related reforms tend to attract.
III. (RE)DEPARTING FROM TRIPS: GOING BEYOND TRADITIONAL FLEXIBILITIES
A. Drawing More 'flexibility "from the TRIPS Agreement
In an age in which we talk about post-WT0 54 and post-TRIPS55 eras, there is
a risk that one might lose sight of the fact that the architecture of our global IP
regime and its ensuing dynamics are anchored in the TRIPS Agreement and will
likely be so for decades to come. More accurately, they are anchored in a certain
interpretation of TRIPS that privileges the interests and bargaining power of the
North. 56  Nonetheless, TRIPS remains the legal framework within which
developing countries have to operate. At the same time, it has been abundantly
emphasized that TRIPS is a minimum standards agreement, 57 and that there is
53. Id.
54. See Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Salama, Towards an Intellectual Property Bargaining Theory:
The Post-WTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 265 (2010); Peter Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II):
Protecting Intellectual Property in Power WTO China, 55 (4) AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) (regarding to
the usage of the expression in connection with BRIC countries). The term has spilled into fields outside
law. See e.g., Ranjanendra Narayan Nag & Bhaskar Goswami, Dual Economy Interlinkage in a
Monetary Framework: A Post WTO Perspective, 20 J. ECON. INTEGRATION 497, 497-510 (2005).
55. The expression has attained global usage over the last decade. See, BURCU KILIQ, BOOSTING
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION IN THE POST-TRIPS ERA: REAL-LIFE LESSONS FOR THE DEVELOPING
WORLD (2014); Kenneth Shadlen, Reforming and Reinforcing the Revolution: The Post-TRIPS Politics
of Patents in Latin America 1-21 (Global Dev. and Env't Inst., Working Paper No. 09-02, 2009).
56. See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1-5 (2008).
57. See J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under
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ample space in the treaty of which countries in the Global South are not making
use in advancing their innovation agendas.
58
Some of this space is created by TRIPS flexibilities.59 Compulsory licensing
is the most prominent example of countries in the South taking advantage of these
flexibilities and, as seen in the previous section, some of the BRICS are paving the
way for other developing countries wishing to incentivize the growth of domestic
generic industries.
Yet, countries in the South can find room in TRIPS outside the realm of
traditional flexibilities to further normative frameworks more suited to their
interests and developmental stages. While TRIPS is not the only source of
pressure for developing countries to adopt TRIPS-plus standards, 60 there is an
array of measures-particularly in the field of copyright-that 1) are TRIPS-
compatible, 2) do not increase the overall levels of intellectual property protection,
and 3) are less likely to attract the level of scrutiny that patent-related flexibilities
have historically triggered.6 1
The following section surveys these options. The list does not configure a set
of measures that developing countries should adopt en bloc; rather, it illustrates
individual proposals that would bring elements of flexibility into national
intellectual property (namely copyright) regimes.
B. Proposals
This section analyzes the following proposals: 1) the adoption of fair use
the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345 (1995). See also Denis Borges
Barbosa, Minimum Standards vs. Harmonization in the TRIPS Context: The Nature of Obligations
under TRIPS and Modes of Implementation at the National Level in Monist and Dualist Systems, in I
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 52-109
(Carolos M. Correa ed., 2010)
58. See Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the
Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 (4) HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (2009).
59. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation between TRIPS and
Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 420 (2011) (discussing the tension between TRIPS flexibilities and the widespread de
facto application of TRIPS-plus standards). See Duncan. Matthews, TRIPS Flexibilities and Access to
Medicines in Developing Countries: the Problem with Technical Assistance and Free Trade
Agreements, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 420, 420-427 (2005) (providing an overview of flexibilities in
the specific context of access to medicines in the Global South); see also Sisule Musungu at al.,
Utilizing Trips Flexibilities For Public Health Protection Through South-South Regional Frameworks,
S. CENTRE (Apr. 2004), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/collect/medicinedocs/pdf/s4968e/s4968e.pdf.
60. See DEERE, supra note 56 (surveying the economic and ideational pressures developing
countries face in building their domestic intellectual property frameworks). For an account of the web
of bilateral and multilateral agreements that push forward TRIPS-plus agendas, see Susan K. Sell,
TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447
(2011) (noting that TRIPS is not the only source of pressure on intellectual property regimes for
countries in the South, as well as in the North); see also Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism?
Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Agreements, I U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125
(2004).
61. See USTR, supra note 23.
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standards; 2) the adoption of flexible licensing mechanisms; 3) the reconsideration
of formalities in copyright law; 4) the creation of take-and-pay regimes; 5) the
creation of a "local working requirement"-like provision in domestic copyright
laws; 6) the removal of paying public domains; and 7) the reconsideration of moral
rights.
1. Adoption of Fair Use Standards
The doctrine of fair use remains largely associated with American case law. 62
In The Fair Use/Fair Dealing Handbook, however, Band and Gerafi note that are
over forty countries in the world with copyright laws that establish fair use or fair
dealing63 provisions.64 Band and Gerafi also note that fair use/dealing regimes
cover more than one-third of the world's population, including a significant
number of developing countries.65 The split is heavily skewered towards fair
dealing, as the map below illustrates:
62. For a cogent analysis of the mechanisms under which fair use operates, see William W. Fisher
III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1744-1783 (1988).
63. JONATHAN BAND & JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK 1 (2013),
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/band-and-gerafi-2013.pdf. More limited in scope
than fair use, fair dealing originates in Chapter III of the U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of
1988 (Acts Permitted in relation to Copyright Works) and provides exceptions to copyright law in the
cases of research and private study (Article 29) and criticism, review and news reporting (Article 30).
See W. R. CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS (2003).
64. BAND & GERAFI supra note 63, at 1.
65. Id.
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Fair Use and Fair Dealing Around the World
Figure 1: Fair Use and Fair Dealing Around the World 66
Fair use models are often presented as "balancing mechanisms" against
thickets of proprietary rights. 6 7 Since the Copyright Act of 1976 codified fair use
in the United States, 6 courts and commentators have identified several ways in
which fair use can make copyright regimes more balanced: fair use provisions can
function as "safety valves" for fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech ;69
they can be used to cure market failures; 70 they promote efficiency in cases where
the value of access to and use of a copyrighted work is higher than the transaction
66. Photo: Map created by Amy Bulgrien (citing BAND & GERAFI, supra note 63),
http://www.librarycopyrightalliance.org/bm-doc/worldmap.pdf.
67. See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007).
68. 17U.S.C. §107(2014).
69. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 540-41 (1985).
70. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure." A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
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costs associated with negotiating a license; 71 and they are a "flexible and adaptable
mechanism" that can adapt to the rise of new technologies.
72
One of the main criticisms often raised by fair use opponents is that it
generates uncertainty and unpredictability. 73 From a doctrinal point of view, fair
use is routinely pitched against the European model of closed lists of exceptions
and limitations.74 If approached through comparative lenses, fair use models will
always offer less legal certainty.75 However, that uncertainty is modulated by the
advantages of having regimes that, as a whole, offer more flexibility.
76
Additionally, it has also been pointed out that fair use is not intrinsically
unpredictable.77 Rather, certain applications of fair use within a system might be
conflicting, 78 but fair use as a normative postulate offers a cogent and stable
framework to deal with limitations on exclusive rights.79
71. Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright Management Systems,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41,44 (2001).
72. Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in
Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49, 51 (1993).
73. CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 159 (2012); Amira Dotan, Niva et. al., Fair Use
Best Practices for Higher Education Institutions: The Israeli Experience, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.
447 (2010). Other critiques of fair use include claims that it is "doctrinally incoherent." Matthew Sag,
Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 47, 51 (2012). Some scholars point out that there is some
tension between the U.S. model of fair use and TRIPS obligations. Ruth Okediji, Toward an
International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 115 (2000).
74. P. B. Hugenholtz & Martin Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of Flexibilities 2
(University of Amsterdam, Working Paper No. 2012-39, 2011).
75. THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 149 (Annette
Kur & Vytautas Mizaras eds., 2011). Also, as it has been pointed out, "There is no model that can
completely remove unpredictability from a flexible system, though proper understanding of case law
and community norms can help." JENNIFER URBAN, REPORT 1: UPDATING FAIR USE FOR INNOVATORS
AND CREATORS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: Two TARGETED REFORMS 3 (2010),
https://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/fair-use-report-02132010.pdf.
76. See Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 74.
77. Sag, supra note 73, at 51; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and
Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-
Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004).
78. See URBAN, supra note 75; Sag, supra note 73
79. See URBAN, supra note 75; Sag, supra note 73; Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 74.
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Of the advantages usually associated with fair use, malleability in
adapting to emerging technologies 80 speaks directly to the needs of countries with
specific interests in promoting industries that rely on digital chains of production
and distribution.8 1
There have already been several instances in the South in which fair use
has been adopted82 or contemplated as a possibility in reforming copyright laws.83
For instance, Nigeria has adopted an ad hoc fair dealing provision for folklore.
84
Uganda, which enacted its most recent copyright laws in 2003, codified a general
fair use provision in Section 15 of the Intellectual Property Act.85 The Philippines
enacted its most recent copyright law in 1997, and the following year the
Intellectual Property Code came into force. 8 6 Chapter VII, entitled "Limitations on
Copyright," codifies fair use.
8 7
A particularly interesting case is that of Israel, which, following a lengthy
application of the British Copyright Act of 1911, enacted its first homebred
copyright law in 2007.88 The law codified fair use in Section 19, closely modeled
80. Carlos M. Correa, Fair Use and Access to Information in the Digital Era, in INFOETHICS
2000: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIETAL CHALLENGES OF CYBERSPACE: THIRD INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS, Nov. 13-15, at 187, 187.
81. This would be the case of countries with relevant music or film industries (e.g. Nollywood,
the film industry in Nigeria). It would also be the case of countries with specific interests within an
industry or sector; once again, Nigeria offers an example in its protection of folklore through ad hoe fair
use. See Adebambo Adewopo, Protection and Administration of Folklore in Nigeria, in 3 SCRIPTED 1,
7-8 (March 2006).
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 9.
85. Intellectual Property Act 36 of 2003, §15 (Uganda),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3922.
86. Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines §185 Ch. VII, Rep. Act 8293,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=129343.
87. Id.
88. See Copyright Act, 5768-2007,2007 LSI 34, 19 (2007)(Isr.),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id= 132095.
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after the American fair use clause.89  Fair use was implemented in Israel
specifically as a way to foster creativity.90 In 2005, the Preamble of the draft bill
that would amend the existing copyright legislation read:
The objective of the laws of Copyright is to establish an arrangement
that will protect creative works while striking a balance between various
interests of the public good. The balance required is mainly between the
need to provide a sufficient incentive to create, which is in the form of
granting general financial rights in the creations, and between the need
to enable the public to use the creations for the advancement of culture
and knowledge. This balance must be obtained while safeguarding the
freedom of speech and freedom of creativity and while preserving free
and fair competition.
91
Unlike the French-, Spanish-, and Portuguese-speaking countries in the Global
South whose copyright laws are inscribed within a legal colonial heritage that
crystalized closed lists of limitations and exceptions, 92 in 2007, Israel transitioned
from British copyright law 93 (which recognized fair dealing as early as in the
nineteenth century)94 to a fair use-based national law. The gap was therefore
narrower than the one in developing countries where Roman-Germanic traditions
still prevail. However, the move towards fair use had already been foreshadowed
in cases decided by Israeli courts before the TRIPS Agreement was even
89. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Israeli Fair Use from an American Perspective, in CREATING
RIGHTS: READINGS IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach eds., 2009).
90. See Michael Birnhack, A Cultural Reading: Israel's 2007 Copyright Act and the Creative
Field, in AUTHORING RIGHTS: READINGS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 83 (Michael Bimhack & Guy Pessach
eds., 2009); see also Meera Nair, Canada and Israel: Cultivating Fairness of Use It (Program on Info.
Jus. & Intell. Prop. Working Paper No. 2012-14, 2012).
91. Nair, supra note 90, at 30 (quoting Preamble of the Draft Bill Amending the Copyright Act
(No. 196), 2005, HH. (Isr.)).
92. See HENRI MAGER, LES DROITS COLONIAuX DE LA FRANCE (1890); DROITET ECONOMIE DE
LA PROPRIETt INTELLECTUELLE (Vivant Michel ed.2014); Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodriguez-Cano et. al.,
COMENTARIOS A LA LEY DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL (2007); JMc TORRES, TRATADO ELEMENTAL
DE DERECHO COLONIAL ESPAi OL (1941); Leandro Fazollo Cezario, A Estrutura Juridica no Brasil
Colonial. Cria~do, ordenagdo e Implementagdo, in 1 REVISTA DO INSTITUTO DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO
9, 5249 (2012).
93. See Michael Birnhack, Mandatory Copyright: From Pre-Palestine to Israel, 1910-2007, in A
SHIFTING EMPIRE: 100 YEARS OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT 1911, 16 (Uma Suthersanen & Ysolde
Gendreau eds., 2012).
94. See CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 63.
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negotiated.95 Scholars and commentators often pinpoint a 1993 case decided by
the Israeli Supreme Court as the first move towards a fair use-based regime. 96 In
Geva v. Walt Disney Company,97 the Israeli Supreme Court established that parody
and satire were protected under the category of criticism in copyright law, and
enunciated for the first time a four-factor test modeled after 17 U.S.C. § 107.98
The 2007 law completed that move.
99
Before the 2007 Copyright Act was enacted, the drafter of the bill, Tamir
Afori, answered several questions about the drafting process. When asked about
the reasons behind the preference for a fair use model in Israel, he framed fair use
as a mechanism of balance in a world of ever-increasing proprietary rights:
[The drafter of the bill] presented the development of fair use in Israel in
context. He emphasized that current Israeli law was insufficient to
protect... cultural works. That, despite the theoretical balance implied
by copyright, copyright has steadily increased in one dimension only-
the expansion of rights to copyrights holders. He presented his view
that fair use was a key element in the pursuit for balance and made
specific reference to Geva, whereby the closed list of allowable
purposes denied the possibility of fair dealing [sic]. l00
Incidentally, in its sweeping revision of 2007, Israel chose not to legislate on
Digital Rights Management ("DRM") technologies,' 0 1 a move that attracted
prompt criticism from the United States Trade Representative and other
institutional representatives in the Global North.10 2 This is a welcome exception in
95. See Nair, supra note 90, at 17.
96. See Netanel, supra note 89.
97. CA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Company, 48(1) P.D. 251 (1993) (Isr.).
98. Nair, supra note 90, at 15.
99. Id. at 11.
100. Id. at 34.
101. Id. at 9-10.
102. Israel was removed from the Special 301 Report in 2014, largely because of its patent reform
in 2010. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Israel Removed from Special 301
Report (Feb. 2014), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2014/February/Israel-removed-from-Special-30 -Report.
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an environment of mounting pressure to adopt Northern-inspired intellectual
property legislation.
As far as limitations to exclusive rights are concerned, Israel embodies the
complete transition from fair dealing to fair use regimes. More importantly, this
particular transition offers evidence of intellectual property policies framed by the
promotion of balance and creativity, an example that should inspire developing
countries seeking to improve their copyright regimes.
Inspiration can also be drawn from the North. South Korea has also
adopted fair use.1 03 The most interesting feature of the Korean copyright law is not
the fact that it contains fair use provisions, but the way it repeatedly resorts to the
concept of fair use to inform its entire copyright law:104
Article 1 (Purpose)
The purpose of this Act is to protect the rights of authors and the
neighboring rights and to promote fair use of works in order to
contribute to the improvement and development of the culture and
related industries (emphasis added). 105
It is remarkable that fair use is explicitly identified as a mechanism of balance
(indeed, as the mechanism of balance) between monopolistic rights and socio-
cultural goals. The Copyright Act also does a good job in linking fair use, as well
as the overall idea of balance in the copyright system, to the concepts of
"improvement" and "development." ° 6 It is especially interesting that "culture and
related industries" also figure in the opening lines of the Act (and in immediate
103. See Jaewoo Cho, As Korea Implements Fair Use, Two Cases Offer Precedent for Flexible
Copyright Exceptions and Limitations, INFOJUSTICE.ORG, (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://infojustice.org/archives/28561.
104. South Korea Copyright Act, Act No. 432, Jan. 28, 1957, amended by Act No. 9625, April 22,
2009 (S. Kor.), http://www.moj.go.kr.
105. Id. art. 1.
106. Id.
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connection with fair use).10 7  Much of the current discourse on "cultural,"
"creative," or "copyright" industries is tied to expansive approaches to
copyright.' 08 When applied to industries in developing countries, this discourse
(Northern, in nature) is usually vehement in advocating for strong copyright
regimes. Suggestions that fair use might be key to the "development" or
"improvement" of these industries are rare, and therefore it would be particularly
relevant for policymakers in the developing world to take the Korean law into
consideration when assessing their copyright environments.
Overall, there is an argument to be made that fair use models can
introduce an element of flexibility into domestic copyright laws. For developing
countries that adhere to this proposition, legal and historical heritages might
prevent them from considering the adoption of fair use models. However, recent
incorporation of generic fair use clauses (as well as ad hoc fair use) into copyright
laws in the South suggests a possible opening towards the expansion of these
models. Even outside South-South exchanges, the examples set by Israel and
South Korea should not go unnoticed in the developing world.
Among the largest economies in the South, the copyright laws of India
and South Africa contain fair dealing provisions, as a result of their former
107. 1d.
108. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2010, Creative Economy
Report 2010, xxiv, 171-79, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2010/3,
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid= 9
4 6
. The same entity has published
reports on "Strengthening the Creative Industries for Development" with a specific focus on
Mozambique and Zambia. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Strengthening the
Creative Industries for Development in Mozambique, 2011, U.N. Doc. UNCTADIDITC/TAB/2009/2,
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditctab20092_en.pdf; Strengthening the Creative Industries for Development
in Zambia, 2011, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2009/1,
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditctab2009 len.pdf.
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association with the legal regime of the United Kingdom. 10 9 As emerging
economies in the South share experiences as part of a strategy to improve their
intellectual property regimes, fair use and fair dealing could become potential
topics for these exchanges.
2. Adoption of Flexible Licensing Mechanisms for Copyrighted Works
Amending or reenacting intellectual property laws-a process that would
be required for the incorporation of clauses like fair use, for instance-is a lengthy
process that is subject to several political and practical constraints.10° Making
copyright systems more balanced as a whole (or even contributing partially
towards that goal by incorporation of fair use regimes) is therefore a long-term
proposition. III
Inside copyright law, there are alternatives to counter the rigidity of
current maximalist regimes. One of those alternatives is flexible licensing, which
was pioneered on a large scale in 2002 with the launch of Creative Commons. 112
Creative Commons ("CC") licenses were created to respond directly to
the "explosion of copyright events caused by the proliferation of digital
technologies."' '1 3 Relying on proprietary rights, these licenses enable copyright
holders to quickly and efficiently demarcate the scope of their monopolies, which
in turn facilitates permitted uses of their protected work:" 4
109. See infra, p. 24.
110. See DEERE, supra note 56, at 4; Barbosa, supra note 57.
111. And one that, if recent history repeats itself, will likely entails\ multiple failures.
112. History, CREATIVECOMMONS.ORG, creativecommons.org/about/history (last visited Feb. 12,
2015).
113. See Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons as Conversational Copyright, in 1 INTELL. PROP.
& INFO. WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 445, 446 (Peter K. Yu, ed., 2007).
114. This aspect has led some scholars to refer to flexible licensing mechanisms as "conversation
copyright." See id. at 452 ("Creative Commons copyright licenses embody a vision of conversational
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A Creative Commons license is a form [of] copyright license that can be
linked to via the World Wide Web. The principle of a Creative
Commons license is to replace the default "all rights reserved" approach
with a more modest "some rights reserved" approach that permits a
variety of uses subject to one or more limitations that the copyright
owner has placed on the work. In addition to the legal code, the license
is described by a "human-readable" Commons Deed, which identifies
the key terms of the license and machine-readable metadata that
associate the Internet location of the licensed resource with the Internet
location of the license document. From the user's perspective, the
presence of a Creative Commons license answers the question, "what
can I do with this" by assuring that, subject to the license conditions, the
user can: (i) copy the work; (ii) distribute the work; (iii) display or
perform the work; and (iv) make a digital public performance of the
work (i.e., Web casting). 
115
Originally seen as "a work in progress, an ongoing natural experiment""
1 6 (and not
without its detractors)," 7 CC licenses quickly spread online." 8 "Today, there are
over 882 million pieces of CC-licensed (or CCO) content on the web,"'1 19 of which
approximately 56% is licensed under terms that allow "both adaptations and
commercial use."'120 The 2014 Report on the State of the Commons estimates that
in 2015, over 1 billion CC-licensed works will be reached.'
2 1
copyright. Within this vision, creators or copyright owners seek to facilitate use of their expression for
purposes such as dialog and education.").
115. Id. at448.
116. Id.
117. See e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Creative Commons: A Skeptical View of a Worthy Pursuit, in THE
FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 1, 2 (P. Berm Hugenholtz & Lucie Guibault, eds., 2006) (forthcoming
2006).
118. Michael Carroll offers the following explanation for the popularity of CC licenses in the mid-
2000s. Carroll, supra note 113, at 455 ("What explains the rapid proliferation of Creative Commons
licenses on the Internet? Among those who choose the licenses, the explanations almost certainly are
varied, for indeed one size does not fit all. From the user's perspective, however, the growth of the
licensed commons points up a new dimension for measuring relevance-the use value of information
found on digital networks.... For those seeking to use information drawn from the Web, works
available under a Creative Commons license have greater use relevance because the legal terms of use
over and above fair use are clearly specified.").
119. State of the Commons, CREATIVE COMMONS (Nov. 2014),
https:/Hstateof.creativecommons.org/report/.
120. Id. This type of Creative Commons license is known as "free culture license." The most
commons type of license is BY-SA (attribution-share alike):
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While the bulk of CC licensing occurs in North America and Europe
(37% and 34%, respectively), there are signs of salutary activity in the Global
South, with Latin America capturing 10% of the share (against 16% in the Asia-
Pacific area, which includes large economies like China, India and Australia). 22
In sub-Saharan Africa, the number falls to a modest 1% (the "Arab world" takes
the remaining 2%). 123
With digital technologies expanding quickly even among some of the
poorest regions, an argument can be made that CC licenses can be especially
beneficial in struggling economies of the South. In these countries, transaction
costs associated with these licenses are lower than the cost of obtaining a
traditional license,' 24 and they increase legal certainty.1
25
Creative Commons license use
MORE
0 ~ (D ( D (D TC (D
@~ 9 D®
Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. While in the North CC licenses can be considered "free," in many Southern economies access to
tablets or computers remains a hurdle.
125. They do so in two ways: first, they are likely to increase certainty regarding ownership of digital
works; and second, as rights holders tailor their CC licenses to their specific needs, second-comers have
clearer indications regarding permitted uses of a given work.
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The following map (Fig. 2) shows the distribution of ongoing CC
licensing (as of 2014), with the darker colors denoting increased CC licensing
activity:
Figure 2: Creative Commons Data by Country
12 6
The only country in the Global South that matches (and in some cases
surpasses) the levels of CC licensing in the North is Brazil. This fact lends some
weight to the idea that CC licenses can positively impact copyright "dialogue" in
emerging and developing economies, although it comes with a cautionary note.
The Brazilian experience with Creative Commons is highly idiosyncratic.
127
Former minister of culture Gilberto Gil played a pivotal role in propelling CC
licenses. Gil, one of the most popular and critically acclaimed singer-songwriters
126. Photo: State of the Commons, supra note 119.
127. See, e.g., Davide Maria Parrilli, Creative Commons Licenses in Brazil: Legal, Economic and
Social Implications, 8 (2) ICFAI U. J. INTELL. PROP. RTs. 38 (May 27, 2009).
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in the history of Brazilian music,' was appointed minister of culture by populist
129president "Lula" da Silva in 2003. Until he quit in 2008, Gil pursued a policy of
cultural diversity and technological development. 130
After Gil left, the Ministry of Culture removed the Creative Commons
logo from its official website.131 As the head of Creative Commons Brazil put it at
the time:
After this change the website of the Ministry of Culture has no license
that authorizes the use of the content that is there. The CC license has
been replaced by a phrase that from a legal standpoint does not mean
anything ("The contents of this site, produced by the Ministry of
Culture, can be reproduced provided that the source is cited"). Anyone
using the contents of the site faces a huge problem of legal uncertainty:
this usage does not have support in any legal document. Moreover, the
phrase that the Ministry put on the site to replace CC license refers only
to 'reproduction'. CC licenses have a much broader and better
formulation, including collaborative production, the development of
derivative works, dissemination and so on. 
132
Ironically, on the same day the Ministry of Culture erased the Creative Commons
logo from its website, the Ministdrio do Planejamento, Orgamento, e Gestdo
(roughly, Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management) released its policy to
128. See Gustavo Krieger & Olimpio Cruz Neto, 0 Mito e o Ministro [The Myth and the Minister],
ROLLING STONE BRASIL (Nov. 2, 2006), http://rollingstone.uol.com.br/edicao/2/o-mito-e-o-
ministro#imagemO; Gilberto Gil, PRODUQAO CULTURAL,
http://www.producaocultural.org.br/slider/gilberto-giU (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (Br.); Larry Rohter,
Gilberto Gil and the Politics of Music, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/12/arts/ 2iht-gil.4882061I.html?pagewanted=aI&-r--0.
129. See Latin America: The Return of Populism, ECONOMIST (Apr. 12, 2006),
http://www.economist.com/node/6802448.
130. Ariel F. Nunes, Pontos de cultura e os novos paradigmas das Politicas Ptiblicas Culturais:
reflex~es Macro e Micro-Politicas 1, in FUNDA( AO CASA DE RuI BARBOSA,
http://www.casaruibarbosa.gov.br/dados/DOC/palestras/Politicas-Culturais/11-Seminario-Intemacional
/FCRB ArielNunesPontos de cultura e os novosparadigmas das_politicas_publicas culturais.pdf.
131. See Ronaldo Lemos, A Legacy at Risk. How the New Ministry of Culture in Brazil Reversed its
Digital Agenda, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Mar. 14, 2011), https://freedom-to-
tinker.com/blog/rlemos/legacy-risk-how-new-ministry-culture-brazil-reversed-its-digital-agenda/;
Marilia Maciel, Brazilian Ministry of Culture Removes Creative Commons Licenses from its Website,
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Jan. 23, 2011), http://infojustice.org/archives/867; M6nica Herculano, Site do MinC
Retira selo Creative Commons e Causa Polmica [Ministry of Culture Site Removes Creative Commons
Seal and Causes Controversy], CULTURA & MERCADO (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://www.culturaemercado.com.br/politica/site-do-minc-retira-selo-creative-commons-e-causa-
polemical.
132. Maciel, supra note 131.
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promote Brazilian public software 33 on the Official Journal, calling for "free
software and flexible licensing."'
134
Even though institutional support for Creative Commons in general has
decreased since Gil left the Ministry of Culture, CC licensing remains higher in
Brazil than anywhere else in the South.' 35 If nothing else, the Brazilian experience
illustrates the viability of flexible licensing in developing economies where access
to digital technologies is fast becoming more widespread.
While TRIPS requires member states to protect certain categories of
works under domestic copyright laws, 136 it does not prevent copyright owners from
giving away (or not exercising) some of their rights. Therefore, flexible and
expedited licensing does not contravene copyright law; rather, it is a mechanism
designed to increase the efficiency of copyright markets that is anchored in
copyright law itself. Creative Commons (or similar licensing frameworks) can
thus become valuable mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and increase legal
certainty in developing countries currently experiencing accelerated technological
leapfrogging.
133. See PORTAL DO SOFTWARE PUBLICO BRASILEIRO, http://www.softwarepublico.gov.br (last visited
Apr. 27, 2015). The expression "software pfiblico brasileiro" refers to open source software that is both
used and sponsored by the federal government. See Edgy Paiva, Use of Open Source Software by the
Brazilian Government, TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. R. (May 2009), http://timreview.ca/article/250
(describing, in English, the history of government-sponsored use of open source software in Brazil).
134. Herculano, supra note 131.
135. See Parrilli, supra note 127; State of the Commons, supra note 119.
136. TRIPS Agreement supra note 9, art. 9(1) (incorporating articles 1 through 21 of the Berne
Convention).
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3. Reconsidering Formalities in Copyright Law
Modern copyright law is mostly devoid of formalities. 137 While up to the
late nineteenth century formalities were generally a prerequisite for the existence
or exercise of copyrights, the 1908 revision of the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works established that international copyright
arises automatically and is enforced independently of formalities:
(2) The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to
any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of
the existence of protection in the country of origin of the work.
Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent
of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to
protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the
country where protection is claimed. (emphasis added) 138
Formalities are "conditions precedent to the existence or enforcement of
copyright,"'139 which include requirements regarding registration, deposit, notice,
recordation of transfers and assignments, and renewal of copyrights. 4 ° These
conditions may be constitutive of copyrights (such as in the cases of notice or
renewal), or simply affect enforcement of existing copyrights (such as registration
or deposit). 141
These prerequisites were in vogue until the early twentieth century
142
because they can help (i) promote legal certainty when copyright disputes arise, 143
137. See STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR HISTORY,
RATIONALES AND POSSIBLE FuTURE (2011).
138. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5, 2, Jul. 24, 1971, 1161
U.N.T.S. 18338 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (art. 4 2 of the 1908 Beme Convention).
139. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The US Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate
Relationship, 33 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 311, 312 (2010).
140. VAN GOMPEL, supra note 137, at 17.
141. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 312.
142. VAN GOMPEL, supra note 137, at I (Although some countries began removing them in the late
nineteenth century).
143. Id. at 43.
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(ii) expedite rights clearance mechanisms, 144 and (iii) "enhance the free flow of
information by enlarging the public domain."' 145 While the 1908 revision of the
Berne Convention prohibited the imposition of formalities on foreign works,
throughout the twentieth century, most countries chose to remove formalities
affecting domestic works. 146
In recent years, however, the development of digital and online markets
has triggered a wave of calls for a global reinstatement of copyright formalities.
147
These calls appear to revolve around the first two functions that formalities have
classically been associated with-maintenance of legal certainty (now in the online
environment) and reduction of transaction costs in licensing processes. 148  Some
authors go as far as suggesting that reinstating formalities would "facilitate
licensing and to cure the problem of orphan works" in the digital environment.1
4 9
Even under current international law,' 50 some types of formalities may
exist. 151 As it has been pointed out, "not every record-keeping or even litigation-
144. Id. at 287.
145. Id. at 7-12,287.
146. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 313.
147. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 139; Cecil C. Kuhne, III, The Steadily Shrinking Public Domain:
Inefficiencies of Existing Copyright Law in the Modern Technology Age, 50 LOY. L. REV. 549, 562
(2004); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHi. L. REV.
471, 477, 518 (2003); Genevieve P. Rosloff, "Some Rights Reserved": Finding the Space Between All
Rights Reserved and the Public Domain, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 37, 37 (2009); Christopher Sprigman,
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004).
148. See Stef Van Gompel, Copyright Formalities in the Internet Age: Filters of Protection or
Facilitators of Licensing, 28 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1425, 1427 (2013); see also Sprigman, supra note 147,
at 487.
149. Copyright Formalities in the Internet Age: Filters of Protection or Facilitators of Licensing, supra
note 148, at 1426.
150. The Beme Convention, supra note 137, art. 5 2 (as incorporated by the TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 9, at art. 9 1).
151. See VAN GOMPEL, supra note 137. Also, Ginsburg points out, Berne does not preclude the
imposition of formalities as a prerequisite for certain acts of enforcement. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at
315 ("In the sense of the Berne Convention, the formalities that art. 5(2) prohibits member States from
imposing on foreign authors include 'everything which must be complied with in order to ensure that
the rights of the author with regard to his work may come into existence.' Thus requirements such as
registration, the deposit or filing of copies, the payment of fees, or the making of declarations or
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related obligation a State imposes should be considered a Berne-banned
'formality."' ' 152 Beme stands in the way of a full "reformalization" of copyright
law in general, 153 but the core of prohibited formalities is composed of formalities
that are imposed on foreign authors and that include "everything which must be
complied with in order to ensure that the rights of the author with regard to his
work may come into existence."
'1 54
(Re)introducing formalities like deposit or notice as prerequisites for the
recognition of copyrights of foreign authors would therefore be forbidden under
Berne,' 55 but certain "requirements of form," for instance, are generally deemed
acceptable under the current international intellectual property regime.1 56 An
example of such a requirement would be mandatory recordation of copyright
transfers in a centralized database, which would help "determine the way in which
a transfer of copyright must be effectuated or which corroborate the existence or
scope of the relevant transaction,"' 157 but neither affects the constitutive dimension
of foreign copyright nor impairs enforcement of rights. 1
58
affixing notices to copies of the work, may not be made mandatory preconditions to protection. But
State-imposed preconditions on the coming-into-being of the author's rights represent only part of the
Beme-targeted formalities. An author may be vested with copyright, but unable to enforce her rights
unless she complies with a variety of prerequisites to suit.").
152. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 316.
153. See Sprigman, supra note 147, at 562 (In particular, imposition of formalities at the level of
remedies is likely to trigger some concerns under Berne and TRIPS); see Ginsburg, supra note 139, at
317-18 (noting "conditioning certain remedies on registration of the work may be problematic.
Arguably, so long as a Berne Member State leaves basic claims for injunctive relief and statutory
damages unencumbered by formalities, it may limit the availability of enhanced remedies, such as
statutory damages, to compliance with registration or other obligations. However, 'the difference
between a permissible conditioning of an enhanced remedy, and an impermissible conditioning of an
effective remedy may not always be apparent, thus making the distinction a delicate one in practice."').
154. SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS:
THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the Berne Convention).
155. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 316-17.
156. VAN GOMPEL, supra note 137, at 204.
157. Id.
158. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 154, at 316-317.
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Another feature of the Berne Convention that is relevant for countries
considering the adoption of copyright formalities is the fact that the principle of
non-discrimination only applies to foreign works and authors. 159  Differential
treatment of copyrighted works is therefore allowed, as long as the protection
afforded to foreign works is compatible with the principle of national treatment
encapsulated in Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement. 160 In other words, foreign
works have to be treated at least as favorably as domestic works, but nothing
prevents a country from treating domestic works less favorably than foreign works.
In light of this framework, developing countries with specific interests in
promoting legal certainty and reducing transaction costs associated with copyright
licensing can incorporate Berne-compliant formalities into their legislations, and
they may do so targeting exclusively domestic works. For instance, after
amending its law to comply with the Berne Convention, the United States decided
to impose registration of domestic (but not foreign) works as a prerequisite for
infringement actions. 161
Countries where legal certainty regarding ownership of rights is
problematic may consider registration formalities targeting domestic works.
Already in the South, there are examples of this trend. Nigeria, for instance, has a
notification scheme partially inspired by the United States' regime:
It is not a mandatory registration scheme but rather a platform to enable
authors [to] give notice of the existence of their work in which copyright
159. See, UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 74-75 (2005).
160. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3 ("Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this
Agreement to the nationals of other Members... ").
161. However, U.S. law makes registration a prerequisite for both foreign and domestic works for
obtaining statutory damages recovering attorney's fees; in the absence of registration (up to three
months after publication of the work), copyright holders can only be awarded damages and profits in
cases of infringement of their work.
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subsists. Unlike the recordation system in the United States, failure by a
copyright owner to notify the Nigerian Copyright Commission through
the notification scheme on the existence of a work does not affect the
right of a copyright owner to commence an action in respect of an
infringement suit requiring enforcement. 1
62
Countries concerned with increasing litigiousness or judiciary backlog may want to
adopt a system closer to the American model, while those focused on legal
certainty might opt for a regime closer to the Nigerian one.
4. Adoption of Take-and-pay Regimes to Promote Sectorial Interests
Proposals to establish liability regimes for specific kinds of intellectual
property rights are not new. 163  Liability rules consist in the payment of an
"objectively determined value" for some sort of entitlement,' 64 and in the case of
intellectual property that entitlement is the monopoly of the author or the inventor.
Proponents of liability (or "take-and-pay") regimes in intellectual property
contexts tend to emphasize arguments of economic efficiency over distributional
goals or other motivations in classic theory on liability rules. 165 This trend is
especially salient in discourse regarding the digital environment, where case law
and doctrine on peer-to-peer infringement is often conflicting or unclear. 1
66
While intellectual property liability regimes might lower transaction costs
as they replace traditional licensing mechanisms, they have been criticized for
162. Kunle Ola, Evolution and Future Trends of Copyright in Nigeria, 2 (1) J. OPEN ACCESS L., no. 1,
2014 1, 6, http://ojs.law.comell.edu/index.phpjoal/article/view/26.
163. See Jerome H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L.REv. 2432, 2504 (1995).
164. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
165. See KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF
DIGITAL SAMPLING (2011); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996),
166. And they are also at the core of proposal for reverse liability rules in digital copyright. MCLEOD &
DICOLA, supra note 165.
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"their lack of flexibility and for their susceptibility to political lobbying."'
167
However, even commentators who acknowledge the general drawbacks of these
regimes concede:
[T]here would be transaction cost benefits to a compulsory license for
any copyrighted material integrated into a multimedia product. Such a
license would obviously eliminate many of the costs that currently
plague the multimedia industry. 1
68
Proposals to create "default liability regimes" were originally construed with
patentable innovation in mind, 169 but a growing number of commentators have
adapted liability to copyright law. 170  Most of these proposals have users of
copyrighted goods in developed countries in mind. 17' However, take-and-pay
regimes could be especially useful in the South, in countries with fast growing
industries that rely on production and distribution of digital goods.
Developing countries wishing to support the growth of copyright-
intensive industries, for example, can benefit from offering a "fixed pricing
menu" 72 for some uses of protected works, therefore avoiding the higher
transaction costs associated with atomized negotiation of licensing agreements. A
concrete example of this proposal would be the adoption of take-and-pay regimes
for music to be used in film.' 73 In developing countries where production and
distribution of digital film occurs at an extraordinarily fast pace and where budgets
167. Merges, supra note 165, at 1376.
168. Id.
169. See Reichman, supra note 163, at 2504.
170. See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 165, at 217-18 (arguing that traditional copyright regimes
might not be enough to incentivize creation in musical genres that depend on digital sampling). See
also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J. C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural
Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to
Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003).
171. See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 165; Netanel, supra note 170.
172. Merges, supra note 165, at 1377.
173. Id. at 1380.
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for production of original content are limited, 174 a take-and-pay regime narrowly
aimed at expediting exchanges with the music industry could benefit nascent and
mid-sized film industries in the South.
5. Creation of a "Local Working Requirement"-like Provision in
Domestic Copyright Laws
The concept of "local working requirement" is synonym with patent law
and with the kind of innovation that the traditional TRIPS flexibilities were
designed to protect. However, this section argues that this specific feature of
patent law could inspire a similar mechanism to be used selectively in domestic
copyright laws of developing countries, particularly in connection with the cultural
industries.
Working requirements are rooted in article 27 of TRIPS 175 and were
created to ensure the exploitation of patented inventions: "Local working
requirements require the patent holder to manufacture the patented product or
apply the patented process (i.e., "work" the patent) within the country granting the
patent rights in order to maintain its exclusive exploitive rights."'
176
In patent law, some interpretations of article 27(1) of TRIPS have raised
concerns about the admissibility of local working provisions under international
174. An example of such an industry is Nollywood, the Nigerian film industry, which over the past few
years has disputed the title of second largest film industry in the world with India's Bollywood
(Hollywood retains the first position). See Uchenna Onuzulike, Nollywood: The Birth of Nollywood:
The Nigerian Movie Industry, 22 (1) BLACK CAMERA 25 (2007); Olufunmilayo Arewa, The Rise of
Nollywood: Creators, Entrepreneurs, and Pirates, (U.C. Irvine School of Law, Research Paper Series
No. 2012-11) (discussing the intellectual property issues surrounding the Nigerian film industry);
Andrew Rice, A Scorsese in Lagos: The Making of Nigeria's Film Industry, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 23
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/20 12/02/26/magazine/nollywood-movies.html?pagewanted=all&-r=0.
175. TRIPS Agreement supra note 9, at art. 27
176. Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The
Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working Requirements, 19 Minn. J. Int'l L. 275, 281
(2010).
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law.'77 Article 27(1) of TRIPS forbids discrimination based on place of invention,
field of technology and "whether products are imported or locally produced
(emphasis added). ,7178 If this article is interpreted as a stand-alone provision,
domestic legislations containing local working requirements can theoretically be
construed as discriminating against patents on goods that are imported or not
locally produced. 1
79
However, TRIPS Article 2(1)'80 incorporates significant portions of the
Paris Convention, 11 including Article 5(A)(2), which was revised in the
Stockholm Conference of 1967 to allow for compulsory licensing to be issued in
cases of abuse of patent rights.182 The article goes on to list only one example of a
behavior that would qualify as abusive under Paris (and hence TRIPS) standards
and that example is precisely failure to work a patent. 
183
Even if the local working requirement has fueled discussion in the patent
field, international and harmonized domestic copyright law is not subject to the
177. See JUSTIN MALBON ET AL, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 48 (2014) (describing the potential tension
between TRIPS Article 27's non-discrimination provision and local working provisions in domestic
legislations). See also Mercurio & Tyagi, supra note 176, at 286-287.
178. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27.
179. See MALBON ET AL., supra note 177. This kind of interpretation derives from absolutist views of
Article 27, like the one favored by the WTO Panel in Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, in which the Panel endorsed the view that "discrimination means any form of differential
treatment." Maria Victoria Stout, Crossing the TRIPS Nondiscrimination Line: How CAFTA
Pharmaceutical Patent Provisions Violate TRIPS Article 27.1, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 177, 180
(2008). See also Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 7.98,
WT/DSI 14R (Mar. 17, 2000).
180. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 2 ("(1): In respect of Parts II, II and IV of this Agreement,
Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967). (2)
Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may
have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.").
181. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 303.
182. Id. art. 5(A)(2) ("Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.").
183. Id.; see GEORGE H. C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, AS REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967 (2007).
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non-discrimination clause of TRIPS Article 27. It would therefore be possible to
establish normative frameworks for local (meaning national) "working
requirements" for holders of assigned copyrights that are not exploiting their
monopolies. 184 Under this proposal, if a local rights holder-a publisher, a
company, etc.-is not using the music or film whose rights it has acquired, then
the author of the work may regain control of the right or bundle of rights that he or
she has given away.
185
Such a proposal would be especially effective for emerging cultural
industries in the developing world. A "working requirement" would protect
misinformed authors and authors with poor bargaining tools who assign their rights
to entities that end up not using their work-and, hence, that do not foster the goals
that copyright regimes are supposed to incentivize.
A "working requirement" in domestic copyright law would therefore
advance the principles that TRIPS expressly seeks to promote. Article 7 of the
Agreement, entitled "Objectives," states that
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations.
i8 6
TRIPS frames intellectual property as a propeller of "social and economic
welfare."' 187  Protecting parties in traditionally weaker bargaining positions
(authors) under the circumstances that would be subject to "copyright working
184. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 183, at 86.
185. See id.
186. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 7.
187. Id.
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requirements" would be consistent with this goal of promotion of welfare. This
proposal would also generate positive externalities, as authors who recapture their
rights after inactivity (or insufficient activity) of the assignee have arguably more
incentives to seek alternative chains to monetize their work. Additionally, the
requirement of "local working" in itself can be construed as a balancing
mechanism, in line with the spirit and letter of the last part of Article 7.
In addition to Article 7, TRIPS also lists a set of principles that inform
implementation of intellectual property regimes:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations,
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
transfer of technology. 88
A "local working requirement" in domestic copyright laws would also be
consistent with these principles, not only in face of the increasing socio-economic
relevance of the industries targeted by this proposal, but also because the behaviors
that would trigger the penalty inherent to a working requirement-i.e., inactivity,
insufficient activity of the rights holder-can potentially be construed as abuses of
intellectual property rights.
188. Id. art. 8.
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Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, often alluded to but generally underused, 189
would therefore provide normative support if challenges to "working requirement"
in domestic copyright laws were to arise.
Although a "copyright working requirement" could be construed narrowly
to apply to one or more strategic industries, it could also be applicable
transversally. As I will argue with regard to moral rights,1 90 the best scenario
would be for "working requirements" to be generally applicable to all kinds of
copyrighted goods in a given country, but nothing would prevent a developing
country with a specific thriving industry to regulate only one kind of goods (e.g.,
film, crafts, and books) produced nationally. Several studies in the patent field
have shown that working requirements have been helpful for emerging economies,
particular in the case of pharmaceuticals.' 9' In spite of the differences between
regulation of patents and that of copyrights, these studies show that measures
geared towards a specific intellectual property-intensive industry can boost
performance within the industry and lead to spillover effects.1 92 The same logics
would apply with regard to the so-called "copyright industries" and therefore
policymakers in a given country may find a "local working requirement" necessary
(or socially/politically easier to implement) only in the case of one or two
industries.
189. See Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPs Agreement, 46 Hous. L. REv. 979
(2009).
190. See infra, pp. 41-45.
191. See, e.g., Kenneth Shadlen, The Politics of Patents and Drugs in Brazil and Mexico: The Industrial
Bases of Health Policies, 42 (1) COMP. POL. 41 (2009); Shamnad Basheer, India's Tryst with TRIPS:
The Patents (Amendment) Act 2005, 1 INDIAN J. L. & TECH. 15 (2005); Mueller, supra note 14.
192. Id
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A possible argument against this proposal is that analogies between
patents and copyrights are bound to be imperfect, as the two fields, while operating
under shared principles of classical intellectual property, obey different incentives
schemes and employ different strategies to cure market failures. However, this
would not be the first time that copyright doctrine borrows inspiration from
patents. 193  Moreover, the overarching goal of bringing more stability, 94 and
fairness into copyright regimes would constitute an additional motive for
implementing "working requirements" in a field where such a notion would, at
first, be a transplant.
6. Removal of Paying Public Domains
While particularly prominent among developing countries in Africa and
Latin America, the idea of a paying public domain is actually Northern in origin
and scope. The concept of a "domaine public payant" was offered as early as 1858
by Pierre-Jules Hetzel in La propridt littdraire et le domaine public
payant, 195 an idea to which Victor Hugo quickly subscribed. 196 Largely based on
derivations of natural rights theories, the concept gained some recognition in the
French literary and artistic milieu in the late nineteenth century.197 This coincided
with the emergence arguments in favor of systemic protection of intellectual
193. Consider the concept of "substantial non-infringing use" that migrated from patent to the copyright
lexicon in American intellectual property law. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 418 (1984). Admittedly, this is the narrowest of examples, but it shows that similar
exchanges are not unheard of.
194. "Stability" in the sense of restoring the rules of incentives that copyright supposedly gives authors
to create and disseminate their work.
195.See PIERRE-JULES HETZEL, LA PROPRItTt LITTtRAIRE ET LE DOMAINE
PUBLIC PAYANT (Imprimerie de Veuve J. Van Guggenhoudt 1858) (Fr).
196. Id.
197. LUCIE M. C. R. GUIBAULT ET AL., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS
IN INFORMATION LAW 90 (2006)
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property rights in continental Europe, which tended to emphasize the personality of
the creator as the main underlying justification for the grant of such rights. 198
Countries sharing France's legal traditions and philosophies also
considered adopting paying public domains during this period. 199 Italy, for
instance, introduced a pubblico dominio pagante in 1865,200 but abolished it in
1996.2°1
In Eastern Europe, several countries implemented different forms of
paying public domains. The most interesting example is that of Hungary, which in
1978 introduced a paying public domain for works of art, but excluded audiovisual
works and sound recordings from the regime. 2° 2 However, the money collected
under this mechanism was distributed to all kinds of authors, including those of
audiovisual and literary works. 203 Other countries in the region, like the Czech
Republic, adopted paying public domains during the Cold War period, but
abandoned this regime during the 1990s. 204
198. Id
199. Id.
200. See LAURA CHIMIENTI, LINEAMENTI DEL NUovo DIRITTO D'AUTORE: AGGIORNATO CON IL
D.LGS 118/2006 E CON IL D.LGS.140/2006, 347 (Giuffr Editore 7th ed. 2006) (It.).
201. Id. at 347.
202. See CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY, SUMMARY OF THE HUNGARIAN COPYRIGHT LAW,
http://www.library.ceu.hu/hucop.pdf.
203. See KAROL JAKUBOWITZ & PIERRE JEANRAY, CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: AUDIOVISUAL
LANDSCAPE AND COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION 120 (Peter Barber Languages trans., I st ed. 1994).
204. Id.
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Several developing countries have also experimented with variations on
the concept of the paying public domain, from the largest economies in the
South0 5 to more modest ones.2 °6
The problem with paying public domains is that they impose the payment
of a tax-like fee on goods that are no longer protected by copyright.20 7 This can be
construed as dejure enclosure of the public domain.2 08 Even for those who resist
the definition of the fees associated with paying public domains as taxes, a paying
public domain results in the creation of an additional layer of protection
surrounding specific goods. Justifications for granting additional layers of
protection should be evaluated in light of the principles that inform intellectual
property and cast IP rights as mediators between situations of market failure and
access to creative inputs freely available for reappropriation.
In some developing countries with paying public domains, it is not
unusual for the corresponding norms not to be enforced, a phenomenon that raises
questions about the existence of any market failures that payment of a fee might
cure. If enforced, paying public domain provisions have the potential to generate a
cultural gridlock economy,20 9 with chilling effects on every kind of creative
industry, and affecting also semi-formalized non-industrial cultural manifestations.
205. Argentina introduced the dominio piblico pagante, also known as dominio pdblico oneroso, in
1958. See Decreto Ley 1.224/58, B.O. 14/2/1958, art 6, (Arg.),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/ar/ar07Oes.pdf.
206. For example, Ghana, which subjects public domain works to the payment of a fee. Copyright Act
(Act No. 690) art. 38(3) (2005).
207. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66
SPG L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003).
208. Id.
209. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION AND COSTS LIVES (2008) (discussing the broader gridlock effects that
an excessive intellectual property rights can generate).
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The World Intellectual Property Organization has offered an analogy on
this topic, likening paying public domains to compulsory licenses:
Under a system of domaine public payant, or "paying public domain," a
fee is imposed for the use of works in the public domain. Generally, the
system works like a compulsory license: the use is conditioned on
payment of the prescribed fee but not upon the securing of a prior
authorization. The public domain to which such a regime applies is
usually only composed of works the copyright of which has expired
(except in countries applying it to expressions of folklore, as further
detailed below). In some countries, only the commercial or for-profit
exploitation of public domain material is subject to payment.210
If, as WIPO points out, a paying public domain is the equivalent of a generalized
system of compulsory licensing, then adopters of these regimes should ask
themselves if that is the economic and philosophical blueprint that they wish to
imprint on their culture and society. Compulsory licensing is a remedial means of
accessing intellectual property goods, not a generalized tax on unprotected works.
There is no legal or practical reason that would prevent a transition from the
current system into a truly open public domain. For instance, Chile switched in
1992 from a paying public domain regime for folklore to a public domain proper,
and there have been no reports of adverse effects on the vitality of Chilean folklore
M iC211music.
21
This article therefore argues that countries that currently codify paying
public domains should consider their removal. Even if paying public domains
were the equivalent of a generalized system of compulsory licensing (which they
210. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Note on the Meanings of the Term "Public
Domain" in the Intellectual Property System With Special Reference to the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions/Expressions of Folklore, at 12, T 54,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17/I4F/8 (Nov. 24, 2010).
211. See Severine Dusollier, WIPO, Scoping Study on Copyright and Related Rights and the Public
Domain, CDIP/7/INF/2 (Mar. 4, 2011).
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are not) legislators and policymakers in these countries should ponder whether this
potential cultural gridlock is a model they wish to imprint on their societies.
7. Reconsideration of Moral Rights
This is a residual suggestion, but one that is allowed by international
intellectual property law and that could expedite transformative uses of
copyrighted works throughout the developing world.
Moral rights were first protected internationally by the Berne
Convention2 in 1886,213 but common law countries resisted the idea of moral
214
rights for a long time. In the case of the United States, Article 6bis of Berne was
one of the main points of contention that prevented the country from ratifying
Berne for over a century, until 1988.215 In 1994, the TRIPS Agreement, which
incorporates Berne by reference in Article 9.1, expressly excluded moral rights
from its scope of protection.2 16 To this day, while protection for moral rights is not
212. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221 (stating
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. (2) The rights granted to
the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at
least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or
institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or
accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the death of the author of all
the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after
his death, cease to be maintained. (3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights
granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is
claimed.).
213. See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Rights: A Study In The Law Of Artists, Authors, and
Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV., 554 (1940); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists'
Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1997).
214. See Jane Ginsburg, Moral Rights in a Common Law System, 4 ENT. L. R., 122 (1990); Justin
Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar "Gap," 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659 (2007).
215. Beme Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
216. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 9.1 ("Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of
the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However, Members shall not have rights or
obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under Article 6bis of that
Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.").
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entirely absent from common law jurisdictions, 2 17 they remain primarily associated
with droit d'auteur countries, both theoretically and in practice.
Criticism of moral rights stresses the fact that the concept of moral rights
hinges on a misleading construct: that the works protected by exclusive
monopolies somehow embody or display certain elements of the personality of the
author, and therefore it is necessary to further extend the protection afforded by the
economic core of the monopoly to encompass rights of attribution, integrity and
others.218 Nevertheless, there is still a widespread belief that moral rights, by
virtue of protecting authors qua authors, protect art and culture in itself, a view that
is often also endorsed in common law countries.219
In recent years, there have been attempts to frame strong moral rights
regimes as crucial balancing mechanisms in the digital world.22 ° Some scholars
suggest that this balancing function of moral rights can better equip developing
countries to incentivize creativity in the digital copyright era.221 While it is not
within the scope of this work to contribute to the discussion surrounding the
broader question of the usefulness of moral rights, this article submits that
217. Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990) (In the United States, for instance, VARA was
passed in 1990 to regulate the rights of attribution and integrity in "works of visual art.").
218. See Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV., 263, 269 (2009).
219. Id. at 264 ("Moral rights scholarship is startling in its uniformity. Scholars take it as gospel that
moral rights are crucial for art to flourish and that, if anything, we need a more robust moral rights
doctrine. Commentators routinely lament the gap between our modest American moral rights laws and
the more expansive European ones. In contrast to copyright law, which has produced a vibrant body of
scholarship critical of the law's excesses, the main scholarly criticism of moral rights is that they do not
reach far enough."). Elsewhere, proposals to incorporate moral rights qua tale into common law
normative frameworks have invariably failed. Monica Kilian, A Hollow Victory for the Common Law?
TRIPs and the Moral Rights Exclusion, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 321, 335-36 (2003)
(proposing that moral rights be treated as an extension of the economic rights of the author as a way of
incorporating them into common law discourse).
220. See, e.g., MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND NEW
TECHNOLOGY (2011).
221. See Mira T. Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights in Developing Countries, 8 J. INT'L INTELL. PROP. RTS.,
357, 358 (2003) ("The trend towards lower levels of protection for moral rights, a characteristic feature
of copyright reform around the world, is an entirely negative one. Moral rights have much to contribute
to culture and creativity in developing countries").
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developing countries with emerging "copyright-intensive" industries should
reconsider their approach to moral rights.
Current copyright regimes establish strong moral rights frameworks
throughout the developing world.222 The economic and social advantages of the
existence of this kind of rights in places like Africa, for instance, have yet to be
determined. Beyond any problems that might affect theoretical justifications of
moral rights, there are drawbacks to protecting moral rights. They add yet another
layer of rights to protected works, which might translate into heightened
transaction costs for second-comers wishing to make transformative uses of those
works. Also, they increase legal uncertainty throughout the developing world, as
the body of law governing the application of moral rights clauses to specific
situations is not entirely clear, 2 3 and is far less developed than the one we find in
Europe.
In an age where the concept of reappropriation in cultural production is
increasingly blurred,224 eliminating moral rights could expedite transformative uses
of these works by trimming down thickets of rights and reducing legal uncertainty.
Countries where copyright industries make (or are expected to make) strong
contributions to the local or national economy should consider suppressing moral
rights in their intellectual property laws.
222. See ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT 319 (Chris Armstrong et. al.
eds., 2010).
223. See Andrew Rens, No Answers: Butcher Boys, Artistic Freedom and Moral Rights, EX AFRICA
SEMPER ALIQUID NovI, (Feb. 17, 2012), http://aliquidnovi.org/no-answers-butcher-boys-artistic-
freedom-and-moral-rights/.
224. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY
(2008).
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In a way, the American experience with protection of moral rights in
visual art through the Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA") 225 illustrates the
viability of circumscribed applications of moral rights. In the United States, a
historical antagonist of moral rights doctrine, ad hoc protection was conferred to a
226specific category of work. This indicates that not all copyrighted works need to
be given the same levels of protection. Conversely, developing countries, long-
time importers of moral rights frameworks, may come to discover that certain
industries can thrive without some of the entitlements they had before.
As stated above, protection of moral rights is neither prohibited nor
mandated by international intellectual property law. Cultural and legal
heritages, 227 social perceptions attached to the concept of morality, resistance to
change and pressure from proponents of expansive intellectual property regimes
might prevent developing economies from considering eliminating moral rights,
even in specific areas. A lesser alternative for countries with perpetual moral
rights that cannot be waived or assigned would be to reduce the duration of the
rights, as well as allowing for waivers and assignments.
IV. CONCLUSION
Regional cooperation among developing countries-most recently, in the
form of the BRICS Intellectual Property Offices Cooperation Roadmap-is poised
to focus primarily on patent law and policy, as well as on patent-flavored TRIPS
225. Visual Artists Rights Act § 106A.
226. See Edward J. Damich, A Comparison of State and Federal Moral Rights Protection: Are Artists
Better Off after VARA, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 953 (1993).
227. DEERE, supra note 56, at 37-63.
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flexibilities. Yet, there are other areas of intellectual property in which South-
South debate and exchanges have been consistently overlooked.
TRIPS is a minimum standards agreement with ample normative space
for countries in the Global South to incorporate provisions that foster their
domestic interests beyond the sphere of patent regulation. This article surveys a
set of TRIPS-compatible measures, which, if adopted, would contribute to the
advancement of innovation and development agendas in the South without
increasing the overall levels of intellectual property protection.

THE INTERPRETATION OF GENERAL EXCEPTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW: IS A SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT INTERPRETIVE APPROACH POSSIBLE?
Gabriele Gagliani*"
I. INTRODUCTION
Although there is no conclusive evidence of a perfect correlation between the
level of income and quality of life, economic growth has a direct connection to de-
velopment.' Economic growth and industrialization can be negative for the envi-
ronment, but endemic poverty and inequality seem to be strongly connected to eco-
logical and other types of crises .2 International trade and foreign direct investment
can play a major role in a country's economic, environmental, and social develop-
ment.3 Whether the multilateral trading system and the investment treaty system,
as currently structured, foster development in practice, remains subject to debate.4
Lengthy, heated discussions have focused on this subject, questioning for instance
whether international investment agreements ("IIAs") between states help attract
foreign investment at all.5 The purpose of this paper is not to examine arguments
and counter arguments on the subject.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that states have expressed much discontent in
respect of this matter.6 Some developing countries have complained that their in-
terests and rights, as enshrined in the World Trade Organization ("WTO") Agree-
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under a thesis co-direction at Bocconi University, Milan (Italy);; External Consultant for intergovern-
mental organizations; LL.B. and Master of Laws (University of Milan), LL.M. (IELPO, University of
Barcelona). E-mail: gagliani.intlaw@gmail.com. Special thanks go to Prof Laurent Manderieux and to
Dora Castafieda for their valuable comments. It goes without saying that any opinion and mistake re-
mains my own and do not represent the position or opinion of any of the persons or institutions above
mentioned.
1. WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2003 at 79, (2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 82-90;INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT - KEY
CASES FROM 2000-2010, at 12 (Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Lise Johnson eds., Int'l Inst. for
Sustainable Dev. 2011), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/201 /Int investment law and sd keycases_2010.pdf
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT].
4. Here, both trade and investment law will be referred to as "systems," imperfect, incoherent
systems but nevertheless systems, in the general sense of "a set of things working together as parts of a
mechanism or an interconnecting network, a complex whole." Oxford Dictionaries, System, OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/system.
5. For opposing views, compare Liesbeth Colen, Damiaan Persyn & Andrea Guariso, What Type
of FDI Is Attracted by Bilateral Investment Treaties?, (LICOS Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Pa-
per 346/2014,2014), http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/licos/publications/dp/dp34
6
, with INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 12.
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ment, have been prejudiced by panels and the Appellate Body together with their
development prospects.7 Similarly, the system of foreign investment protection,
with the unrestrained possibility for foreign investors to bring investment claims
against states, has been questioned. 8 Developing and least-developed countries
have emphasized the alleged pressure they were subjected to during the Uruguay
Round negotiations. 9 Also, it is alleged that these countries apparently ignored the
real impact of HAs, the signing of which were perceived as merely photo opportu-
nities during visits of high-level delegations from other countries.1 o Without delv-
ing into these claims, simple and unfettered trade liberalization and foreign in-
vestment protection do not appear to be necessarily conducive to sustainable
development. This is not to imply, contrarily, that the WTO, free trade agreements
("FTAs"), or international bilateral and multilateral investment agreements, should
become the primary forum or instruments to promote development, a situation
some have warned against.
Although several proposals to reform the trade and investment systems have
been put forward, 12 it seems that the focus has been mainly on the institutional
structure of the WTO and investment arbitral tribunals and the drafting of the rele-
vant agreements. The value of these proposals, which have considered, among
others, the creation of an obligation (as opposed to the current possibility) for de-
7. See, e.g. Proposal by the African Group, Kenya - Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding: Proposal by the African Group to the Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body,
TN/DS/W/15 (Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter DSU African Group]; Proposals on DSU by Cuba, Hondu-
ras, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, Negotiations on the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding, TN/DS/W/1 8 (Oct. 9, 2002) [hereinafter DSU Cuba, et al.].
8. See, e.g., Leandi Kolver, SA Proceeds with Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sa-proceeds-with-
termination-of-bilateral-investment-treaties-2013-10-21; Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela's Withdrawal
from ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve, IISD INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/201 2/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-
achieve/.
9. Martin Khor, The Proposed New Issues in the WTO and the Interests of Developing Coun-
tries, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, http://twn.my/title/mk l0.htm.
10. Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning, 65 WORLD POL. 273, 280-81 (2013).
11. Veijo Heiskanen, Book Review: The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Politi-
cal Analysis, Patrick. F .J Macrory, Arthur. E. Appleton, and Michael. G.. Plummer (Eds.), Springer,
2005, Volumes 1-111, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 1149,1153 (2006).
12. William J. Davey, Reforming WTO Dispute Settlement, (Univ. of lll. Pub. L. and Legal The-
ory Res. Paper No. 04-01, 2004), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=495386; Andreas
R. Ziegler & Yves Bonzon, How to Reform the WTO Decision-Making? An Analysis of the Current
Functioning of the Organization from the Perspectives of Efficiency and Legitimacy, (NCCR Trade
Working Paper No. 2007/23, 2007), http://phase1.nccr-
trade.org/images/stories/publications/IP2/Working%2OPaper%2ONo%202007_23.pdf; United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a
Roadmap, Int'l Inv. Agreement Issues Note No. 2 p.4 (June 2013), [hereinafter UNCTD],
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb20l3d4_en.pdf, Stephan W. Schill, The Sixth Path:
Reforming Investment Law from Within, (Fourth Biennial Conference of the Society of Int'l Econ. Law
(SIEL) Working Paper No. 2014/02, 2014),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cnfm?abstract-id=244691 8.
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veloped countries to give special attention to problems and interests of developing
country Members, 13 or the clarification and tailoring of HAs' provisions,
14 is not to
be underestimated. Nonetheless, the design and drafting of WTO and investment
agreements as they stand at present already partially allow the WTO panels, the
Appellate Body, and investment tribunals to address developing and least-
developed countries' developmental interests.
1 5
This paper will focus on the interpretation of general exceptions provisions in
international trade and investment law. Under international law, exceptions are
justifications that, under certain conditions, exclude a state's responsibility when it
would be otherwise engaged for the violation of an international obligation. 16 Ex-
ception clauses have been referred to with many terms, such as defenses, non-
13. Davey, supra note 12, at 13.
14. UNCTD, supra note 12, at 5-6.
15. This distinction between institutional reforms and interpretation by adjudicatory bodies, be-
tween creation of the law and interpretation of the law, although clear in theory, is extremely blurred in
practice. The interpretation of legal provisions always involves a part of creation by the interpreter.
Interpreting the law amounts to some extent to making the law and this is even more so in the realm of
international law. See, e.g. INGO VENZKE, HOW INTERPRETATION MAKES INTERNATIONAL LAW - ON
SEMANTIC CHANGE AND NORMATIVE TWISTS (2012). WTO Panels and the Appellate Body, as well as
investment arbitral tribunals, are not the sole interpreters of WTO Agreements and IlAs' provisions.
Rather, states are creators of the law, but their interpretation and application of the law also affects what
tribunals decide in a particular case. This could happen, for instance, with the creation of specific
mechanisms through which states can clarify or resolve disputes on the interpretation or application of
treaty provisions. Article 3.9 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and Article IX:2 of
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement), indeed allow Mem-
bers to seek authoritative interpretations of covered agreements' provisions. Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.9, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S 401 [hereinafter DSU]; Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. IX:2, April 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 154
[hereinafter WTO Agreement). Under Article 2001 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), a Free Trade Commission composed of representatives of the NAFTA parties or their desig-
nees, was created with the same purpose. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 2001, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. Similarly, Article 51 of the 2004 Canada Model Agreement
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments mentions a Commission to the same end. 2004 Can-
ada Model BIT, Preamble, Art. 51, ITALAW, http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-
en.pdf. These are just some examples. Some scholars have also discussed the case for the material dis-
tribution of power among State actors to affect the interpretation of international trade law. See Andrew
Lang, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLtBERALISM - RE-IMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER
166 (2011) (explaining an idea perhaps applicable to the investment treaty system as well). In addition,
in both trade and investment, one should foresee any potential future interpretation already at the mo-
ment of negotiation and drafting of legal provisions. See Asif Qureshi, Interpreting WTO Agreements
for the Development Objective 95 ICTSD Resource Paper No. 5, (2003). This grants (limited) interpre-
tative power to States and investors which, through their interpretations could drive the agreements
(re)negotiation agenda. As a result, one can support the view that neither States nor investment tribu-
nals enjoy ultimate interpretive authority in all circumstances. See Anthea Roberts, Power and Persva-
sion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (2010). The
adoption of a development-oriented interpretation is the result and responsibility of all actors participat-
ing in the trade and investment systems.
16. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 (8th ed.
2012).
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
precluded measures clauses, or circumstances precluding wrongfulness. The no-
men iuris does not alter their purpose, which is to preclude the wrongfulness of a
conduct that would otherwise not be in conformity with the international obliga-
tions of the state concerned. 17 General exceptions provisions in the WTO context
are no different. 18 These provisions allow WTO Members to adopt measures that
pursue the promotion and protection of other societal values and interests and are
inconsistent with other provisions of the relevant Agreements, justifying them., 9
Currently, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and General
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS")-style general exceptions are included
in several IIAs and FTAs in respect of investments.
The main argument of this paper is that a sustainable development interpre-
tive approach to general exceptions (that is, the explicit consideration of states' de-
velopmental needs) is possible. When interpreting general exceptions provisions,
trade and investment adjudicatory bodies can take into account the developmental
condition of the state adopting a measure at issue, the condition of the states af-
fected by the measure (in the case of the WTO), and the developmental objective
and impact of the measure itself. In the WTO context, some decisions of the Ap-
pellate Body have paved the way in this direction.2 0 This has been done in a rather
implicit way. However, there seems to be enough interpretative space for a more
explicit development-oriented approach, as further discussed below. This interpre-
tative approach could have a direct bearing on the interpretation of general excep-
tions in IIAs and FTAs with an investment chapter, and it could allow considera-
tion on a case-by-case basis of the needs of the specific country under scrutiny. It
would avoid the common grouping of developing and least developed countries
with very diverse developmental interests and bypass difficulties related to the
crystallization of countries' dynamic needs into legal provisions. In sum, it would
serve the interests and the needs of developing and least developed countries bet-
ter.
More specifically, the sustainable development interpretive approach 2' al-
luded to in this paper calls for a balancing interpretative technique, which tries to
integrate economic development with social development and environmental pro-
tection 22 in the interpretation of legal provisions. With a view towards achieving
17. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts, With Commentaries, in Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10
(2001),http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9-6-2001.pdf.
18. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art.
XX [hereinafter GATT); General Agreement on Trade in Services, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B,33 1.L.M. 1167, art. XIV [hereinafter
GATS].
19. PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
615 (2d ed. 2008).
20. See discussion infra Part B.
21. In this paper, the two terms of 'development' and 'sustainable development' are used inter-
changeably.
22. Phillipe Sands, International Courts and the Application of the Concept of "Sustainable De-
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this purpose, adjudicatory bodies should always give due consideration to the de-
velopmental situation of the countries concerned and to the developmental impact
of the measure at issue in a given case. This interpretative approach should not be
conceived of as a way to create new legal obligations.
After some general considerations, the interpretation of exceptions provisions
in the WTO context will be discussed. Later in the paper, the inclusion of general
exceptions provisions in the investment domain will be examined together with a
brief analysis of how general exceptions provisions might be applied in practice in
an investment law context. Finally, general conclusions will be drawn.
II. INTERPRETING TRADE AND INVESTMENT GENERAL EXCEPTIONS PROVISIONS: IS
A DEVELOPMENT INTERPRETIVE APPROACH POSSIBLE?
A. General Considerations
As already mentioned above, a development-oriented interpretation of general
exceptions is possible. WTO panels and the Appellate Body have already done this
implicitly. However, a further step towards an explicit development-oriented in-
terpretative approach could also be possible, moving within the borders of general
rules of treaty interpretation under international law. The customary rules of treaty
interpretation fully support such an interpretative approach. Under Article 31 (1)
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"), "a treaty shall be in-
terpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose., 23 Ar-
ticle 31, together with Article 32, of the VCLT is widely considered a codification
of customary rules on treaty interpretation. 24 Article 3.2 of the WTO Understand-
ing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU")
makes the "customary rules of interpretation of public international law" explicitly
applicable in the WTO context.25  WTO panels and the Appellate Body have
commonly resorted to these rules.26 Indeed, WTO law can be considered a part of
velopment", 3 MAX PLANCK Y.B.U.N.L. 389, 400 (1999).
23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340
[hereinafter VCLT].
24. See, e.g. Territorial Dispute Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. 6,
29 (Feb. 3); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 1045, (Dec. 18);
Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R at 29 (1975); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 127 1-
75 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds. 1992)
25. Article 3.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes (DSU), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, reads as
follows:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify
the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpreta-
tion of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
DSU, supra note 15,at art. 3.2.
26. Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
public international law.2 7 Due to its private-public mixed nature, the possibility of
applying customary rules of public international law is still an unresolved, contro-
versial point in investor-state arbitration.2 8 Nevertheless, these disputes relate to
treaties and investment tribunals have shown varying degrees of acceptance of the
customary rules of treaty interpretation.29
Article 31 (1) of the VCLT makes a clear reference to treaties' objects and
purposes, as relevant elements to be taken into consideration. 30 These are normally
expressed in the preamble of a given agreement, although they could be detected in
the operative clauses of the agreement taken as a whole. 3' However, since Article
31(1) refers to different elements (terms of the treaty, its context, its object and its
purpose), it is essential to understand how to consider all these elements together.
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have clarified that the principles of interpre-
tation that are set out in Articles 31 and 32 are to be followed in a holistic fashion,
"so as to yield an interpretation that is harmonious and coherent and fits comforta-
bly in the treaty as a whole in order to render the treaty provision legally effec-
tive. ' 32 This approach has been supported by some developing countries.33 In the
WTO Preamble, WTO Members explicitly recognized the need for fostering de-
velopment. This has been expressed through the recognition of the need for devel-
oping and least-developed countries to develop their economies, the need for rais-
ing the standards of living, for ensuring full employment, for growing of real
line, at 17, WT/DS2/AB/R(adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter US - Gasoline]; Appellate Body Report,
India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 46,
WT/DS50/AB/R, (Dec. 19, 1997); Appellate Body Report, Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, 42, WT/DS56/AB/R, (adopted Jan. 16, 1998); Appellate
Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Germany, 7 61-62, WT/DS213/AB/R, (adopted Dec. 19, 2002).
27. Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95
AM. J. INT'L L.535, 538 (2001).
28. See, e.g., BG Group Plc. v. Republic of Argentina, Final Award, 408 (2007) (excluding the
applicability of Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility in investor-State arbitration
since it "relate[s] exclusively to international obligations between sovereign States."). For further dis-
cussion on state-to-state and investor-to-state relationship in investment treaty arbitration, see Zachary
Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT.Y.B. INTL. L. 151 (2003).
29. Compare Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on
Jurisdiction, T 80 (Aug. 3, 2004), (where the Tribunal stated that it was going simply to "adhere" to the
rules of interpretation codified in Article 31 (1) of the VCLT), with Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn
Bhd v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, at 56, (Apr.
16, 2009) (where the Committee considered "itself on firm ground in resorting to the customary rules of
interpretation of treaties as codified" in the VCLT), and Tokios Tokelds v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27, (Apr. 29, 2004) (recalling that "other tribunals" used these
rules of interpretation), and Noble Ventures Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1 1, Award, 50,
(Oct. 12, 2005) (referring to the supplementary means of interpretation as codified in Article 32 of the
VCLT).
30. VCLT, supra note 23, art. 3 1(1).
31. Qureshi, supra note 15, at 96.
32. Appellate Body Report, United States - Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology, 268, WT/DS350/AB/R, (adopted Feb. 19, 2009).
33. See generally DSU African Group, supra note 7; and DSU Cuba et al., supra note 7.
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income, and for optimally using the world's resources.
34
Nonetheless, only through due consideration of developmental concerns is it
possible to reach one of the main purposes of the WTO, that is, "to develop an in-
tegrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system," as mentioned in the
Preamble of the WTO Marrakesh Agreement.35 In a similar fashion, notwithstand-
ing the uniqueness of each investment treaty, investment treaties often refer to de-
velopment in one way or the other. In the United States-Azerbaijan Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty,36 both parties recognize that the treatment accorded to investment
under the treaty will stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic devel-
opment of the parties and agree that a stable framework for investment will maxi-
mize effective utilization of economic resources and improve living standards,
without it being necessary to relax health, safety, and environmental measures of
general application. The same concerns are mentioned in the Preamble of the 2012
United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, which also includes specific pro-
visions on investment and environment, and investment and labor, respectively at
Articles 12 and 13; 37 while the 2004 Canada Model Bilateral Investment Treaty
expressly mentions in its Preamble the promotion of sustainable development and
later contemplates the relation between investment and health, safety, and envi-
ronmental measures in its Article 11.38
Other countries, such as China, do not make reference to development in their
bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"), but mention "mutual benefit" 39 and the "in-
crease [of] prosperity in both States,"40 which recall the concept of development.
In addition, the Preamble of the 1965 Washington Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the "ICSID
Convention"), 41 clarifies that the Contracting States agreed to the ICSID Conven-
34. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble, April 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S 154.
35. Id.
36. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Republic of Azerbaijan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, US-
Azer., Aug. 1, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-47 (2001).
37. 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 12-3, 2012,
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%
2 0Meeting.pdf [hereinafter US-
Model BIT].
38. Canada Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Preamble, art. 10,
2004, http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf [hereinafter Canada Model BIT].
39. Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government
of the Republic of Albania Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Alb., Preamble, Feb. 13, 1993, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/8.
40. Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of investments Between the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the People's Republic of China, Colom.-
China, Preamble, Oct. 22, 2008, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
7 2 0.
41. The ICSID Convention established the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), the primary institutional and procedural framework for the settlement of investment
disputes between governments and foreign investors. See A. Broches, The Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes: Some Observations on Jurisdiction, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 264
(1966).
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tion's taking into consideration the need for "international cooperation for eco-
nomic development, and the role of private international investment therein" and
the desire "to establish such facilities [for international conciliation and arbitration]
under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, 42 whose primary goal is to foster development.4 3 The idea of a develop-
ment-oriented interpretation appears to be strengthened also by other provisions of
the VCLT. Under Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, the interpreter has to take into
consideration together with the context, any relevant rules of international law ap-
plicable in the relations between the parties. 44 Treaties' preambles serve to high-
light the object and purpose of a treaty, while the need to take into consideration
other relevant rules of international law reflects the need of a systematic integra-
tion, allowing the interpreter to find appropriate accommodation between conflict-
ing values and interests in the international society.45 This is especially relevant
when interpreting treaty obligations that interact with other treaties.46 In this latter
sense, systematic integration might have the same purpose of exceptions in interna-
tional law: striking a balance between opposite needs or concerns.
Indeed, it is not easy to understand whether the relevant rules referred to in
VCLT Article 31(3)(c) are those binding on all parties (say for instance, all WTO
Members) or only on some of them.47 However, in certain multilateral contexts
such as at the WTO, it would be illogical to require the relevant rules to be those
that are applicable to all WTO Members.48 On a similar line, Article 42 of the
ICSID Convention stipulates that in the absence of an agreement between the par-
ties on the rules of law to be applied, "the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Con-
tracting State party to the dispute... and such rules of international law as may be
applicable., 49 Given the (at least voiced) support for them, it would be difficult
not to see declarations, agreements, and principles of international law on devel-
opment as relevant and applicable to the economic relations between the parties.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development ("UNCED"), which in its
42. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Preamble, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
43. See Article I of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which stipulates
that the Bank shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes set out in Article I, in particular, to
assist "the reconstruction and development of territories of members;" "to promote the long-range bal-
anced growth of international trade;" and "to conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of in-
ternational investment on business conditions in the territories of members." Articles of Agreement of
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, art. l(i),(iii),(v), Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134.
44. Article 31 (3)(c) of the VCLT reads as follows: "There shall be taken into account, together
with the context: ... (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties." VCLT, supra note 23, at 31(3)(c).
45. Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vi-
enna Convention, 54 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 279, 318-19 (2005).
46. Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 753, 780
(2002).
47. Id. at 780-81.
48. Id. at 782.
49. ICSID Convention, supra note 42, art. 42.
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Principle 27 calls attention to sustainable development, implicitly recognizes that
at the time of its negotiation there existed a body of international law on sustain-
able development. 50 The right to development has also been eminently recognized
as an important principle of international law.
51
In light of the above, one should bear in mind that the object and purpose of a
treaty as indicated in its preamble should 'pervade' all its provisions, including ex-
ceptions. This has been confirmed, for instance, by the WTO Appellate Body
when it clarified that the language of the Preamble of the WTO Agreement "must
add color, texture and shading" to the interpretation of the Agreements annexed to
the WTO Agreement, including GATT Article XX.52 The Appellate Body has
stressed that an exception is another treaty provision that should be interpreted in
accordance with its terms, its context, and in light of the object and purpose of the
treaty - the ordinary rules of treaty interpretation. 53  Investment tribunals have
taken into account the ICSID Convention and HAs' objects and purposes as indi-
cated in their preambles. 54 Nevertheless, contrary to what is argued in this paper,
some investment tribunals have suggested that in accordance with the investment
promotion and protection purpose of IAs, exceptions to IIAs obligations should be
interpreted narrowly. 55 In Canfor Corporation v. United States and Terminal For-
est Products Ltd. v. United States, the Tribunal, referring to GATT jurisprudence,
56
stated that exceptions in international instruments should be interpreted narrowly.
57
In CMS v. Argentina, with regard to the interpretation of the "essential security
interest" exception in Article XI of the 1991 Argentina-U.S. BIT, the Tribunal
supported the idea of a restrictive interpretation with the reasoning that "If strict
50. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-
14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. I (Vol.
I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992); Sands, supra note 22, at 392.
51. Subrata Roy Chowdhury,Jntergenerational Equity: Substratum of the Right to Sustainable
Development, in THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 233, 233 (Subrata Roy
Chowdhury, Eric M.G. Denters & Paul J.I.M. de Waart eds., 1992).
52. Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, 153, WT/DS58/AB/R, (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp].
53. Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supplying of
Gambling and Betting Services, 291, WT/DS285/AB/R, (adopted Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter US-
Gambling] (general exceptions "affirm the right of Members to pursue objectives identified in the para-
graphs of these provisions even if, in doing so, Members act inconsistently with obligations set out in
other provisions of the respective agreements, provided that all of the conditions set out therein are
satisfied."); see also US-Shrimp, supra note 52, 121 (where the Appellate Body criticized the ap-
proach of the Panel in excluding a priori certain measures from the scope of the GATT Article XX ex-
ception.); ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUiS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES
487 (2009).
54. See, e.g., Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka,
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2, Award, 149 (Mar. 15, 2002); American Manufacturing & Trading Inc. v.
Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/I, Award, 5.12, (Feb. 21, 1997).
55. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 53, at 484-85.
56. Panel Report, Canada - Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, 59, L/6568-36S/68
(Sept. 27, 1989) GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) [hereinafter Canada-Restrictions on Ice Cream].
57. Canfor Corp. v. United States & Terminal Forest Prods. Ltd. v. United States, Decision on
Preliminary Question, 187, (June 6, 2006).
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and demanding conditions are not required or are loosely applied, any State could
invoke necessity to elude its international obligations. This would certainly be con-
trary to the stability and predictability of the law."
58
The same restrictive approach, with regard to the same provision of the 1991
Argentina-U.S. BIT, was adopted by the Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,
L.P. v. Argentina Tribunal since ". . . any interpretation resulting in an escape route
from the obligations defined cannot be easily reconciled with that object and pur-
pose. Accordingly, a restrictive interpretation of any such alternative is manda-
tory.",59 Some commentators have even supported the view that protecting inves-
tors' rights was the only objective of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.60  This reading
expressly overlooks the recognition in the BIT's Preamble of the economic devel-
opment of the parties, the effective use of economic resources, and the contribu-
tions to the well-being of workers. Conversely, some investment tribunals, con-
ceding that protection of foreign investment is a necessary element of BITs,
significantly noted that it is not the sole aim of investment treaties. 61 Some schol-
ars have also underscored that the presumption of a narrow interpretation of excep-
tions could be contradicted by the contrary presumption that a restrictive interpre-
tation of treaty obligations is an undue derogation of sovereignty (by way of the in
dubio pars mitio est sequenda or in dubio mitius principle).62
All of these considerations allow one to affirm that a development-oriented
interpretation, moving within the borders of the general rules of interpretation of
international law and the relevant treaties' objects and purposes, would not detract
from legal certainty and predictability on the one hand, nor would it be a form of
judicial activism or excess of power by a WTO panel, the Appellate Body, or an
investment arbitral tribunal. This interpretative approach is strictly anchored to the
wording of the relevant agreements and moves within the perimeter of the letter of
the law. DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2 stipulate that panels and the Appellate Body,
as well as the Dispute Settlement Body, cannot add or diminish the rights and obli-
gations of WTO Members under the covered agreements. The common view is
that these provisions preempt panels and the Appellate Body from engaging in ju-
dicial activism.63 This issue has been discussed as well in respect of investment
58. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 317
(May 12, 2005),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=
DC504 En&caseld=C4.
59. Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/03, Award, 311, May 22,
2007, http://www.italaw.com/documents/Enron-Award.pdf.
60. Jos6 E. Alvarez &Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse
into the Heart of the Investment Regime, 80-81 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Inst. for Int'l Law & Justice
Working Paper 2008/5, 2008), http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2008-5.AlvarezKhamsi.pdf.
61. Saluka Inv. BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 296-308 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=105.
62. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 53, at 116, 485 (the in dubio pars mitio est sequenda or
in dubio mitius principle, means that since treaty commitments are a derogation of sovereignty, the in-
terpretation favouring a lesser obligation should be favoured).
63. Though the nature and meaning of these provisions is still disputed, see, e.g. Lorand Bartels,
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tribunals.64 Although in IIAs and FTAs with investment chapters there seems to be
no provision drafted in a DSU Article 3.2-similar fashion, the jurisdiction of arbi-
tral investment tribunals is limited and depends on the underlying dispute resolu-
65tion clause(s). Apparently, judicial activism in investment law has considerably
increased over the last decade.66 However, as it will be further discussed below,
taking into consideration developmental needs would mean to act with due respect
for the letter of the law. 67 A development-oriented interpretative approach, as in-
tended here, does not trespass in the territory of judicial activism or excess of
power.
B. The Interpretation of General Exceptions Provisions in the WTO Context
Discussing the state of the WTO as an institution and the challenges of a
globalized world on the occasion of the WTO tenth anniversary, the Sutherland
Report emphasized, "neither the WTO nor the GATT was ever an unrestrained free
trade charter." 68 WTO Members are allowed to promote and protect other impor-
tant societal values and interests, if certain conditions are met. 69 This is precisely
what general exceptions in the GATT and GATS were intended for.70 Moreover,
the promotion and protection of societal values comes at a certain price, which in
economic terms, can be compensated through the economic activity and welfare
generated by trade. 71 Sustainable development is a necessity, which encompasses
the legitimate objectives of GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV. The pro-
tection of human, animal, and plant life and health; the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources; and the protection of national treasures are just a few of the ob-
jectives which could be pursued to foster sustainable development. There are
some exceptions provisions in the GATT 1994 that explicitly have an economic
development rationale, 72 such as GATT Article XVIII:4 (the infant-industry-
protection exception) 73 and the Enabling Clause.
74
Nonetheless, GATT and GATS general exceptions clauses can also be in-
voked to pursue development-related policies. Although there are some differ-
Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, 35 J. WORLD TRADE L. 499, 499 (2001).
64. PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY: WORLD TRADE FORUM
(Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauv6 eds., 2013).
65. Christopher Schreuer, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 1
MCGILL J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
= 2520501.
66. THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME, EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS
19 (Josd E. Alvarez, et al. eds., 2011).
67. ROBERT HOWSE, THE WTO SYSTEM: LAW, POLITICS AND LEGITIMACY 49 (2007).
68. W.T.O. Rep. by the Consultative Bd. to the Dir.-Gen., The Future of the WTO: Addressing
Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium 39 (2004) (Peter Sutherland, et al.) [hereinafter Suth-
erland Report].
69. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 19, at 616.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 615.
72. Id. at 723.
73. GATT 1994, supra note 18, at art. XVIII 4.
74. Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Develop-
ing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 203 (1980).
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ences between the GATT Articles XX and GATS Article XIV, they have been of-
ten cross-referenced, 75 and many lessons can be learned from the respective case
law. 76 Both GATT and GATS cases have given panels and the Appellate Body the
opportunity to clarify the meaning and scope of general exceptions. Here, it is ar-
gued that when interpreting general exceptions, it is possible to specifically take
into consideration the development condition of the Member that adopted the
measure at issue, of the Members affected by that measure, and the developmental
impact of the measure(s). As further discussed below, this would be in line with
previous WTO case law. In this vein, some commentators have expressed the
view that the Appellate Body's decisions, with regard to development, have shifted
towards a more balanced approach to trade liberalization. 77 Others have empha-
sized the Appellate Body's difficulty in emancipating itself from a rigorous textual
approach toward a more holistic approach of treaty interpretation.
78
It is nonetheless worth noting that this latter view has been debated,79 while
the former seems to be based on a comparison of panels' decisions with Appellate
Body's decisions, and GATT 1947 cases with WTO cases. This does not signal a
real shift of the same adjudicatory body sensu stricto, and identifies alleged trends
by reference to highly disputed decisions, such as Tuna 1.80 Moreover, although the
Appellate Body's use of 'sustainable development' has been regarded as a way of
dealing with potential conflicts, apparently leading to the construction of a "subtle
doctrine of harmony," 81 this view characterizes the rather 'shy' position of the Ap-
pellate Body on sustainable development as a well-constructed explicit position.
Through WTO case law, panels and the Appellate Body have identified some
now well-established rules on the interpretation of general exceptions. The two-
75. Appellate Body Report, European Union - Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Mar-
keting of Seal Products, n. 1178, WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014) [herein-
after EC-Seal Products]; Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 7.759, WT/DS363/R
(Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter China-Publications and Audiovisual Products]; US-Gambling, supra note
53, 291.
76. See, e.g., VAN DEN BosSCHE, supra note 19, at 662-663 (giving specific regard to general
exceptions provisions chapeau). For these reasons, whenever a reference is made in this paper to GATT
Article XX, it is supporting the idea that the same holds true and applies to GATS Article XIV, and vice
versa, where possible and unless otherwise specified.
77. Padideh Ala'i, Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO Appellate
Body's Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalization, 14 AM. U INT'L L. REv. 1129,
(1999).
78. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the 'World Trade Court': Some Personal
Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE
605, 615 (2002); Frederico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US -
Gambling: A Critique, 9 J. Int'l Econ. L. 117 (2006).
79. Asif Qureshi, Interpreting WTO Agreements for the Development Objective 98 (ICTSD Re-
source paper No.5, 2003).
80. Panel Report, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (June 16, 1994) (not
adopted).
81. Gabrielle Marceau & Fabio Morosini, The Status of Sustainable Development in the Law of
the World Trade Organization,in ARBITRAGEM E COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL - ESTUDOS EM
HOMENAGEM A Lutz OLAvo BAPTISTA 60,61 (Umberto Celli Junior, et al. eds., 2013).
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tier test to be applied in the interpretation of general exceptions is among them.
Interpreting general exceptions clauses consists of a first step, where it is necessary
to examine whether the measure(s) at issue comes under one or another of the par-
ticular exceptions indicated in the subparagraphs of Article XX; and a second step,
where the measure(s) must be further appraised under the introductory clause of
Article XX. 82 The Appellate Body has confirmed this two-tier analysis for the in-
terpretation of GATS Article XIV.8 3 Accordingly, if one measure is inconsistent
with an obligation of the GATT 1994 or the GATS but falls within one of the sub-
paragraphs of GATT Article XX or GATS Article XIV, the way the measure is
applied must still be examined under the chapeau. 84 In fact, the chapeau of both
Articles requires that the measures at issue "are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade." 85 The analysis under the specific exceptions under GATT and GATS gen-
eral exceptions provisions subparagraphs has to be distinguished from the one un-
der the chapeau. 86 In particular, under general exceptions clauses, depending on
the interest or policy sought to be promoted or realized, a different kind or degree
of connection between the measure at issue and the interest or policy is required.87
As already observed, the GATT is not to be read in clinical isolation from public
international law. 88 Accordingly, GATT Article XX should be read in the light of
the Agreement's object and purpose; and the relationship between a general excep-
tions provision and other affirmative commitment provisions can be given meaning
within this general interpretative scheme only on a case-by-case basis, 89 depending
on the specific provisions breached in the first place.
It follows that the reading of general exceptions depends on the substantive
provisions violated in each case, on the affirmative commitments they set out, and
their specific relationship with the exceptions.9" This case law has positively dis-
tanced WTO adjudicatory bodies from the narrow interpretation originally favored
82. Appellate Body Report, Korea -Measures Affecting of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef 156
WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Jan. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Korea -Various Measures on
BeeA]; US-Gasoline, supra note 26, at 22; US-Shrimp,supra note 52, 119-21.
83. US-Gambling, supra note 53, 292. This is not to deny that some differences between the
two Articles exist, also with regard to the regulatory autonomy space left to Members under one or the
other, see Thomas Cottier, et al., Article XIV GATS: General Exceptions, in 6 MAX PLANCK
COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW, WTO - TRADE IN SERVICES 287 (Wolfrum R0diger, et al.,
eds. 2008).
84. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
215, WT/D332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil -Retreaded Tyres].
85. GATT, supra note 18, at art. XX. See also GATS, supra note 18, at art. XIV.
86. US -Gasoline, supra note 26, at 22.
87. Id. at 18 (stating that "it does not seem reasonable to suppose that WTO Members intended to
require, in respect of each and every category, the same kind or degree of connection or relationship
between the measure under appraisal and the state interest or policy sought to be promoted or real-
ized.").
88. Id. at 17-18.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id.
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by some panels. In Indonesia-Autos, the Panel, after stressing that the fundamen-
tal objective and purpose of the WTO system is trade liberalization, stated that un-
der the WTO system waivers and exceptions have to be interpreted narrowly. 91 To
support its general statement, the panel quoted substantial case law in the same di-
rection. 92 To the contrary, one should avoid fixed interpretations, elaborated a pri-
ori on the 'one size fits for all' principle. By implication, one can assert that an
agreement's object and purpose, as identified in the agreement's preamble, is to be
distinguished from general exceptions clauses and has to be regarded as adding to
it, rather than already implicitly incorporated in it. The Appellate Body has given
a consistent interpretation of general exceptions provisions. The exceptions recog-
nized in Article XX of GATT 1994 embody domestic policies recognized as im-
portant and legitimate in character. 9 3 In U.S.-Shrimp, recalling that there are some
binding principles of interpretation that panels should abide by,94 the Appellate
Body emphasized that GATT Article XX (g) must be read "in the light of contem-
porary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation
of the environment," a legitimate goal of national and international policy, together
with the objective of sustainable development, which is acknowledged in the Pre-
amble of the WTO Agreement and informs the GATT 1994 and other covered
agreements. 95 In U.S.-Gambling, the Appellate Body found that Members are not
required to negotiate with other affected Members because negotiation is a process
and not a reasonable alternative measure per se. 96 However, here, the Appellate
Body was discussing the panel's position on the need for Members to negotiate
with specific regard to GATS Article XIV(a) public morals and public order ex-
ception, not under the chapeau, as it had done in U.S.-Shrimp.97 The Appellate
Body found that it is for the responding party to show that the measure is necessary
to achieve objectives relating to public morals and public order.98
However, a Member need not identify the universe of less trade-restrictive al-
ternative measures and then show that none of those measures achieves the desired
objective.99 A measure generally is not "reasonably available" if the Member is
not capable of taking it or, due for instance to prohibitive costs or substantive tech-
91. Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 5.237-
5.238, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, (July 23, 1998) [hereinafter Indonesia-
Autos].
92. Panel Report, United States - Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from
Canada, 4.4, DS7/R (July 11, 1991) GATT B.I.S.D. (38th Supp.) (provisions that constitute "an ex-
ception to basic principles of the General Agreement had to be interpreted narrowly."); Panel Report,
Norway - Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment, 4.5, GPR DS2/R (May 13, 1992) ("Since Arti-
cle V: 16(3) [of the Government Procurement Agreement] was an exceptions provision, its scope had to
be interpreted narrowly"); Canada-Restrictions on Ice Cream, supra note 56, 59 (the panel "noted, as
had previous panels, that exceptions were to be narrowly interpreted").
93. US-Shrimp, supra note 52, 121.
94. Id.
95. Id. 129.
96. US-Gambling, supra note 53, 317.
97. Id.
98. Id. 309.
99. Id.
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nical difficulties, if the measure imposes an undue burden on that Member. 100 Pro-
hibitive costs, substantive technical difficulties, or the burden imposed by a meas-
ure implicitly push toward the consideration of the developmental status of a WTO
Member. It does not amount nonetheless to an explicit consideration of this status
and the related problems that its entails. Further, in Korea-Various Measures on
Beef with regard to GATT Article XX(d), the Appellate Body found that the more
vital or important the common interests or values pursued are, the easier it would
be to accept as "necessary" a measure designed as an enforcement instrument.
10 1
To determine whether a measure, which is not indispensable, is still necessary un-
der Article XX(d), a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors has to be
conducted in every case. 102 Here again, developmental goals could be or could en-
compass vital and important common interests or values that a state might pursue
according to the Appellate Body's interpretation. 10 3 Also, a WTO Member's de-
velopmental status could be one of the factors to be taken into account to under-
stand whether a non-indispensable measure is still necessary. Nevertheless, this
does not amount to an explicit recognition of sustainable development as a com-
mon interest and value pursued nor as an element to be necessarily factored in un-
der a GATT Article XX assessment.
In light of the considerations above, the developmental condition of a WTO
member and the bearing of the measure at issue could gain an explicit standing as
elements to be taken into account once an assessment under a general exceptions
clause is made. The interpretation given to the chapeau of GATT Article XX and
GATS Article XIV seems to move along similar lines of general exceptions provi-
sions subparagraphs. The chapeau embodies WTO Members' recognition of the
need to maintain a balance between Members' rights and obligations. 10 4 A balance
between Members' rights and obligations depending on the measure at stake and
the facts of the case has to be struck, without rendering Members' right to invoke
exceptions imaginary. 0 5 In U.S.-Shrimp, after finding that the measure at issue
was justified under GATT Article XX(g), the Appellate Body examined it under
the chapeau. 10 6 It found that the language of the GATT Preamble must add color,
texture, and shading to the interpretation of the covered agreements. 10 7 The Appel-
late Body also referred to the Decision of Ministers at Marrakesh to Establish a
Permanent Committee on Trade and Environment,10 8 as a development that oc-
curred and which helped elucidate the objectives of the WTO Members. In this
way, the need to pay attention to the dynamic and evolutionary relationship be-
tween trade and environmental objectives was explicitly recognized.
100. Id. 308.
101. Korea -Various Measures on Beef supra note 82.
102. Id. T 164.
103. Id. 162.
104. US-Shrimp, supra note 52, 156.
105. Id. 7 156, 159.
106. Id. 146.
107. Id. 153.
108. Id. 154.
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By the same token, although still not tested, a similar analysis could be ap-
plied with regard to other sustainable development objectives. For instance, the
GATT Preamble also adds color, texture, and shading to other GATT Article XX
subparagraphs; and, as already clarified, sustainable development is one of the
WTO Members' objectives. Thus, an adjudicatory body has to give the right
weight to the developmental objectives and developmental status of the Member(s)
concerned, while also bearing in mind the changing relationship between trade and
developmental objectives. Further, when examining whether a measure was an
"arbitrary discrimination," the Appellate Body found that the chapeau mandates a
Member adopting the measure under appraisal to take into consideration different
conditions which may occur in the territories of the Members affected by the
measure.' 0 9 The chapeau explicitly refers to "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion between countries where the same conditions prevail."' 10 These conditions
might include the developmental status of the Member(s) affected by the measure
at issue. Reference to the impact of the measure on the developmental condition of
both the Member adopting it and the Member(s) affected might also lead to a mar-
ket- or sector-specific examination. A developing country might for instance be
extremely strong in some sectors, while weak in others. Also, the prevailing con-
ditions do not necessarily require a state-to-state comparison: they could refer to
conditions prevailing in specific regions or industries/ sectors.
Such an approach might deliver better results in terms of tailored solutions for
developmental concerns. The U.S.-Shrimp case shows how a developmental
measure, in a globalized and interconnected world, where the territorial nature of
certain measures is relative, could be taken by a developed country such as the
United States, and still benefit or impair developing and least-developed countries'
interests. The Appellate Body highlighted the need to negotiate a suitable alterna-
tive solution or to try to do it with other Members,' 11 which seems to implicitly
impose on the Member adopting the measure to consider other Members' positions
and the impact of the measure on their conditions. It remains to be seen whether
the need to negotiate with other WTO members is necessary for a measure to be
justified under a general exceptions provision or if it simply was an element identi-
fied by the Appellate Body based on the specific facts of the case. In any case, the
special consideration of WTO Members' developmental status or of a measure de-
velopmental impact would be no stranger to the multilateral trading system. For
instance, Member States should already give special attention to developing coun-
try Members' problems and interests during consultations, 1 12 and panels indicate in
their reports the way in which they took account of special and differential treat-
ment provisions.1 3 In the chapeau analysis, for a measure not to be an "unjustifi-
able" discrimination, a Member has to defend or convincingly explain the rationale
109. Id. 165.
110. Id. 120.
111. Id. 168-70.
112. DSU, supra note 15, art. 4.10.
113. Id. art 12.11.
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for any discrimination in the application of the measure. 114 Consequently, the
measure is an "unjustifiable" discrimination when it does not relate to the pursuit
of or goes against the objective that it was provisionally found to legitimately pur-
sue under a paragraph of GATT Article XX." 5 In this vein, "arbitrary discrimina-
tion," "unjustifiable discrimination," and "disguised restriction" might be read
side-by-side." 6 A measure is specifically a "disguised restriction" if its compli-
ance with a paragraph of a general exceptions clause is in fact a disguise to conceal
the pursuit of trade-restrictive objectives."1 The design of the measure, its archi-
tecture, and revealing structure are all elements disclosing whether there has been a
"protective application" of the measure."I 8 Hence, it is difficult to see how one
could test a measure under the chapeau without evaluating the general situation of
the Member adopting the measure at issue, of the Members affected by it, and the
result of the application of the measure, which relates also to its developmental
impact. Also, one should not forget that the characterization that a Member gives
to its own measure is not decisive. 1
9
C. General Exceptions Provisions in International Investment Agreements
International trade law and investment law have been characterized by a high
degree of osmosis. Legal concepts and legal reasoning have passed from one field
to the other. The Most Favored Nation ("MFN") treatment obligation, which was
first included in treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation in the realm of
trade and has later gained currency in investment law,' 20 is just one of many possi-
ble examples. Investment tribunals have proven to be open to persuasion based on
legal reasoning developed in GATT and WTO case law. 12 1 The Appellate Body
has rarely made reference to investment tribunals in support of its reasoning.1
22
The historical and conceptual links between trade and investment have made it
114. Panel Report, Brazil -Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 7.260, WT/DS332/R
(June 12, 2007).
115. Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, supra note 84.
116. US- Gasoline, supra note 26.
117. Panel Report, European Communities -Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Contain-
ing Products, 8.236, WT/DS135/R (Sep. 18, 2000).
118. Id.
119. Indonesia-Autos, supra note 91, 14.91.
120. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2010, Most-Favored-Nation Treat-
ment, at 9-12, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA (2010), http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia2010 l-en.pdf.
121. Methanex Corp. v. United States, ICSID, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and
Merits, 6 (Aug. 3, 2005) (where the Tribunal stated that whilst interpretations given in the context of
the GATT are not binding precedent, "the Tribunal may remain open to persuasion based on legal rea-
soning developed in GATT and WTO jurisprudence, if relevant." This case has been nonetheless re-
garded as a case where investment tribunals have been reluctant to rely on WTO case law in the inter-
pretation of specific investment obligations, see ANDREW NEWCOMBE,_General Exceptions in
International Investment Agreements, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW
351, 364 (Marie-Clair Cordonnier Segger, et al. eds., 2011).
122. Appellate Body Report, United States - Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel
from Mexico, at 67 n.313, WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted May 20, 2008) [herein after US-Stainless Steel
from Mexico].
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easy for investment tribunals to turn to trade case law to interpret investment trea-
ties. 23 In this context, GATT and GATS-style general clauses are among those
legal provisions borrowed by IIAs and FTAs with investment chapters. 2 4 Some
scholars have estimated that around twenty-five to thirty current IIAs contain
GATT and GATS-like general exceptions. 125 General exceptions applicable to in-
vestment appear to be more often included in FTAs with investment chapters.
1 26
As for their drafting, these general exceptions provisions vary significantly: for in-
stance, Article 95 of the Switzerland-Japan Free Trade Agreement and Economic
Partnership Agreement "incorporates" and "makes part of the Agreement," mutatis
mutandis, Articles XIV and XIVbis of the GATS; 127 while Article 22.1(3) of the
2014 Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement adopts almost the same language of
GATS Article XIV, with some slight changes. 128 Some commentators have identi-
fied four different approaches to the inclusion of general exceptions provisions in
HAs. 129  However, one should be careful in classifying other types of clauses
aimed at promoting some limited legitimate interests such as the environment or
cultural and linguistic diversity and public order exception clauses1 30 as some form
of general exception clauses, due to their structural diversity.
The introduction of general exceptions provisions in the realm of investment
law has bestowed mixed blessings. Some scholars have argued that the inclusion
of general exceptions clauses in IIAs and FTAs will not have much practical sig-
nificance.1 31 Some have even gone so far as to qualify their application to invest-
123. Robert Howse & Efraim Chalamish, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbi-
tration: A Reply to Jurgen Kurtz, 20 EUR. J. INT'L. L.1087 (2009),
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/4/1087. full.
124. See e.g. Framework Agreement of the ASEAN Investment Area art. 13 (Oct. 7, 1998),
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1998%2OFramework%2OAgreement%20on%20the%20ASEAN%2Olnvestm
ent%20Area-pdf.pdf; Canadian Model BIT art. 10, 2004, http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-
FIPA-model-en.pdf; Norway Draft Model BIT art. 24 (Draft Version 191207, 2007),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ital031 .pdf (now shelved); Damon Vis-Dunbar, Nor-
way Shelves its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (June 8, 2009),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/06/08/norway-shelves-its-proposed-model-bilateral-investment-treaty/;
Free Trade Agreement, Kor.-Austl. art. 22, Dec. 12, 2014,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/kafta/official-documents/Pages/chapter-22-general-
provisions-and-exceptions.aspx; Investment Treaty, Jordan-Sing. art. 18, May 16, 2004,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1755.
125. NEWCOMBE, supra note 121, at 358.
126. Id. at 359.
127. Agreement on Free Trade and Economic Partnership, Japan-Switz., Feb. 19, 2009,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/switzerland/epa0902/agreement.pdf.
128. Free Trade Agreement, Kor.-Austl., Dec. 12, 2014,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/kafta/official-documents/Pages/chapter-22-general-
provisions-and-exceptions.aspx.
129. Barton Legum & oana Pectulescu, GAT Article XX and International Investment Law, in
PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 340, 344-48 (Roberto Echandi & Pierre
Suavd eds., 2013).
130. Id. at347-48.
131. Id. at 351-52; NEWCOMBE, supra note 121, at 351.
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ment as a "potentially risky policy."' 32 Conversely, other academics, while spe-
cifically addressing public health measures and cautioning that general exceptions
are not a "magic bullet" defense against investors' claims, have judged their inclu-
sion as a promising step for the limitation of investment protection. 33 Although
the scope and interpretation of general exceptions in investment law is still un-
clear,' 34 the idea of a positive impact in terms of enhanced public policy space for
host states is not to be ignored. This is even more so if one anticipates that the in-
terpretation of general exceptions in the WTO context will likely affect the inter-
pretation of general exceptions and (even) of other types of exceptions in invest-
ment law. The inclusions of general exceptions in HAs and FTAs with investment
chapters reasonably carry with them the interpretations provided by panels and the
Appellate Body in their reports, which constitute the GATT acquis and create le-
gitimate expectations among WTO Members. 3  This is not to deny that general
exceptions provisions need adaptation to the investment reality. Due to the spe-
cific circumstances of a case or to other factors, an investment tribunal could well
decide to distance itself from the interpretation of general exceptions given at the
WTO. In this latter case, the investment tribunal would likely have to detail the
reasons on which its position is based, a general obligation of investment tribu-
nals 136 and even more so in the case of a substantive body of case law on general
exceptions, although elaborated in the different context of the WTO.
Thus, in the investment law context there is space to elaborate and further ad-
vance the interpretative solutions which have been touched upon at the WTO. In
their interpretation of general exceptions articles, investment tribunals have the
opportunity to accord due weight to the developmental needs and concerns of the
host state and the developmental impact of the measure at issue. The more rele-
vant the developmental condition or interest addressed, the more the tribunal has to
be careful in its analysis. No obstacle prevents the adoption of adevelopment-
oriented interpretation of general exceptions clauses in the investment realm. The
economic underpinning of trade and investment has already provided fertile
ground for some convergence in the interpretation of trade and investment legal
132. C61ine L~vesque, The Inclusion of GATT Article XX Exceptions in 11As: A Potentially Risky
Policy, in PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY363, 363-70 (Roberto Echandi
& Pierre Suavd eds., 2013).
133. Bryan Mercurio, International Investment Agreements and Public Health: Neutralizing a
Threat Through Treaty Drafting, WORLD HEALTH ORG. BULL, 520, 522 (2014),
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/92/7/13-130955.pdf.
134. Simon Lester, Improving Investment Treaties Through General Exceptions Provisions: The
Australian Example, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (May 14, 2014),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/05/14/improving-investment-treaties-through-general-exceptions-
provisions-the-australian-example/; NEWCOMBE, supra note 121, at 369.
135. US-Stainless Steel from Mexico, supra note 122, 158-160; Appellate Body Report, Japan -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS1O/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1,
1996) [hereinafter Japan-Alcoholic Beverages].
136. For instance, the failure of the award to state the reasons on which it is based is one of the
grounds on which either party of an investment arbitral proceedings may request annulment of the
award under Article 52 (1) (e) of the ICSID Convention.
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instruments. 137 In this vein, the inclusion of general exceptions provisions in the
investment domain might even reveal a quest for greater coherence between trade
and investment law. The recent litigation of the Tobacco Plain Packaging cases
against Australia in differentfora, 138 or the Softwood Lumber controversy between
the United States and Canada involving trade disputes, investment arbitration, and
domestic litigation, 139 has showed how the two regimes can be entangled. Framing
exceptions provisions in the language of GATT and GATS general exceptions
could signal that the investment discipline in IIAs and FTAs has been devised to
coexist with the relevant trade rules under WTO Agreements. 140  Indeed, there
have been some cases such as the GATT Canada-FIRA case or Methanex v.
U.S.A., 14 1 where trade and investment issues were emerging in front of one and the
same adjudicatory body. This is not to disregard the fact that, since trade and in-
vestment are different, they are regulated in different ways. 4 2 It is true that the
two regimes promote at time different interests and this could entail the need of
somewhat different legal reasoning and logic. 14 3 Nonetheless, with all due adjust-
ments, panels and the Appellate Body's interpretative approach to general excep-
tions clauses might deliver positive, concrete results in investment law.
It has been already briefly mentioned that doubts have been expressed about
the inclusion of general exceptions provisions in IIAs and FTAs with an invest-
ment chapter. 144 This skepticism has been based on the position of some invest-
ment tribunals which, in the absence of express general exceptions to investment
137. Giorgio Sacerdoti, Trade and Investment Law: Institutional Differences and Substantive Simi-
larities, 9 JRSLM. REV. LEGAL STUD 1, 1 (2014).
138. See generally Australia - Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indica-
tions and other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, Request
for Consultations by Indonesia, WT/DS467/1 (Sep. 25, 2013); Australia - Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging, Consultations by Dominical Republic, WT/DS441/1 (July 23, 2012); Australia
- Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and other Plain Packaging Re-
quirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by
Honduras, WT/DS435/16 (Oct. 17, 2012); Australia - Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and
other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, Request for Con-
sultation by Ukraine, WT/DS434/1 (Mar. 15, 2012); Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of
Austl. PCA Case No. 2012-12 (the case also has been litigated in Australian courts).
139. See Leonila Guglya, The Interplay of International Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The
Softwood Lumber Controversy, 2 J. INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 175,175 (2011).
140. This was apparently the argument used by Alejandro Jara, WTO former Deputy Director-
General at the time, when he held a meeting with World Health Organization officials in October 2009,
to convince them include in the text they were drafting on non-communicable diseases to incorporate
terms related to GATT general exceptions, with a view to avoid potential challenges and incoherence
with the multilateral trading system. CRAIG VANGRASSTEK, THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION 174 (2013).
141. Panel Report, Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, 1.3, L/5504
(Feb 7, 1984) GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.).
142. Nicholas Di Mascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Non-discrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties:
Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J.INT'L L. 48, 48 (Jan. 2008).
143. Howse & Chalamish, supra note 123, at 1090.
144. Id. at 17-8.
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obligations, have apparently considered public policy space as already inherent in
substantive provisions and thus have implied them. 145 Further, since general ex-
ceptions clauses provide a closed list of legitimate policy objectives, the unin-
tended consequence of their inclusion in IIAs and FTAs might be a limitation of
the range of legitimate objectives available to states. 146 The overall result could
allegedly be that investment tribunals interpret general exceptions provisions as
providing less regulatory flexibility than the one provided by IlAs and FTAs with
investment chapters which do not contain similar exception clauses.147 Investment
tribunals have indeed expressed the view that some policy space for states to pur-
sue legitimate objectives is already inherent, for instance, in national treatment ob-
ligations. 148 Others have even made reference to GATT 1947 case law to support
the view that exceptions should be interpreted narrowly. 
149
Though these arbitral decisions are relevant, they have been taken in the ab-
sence of general exceptions provisions in the relevant agreements. With their
presence, an investment tribunal should distinguish and separate an exception pro-
vision from a breached affirmative-commitment provision. This approach would
be respectful of the customary rules of treaty interpretation. In fact, one should not
confuse the question of whether a violation of a substantive rule exists with the
separate one of whether the inconsistency is nevertheless justified. 150 To do oth-
erwise would result in the reduction of whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to
redundancy or inutility. 151 Conversely, all treaty provisions should be interpreted
with a view to make them legally effective, 152 including general exceptions provi-
sions. Moreover, the inclusion of general exceptions provisions might be a general
signal that states wish to retain more power to pursue public policy goals. In this
sense, an exception provision is to be distinguished and held separate from other
affirmative commitment provisions. In China-Raw Material, the Appellate Body
confirmed the necessity to hold this distinction. It found that contrary to China's
argument, China could not invoke Article XX of the GATT 1994, which had to be
regarded as a separate and distinct provision, since in a given paragraph of China's
Accession Protocol to the WTO there was only a reference to a specific Article of
the GATT 1994, without mentioning any of its other provisions. 53 The compari-
145. NEWCOMBE, supra note 121, at 357.
146. Id. at 356.
147. Id.
148. See e.g. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Can.Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 78 (Apr. 10 , 2001);
GAMI Investments Inc. v. Gov't of the United Mexican States, Final Award, 114 (Nov. 15, 2004).
149. Canfor Corp. v. United States & Terminal Forest Prods. Ltd. v. United States, Decision on
Preliminary Question, 7 187(June 6, 2006) (referring to Report of the Panel, Canada - Import Restric-
tions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, 59, L/6568-36S/68 (Dec. 5, 1989)).
150. US-Gasoline, supra note 82, at 23.
151. Id.
152. Appellate Body Report, United States- Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology, 268, WT/DS350/AB/R (adopted Feb. 19, 2009) [hereinafter US-Continued Zeroing].
153. Appellate Body Report, China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Mate-
rials, 7 288-291, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/398/AB/R (adopted Feb. 22, 2012) [here-
inafter China Raw Materials].
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son of the language of different provisions of China's Accession Protocol strength-
ened this conclusion. 154 Hence, although the inclusion of general exceptions provi-
sions could not lead as far as making it overlap with affirmative-commitment pro-
visions, it could very well mold the reading of the overall agreement and help
determine the balance of rights and obligations sought in its negotiation.
Some academics have added to the second, already mentioned line of criti-
cism (the one pointing out that general exceptions provide with a limited range of
legitimate objectives) that the chapeau would pose a very high threshold for meas-
ures to be justified. 55 On the one hand, general exceptions are qualified as general
precisely due to the wide range of interest or values that states are allowed to pur-
sue in comparison to other types of exceptions. Thus, the alternative view, that no
list is better than a limited list of legitimate objectives, has to be rejected for the
reasons above. On the other hand, it is worth remarking that so far there seems to
be no conclusive evidence that interpretation provided by investment tribunals
generally, with regard to exceptions, is more balanced and less strict than the one
provided by panels and the Appellate Body. To the contrary, there are examples of
investment tribunals which have adopted narrow interpretations of exceptions.' 56
This restrictive interpretation is sometimes premised on the idea that any uncer-
tainty on treaty interpretation should be resolved favoring the protection of covered
investments.157 For instance, the protection of foreign investment has been identi-
fied as the only object and purpose of the 1991 Argentina-U.S. BIT.' This argu-
ment appears overly centered on the alleged position of the United States during
negotiation, disregarding that a treaty is the result of the will and expectations of
all its parties and completely diminishes the recognition of economic development,
of the need to effectively use economic resources and to respect workers' rights in
the Preamble of that specific Treaty.' 59
WTO panels and the Appellate Body interpretation of general exceptions have
already proven influential in the investment treaty system with regard to the inter-
pretation of exceptions. In Continental Casualty v. Argentina,16 the investment
arbitral tribunal relied on the method used to interpret GATT general exceptions in
the WTO context to interpret the exception contained in Article XI of the 1991
U.S.-Argentina BIT. 161 Eventually, the Tribunal adopted, only in part, a WTO-like
approach, since it started its analysis of the exception in the relevant BIT without a
154. Id. at 291.
155. L~vesque, supra note 132, at 365; NEWCOMBE, supra note 121, at 358.
156. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, supra note 58, at 317; Enron Corp.
& Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 331 (May 22, 2007),.
157. Soci6td Gdndrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6,
Objections to Jurisdiction, 116 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005).
158. Alvarez, et al, supra note 66, at 80-81.
159. Id.
160. Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, CISD Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 192
(Sep. 5, 2008).
161. See generally Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ment, U.S. - Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/documents/organization/43475.pdf.
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prior analysis of whether any obligation under the BIT had been breached. 6 2 This
decision has raised criticism and praise at the same time. It has been criticized for
its alleged shallow analysis of the reasons to adopt a GATT Article XX-like analy-
sis and for the rejection of the customary rule of state of necessity professedly re-
flected in Article XI of the BIT.163 It has been praised for its approach on excep-
tions and its use of the proportionality method.1
64
The Annulment Committee in Continental Casualty v. Argentina dismissed in
its entirety the application for annulment of Continental Casualty Company (and of
Argentina). 165 It is worth stressing that in the annulment proceedings, Continental
itself quoted WTO case law, among other cases of international tribunals, to sup-
port its view that exception provisions cannot continue to justify breaches of a
treaty commitment when the required situation or condition for the justification
under the exception no longer exists. 166 Continental then challenged the tribunal's
characterization of Article XI of the BIT in light of GATT Article XX. 167 The An-
nulment Committee considered: that the claimant had relied on the award in CMS
v. Argentina, which had been subsequently annulled; 168 the reasons for the Tribu-
nal rejected certain parties' arguments were implicit in the considerations and con-
clusions contained in the award; 169 and that, although Continental argued that the
Tribunal had erred in its analysis of the law of the GATT-WTO, the Tribunal
was clearly not purporting to apply that body of law, but merely took it
into account as relevant to determining the correct interpretation and ap-
plication of Article XI of the BIT. Even if it could be established by
Continental that the Tribunal reached an erroneous interpretation of Ar-
ticle XI of the BIT based on an erroneous understanding of GATT-
WTO law, that would amount only to an error of law, which is not a
ground of annulment... 170
A thorough discussion of the Continental Casualty v. Argentina case is be-
yond the scope of this paper. Here, it is sufficient to stress the potential relevance
of WTO case law on general exceptions for the interpretation of non-general ex-
ceptions provisions in international investment law. In S.D. Myers v. Canada,'7 1
the Tribunal extensively referred to GATT case law in order to clarify the meaning
162. Continental Casualty Co.y v. Argentine Republic, supra note 160, 160 -61.
163. Jose E. Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Continental Casualty v.
Argentina, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2010 - 2011 319, 319-21
(2012).
164. Alec Stone Sweet, Investor - State Arbitration: Proportionality's New Frontier, 4 L. &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 47, 76 (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=1569412.
165. Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/09, Application for
Partial Annulment of continental Casualty Company & the Application for Partial Annulment of the
Argentine Republic, 114 (Sep. 16 2011).
166. Id. 108(a).
167. Id. 108(h).
168. Id. 127.
169. Id. 131.
170. Id. 133.
171. S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award, (Nov. 13, 2000).
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of the expression "in like circumstances" of NAFTA Article 1102 national treat-
ment provision, 172 and to reach the conclusion that all provisions of NAFTA are
complementary. 1
73
However, as in Continental Casualty v. Argentina, the S.D. Myers v. Canada
tribunal did not fully embrace a WTO-like reasoning. The Tribunal, when examin-
ing whether the national treatment obligation has been violated, considered that "a
prima facie finding of discrimination in 'like' cases often takes place within the
overall GATT framework, which includes Article XX (General Exceptions). A
finding of 'likeness' does not dispose of the case," since GATT Article XX might
justify the measure which could pursue a legitimate public policy.' 74 It is true that
the presence of a general exceptions provision in a given agreement has an impact
on the overall reading and interpretation of the agreement. However, the Tribunal
here did not seem to reckon that general exceptions provisions come into play only
once a violation of another legal provision has been found to exist. The general
exceptions provision makes the measure at issue consistent with the Agreement,
including with the specific provision, violated in the first instance. 175 Further, the
Appellate Body has clarified that the standard for a finding of discrimination under
the chapeau of GATT Article XX is not the same of other substantive rules of the
General Agreement. 176 These cases confirm that investment tribunals make use of
WTO law and legal reasoning. This use might be a selective one, but it could be a
way to adapt WTO law to the investment treaty system.
D. Practical Consequences of General Exceptions Provisions in Investment
Law
The practical implications of the inclusion of general exceptions provisions in
the investment realm are not to be underestimated. A common obligation of host
states is the National Treatment obligation. Generally speaking, National Treat-
ment obligations oblige states to accord foreign investors who are nationals of the
other state parties to the specific agreement treatment no less favorable than the
one they accord, in like circumstances, to their own investors. 177 Doubts have been
expressed, for instance, on the effect of general exceptions provisions on invest-
ment tribunals' interpretation of the National Treatment obligation contained in
Article 1102 of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). 78 It is
172. Id. 243-51.
173. Id. 291-94.
174. Id. 246.
175. Id. 267.
176. U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 26, at 23.
177. Rudolf Dolzer, National Treatment: New Developments, Symposium Co-Organized by
ICSID, OECD and UNCTAD, Making the Most of International Investment Agreements: A Common
Agenda, (Dec. 12, 2005),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/intemationalinvestmentagreements/36055356.pdf.
178. L~vesque, supra note 132, at 364-67; Article 1102 of the NAFTA reads as follows:
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that
it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, ac-
quisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of in-
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certainly true that Tribunals have built in the National Treatment provision a space
for governments to pursue legitimate public policy goals.1 79 Even though invest-
ment tribunals have built in this policy space without there being a closed list of
legitimate objectives or a chapeau such as the one of a general exceptions provi-
sion, 180 the interpreter is always constrained by the text, context, and object and
purpose of a given treaty. Since an affirmative commitment provision and a gen-
eral exceptions clause have to be distinguished, the inclusion of the latter in a
treaty might well enlarge this space rather than restrict it.
Perhaps more significantly, there could be measures which, although dis-
criminatory and in violation of a National Treatment obligation, might be "neces-
sary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with
the provisions" of a given Agreement. 18' This specific exception "is susceptible of
application in respect of wide variety of 'laws and regulations' to be enforced,"'
182
thus allowing a significant enlargement of the list of legitimate objectives that a
state might pursue under a general exceptions provision. Hence, a measure might
be in violation of a national treatment obligation,' 83 but could still be justified un-
der this specific exception. This could be for instance the case under Article 10(b)
of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT, where such a measure could be necessary to
comply with laws or regulations adopted with a wider sustainable development ob-
jective.
Another very common provision in IlAs and FTAs with investment chapters
is the fair and equitable treatment obligation. Different formulations and ap-
proaches of the fair and equitable treatment obligation have been adopted in in-
vestments.
2. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment no less fa-
vorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of its own investors with
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and
sale or other disposition of investments.
3. The treatment accorded by a Party under paragraphs I and 2 means, with respect to a state
or province, treatment no less favorable than the most favorable treatment accorded, in like
circumstances, by that state or province to investors, and to investments of investors, of the
Party of which it forms a part.
4. For greater certainty, no Party may:
(a) impose on an investor of another Party a requirement that a minimum level of equity in
an enterprise in the territory of the Party be held by its nationals, other than nominal qualify-
ing shares for directors or incorporators of corporations; or
(b) require an investor of another Party, by reason of its nationality, to sell or otherwise dis-
pose of an investment in the territory of the Party.
North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1102, Dec. 17, 1992.
179. E.g., GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Government of the United Mexican States, Final Award,
114 (Nov. 15, 2004); Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 170, 182 (Dec.
16,2002).
180. Lvesque, supra note 132, at 366.
181. GATT, supra note 18, art. XX(d); see also GATS, supra note 18, art. XIV(c).
182. Korea-Various Measures on Beef supra note 82, 162.
183. See Report of the Panel, Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef
WT/DS 161 /R (July 31, 2000) (although in the end the Panel did not find the measures at issue to be
justified under Article XX (d) of the GATT 1994).
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vestment treaties. Without taking any position on whether a measure in violation
of the fair and equitable standard would necessarily be arbitrary under a general
exceptions provision chapeau,' 8 4 it seems relevant to highlight that this standard
has been regarded as intentionally made up of vague terms. 8 5 Indeed, it would
grant adjudicators a quasi-legislative authority to enunciate rules necessary to
achieve a treaty's object and purpose in a specific dispute.18 6 Some investment tri-
bunals have included in this standard foreign investors' legitimate expectations for
a stable legal and business framework for investment' 8 7 and even protection
against general and nationality-based discrimination.' 88 As noted by some in re-
spect of investors' legitimate expectations,' 89 there could be measures which vio-
late foreign investors' legitimate expectations, but which still could be applied in
an arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory manner and thus be justified under a
general exceptions provision. This could hold equally true in the case of measure
which generally discriminate among foreign investors.
The full protection and security (or "most constant protection and secu-
rity")190 standard is also often included in investment treaties. Some investment
tribunals have extended this standard of treatment beyond the duty to ensure physi-
cal security and protection from private parties and the host state and its organs'
actions. 91 Apparently, this standard does not require the host state to provide ab-
solute protection to the foreign investment, 192 but rather to exercise due diligence
in discharging its duty (as opposed to a strict liability standard). 193 Some arbitral
tribunals have stressed that the liability of the host state on the basis of its full pro-
tection and security standard obligation depends on the host state's resources. i 94
184. For a clear position on this issue see Legum & Pectulescu, supra note 129, at 355.
185. Charles H. Brower, Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 66 (2003).
186. Id.
187. See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 154 (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter Tecmed S.A.]; Occidental Exploration and
Production Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Case No. UN 3467, Final Award, T 196 (July
1, 2004); PSEG Global, Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, 7 240, 253
(Jan. 19, 2007).
188. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID, Award, 542, 232-33 n. 1087 (June 8,
2009).
189. Legum & Pectulescu, supra note 129, at 356.
190. Eg., Energy Charter Treaty art. 10(1), Apr. 16, 1998, OJ L 69.
191. Extending for instance to "security and legal protection," CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The
Czech Republic, Partial Award, T 613 (Sept. 13, 2001); to a State's obligation to guarantee "stability in
a secure environment, both physical, commercial and legal," Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United
Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 729 (July 24, 2008); and to the duty for
the state to have a "functioning system of courts and legal remedies available to the investor," Frontier
Petroleum Services Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, Final Award, 273 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010).
192. Legum & Pectulescu, supra note 129, at 356(quoting RUDOLF DOLZER& CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 149 (2008)).
193. Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd., supra note 191, 270; Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1 1, Award, 7 164 (Oct. 12, 2005).
194. Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21,
Award, 77 71-84, (July 30, 2009).
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Although this appears a sound interpretative stance, there seems to be no authority
indicating that in a case where no violence is involved, a relative liability standard
would be applied.1 95 The consequence is that although relative, the degree of dili-
gence imposed on the host state is still a high one and might prove disproportionate
to the developing condition of the host state. 19 6 It should therefore not be excluded
that a development-oriented interpretation of a general exceptions provision might
still justify a measure which does not meet a, reasonable but yet high, full protec-
tion and security standard.
Finally, the inclusion of general exceptions provisions in the investment realm
might have some relevance for regulatory actions and expropriations as well. It
has been contended that general exceptions provisions will not add much to the
analysis of compensation for expropriation, unless they are regarded as a codifica-
tion of customary international law on the matter.' 97 Although one can assert that
general exceptions provisions do not codify any customary law rule on the exclu-
sion of compensation in the case of expropriation, 198 some deeper reflections are
much needed. Investment tribunals have adopted different attitudes on the issue of
the compensation to be paid in case of regulatory measures affecting investment
covered by a given treaty. Some arbitral tribunals have excluded compensation
where the regulatory measures had been taken for a public purpose and in accor-
dance with due process, unless other specific conditions subsisted. 199 Others have
deemed that the public purpose of a regulatory measure does not affect its qualifi-
cation as an expropriation and the right to compensation of the investor.200 As in-
dicated above, one could see the inclusion of general exceptions clauses in IAs
and FTAs as a call for investment tribunals to be moderated when faced with a
public policy measure, something that even those expressing doubts have recog-
nized.2° '
Although a measure could be justified under a general exceptions provision,
with the consequence of its legitimacy under a given treaty, all modem investment
treaties address preconditions and, more importantly, consequences of expropria-
tion.202 As a result, normally compensation has to be paid in the case of expropria-
195. Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd., supra note 191, 271.
196. Mahnaz Malik, The Full Protection and Security Standard Comes ofAge: Yet Another Chal-
lenge for States in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, International Institute for Sustainable Development
Best Practices Series, 5 (Nov. 2011), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/201 1/fullprotection.pdf.
197. Legum & Pectulescu, supra note 129, at 362.
198. Lvesque, supra note 132, at 367.
199. See, e.g., "Tecmed S.A.," supra note 187, 119; "Feldman," supra note 179, 103;
Methanex Corporation, supra note 119, 7; Lauder v. The Czech Republic, Final Award, 198 (Sept.
3,2001).
200. Compafilia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. The Republic of Costa Rica, Final Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, 72 (Feb. 17, 2000); ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. The Republic of Hungary,
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, 424 (Oct. 2, 2006).
201. NEWCOMBE, supra note 121, at 357.
202. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 40 (2d ed. 2012).
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203tion, even if this latter is legal. General exceptions provisions might nonetheless
be factored into the interpretation of the entire investment treaty; and thus make
the objective pursued through a specific measure an important element to be taken
into consideration in the calculation of the compensation due, in particular a devel-
opmental goal sought by a developing or less-developed country. This is true even
though many investment treaties provide for specific guidance on the calculation
of the value of the expropriated investment,20 4 and some investment tribunals have
excluded that the public purpose of a measure affects the amount of compensation
due.20 5 However, as mentioned above, since general exceptions provisions inclu-
sion will inevitably have an impact on the overall reading of a given treaty and the
balance between investors' rights and host states' ability to regulate, it might in-
crease the chances of a measure to be regarded as a regulatory measure for which
compensation is not due, rather than an indirect expropriation. Indeed, each treaty-
based provision should be read and interpreted in its specific context,20 6 and the
inclusion of general exceptions might be regarded as a step towards enlargement of
states' sovereign power to pursue public policies.
Although one of the fundamental elements for such a characterization is
whether a substantial deprivation of an investment has occurred,20 7 other elements
have been stressed in some cases. In the Oscar Chinn case, the Permanent Court
of International Justice ("PCIJ") considered the interventions of the Belgian Gov-
ernment in the market of shipping trade in the Congo River in the 1930s, which led
Mr. Chinn to wind his transport and shipbuilding business up, to be non-
208compensable measures. The key consideration of the PCIJ was that the position
of Mr. Chinn was not a vested right. Nonetheless, the Court reasoned that "favor-
able business conditions and goodwill are transient circumstances ... [and] the in-
terest of transport undertakings may well have suffered as a result of a general
trade depression and the measures taken to combat it."'20 9 In Fireman's Fund v.
Mexico, the arbitral tribunal held that none of the claims of the investor satisfied
the concept of expropriation under the NAFTA and international law in general
and the investment had been risky. 21 One might wonder whether the scope of pro-
tection provided by an investment treaty overall, thus specifically considering the
exceptions contained in it, has an impact on the risk of the investment (as consid-
ered in the Fireman's Fund case) and on investors' expectations (as in the Oscar
Chinn case), with particular regard to the regulation foreseeability. The matter
203. The legality of expropriation rests upon the cumulative fulfillment of certain requirements
which normally are a) that the measure serves a public purpose, b) the measure must not be arbitrary or
discriminatory, c) principles of due process have been followed in the adoption of the measure, d)there
must be prompt, adequate and effective compensation, id. at 42.
204. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 109-12 (1995).
205. Compafiia del Desarrollo, supra note 200, 71.
206. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 202, 't 51.
207. Id. at 48.
208. Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63 (Dec. 12).
209. Id. at 88.
210. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States, ICISID Case No.
ARB(AF)/02/01, Award, 218 (July 17, 2006).
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needs further reflection and, as shown, could have a direct bearing on the justifica-
tion of host states' regulatory measures. Although in the past different measures
have been deemed to be expropriatory actions, governments must have a space to
act in the public interest and this is difficult if any affected business may seek
compensation.2 1
III. CONCLUSION
At a moment when both the trade and investment systems face criticism, it
seems timely and appropriate to explore the full potential of general exceptions
provisions. This is even more so if one bears in mind that these provisions are now
present in both systems, despite their different geographies, and that a sustainable
development interpretative approach is possible and even desirable. Such an inter-
pretative approach could indeed create more general action that would better ad-
dress each country's specific developmental concern. Developing and least-
developed countries have very diverse needs and problems. A development-
oriented interpretation of general exceptions provisions would make it possible to
further differentiate among countries and to focus on sector or industry-specific
solutions. In addition, legal provisions often prove inadequate to catch the dy-
namic dimension of development. The extremely rapid change of countries' eco-
nomic, environmental, and social conditions prevent legal provisions addressing
developmental interest from being really effective. For instance, in the 1960s the
Republic of Korea was among the poorest countries in the world. By the end of
2011, it was predicted to be richer than the European Union on average. 212 Al-
though so far it seems a unique example of a rapid development within a working
life, other developing countries have experienced rapid growth. At the other end
of the spectrum, some developing and least-developed countries have been hit hard
by the recent economic and financial crisis,213 contradicting development forecasts.
Legal provisions tend to crystallize at one moment in time. A development inter-
pretative approach to general exceptions might offer the opportunity to reconsider
countries' developmental interest in the light of their changed condition and, as
showed by the Appellate Body with regard to the environment, 214 in the light of the
contemporary (changing) concerns of the community of nations on development.
Beyond these considerations, the insertion of general exceptions provisions in
the investment realm might represent another step toward convergence of trade and
investment law. These provisions represent a trait d'union with values and con-
cerns underpinning other fields of international law. This idea is supported also by
the inclusion in some IAs of other provisions tackling environmental and social
215issues. In this sense, a reconceptualization of investment law towards a bal-
211. "Feldman," supra note 179, 103.
212. South Korea's Economy- What Do You Do When You Reach the Top?, THE ECONOMIST,
(Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21538104.
213. Bruno Gurtner, The Financial and Economic Crisis and Developing Countries, 1 INT'L DEV.
POL'Y 189 (2010).
214. US-Shrimp, supra note 52, 129.
215. See US Model BIT, supra note 37; Canada Model BIT, supra note 38.
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anced socially and environmentally responsible international investment legal
framework seems to be already underway.216 In a context of multiplicity of treaties
and of arbitral tribunals, where each treaty has an individualized interpretation and
a single related ad hoc arbitral tribunal is constituted, one might wonder whether
consistency is achievable at all. 17 Despite the legitimacy of such doubts, one can
still hope for greater coherence and consistency both within and outside the trade
and investment law systems. The apparent willingness of arbitrators to receive
guidance in their interpretation of investment treaties,218 the influence of the WTO
rules and case law on other dispute settlement mechanisms, 2 19 and the growing mu-
tual attraction between international trade and investment law220 make it possible
to expect further integration, also in the interpretation of general exceptions provi-
sions.
216. KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 382 (2013).
217. Yas Banifatemi, Consistency in the Interpretation of Substantive Investment Rules: Is It
Achievable?, in PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 200, 202-04 (Roberto
Echandi & Pierre Sauvd eds., 2013).
218. James Crawford, Similarity of Issues in Disputes Arising Under the Same or Similarly
Drafted Investment Treaties, in PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 97, 99-100 (Emmanuel
Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds.,2007).
219. Gabrielle Marceau, Amau Izaguerri & Vladyslav Lanovoy, The WTO's Influence on Other
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: A Lighthouse in the Storm of Fragmentation, 47 J. OF WORLD TRADE
481 (2013).
220. Mary. E. Footer, On the Laws of Attraction: Examining the Relationship Between Foreign
Investment and International Trade, in PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY
105(Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvd eds., 2013).
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TRANSNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS AND HOST
STATES' EXPORT RESTRICTION FLEXIBILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
Gashahun L. Fura*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article explores agricultural export restriction disciplines under
international economic law, mainly international trade and investment laws, in the
particular context of the recent translational race for farmland. A number of
reasons justify this undertaking. Firstly, the use of export restrictions of various
sorts by a number of countries in response to the food price spikes in 2007-2008
exacerbated the food crisis. Part of the explanation for this pervasive use of export
restrictions is that the World Trade Organization ("WTO") law discipline on
export restrictions is too weak to restrain exporting countries from introducing and
maintaining these measures. As such, agricultural export restrictions have gained
some attention in various regional and globalfora that have been calling for tighter
disciplines, although to date there is little progress to this effect. Secondly,
agricultural export restriction measures have also been one of the push factors for
increasing acquisition of farmland abroad in recent years. Indeed, many of these
land deals target either food security of home states (export back home), or
generating stable profit through, among others, secure access to international
markets. Hence, possible export restriction measures by host states, even when
dictated by local necessities, would be a counter move to these goals, and likely
lead to tensions between the competing interests of foreign investors and host
states (local communities). This is particularly so in the context of sub-Saharan
African host countries, which are often themselves facing frequent food insecurity
(hunger) challenges.
Admittedly, export restrictions may not be a panacea to ensure food
availability in local markets, let alone access at household level.' Thus, it may be
argued that so long as there are alternative sources of food supply, mainly the
international market, the emphasis on export restrictions is a misplaced concern.
2
. PhD Candidate, Melbourne Law School (gfura@student.unimelb.edu.au); an earlier version of this
article was presented at the American Society of International Law's International Economic Law
Interest Group 2014 Biennial Research Conference held at the University of Denver Sturm College of
Law Denver, Colorado, November 13-15, 2014; I would like to thank the participants of the Conference
for stimulating questions and comments. I am also grateful to Jtirgen Kurtz and Sundhya Pahuja for
their thoughtful comments on earlier draft of sections of this work, and the editorial team of the Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy for the meticulous edits; any mistakes are, however, mine.
1. See AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION
(1981) (demonstrating that nationwide food availability does not necessarily translate into household
food access).
2. See Siddhartha Mitra & Tim Josling, Agricultural Export Restrictions: Welfare Implications
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But, given that it is the lack of confidence on the international market that has in
the first place propelled importing (investor) countries to acquire land abroad, there
would hardly be an overriding logic that assures the reliability of this same market
for host states. Indeed, at times, export restriction maybe one of the only few
policy options available to host states.
Despite the increasing attention agricultural export restrictions have gained in
recent years, and the complex issues the potential application of these measures to
foreign agricultural investments may involve, the existing literature tends to focus
more on WTO law and less on how WTO law interact with the disciplines existing
under other strands of international economic law, notably international investment
law. 3 This work is an attempt to address this gap in the existing body of literature.
The article makes a claim that despite the relatively loose WTO discipline on
export restrictions and hence the increasing call for tighter disciplines in recent
years, transnational national agricultural investments, which are further subject to
international investment law, are already subject to tighter export restriction
disciplines in a manner that inhibits hosts states policy space to respond even to
local hunger.
The article is organized as follows. Following this introductory section, part
II will provide for the general context in which these farmland acquisitions are
happening; noting that food security (food demand) in home states is a
significant-if not necessarily the principal-driver of these investments, and
highlighting the relevance of export restrictions measures to foreign agricultural
investments in sub-Saharan Africa host states often facing hunger challenges such
as Ethiopia. Part III will explore this ability of host (exporting) states under the
WTO laws, particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade( "GATT
1994") and the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) and jurisprudence. This paper
will demonstrate that in the light of indeterminate and subjective nature of the key
terms defining the conditions that might justify recourse to export restriction
measures, weak procedural requirements that can easily be eschewed, and the
absence of limit to the use of export taxes (that otherwise have similar effect to
quantitative restrictions), the WTO leaves member states with adequate room to
introduce agricultural export restriction measures. Part IV will analyse how WTO
law interacts with international investment law in disciplining export restrictions.
The article concludes, in part V, that in the context of transnational agricultural
investments, WTO law flexibilities on export restrictions on ground of food
security would be diminished when read in the light of relevant disciplines under
international investment law and practice, inhibiting host states ability to respond
and Trade Disciplines I (IPC Position Paper, 2009),
http://agritrade.org/documents/ExportRestrictions-final.pdf (noting that "export restrictions - in the
long as well as the short run - lead to a deterioration of welfare in both the country imposing such
measures and the rest of the world.").
3. See, e.g., ROBERT HOWSE & TIM JOLING, AGRICULTURAL EXPORT RESTRICTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: A WAY FORWARD 21-22 (Int'l Food & Agricultural Trade Pol'y Council
ed., 2012) ("[C]onsideration also needs to be given to the disciplines [on agricultural export restrictions]
that currently exist in regional trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties.").
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to even local hunger.
I. TRANSNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS: THE CONTEXT
A spike in food prices of 2007 (which escalated even further in 2008) made
food unaffordable in many countries, and sparked a wave of 'food riots' in over
forty countries.4 In response, some importing countries engaged in 'panic
purchasing' of grains while others attempted to negotiate long-term grain supply
agreements with exporting countries.5 On the other hand, a number of grain
exporting countries began introducing export restriction measures partly to limit
food prices inflation at home 6 -producing a growing realisation that the global
market was no longer reliable source of food. This propelled relatively rich
countries with shortage of arable land and water to outsource food production
through purchase or lease of farmland abroad.7 In addition, the rise in the price of
oil during the same period and policy responses to climate change imperatives
resulted in considerable demand for alternative and renewable sources of energy,
such as biofuel, which further contributed to the increasing demand of arable land.8
Also, as a result of the global financial crisis, investments in land (agriculture)
were 'rediscovered' as 'safer' ventures. 9 Thus, the convergence of global food,
energy (fuel) and financial crises-so called "the triple-F crisis' 10 -of recent
years triggered the increasing acquisitions of farmland mainly in the global South
and most notably in sub-Saharan Africa 1 by both foreign private investors and
4. Editorial, The Food Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, at A26,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/opinion/25fri2.html? r-0.
5. See PAUL MCMAHON, THE FEEDING FRENZY: THE NEW POLITICS OF FOOD (2013)
[hereinafter MCMAHON].
6. See Howard Mann & Carin Smaller, Foreign Land Purchases for Agriculture: What Impact
on Sustainable Development?, SUSTAINABLE DEV. INNOVATION BRIEFS 2, Jan. 2010,
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/no8.pdf (nothing that "at least 25 countries
imposed export bans or restrictions in 2008"); see MCMAHON, supra note 5 (explaining that "as a
number of countries resorted to such measures, no one country was on the 'high moral ground' to
challenge the legality of the measures"). Arguably such measures could be justified under GATT and
the Agreement on Agriculture of the WTO. Later sections of this article will argue that the situation will
most likely be different if the food (grain) belongs to foreign investors as in the case of transnational
agricultural investments.
7. See GRAIN, SEIZED! THE 2008 LAND GRAB FOR FOOD AND FINANCIAL SECURITY (2008),
http://www.grain.org/article/entries/93-seized-the-2008-landgrab-for-food-and-financial-security.
8. Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and The Politics of Food, 49 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 101,109, 112 (2013).
9. See KLAUS DEININGER ET AL., WORLD BANK, RISING GLOBAL INTEREST IN FARMLAND: CAN
IT YIELD SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE BENEFITS? xxv (2011) ("[T]ogether with the reduced
attractiveness of other assets due to the financial crisis, the boom led to a 'rediscovery' of the
agricultural sector by different types of investors and a wave of interest in land acquisitions in
developing countries.").
10. RUTH HALL, LAND GRABBING IN AFRICA AND THE NEW POLITICS OF FOOD (David Hughes
ed., Future Agrics. 2011).
11. DEININGER ET AL., supra note 9, at 51 (noting that out of the 56.6 million hectares of land
deals reported between 2008 and 2009, two-thirds of the total area, 39.7 million hectares, involves sub-
Saharan Africa). The Land Matrix, on the other hand, reported that out of the 33.9 million hectares of
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sovereign wealth funds, 12 a phenomenon often infamously referred to as 'land
grabs.'
1 3
At the receiving end too, host states are not passive partners. Indeed, they
have long been courting for large scale investment in agriculture through a series
of measures ranging from the waves of land law reforms to incentives of various
sorts, although it now appears that only the recent global 'crises' induced such
investments than those incentives. 14 The often-claimed potential benefits of these
investments to host states include enhanced food security, employment
opportunity, and access to new farm technologies, export earnings, and
development goals in general. 15 Yet, whether these investments deliver on those
counts, 16 or even, whether host governments are 'neutral' agents promoting the
interest of their people in this process is quite contentious. Indeed, it appears that
the discontents against these land deals in different parts of the world speak to
land deals between 2008 and 2011, 60% happened in sub-Sub-Saharan Africa. See The Online Public
Database on Land Deals, LAND MATRIX, http://www.landmatrix.org/en/ (last updated Nov. 25, 2014).
While the emerging literature on the recent farmland deals generally point to an increasing trend, the
actual size of land transferred to investors, however, is far from certainty. The computation of the scale
of land deals draws heavily on official documents, which reveal only a small percentage of such deals
and/or media reports, which tend to overstate the deals; as such creating a sense of "false precision."
See generally Ian Scoones et al., The Politics of Evidence: Methodologies for Understanding the Global
Land Rush, 40 J. PEASANT STUD. 469 (2013), and Carlos Oya, Methodological Reflections on "Land
Grab " Databases and the "Land Grab" Literature "Rush ", 40(3) J. PEASANT STUD. 503, 506 (2013).
12. LAND MATRIX, supra note 11. According to the latest report by the Land Matrix, a
partnership of civil society and intergovernmental organizations, the top ten investor countries are:
United States, Malaysia, Singapore, Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, India, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia,
Brazil, and China. Id.
13. Matias Marguis, Nora Mackeon & Satumino Morras, Land Grabbing and Global Governance
Critical Perspectives, 10 GLOBALIZATIONS 1, 2 (2013) (recognizing that the term "land-grabbing" is
originally employed by Karl Marx); see Int'l Land Coalition, International Conference and Assembly of
Members, May 24-27, 2011, Tirana Declaration: Securing Land Access for the Poor in Times of
Intensified Natural Resources Competition (May 27, 2011), http://www.landcoalition.org/fr/node/ 109
(defining land grabbing in a contemporary context). Other terms associated with the increasing
transnational land acquisitions in recent years include: large scale land acquisitions, global land rush,
enclosures, green rush, green grabbing global farm race, and agro-imperialism.
14. See AMBREENA S. MANJI, THE POLITICS OF LAND REFORM IN AFRICA: FROM COMMUNAL
TENURE TO FREE MARKETS (2006). See also PATRICK MCAUSLAN, LAND LAW REFORM IN EAST
AFRICA, TRADITIONAL OR TRANSFORMATIVE?: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF 50 YEARS OF LAND LAW REFORM
IN EASTERN AFRICA 1961-2011 (2013).
15. See generally THE GLOBAL FARM RACE: LAND GRABS, AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT, AND
THE SCRAMBLE FOR FOOD SECURITY (Michael Kugelman & Susan L. Levenstein eds. 2013); Olivier De
Schutter, How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-Scale Investments in
Farmland, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 249 (2011); Narla, supra note 8.
16. E.g., DEINtNGER ET AL., supra note 9. The World Bank's report, for example, while noting the
potential opportunities farmland investment presents for both investors and host states (even local
people) found that "in many cases, potential benefits from such [large scale farmland] transfers are not
realized or outweighed by negative impacts." Id. at 5. FAO's report also notes that, "While a number
of studies document the negative impacts of large-scale land acquisition in developing countries, there
is much less evidence of its benefits to the host country, especially in the short term and at local level."
FAO, TRENDS AND IMPACTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRY AGRICULTURE:
EVIDENCE FROM CASE STUDIES 336(2012), http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i31l2e/i31l2e.pdf.
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these doubts. In 2008, for instance, the South Korean business group Daewoo
Logistics attempted to lease for ninety-nine years 1.3 million hectares of land
(roughly a quarter of the country's arable land) from the Malagasy government to
produce rice to be exported back to Korea, despite Madagascar's dependence on
U.N. food aid. 17 A popular riot against the deal culminated in the overthrow of
Madagascar's President Marc Ravalomanana-the new government axed the deal
in March 2009.18 Similar discontents have been reported in many other countries,
including those in sub-Saharan Africa region.
19
While land acquisitions abroad have historical roots in imperial expansions
20
and colonial plantations, in contrast to their historical antecedents, the recent
transnational land acquisitions are occurring at scale and pace not seen before, and
center on production of staple foods and biofuels or simply speculation. While
food and biofuel are regarded as significant drivers of the recent transnational land
21
acquisitions, their respective share is far from clear. Indeed, food and biofuel
production are competing drivers. Whereas the early 'land grabs' reports presented
food as a major driver, some recent works point to biofuels as the major driver. For
example, the World Bank's Policy Research Working Paper, titled What Drives the
Global "Land Rush"?, documents "[d]ependence on food imports emerges as a
strong driver of demand for land acquisition. 22 On the other hand, according to the
17. Rivo ANDRIANIRINA RATSIALONANA ET AL., INT'L LAND COALITION, AFTER DAEWOO?:
CURRENT STATUS AND PERSPECTIVES OF LARGE-SCALE LAND ACQUISITION IN MADAGASCAR 2, 11
(2011),
http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/publication/905/CIRADOFMadaENG-web16.03.1
I.pdf.
18. LORENZO COTULA & SONJA VERMEULEM, INT'L INST. FOR ENV'T & DEV., 'LAND GRABS' IN
AFRICA: CAN THE DEALS WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT? 4 (Sept. 2009),
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/7069IIED.pdf.
19. See SOC. DEV. INTEGRATED CTR., KILLING FOR BANANA: GOVERNMENT LAND GRAB,
VIOLENCE AND THE FORGOTTEN RIGHTS OF OGONI FARMERS (2013),
http://saction.orgibooks/Killingfor Banana_2013.pdf. For example, the acquisition of farmland in
Ethiopia by foreign investors has also aroused considerable resentment (and even violence) in some
parts of the country. In Nigeria, the acquisition of land by a Mexican company led to clashes between
the local people and government agents culminating in inter-community violence and killings. See,
e.g., Jason Mosley, Gambella Violence and Land Deals: A Link?, FOCUS ON THE HORN (June 18, 2012,
7:00 AM), http://focusonthehomrn.wordpress.com/2012/06/I8/gambella-violence-and-land-deals-a-link/;
see also, Anywaa Survival Org., Ethiopia: Land Grabs Are Fueling Violence in Gambela, FARM LAND
GRAB (Feb. 22, 2011), http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/20069.
20. See Derek Byerlee, Are We Learning from History?, in THE GLOBAL FARM RACE: LAND
GRABS, AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT AND THE SCRAMBLE FOR FOOD SECURITY 21 (Michael Kugelman
& Susan Levestein eds., 2013); Nancy Lee Peluso & Christian Lund, New Frontiers of Land Control:
Introduction, 38(4) J. PEASANT STUD. 667 (2011),
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf! 0.1080/03066150.2011.607692; Liz Alden Wily, Looking Back to
See Forward: The Legal Niceties of Land Theft in Land Rush 39 J. PEASANT STUD. 751 (2012); Charles
Geisler, New Terra Nullius Narratives and the Gentrification of Africa's "Empty Lands ", 18 J. WORLD-
SYSTEMS RES. 15 (2012), http://www.jwsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Geisler-voll 8n1 .pdf.
21. LAND GRABBING AND FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA (Prosper B. Matondi, Kjell Havnevik &
Atakilte Beyene eds., 2011).
22. Rabah Arezki, Klaus Deininger & Harris Selod, What Drives the Global "Land Rush"? 20
(World Bank Pol'y Research, Working Paper No. 5864, 2011),
2015
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Land Matrix database, only about fourteen percent of the land acquisitions in sub-
Saharan Africa are for food production, while non-food production, multipurpose
(several crops in different categories), and flex crops (crops with multiple uses
across food, feed, fuel and industrial purposes) constitute forty-three, thirty, and
thirteen percent respectively.23 As long as the share in the 'multipurpose' and 'flex
crops' is not provided, it is difficult to tell the absolute share of food and biofuel
from the database. The share of the driving factors also differs from country to
country.24 What makes the food-fuel distinction further blurred is also the fact that
some crops officially proposed for biofuel production (non-food category) can
easily be shifted to food (animal feed) depending on the dynamics of demand and
profit-maize and soybean are apt examples here. The converse may not,
however, be the case, since a shift from food to biofuel requires more investment
in processing facilities. At any rate, the more arable land is used for biofuel than
food production, the more pressure and competition over the 'remaining' arable
land for production of food.
Reportedly, the pace of farmland acquisitions has slowed over the last two
years; yet the growing demand for food and biofuel point to further demand for
farmland. The World Bank, for instance, predicts that 18 to 44 million hectares of
land will be required for biofuel production by 2030.25 The U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization ("FAO") also reports that surging global population and
growing demand for food pose major challenges for agriculture as world food
production will need to increase by sixty percent by 2050 while at the same time
coping with a changing climate. 26  Thus, these land deals largely derive their
justificatory power from food security27 although "[t]here is still a lack of
systematic evidence on the food security impacts of agricultural FDI.,,28  It is
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/201 1/wpl 1251 .pdf.
23. LAND MATRIX, surpa note 11.
24. In the case of Ethiopia, for instance, out of thirty-eight farmland deals publicly available, four
land deals (constituting 2/3 of the large scale land acquisitions by foreign investors) are exclusively for
food crops production, while the remaining thirty-four land deals are for the production of either
agricultural raw materials such as cotton or a mix of food and non-food crops. Ministry of Agriculture,
Land Leased Information, FED. DEM. REP. OF ETHIOPIA, http://www.moa.gov.et/web/pages/land-leased
(last visited Apr. 9, 2015). The crops mentioned under the column 'investment type' are the main areas
of investment; but often, the contracts mention for the possibility of growing additional crops which
makes the food vs. non-food distinction difficult. Id.
25. DE1NINGER ET AL., supra note 9, at 15.
26. FAO Initiative Brings Global Land Cover Data Under One Rooffor the First Time, FOOD &
AGRIC. ORG. U.N. (Mar. 17, 2014), http://ht.ly/uJSou [hereinafter FAO Report].
27. See, e.g., Maria Cristina Rulli & Paolo D'Odorico, Food Appropriation Through Large Scale
Land
Acquisitions 9 ENT'L RES. LETTERS 1 (2014), http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/9/6/064030/article
(noting that "It is expected that in the long run large scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) for commercial
farming will bring the technology required to close the existing crops yield gaps... and [that up] to
300-550 million people could be fed by crops grown in the acquired land, should these investments in
agriculture improve crop production and close the yield gap.").
28. Jesper Karlsson, Challenges and Opportunities of Foreign Investment in Developing Country
Agriculture for Sustainable Development 3 (FAO Comm. & Trade Pol'y Research, Working Paper No.
48, 2014), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4074e.pdf.
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therefore imperative to explore the effect of these land deals on host countries and
their communities, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, a region which hosts
the highest proportion of hungry people. 29 One aspect of such undertaking could
be a closer look at the terms on which these land deals take place including what
happens to the produce. This article therefore explores the leverage host states
may have over food produced through transnational agricultural investments by
analysing how international trade and investment laws interact in ordering
potential export restriction measures applicable to these investments.
III. FLEXIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF WTO LAW ON AGRICULTURAL EXPORT
RESTRICTIONS
A. WTO law and jurisprudence
Within international trade law-mainly WTO law-framework, agricultural
export restrictions are disciplined under the GATT 1994,30 the Agreement on
Agriculture ("AoA"), 31 and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures
("TRIPs"). 32  The GATT generally prohibits quantitative import and export
restrictions but, by way of exception, allows members to introduce export
restriction measures, among others, to address critical local food shortages.3 3 The
AoA provides for procedural requirements that a member introducing export
restriction measures shall comply with.34  The TRIPs Agreement, on the other
hand, prohibits trade related investment measure that is inconsistent with GATT
Article III (national treatment) or Article XI (quantitative restrictions).
35
Thus, Article XI:I of the GATT 1994, which provides for a general
elimination of quantitative restrictions in relevant parts, states: "[n]o prohibitions
or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges ... shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation... or on the exportation or
sale for export of any product ..."36 The scope of "prohibitions or restrictions"
envisaged under Article XI is very broad. As the panel in India-Quantitative
Restrictions set out:
[T]he text of Article XI: I is very broad in scope, providing for a general
29. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE
WORLD: THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF FOOD SECURITY 8 (2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf (noting that from 2011-2013, sub-Sahara Africa
hosted 222.7 million chronically hungry people (24.8 percent of the total population, which is the
largest proportion in the world)).
30. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
31. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 [hereinafter AoA].
32. TRIPS Agreement: Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, The Legal Texts: The
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 143 (1999), 1868 U.N.T.S. 186
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
33. See GATT, supra note 30, at art. XI(l), XI(2)(a).
34. See AoA, supra note 31, at art. 12.
35. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 2.
36. GATT, supra note 30, at art. XI(I).
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ban on import or export restrictions or prohibitions 'other than duties,
taxes or other charges.' As was noted by the panel in Japan-Trade in
Semiconductors, the wording of Article XI:I is comprehensive: it
applies 'to all measures instituted or maintained by a [Member]
prohibiting or restricting the importation, exportation, or sale for export
of products other than measures that take the form of duties, taxes, or
other charges.' The scope of the term 'restriction' is also broad, as seen
in its ordinary meaning, which is 'a limitation on action, a limiting
condition or regulation.'
37
In principle, therefore, a WTO member may not introduce or maintain any
export (and import) restriction nor prohibition measures (other than duties, taxes or
other charges), even on grounds of food security. By way of exception, however,
as provided under Article XI:2(a), a WTO member is allowed to take "[e]xport
prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting
party. Also, at least arguably, the general exception provisions of the GATT-
Article XX, notably paragraph (j) which allows restrictions that are "essential to
the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply '39-
could also be invoked to justify restriction of exports of products, especially
products which can be used as food or raw material (for example, for production of
biofuel), such as maize and soybean.
In order to justify export "prohibition or restriction" measure on ground of
food security, the measure needs to meet both the substantive requirements of
GATT Article XI:2(a)-including the existence of "critical shortage" of foodstuffs
and the "temporary" application of the measure40-and the procedural
requirements of notification and consultation under AoA Article 12.41 An export
restriction measure that is justified under GATT Article XI:2(a) indiscriminately
applied to both domestic and foreign producers (exporters) in compliance with the
AoA Article 12 shall be deemed to be consistent with the TRIPs, as the latter only
prohibits TRIPs that are inconsistent with the GATT Article III (national
treatment) or Article XI (quantitative restrictions).42
Nonetheless, what constitutes 'critical,' 'shortage,' as well as 'temporarily'
application under GATT 1994, Article XI: 2(a) is far from straightforward. Apart
37. See Panel Report, India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and
Industrial Products, 646-47, WT/DS90/AB/R (adopted Sept. 22, 1999),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/90r.pdf.
38. GATT, supra note 30, at art. XI(2)(a).
39. Id. at art. XX.
40. Id. at art. XI:2(a).
41. AoA, supra note 31, at art. 12(1)(b).
42. GATT, supra note 30, at arts. III, XI. Note also that Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement,
which prohibits trade measures is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III and Article XI of GATT
1994. This is further qualified by the introductory phrase explaining that such acts must be taken
"[w]ithout prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994." This is indicative of the fact
that a taken measure which is justified under the exception clauses under GATT must not be
inconsistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
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from a mere reference to the term "food security," neither does the AoA, which
sets the procedural requirements for the application of GATT, nor Article XI:2(a)
provide for precise definition of the conditions that justify the invocation of this
provision. And this omission seems intentional; as for example Smith observes:
"[t]he omission of a definition of food security appears [to be] deliberate and
implies that food security is not a matter for the rules per se, but is something
separate which is to be determined by other international agreements and/pr by the
WTO Member.,
43
There is also no adequate GATT/WTO jurisprudence guiding the
interpretation of GATT Article XI:2(a)-to date, the GATT/IWTO Dispute
Settlement Body considered only few cases relating to export restrictions.4
Among these cases, it is in the China-Raw Materials case that the panel has
directly dealt with some of the key terms under GATT Article XI:2(a), albeit in the
context of raw materials, as opposed to foodstuff. Thus, with regard to what
constitutes 'critical shortage', the Panel ruled that:
The meaning of 'shortage' as a deficiency in the quantity of goods
appears to be common ground with the parties and the Panel also
considers this to be its meaning as used in Article XI:2(a). In the
Panel's view, the term 'critical' indicates that a shortage must be of
'decisive importance' or 'grave,' or even rising to the level of a "crisis"
or catastrophe. Article XI:2(a) states that measures in the form of
restrictions or bans may be used on a temporary basis to either outright
43. Fiona Smith, Food Security and International Agricultural Trade Regulation: Old Problems,
New Perspectives, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AGRICULTURE ON THE WTO AGRICULTURE
AGREEMENT 31, 40 (Joseph A. McMahon & Melaku Geboye Desta eds., 2012),
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1307200/l/1307200_FoodSecurityartFinal.pdf. In her article, the author
further notes that "It is then for the Member to decide what is most appropriate for the needs of its
domestic population in food security terms. Whether the policies work and the Members' population
benefits are not relevant considerations for the current international agricultural trade rules." Id.
44. See Panel Report, Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, L/6268-35S/98 GATT B.I.S.D. (adopted Mar. 22, 1988),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/87hersal.pdf, Panel Report, Japan - Trade in Semi-
Conductors, L/6309 - 35S/1 16 (adopted May 4, 1988),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/87semcdr.pdf, Panel Report, Argentina - Measures
Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R (adopted Dec.
19, 2000), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueldList='3185,9556&CurrentCatalogueldlndex=1&FullTextSearch=;
Panel Report, US - Measures Treating Export Restrictions as Subsidies, WT/DS I 94/R (adopted June
29, 2001), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueldList =108248,44667,80669&C
u rr
entCatalogueI d l ndex= 1 &FullTextS
earch=; Panel Reports, China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and
Molybdenum, WT/DS43 l/R, WT/DS433/R, WT/DS433/R (adopted Aug. 29, 2014)
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu-e/431432433r-e.pdf [hereinafter China Rare Earths
Report]; Panel Report, China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (adopted July 5, 2011),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FES_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueldList-55573,108753,96753&CurrentCatalogueldlndex=l &FullTextS
earch = .
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'prevent' or otherwise 'relieve' such a shortage. 45
The Panel is persuaded by the complainants' argument that the
requirement that measures be applied 'temporarily' contextually informs
the notion of 'critical shortage.' In this sense, as noted by the European
Union, if there is no possibility for an existing shortage ever to cease to
exist, it will not be possible to 'relieve or prevent' it through an export
restriction applied on a temporary basis. If a measure were imposed to
address a limited reserve of an exhaustible natural resource, such
measure would be imposed until the point when the resource is fully
depleted. This temporal focus seems consistent with the notion of
'critical,' defined as 'of the nature of, or constituting, a crisis.'46
Thus, from the reading of China-Raw Materials Panel's report, it transpires
that "critical shortage" refers to a shortage that is of "decisive importance,"
"grave," or of such a nature that amounts to "crisis" although what constitutes
"decisive importance," "grave," or "crisis" begs for further interpretation of
whoever invoking (or challenging) the measure in question.
With regard to the temporality of the measure the panel noted that:
[T]he ordinary meaning of 'temporarily' is 'for a time only' and 'during
a limited time.' The term 'limited time' means 'appointed, fixed' and
'circumscribed within definite limits, bounded, restricted.' These
definitions suggest a fixed time-limit for the application of a measure.
Thus, on its face, Article XI:2(a) would appear to justify measures that
are applied for a limited timeframe to address 'critical shortages' of
'foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting
party.'
47
In the Panel's view, on the basis of textual interpretation, "temporarily"
means "limited timeframe," implying that members' export restriction measures
under Article XI:2(a) shall specify the duration of the measure, precluding
indefinite and long-term export restriction measures. The Panel further
strengthened this textual interpretation with contextual interpretation, maintaining
that otherwise interpretation of "temporarily" under Article XI:2(a) would
undermine the import of GATT Article XX(g).4 8  But in response to China's
appeal, the Appellate Body, while generally upholding the Panel's report, reversed
the Panel's interpretation of the term "temporarily" as "limited time frame, 49
45. China Rare Earths Report, supra note 44, 7.296.
46. Id. 7.297.
47. Id. 7.255.
48. Id 7.298.
49. Appellate Body Report, China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (adopted Feb. 22, 2012),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueldList=55573,108 7 5 3,96753&CurrentCatalogueldlndex= I &FullTextS
earch=. The Appellate Body argued that, "[W]e disagree that 'temporary' must always connote a time-
limit fixed in advance. Instead, we consider that Article XI:2(a) describes measures applied for a limited
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implying that even long-term export restriction measures could be justified under
GATT Article XI:2(a).
As with most WTO disputes, the taint of protectionism50 seems to have
influenced the Panel's strong legal approach to this case. Although a WTO
adjudicator faced with a true food security crisis may not necessarily approach
Article XI(2) in the same way as the Panel in Raw Materials, given the fact that
this is the first case in which this provision is seriously engaged in the WTO
dispute settlement, it may have important implications for understanding potential
export restriction measures applicable to transnational farmland investments
(produces). As noted before, in most of the sub-Saharan African countries, which
are the principal destinations of the recent farmland investments, food shortage is
rather a perpetual problem. 51  Thus, in the light of the Panel's report, such
shortages may defy the qualification of 'critical shortage' which draws its strength
from the temporality of the problem (that can be prevented or alleviated by
temporarily restricting food exports), making the justification under GATT Article
XI:2(a) difficult, if not impossible. But given the Appellate Body's broad
interpretation of the term "temporarily," it can be contemplated 52 that even long-
term export restriction measures taken in response to the type of incessant food
shortages faced by most of sub-Saharan African countries could be justified under
GATT 1994.
Even when an export restriction measure is prima facie justified under Article
XI:2(a), as noted before, compliance with further procedural requirements under
the AoA is still necessary. Thus, AoA Article 12 requires any Member instituting
new export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs to "give due consideration to the
effects of such prohibition or restriction on importing Members' food security."
53
Moreover, before instituting such measure, the member shall also notify, in
writing, the Committee on Agriculture as to the nature and duration of the
measure, and shall, upon request, consult with and provide necessary information
to any other member having a substantial interest as an importer with respect to
any matter related to the measure in question.54 A developing country member,
however, is exempted from these requirements unless it is a net-food exporter of
duration, adopted in order to bridge a passing need, irrespective of whether or not the temporal scope of
the measure is fixed in advance." See id. at 331.
50. For example, although China had pleaded for environmental justification (that raw materials
were an exhaustible natural resource and thus restrictions on production/consumption were required), its
measures were not even-handed -it has not reduced levels of domestic consumption of those essential
industrial inputs whose price had dropped significantly with the export restraints. Id. at 5-6.
51. See FAO Report, supra note 25.
52. Although the WTO Dispute Settlement Body does not follow the principle of stare decisis per
se, the practice suggests that panels to some extent, and the Appellate Body to a greater extent, draw on
their prior rulings. WTO, Chapter 7: Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate Body Reports and DSB
Recommendations and Rulings in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING MODULE 7.2,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop__.e/dispue/disp_settlement cbt e/c7s2pl_e.htm (last visted Sept.
23, 2015).
53. AoA, supra note 31, art. 12(1)(a) (emphasis added).
54. Id. at art. 12(1)(b).
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the specific foodstuff concerned.5 5 The requirements under AoA Article 12 are,
however, akin to 'soft law' for eschewing these rules does not carry an express
penalty on the concerned exporting country. 6 The experience to date also suggests
that these provisions have not effectively restrained members from using export
restrictions and hence, unlikely will do in the future.5 7
On the other hand, as the China-Raw Materials case suggests, the WTO
discipline on export restriction may not be completely ineffective. As, for
example, Robert Howse and Tim Josling contend on the basis of the outcome of
this case, food exporting countries may not respond to local food crisis in a manner
that is indifferent to the food security impacts on import-dependent countries. 58
They further suggest that there is a room for the WTO to collaborate with another
international organization, which is primarily focused on questions pertaining to
international and national food security 9 to assess the existence of a ground that
justifies export restriction as provided under WTO laws.60 Given the sensitive
nature of hunger (food security) and the protection the agricultural sector has been
accorded historically, however, it may not be easy to conceive that WTO members
would entrust the mandate to determine the existence of "critical shortage of
foodstuff' in their territory to an external body.
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that few countries that have recently acceded
to the WTO accepted stricter export restriction commitments, so called "WTO
plus" commitments, 61 the WTO disciplines on export restrictions, including on
ground of food security, remain very loose. This is manifested partly in the
interpretive difficulty of the key, yet indeterminate and subjective, terms-
including "critical," "shortage," and "temporarily"--envisaged under GATT
Article XI:2(a) compounded by the AoA's essentially hortatory procedural
requirements.
But what explains the 'under-regulation' of export restrictions? One
explanation is that, WTO members "did not feel at the time [of the negotiation of
the AoA] there were good reasons to be concerned about the possibility of
countries finding it convenient to restrict their exports." 62 Another explanation has
to do with the prevailing asymmetry of bargaining power among countries during
the Uruguay Round-agricultural trade negotiation remained largely, and firmly, in
the hands of net food exporting developed countries for whom high international
55. Id. at art. 12(2).
56. See, for example, GIOVANNI ANANIA, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTURAL EXPORT RESTRICTIONS AND THE WTO: WHAT OPTIONS
DO POLICY-MAKERS HAVE FOR PROMOTING FOOD SECURITY?, ISSUE PAPER NO. 50 (2013).
57. Id. at 17.
58. Howse & Josling, supra note 3, at 2.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id.
61. The countries that had to accept obligations which go beyond, to different extents, existing
WTO rules (and hence 'WTO-plus' commitments) include: China, Mongolia, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Ukraine and Vietnam. For more on this see ANANIA, supra note 56, at 1.
62. Id. at 18.
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prices and their impact on food security is a low priority compared to making
markets more open and profitable for their exports.63 It is thus worth considering
what, if any, has changed under the current Doha Round of trade negotiations.
B. The Doha Round Negotiations
Agricultural, and hence food, export restrictions have been the subject of
discussions under Doha Round of Trade Negotiations ("Doha Development
Agenda Round") launched in November 2001.64 Indeed, even before the launch of
the round, several countries, and groups of countries, suggested the need to
introduce more stringent regulations of export restrictions in their initial proposal
on the basis of the AoA inbuilt negotiation agenda (Article 12).65 It is, however,
the food crisis of 2007-2008 which was arguably exacerbated by export restriction
measures of some major exporters that revived the issue in the context of the
agricultural negotiations.
For example, in April 2008, as part of the ongoing effort to find an agreement
which could purportedly bring the Doha Round to an end in later months, Japan
and Switzerland jointly circulated an informal paper calling for stricter WTO rules
on the introduction of export restrictions for food products and on the consultation
and notification procedures. 66 The paper, among other things, proposes that
any new export prohibition or restriction [to] be limited to the extent
strictly necessary for the country imposing it... [taking into account]
production, stocks, and domestic consumption. 67 The proposed rules
[also require] countries seeking to restrict exports to give 'due
consideration' to importers' food security, and look at how trade would
have flowed in the absence of restrictions.
68
Moreover, members need to show how the measure may affect "food aid for
net food-importing developing countries would be affected., 69 Procedurally, the
proposal requires members to a member taking export restriction measure needs to
notify the WTO Committee on Agriculture before instituting export restrictions,
explaining the nature, duration, and reasons for the measures.7" Further,
governments would be required to consult with importers about 'any
63. Id. at 17-8.
64. Id. at 3.
65. See, for instance, the proposal by the Carins Group (including Argentina, Australia, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay,
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay), Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture,
WTO Negotiations on Agriculture - CAIRNS Group Negotiating Proposal, G/AG/NG/W/93 (Dec. 21,
2000). Other countries which tabled initial proposal on export restriction are: Japan, Switzerland, Rep.
Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Jordan.
66. Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Japan, Switzerland Propose Stronger WTO Curbs
On Use Of Food Export Restrictions, BRIDGES (Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-
news/bridges/news/japan-switzerland-propose-stronger-wto-curbs-on'use-of-food-export.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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matter related to the proposed' export restriction, and delay the
implementation of the planned measure pending the consultations, 71 and
if the differences cannot be resolved within a certain period of time, the
proposed export restriction would be referred to binding arbitration by a
"standing committee of experts., 72
This proposal was not, however, accepted by WTO members. On the other
hand, the Doha Draft Modalities of 2008 also provides for a modest proposal on
disciplining agricultural export restrictions. 73 The Draft Modalities text would
require members to notify the WTO about the export restrictions, including the
reasons for taking the measure, within ninety days after the imposition of the
measures, and "shall consult, upon request, with any other Member having a
substantial interest as an importer with respect to any matter related to the
proposed measure... and provide, upon request, the interested importing Member
with necessary information, including relevant economic indicators." 74 Export
restrictions would "not normally be longer than [twelve] months" unless otherwise
agreed by "affected importing Members." 75 Nonetheless, despite the increasing
calls for tighter disciplines on export restrictions even within other multilateral
settings 76 -in the face of the impasse of the Doha Round as a whole-there has not
been further progress at the WTO as yet.
Relatedly, a few WTO Members, such as India, have recently embarked on
public stockpiling of grains as a food security strategy77 which has sparked a huge
debate among WTO members-and has almost risked the collapse of the already
shaky Doha Round trade talks. The Indian National Food Security Bill, which was
introduced in 2013, allows the government to buy food, including grains, from
farmers and stockpile it for a public distribution system, where it is sold at
government-run stores at subsidized prices-the subsidy is estimated to be
"available to seventy-five percent of India's rural population and fifty percent of
the urban population." 78  However, some WTO Members, including the United
States and Pakistan, have expressed fears that the scheme runs the risk of
exceeding the ten percent domestic support allowed under the WTO rules, resented
that "India was accumulating too much grain, and that [India] might eventually
release the surplus on the world market, lowering prices for other producers". 79 In
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture,
TN/AG/W/Rev.4 (Dec. 6, 2008).
74. Id. . 174. The modalities also include an exemption from these requirements for least-
developed and net food-importing countries.
75. Id. 179.
76. As part of food security discussions since 2007, different levels of stricter export restriction
disciplines have been suggested in multilateral settings such as G-8, G-20, and FAO.
77. USING PUBLIC FOOD GRAIN STOCKS TO ENHANCE FOOD SECURITY, WORLD BANK REPORT
NO. 71280-GLB, 2 (Sep. 2012) [hereinafter USING PUBLIC FOOD].
78. Neha Bagri, U.S.-India Agreement on Stockpiles of Food Revives a Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2014.
79. Id.
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the face of India's insistence in defending its policy, even threatening to veto the
multilateral agreement on trade facilitation which was part of the Bali Package,
"WTO [M]embers had agreed to a temporary solution in which developing
countries would not be penalized for breaching their subsidy levels until a
permanent solution was found by 2017.''8O If the eventual 'permanent' deal
ensures further tolerance for public stockpiling tied to domestic support, and
thereby extends the level of domestic support currently allowed under the WTO, it
can also in effect allow further export restriction flexibility without the need to
resort to the justification under GATT Article XI:2(a).
IV. THE INTERACTION OF WTO LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN
DISCIPLINING AGRICULTURAL EXPORT RESTRICTIONS
As explained in the preceding section, international trade law offers more
flexibility to exporting states, and hence host states, should they choose to address
local hunger (food security) through export restrictions; and that despite the
increasing attention the disciplining of export restrictions received, no real
agreement towards stricter discipline of export restrictions has been reached in the
current negotiations under the Doha Round either. But, one of the outstanding
issues in the context of the current race for farmland in sub-Saharan Africa is that,
where the food produced in the country of export belongs to a foreign investor's
home state,8 1 an export restriction measure which is, arguably, legitimate under
WTO law may nonetheless amount to a breach of host state's obligation under
international investment law, including BITs. In other words, in the context of
transnational farmland investments, host states' export restriction measures, even
those taken in response to local hunger, cannot be seen isolated from investors'
property rights protected under international investment law, another layer of law
applicable to these investments. The following sub-sections seek to explore this
interface between international trade and investment laws in disciplining export
restrictions relating to foreign farmland investment.
A. Farmland Investment Contracts
Although the notion of 'land grabbing' prominently featuring in the media
reports seems to point to a unilateral appropriation of land by a 'land grabber,' it is
now widely acknowledged that most of the deals are effected through contracts
duly signed by relevant authority and complying with national laws.8 2 As such,
these investment contracts are deemed to represent a compromise between the
different, but not mutually exclusive, interests. 83 It could thus be argued that the
terms of investment contracts should not be much of a concern as host countries
80. Id.
81. As noted before, a significant number of foreign land deals for food production in Ethiopia
and most of sub-Saharan Africa are specifically meant for export of food back home.
82. See generally LORENZO COTULA, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPENT, LAND DEALS IN AFRICA: WHAT IS IN THE CONTRACTS? (2011); Wily, supra note 17.
83. WORLD BANK, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
VOL II: GUIDELINES para. 39 (1992).
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can always re-open them for negotiation. In this respect, Raymond Vernon, from
his study of U.S. multinational corporations' operations abroad in the raw
materials venture in the 1960s, observes that host states often opened up the
ventures for re-negotiation "repeatedly-almost predictably," a phenomenon he
termed "obsolescing bargain",84 Nonetheless, such frequent re-opening of
negotiations in the current situation when foreign investments enjoy expansive
legal protection and informal backup through various channels comes only at the
expense of one nature or another to host states. As such, it is worthwhile to
scrutinize these contracts.
In this regard, Lorenzo Cotula, from his preliminary analysis of selected
farmland investment contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa, alerts that "there are real
concerns that some contracts underpinning the recent wave of land acquisitions
may not be fit for purpose." 85 A number of the contracts reviewed appear to be
"short, unspecific documents that grant long-term rights to extensive areas of
land.",86 Indeed, as Smaller argues, many of the negative impacts of large scale
farmland investments-such as those documented in recent World Bank report 87 _
could have been resolved through better contracts between states and foreign
investors and more robust monitoring and evaluation of projects after the contract
is signed.88
In the context of food security, although agricultural investments can
ostensibly bring yield increases that will benefit food security in both host and
investor countries, if not properly managed, such investments could also have long
term negative impact on food security in host states.89 Particularly, where host
countries themselves experience frequent shortage of food, as for example in the
case of Ethiopia, it is imperative to properly spell out, among others, ways of
distribution of produce between domestic and international markets in the event of
food shortages in the host country. This section will explore how farmland
investment contracts regulate export restrictions under such circumstances.
Depending on the data source used, Ethiopiahas transferred between 300,000
to 3.7 million hectares of farmland to foreign investors, often through long-term
84. See RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF US
ENTERPRISES 46 (1971).
85. COTULA, supra note 82, at 43.
86. Id.
87. The Report by and large positively appraises the practice of large scale farmland investments,
but also notes some negative impacts in relation to access to: land, water, employment, environment,
outgrower schemes, food security, infrastructure, technology transfer, resettlement, and markets. See
generally THE WORLD BANK, THE PRACTICE OF RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES IN LARGER-
SCALE AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT ON
LOCAL COMMUNITIES, REPORT No. 86175-GLB, XIV (2014).
88. Carin Smaller, Foreign Investment in Farmland and Water: 10 Steps for Better Contracts,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (May 14, 2014),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/05/14/foreign-investment-in-farmland-and-water-10-steps-for-better-
contracts.
89. For example, see De Schutter, supra note 12, at 250. See generally, COTULA, supra note 82;
DEININGER ET AL., supra note 9.
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lease (for a period of twenty-five to fifty years). 90 Investment contracts for most of
the farmland leased between 2009 and 2012 are publicly available.91 According to
the terms of the contracts, the lands acquired are meant for production of food
crops, mainly rice, oil seeds, soya, and maize; biofuel crops such as palm oil,
Jatropha curcas, and castor beans; and industrial crops (raw materials), especially,
cotton, and sugar cane. The contracts are generally short, about nine to eleven
pages long, often organized under nineteen to twenty-one articles. Interestingly,
the key terms of the contracts are identical, save for minor differences relating to,
for example, the identity of the parties, size and location of land, and rate of lease,
and still minor variation depending on whether the investor is a foreigner or local.
Apart from activities relating to the cultivation and harvest of the products, 92
the contracts do not envisage what the investor may or may not do with the
harvest. The only limitation the contracts impose on investors in this respect is
that the investor shall not make unauthorized use of the leased land beyond the
predetermined purpose or objective or plan without express consent of the lessor in
writing. 93 Thus, the contracts do not mention the possibility of export restrictions
even under exceptional circumstance where there are local food crises. Indeed,
Esayas Kebede, former Director of the Agricultural Investment Directorate at the
Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture, argues that: "[i]t's not our task to take revenue
away from investors .... [W]e want to increase the purchasing power of our
people so that they can afford to buy corn from Karuturi. If the investors can get a
good price here in this country, they will sell here.'
94
This approach of Ethiopian government seems to emanate from export-
oriented agricultural policy of the country,95 and contrasts with the practice in
some other countries in sub-Saharan Africa region. For example, in examining
selected farmland investment contracts, Cotula notes the Liberian experience of
90. See DEININGER ET AL., supra note 9, at 62 (reporting that total transfers in 2004-09 amounted
to 1.2 million in Ethiopia); Dessalegn Rahmato, The Perils of Development from Above: Land Deals in
Ethiopia, 12 AFR. IDENTITIES 26 (2014) (noting that '[i]t is estimated that the total land ceded to
investors from the mid-1990s to the end of 2011 may be in the order of 3.00-3.5 million hectares.'). See
also THE OAKLAND INSTITUTE, UNDERSTANDING LAND INVESTMENT DEALS IN AFRICA COUNTRY
REPORT: ETHIOPIA 1 (2011) ("Since early 2008, the Ethiopian government has embarked on a process
to award millions of hectares (ha) of land to foreign and national agricultural investors. Our research
shows that at least 3,619,509 ha of land have been transferred to investors, although the actual number
may be higher.").
91. Land Leased Information, ETHIOPIAN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE (last visited Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.moa.gov.et/web/pages/land-leased.
92. Thus Article 3(4) of the contract(s) provides that, the lessee [investor] has the right to
'[d]evelop and cultivate the land and harvest the crop and carry on all other activities by mechanization
or such other means that the lessee shall in its own discretion deem fit and proper in the circumstances.'
USING PUBLIC FOOD, supra note 77.
93. See USING PUBLIC FOOD, supra note 77, at art. 4(10).
94. See Elias N. Stebek, Between 'Land Grabs' and Agricultural Investment: Land Rent
Contracts with Foreign Investors and Ethiopia's Normative Setting in Focus, 5 MINZAN L. REV. 175,
210 (2011).
95. ETHIOPIAN MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH AND
TRANSFORMATION PLAN (2009).
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granting the investor the right to export rice "provided domestic consumption
demands are met," whereas, in Madagascar, a contract "determines export and
domestic market quotas for specified crops (rice, wheat, and maize), though all
pulses are for export and the contract allows exceptions where 'situation or
circumstances otherwise demanded.'
96
While reserving the right to export restrictions in farmland contracts-or, as a
matter of fact export restriction itself-may not be a panacea for addressing local
food shortage (in terms of both availability and access), at times, particularly when
there is local food crisis, these measures might be a necessity than optional policy
responses. The fact that these contracts are silent thus evokes doubts as to whether
the issue is seriously taken during the negotiations for transfer of large tracts of
land to foreign investors. In the face of the silence of the investment contracts and
other domestic laws on the issue, which in effect amounts to granting the investor
unconditional right of export, possible export restriction measures by host states
would run the risk of violating contractual commitments. Although disputes over
contractual commitments, as ordinary commercial disputes, are adjudicated within
the framework of domestic laws, depending on the architecture of host states
commitments under other laws applicable to these investments (for example
relevant BITs), the breach of contractual obligations may constitute the breach
international investment law (BIT) entailing international adjudication 97 -which is
never easy to most of the host states in sub-Saharan Africa.
B. International Investment Law and Jurisprudence
Investment laws which offer expansive protection to foreign investments are
assumed to facilitate the flow of foreign investment to host states and ostensibly
promote economic growth and development. 98 Perhaps, the most significant shift
in the protection of foreign investments has been the introduction of BITs in the
late 1950s and 1960s and their phenomenal growth in the decades to follow.
99
BITs, which are now regarded as important source of international investment
law,' 00 impose restraints on the arbitrary exercise of power of host states with
96. COTULA, supra note 82, at 38.
97. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
152-54 (2d ed. 2012).
98. This assumption, however, has been challenged by empirical accounts. For example, see
generally, Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct
Investment? Only a Bit and They Could Bite 20 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper no. 3121,
2003); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VIRG. J. INTL. L. 639, 642-43 (1997). For competing claims, see
generally Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess, Do BITs increase FDI in Developing Countries 33 WORLD
DEV. 1567, 3-5 (2005). For mixed claims, see generally KARL P. SAUVANT AND LISA E. SACHS EDS.,
THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES,
DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (2009).
99. For a succinct account of the origin and incessant evolution of BITs, see generally Juirgen
Kurtz, The Shifting Landscape of International Investment Law and its Commentary 106 AME. J. INT'L
L. 686 (2012).
100. See generally JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
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respect to foreign investors. These restraints (investors' rights) are also often
enforced through an independent dispute resolution system. 10 1 The introduction of
BITs by countries of the global north was in large measure a counter move to the
emerging claim of capital importing countries for permanent sovereignty over
natural resources and more broadly the establishment of New International
Economic Order ("NIEO").1°2  The complexity and instability of modem
international investment law103 is thus marked with the competing interests of
capital exporting states or their investors and capital importing countries. Clearly,
food security induced transnational farmland deals of recent years are typical
examples of investments involving competing interests of home and host states
that would potentially trigger the application of BITs.
Despite the tendency to introduce more flexibilities to legal regimes of
foreign investment protection in recent years, 10 4 foreign investments (hence
farmland investments) still enjoy a wide range of protection under BITs through
such standards as most favored nation ("MFN"), national treatment, fair and
equitable treatment, full protection and security, expropriation, as well as umbrella
clauses which potentially elevate breach of contracts to the breach of BITs
standards.
For example, the 2004 BIT of Ethiopia and Germany provides that: "[a]
Contracting Party shall adhere to any other obligation deriving from a written
commitment undertaken by it in favour of an investor of the other Contracting
Party with regard to an investment in its territory."' 10 5 The implication is that the
violation of farmland investment contracts, which is otherwise a domestic law
issue, could amount to a breach of BIT containing such clauses and hence an
international investment law issue with potential international adjudication-and
associated costs. Even more intriguingly, an umbrella clause in one BIT could,
through the operation of MFN clauses, be extrapolated to the country's other BITs
with no such clauses. Although whether a MFN clause only covers neither
substantive provisions, nor whether it "only allows an investor to invoke
provisions from other investment treaties that are 'compatible in principle' are not
clear from existing arbitral awards, 10 6 the use of MFN clauses to import more
LAW: NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL (2013).
101. Prabhash Ranjan, National Contestation of International Investment Law and International
Rule of Law, RULE OF LAW AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS: CONTESTATIONS AND
DEFERENCE (Machiko Kanetake & Andrae Nollkaemper eds., forthcoming 2015).
102. For a thorough analysis of this, see generally SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONIZING
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY
(2011).
103. Kurtz, supra note 99, at 689.
104. See generally SURYA P SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY
AND PRINCIPLES (2d ed. 2012).
105. Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Eth., art. 8(2),
Jan. 19, 2004, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1 164.
106. See Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, The Significance of South-South BITs for the International
Investment Regime: A Quantitative Analysis, 30 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 101, 127 (2010) (noting that:
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favorable substantive treatment from third country BITs is largely uncontested."°7
The potency of a given BIT's MFN clause to import more favorable conditions
(treatments)-including an umbrella clause-from another BIT, however, depends
on its exact wording as well as the scope of the application of the basic treaty
containing the clause.'0 8 Indeed, there are several cases in which tribunals have
generally allowed investors to "import" substantive provisions from other BITs
entered into by the host state 109(although there have also been cases where such
requests were denied). The Bayindir v. Pakistan tribunal, for instance, allowed the
investor to invoke a fair and equitable treatment clause from another BIT via MFN
clause of the BIT between Turkey and Pakistan. 110 Similarly, the CME v. Czech
Republic tribunal held that the investor could rely on an expropriation provision
from another BIT to determine the standard of compensation."'
This, arguably, implies that, as long as a host country has signed at least one
BIT containing an umbrella clause, all of its other BITs with MFN clauses-
depending on the wording of the clause and the scope of application of the treaty
containing the clause-can import this obligation. Thus, a breach of commitment
for the investor (investment contract) which is otherwise adjudicated in domestic
courts would become a breach of host states commitment to investor's home state
under relevant BIT. As the vast majority of existing BITs permit investors to bring
arbitral claims directly against host states, the operationalization of investment
contracts through BITs could thus lead to costly international adjudication that
most of the host states of the recent transnational agricultural investments hardly
afford. This has important ramification for host states, particularly in the face of
poorly drafted transnational farmland contracts, and hence the tendency to
overlook the challenges the cumulative application of various layers of laws
ordering these farmland deals.
To date, no real case has emerged concerning host states' measures, including
export restrictions, relating to the recent transnational farmland investments within
"Whether the ejusdem generis principle implies that the clause only covers substantive provisions False
[or, whether it] only allows an investor to invoke provisions from other investment treaties that are
'compatible in principle,' and if so, how that applies in terms of limiting its application" is unclear from
existing case law.); see also Subedi, supra note 104.
107. Stephan W. Schill, Mulitilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored-Nation
Clauses, 27 BERKELEY. J. INT'L L. 496, 519 (2009).
108. See Jorgen Kurtz, The AFN Standard and Foreign Investment: An Uneasy Fit? 5 J. WORLD
INV. & TRADE 861, 872-73 (2004) (noting that "The breadth of operation of a particular MFN clause
will depend to some degree on its exact wording in a given investment treaty. The MFN clauses in
most treaties do not use identical language and, as a result, offer potentially different interpretative
options for arbitral tribunals."); see also Schill, supra note 107, at 523 (noting that "the scope of
application of MFN clauses is regularly also restricted indirectly by the scope of application of the basic
treaty itself.").
109. Schill, supra note 107, at 519.
110. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.5. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 206, 225-30 (Nov. 14, 2005),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0074.pdf
111. CME Czech B.V. v. Czech (Neth. v. Czech), Final Award, U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law,
497-500 (Mar. 14, 2003), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2003-FinalOO2.pdf.
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the framework of international investment law-understandably because of the
incipient nature of the investments. This, however, may not imply that no such
case would appear in the future. Given that local food shortage is already there in
many of the sub-Saharan Africa region," 2 such cases likely arise where there is,
shortage of food in investors home states which would want to have a secure
access to such food, or where sales in international markets offer better returns to
investor than host market (or government) offers.
In fact there are investment arbitration cases in different contexts that are
emblematic of how investment arbitration tribunals may deal with host states'
export restriction measures relating to transnational agricultural produces. The
Venezuela Holdings et. al v Venezuela 113 tribunal, for example, found that
Venezuela's production and export curtailments of oil were incompatible with,
among others, the fair and equitable treatment standard of The Netherlands-
Venezuela BIT. 14 In the tribunal's words:
In the Tribunal's opinion, this standard may be breached by frustrating
the expectations that the investor may have legitimately taken into
account when making the investment. Legitimate expectations may
result from specific formal assurances given by the host state in order to
induce investment."15 .... It thus appears that the production and export
curtailments imposed from November 2006 were incompatible with the
Claimants' reasonable and legitimate expectations, and thus breached
the [fair and equitable treatment] standard contained in Article 3(1) of
the BIT."
16
It is thus evident that where the right to freely export (dispose) is recognized
or where there is no reservation to this right under relevant laws or investment
agreements, as is the case in Ethiopia and many other host states, possible export
restriction measures relating to transnational farmland produces likely violate
investment contracts and eventually breach of relevant BIT, even when such
112. Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Int'l Fund for Agric. Dev., & World Food Programme, THE
STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2013: THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF FOOD SSECURITY 8
(2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf (noting that from 2011-2013, sub-Sahara
Africa hosted 222.7 million chronically hungry people (24.8 percent of the total population, which is
the largest proportion in the world)); see also Basic Definitions, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N.,
http://www.ecsw.org/resourcecenter/global/world%20hunger/2Oundemutrition/FAO% 2OBasic% 2 0def
initions%20oP/o2OHunger.pdf (according to which undernourishment or chronic hunger is understood
as the status of persons, whose food intake regularly provides less than their minimum energy (dietary)
requirements).
113. See generally Veneza Holdings, B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic ofVenez., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/27, Award, (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw401 I.pdf.
114. Id.
115. Id. 256. The Toto v. Lebanon Tribunal, on the other hand, took a broader view when it states
that legitimate expectations "may follow from explicit or implicit representations made by the host
state, or from its contractual commitments." Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic of Leb.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, 159 (June 7, 2012),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital 1013 .pdf.
116. Venez. Holdings, B.V., ARB/07/27 at 264.
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measures could be primafacie justified under WTO law.
Similarly, the ICSID Tribunal in El Paso v Argentina, 1 7 regarding
Argentina's ban on oil export following the economic crisis of 1999, noted that the
investor's right to freely export could draw either from host state's laws or
investment agreement signed by host state and foreign investor. 118 In the
Tribunal's view, where the host state's law provides for possibilities of export
restrictions, a foreign investor may not be entitled to an absolute right of export." 19
In the Tribunal's words:
Concerning CAPSA [Compafiias Asociadas Petroleras], in the
Tribunal's view, the right to export freely that was granted by law was
not unrestricted. As any right, it was subject to reasonable restrictions
decided by the Government for reasons of public interest, for example in
order to satisfy the domestic market. This was provided for by Article
377 of the Mining Code ....
On the face of it, therefore, if the possibility of export restrictions is envisaged
under relevant domestic law or investment agreement, a host state may legitimately
introduce export restriction measures, provided that the conditions that dictate the
introduction of the measure exist. On the other hand, this ruling also, as in
Venezuela Holdings, suggests that where no reservation to the investor's right to
export freely is envisaged under either investment contract or other laws of the
host state, a restriction of exports runs the risk of interfering with the property right
of an investor often protected under both domestic laws and international
investment law (BITs). The implication for transnational land deals in countries
like Ethiopia is no different. Where neither domestic laws nor farmland
investment contracts provide for the possibility of export restrictions, even by way
of exception, and particularly where the international market offers higher price
than domestic market, the introduction of export restriction measure may constitute
a breach of both investment contract and-through the operation of umbrella
clause-relevant BITs standards.
As the foregoing cases suggest, one of a BITs standards that the introduction
of agricultural export restriction measures likely violate is the fair and equitable
treatment ("FET") standard which, as Rudolph Dolzer rightly observes, is "[t]he
[b]roadest and [m]ost [p]rominent [s]tandard in [i]nvestment [t]reaties.'' That is,
117. See generally El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0270.pdf.
118. Id. 432.
119. Id. 433.
120. Id.
121. Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today's Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L
L.7, 10 (2013). Based on arbitral jurisprudence, Dolzer identifies certain common elements of fair and
equitable standard: good faith in the conduct of a party, consistency of conduct, transparency of rules,
recognition of the scope and purpose of laws, due process, prohibition of harassment, a reasonable
degree of stability and predictability of the legal system, particularly, recognition of the legitimate
expectation on the part of the investor, arbitrariness and discrimination (even though separate, specific
rules in investment treaties may (or may not) address these concepts). Id. at 15.
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since "legitimate expectations,"-which may derive, among others, from explicit
or implicit representations by the host state, or from its contractual commitments-
is at the center of the fair and equitable standard,
122 the introduction of export
restriction measures-in the absence of reservation of this right in relevant contract
or law at the time of investment-will likely constitutes a prima facie case of
denial of legitimate expectations of the investor, and hence breach of FET
standard. Of course, depending on the nature and effect of export restriction
measure on the investment, other BIT standards such as full protection and
security123 and (indirect) expropriation124 may also be invoked.
Nonetheless, although BITs are often drafted, and interpreted, with more pro-
investor telos, it is possible to accommodate, to some extent, host states' legitimate
regulatory interests through the use of exceptions (general or special). 2 5 Of course,
the wording and hence scope of these clauses varies from one instrument to
another, as does their interpretation by investment tribunals even when their
formulations and the factual circumstances surrounding a given set of cases are
122. Id. at 17 (noting that: "The protection of legitimate expectations by the FET standard will
today properly be considered as the central pillar in the understanding and application of the FET
standard.").
123. While most BITs employ the term 'full protection and security' or 'adequate protection and
security,' others employs its variants, for example Ethiopia-Finland BIT of 2006 provides for 'constant
protection and security' while Ethiopia-Austria BIT of 2004 employ 'full and constant protection and
security'. In its classical understanding, 'full protection and security' is understood as host state's
obligation of due diligence in relation to the physical protection of the investment, although tribunals
have also construed the norm as one extending to ensuring both physical safety of and legal security for
foreign investment. See Roland Kldger, "FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT" IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 293-94 (2011). Klager further notes that "a guarantee of full protection and security
seems to add little to a fair and equitable treatment clause in an investment agreement." Id. at 295; see
also Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Full Protection and Security, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC Law 183, 212 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010) (noting that: "Often, the ultimate
outcome may not differ strongly, as one tribunal may assess under the 'fair and equitable treatment'
clause what another considers under an FPS clause. But the lack of consistency nevertheless risks
undermining the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration.").
124. Where export restriction measure in question potentially neutralizes the property rights of the
investor, or investor's control over his investment, the measure could arguably amount to indirect
expropriation. The 'sole effect doctrine' as a criterion has been a dominant test in establishing the
existence of indirect expropriation (as opposed to legitimate non-compensable regulatory measure). See
Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?, 11 N.Y.U. Envt'l L.J. 64, 81-81 (2002).
Although some tribunals have also paid due regard to the cause (nature and context) of the measure as
important criterion to determine indirect expropriation (for example, LG&E v. Argentina), it appears
that the effect of the measure (how severely the investment has been interrupted?) is still an important,
although not necessarily the only, test. See also Markus Perkams, The Concept of Indirect
Expropriation in Comparative Public Law-Searching for Light in the Dark, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 107, 111 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010). Perkams
identifies three general approaches (sole effect, exclusion of non-discriminatory bona fide regulations,
and weighing the public interest protected against the effect of the measure) to establishing indirect
expropriation and notes that: "None of these tests is currently prevailing and it is hard to predict how a
tribunal will approach the issue of indirect expropriation." Id. at 110.
125. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Rebalancing Through Exceptions, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 449,
449-50 (2012).
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similar. General exceptions, those applying to all of the obligations of a BIT, are
often formulated in terms of "essential security interests," 126 although some BITs
also employ alternative formulations including "public security" and "public
order."' 127 Special exceptions, on the other hand, apply only to a limited number of
BIT obligations-most commonly national and most favored nation treatment
obligations. 
128
The question to ask is, then, to what extent can BITs' exception clauses
(measures) be employed to justify food export restrictions on ground of local food
crisis (food insecurity)? Since special exceptions, as noted before, commonly
pertain to most favored nation treatment (how a given foreign investor is treated
vis-h-vis other comparable foreign investors) and national treatment (how a given
foreign investor is treated vis-A-vis comparable domestic investors), they are more
about ensuring non-discrimination in the application of a given measure than
whether the introduction of the measure itself is justified in the first place. So, in
the absence of any special exception on ground of, say food security (to date, not
many, if any, BITs seems to have expressly envisaged this), 129 one would only
look at general exceptions for guidance. Thus, could general exceptions-
commonly referring to measures aimed at protecting "national security, public
security or public order," 130 "public security and order,"'131 and "essential security
interests" 132 of a party-be invoked to justify host state's export restriction
126. Id. at 449.
127. Other formulations include: measures aimed at protecting human, animal, and plant life and
health; environmental measures; measures to fulfill a party's obligations with respect to the
maintenance of international peace and security; measures with respect to financial services taken for
prudential reasons; measures related to monetary or exchange rate policies; measures of taxation; and
measures to promote cultural or linguistic diversity. Id. at 449-50. See, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
& DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES: FREEDOM OF INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING
WORLD 99 (2007) (noting that exceptions on ground of essential security interests may at times apply to
specific treaty obligations-such as expropriation/nationalization, non-discrimination, dispute settlement,
and application of host-country-law to foreign investment-and in that sense become a special exception
clauses as opposed to general exception).
128. Vandevelde, supra note 125, at 449-50.
129. See, e.g., Christian Hfiberli & Fiona Smith, Food Security and Agri-Foreign Direct
Investment in Weak States: Finding the Governance Gap to Avoid "Land Grab, " 77 MOD. L. REV. 189,
221 (2014). Haberli and Smith propose a public interest clause for food security:
In view of the specific situation of weak host states, their strong international commitments
under BITs and other instruments, and comparing these commitments with the soft law
principles applicable to home states and investors, we conclude our analysis in this article
with a proposal for a public interest clause for food security which could be incorporated into
the binding commitments of the host state and the investor, either in a BIT or regional treaty.
Id.
130. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments,U.K.-Eth.; Nov. 19, 2009,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/l 180.
131. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, supra
note 105.
132. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of
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measures taken in response to local food crisis (food insecurity)?
The answer to this question is far from straightforward. One source of
difficulty has to do with the interpretation of the aforementioned terms (subjects)
of treaty exception. Indeed, as Arnold Wolfers cautions, "political formulas" like
national security "may not mean the same thing to different people" and "may not
have any precise meaning at all." 133 In the context of international investment law,
there have been limited instances in which arbitral tribunals have grappled with the
interpretation of these terms. One such instance was in the aftermath of
Argentina's financial crisis of 2000-2001when a number of foreign investors
brought arbitral claims against Argentina's regulatory response to the crisis. In its
defence, Argentina attempted to justify its measures, among others, through
invocation of "public order" and "essential security interests" exceptions to its BIT
obligations. Nonetheless, as for example, Jtirgen Kurtz's analysis of the first five
of these awards reveals, "[the] rulings engage fundamentally different and at times
conflicting methods of interpreting the relationship between the operative treaty
exception and relevant customary law."'
' 34
The Continental Tribunal, which largely ruled in favour of Argentina on its
invocation of treaty exception, 135 for instance-by dismissing the claimant's
submission that public order is synonymous with public policy which more
narrowly refers "to measures necessary to maintain the public policies, laws and
morals that define the country's society"' 36-interpreted "public order" instead as
a broad synonym for "public peace," "which can be threatened by actual or
potential insurrections, riots and violent disturbances of the peace . . . [including]
due to significant economic and social difficulties."' 37 Viewed in this light, where
food crisis (shortage) in host state results in, among others, riots or other
disturbances that may threaten the legal order (rule of law) in a host country-as
for example widely seen following the 2007-2008 food crisis-a response through
export restriction could be justified through the invocation of "public order" treaty
exception, provided of course that the restriction is necessary in the circumstances.
Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Israel for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Eth.-Isr., Nov. 26, 2003,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1 167.
133. Arnold Wolfers, "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 481, 481
(1952).
134. Jorgen Kurtz, Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment Law: Security, Public
Order and Financial Crisis, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 325, 334 (2010).
135. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, Award, 160, 319 (Sept 5,
2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita02 2 8.pdf. Among the other four
Tribunals, three (CMS, Enron and Sempra) Tribunals ruled against Argentina while the LG&E Tribunal
partially finds in favour of Argentina on its invocation of the exceptions. Kurtz, supra note 134, at 333.
136. Cont'l Cas. Co., ARB/03/9 171.
137. Id. 174. Although the Continental tribunal considers 'public order' exception as distinct
from 'essential security interests' exception, as UNCTAD notes, whether 'public order' exception is
more directed towards disturbances of the internal legal order or whether it covers any kind of threat to
national security is not clear from exiting arbitral awards. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., THE
PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN IIAs 74 (2009).
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This brings the discussion to the other commonly used general BIT
exceptions: "national security" or "essential security interests," and particularly to
the question whether host states' agricultural export restriction measures could be
justified under these exceptions. As a starting point, whether "essential security
interests" and "national security" refer to the same thing or whether they are
significantly different is not clear from existing case law. However, as the U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") argues, given the prefix
"essential", "essential security interests" could be "narrower than the more general
term "national security."' 138 However, whether Contracting Parties, by choosing
one of these alternatives, actually intend to introduce such a distinction is far from
obvious. 139 Further, and perhaps more importantly, whether the notion of essential
security interests is confined to its traditional understanding of a state's measures
directed to counter external threats, often military, to its territorial integrity or
whether it also captures the more evolving notion of human security is also not
self-evident. 140
Human Security is the latest in a long series of attempts to broaden traditional
conceptions of security-other such attempts include: global security, societal
security, common security, comprehensive security and cooperative security. 14 1
The notion was first articulated in the 1994 United Nations Development
Programme ("UNDP") Human Development Report which called for the
broadening of the conception of security "from an exclusive stress on territorial
security to a much greater stress on people's [human] security," which
encompasses seven different dimensions: economic, food, health, environmental,
personal, community, and political security. 142 Indeed, about two decades later-
building on the works of the U.N. Commission on Human Security-the U.N.
General Assembly passed a Resolution that aims at creating a common
understanding on the notion of human security. 143 The Resolution conceptualizes
the notion as, inter alia, "[t]he right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free
from poverty and despair" 144 and as one calling for "people-centred,
comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen
the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities."'' 45 Further,
the Resolution concedes that "Human security does not replace State security."' 14 6
As BITs exception clauses often employ "national security" and "essential security
interests," instead of human security, the task of interpreting these clauses either
narrowly-with a focus on territorial integrity-or broadly-in line with the
138. Id. at 72-73.
139. Id. at 73.
140. See also Kurtz, supra note 134, at 361-63.
141. Keith Krause, Policy Paper, Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda, 26 GENEVA
CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES 1 (2007).
142. U.N. Dev. Programme, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994 24 (1994).
143. G.A. Res. 66/290, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/290 (Oct, 25, 2012).
144. ld. 3(a).
145. Id. 3(b).
146. Id. 3(e).
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evolving notion of human security-is left for tribunals. The Continental
Tribunal, for example, seems to have taken the latter approach when it considered
the effects of the economic crisis (such as near collapse of the domestic economy,
the leap in unemployment, the immediate threats to the health of young children,
the sick and the most vulnerable) would qualify as a situation in which the
essential security of Argentina as a state and country was vitally at stake.'
47
Thus, arguably, a case can also be made of shortage of food as a 'security'
matter. As Lester R. Brown argues, for example, "[i]t is no longer possible to
separate food security and security more broadly defined;, 148 indeed, the security
equation is simple: "by denying access to food, life can be threatened."'149 Thus, a
situation in which the acuteness of local food shortage threatens lives may trigger
the invocation of "essential security interests" and "national security" treaty
exception to justify host state's possible response measures such as export
restrictions. For, while export restrictions may not guarantee access to food, it can
by enhancing local food availability, contribute towards access. Nonetheless,
current "understanding of food as a matter of security remain ad hoc."' 5 ° Neither
has this nexus, food as a matter of 'security,' found its way into hard international
law to aid tribunals engaging with the interpretation of treaty exception. Indeed, if
BITs exception clauses are to be interpreted in the light of the parties' obligations
under other international agreements-as mandated by the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") 5 '-host state's duty to realize its people's right to
adequate food under the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights ("ICESCR") 152 could create the food "essential security interests" link.
153
This approach seems appealing, if also raises a more complex issue of the interplay
between international investment and human rights law, which is beyond the scope
of this work; the extent to which tribunals are willing to take this road, however, is
not clear from existing case law. It is also worth mentioning that, even where food
shortage (insecurity) maybe understood as a threat to the essential security interests
of the host state invoking a treaty exception, it is still incumbent upon that state to
prove the existence of the condition (food shortage) that triggers the measure (in
147. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, Award, 180 (Sept 5, 2008),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita02 2 8.pdf.
148. Lester R. Brown, FULL PLANET, EMPTY PLATES: THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF FOOD SCARCITY
121 (2012).
149. Peter Wallensteen, Scarce Goods as Political Weapons: The Case of Food, 13 J. PEACE RES.
277, 277 (1976).
150. See Tim Siegenbeek van Heukelom, Food as Security: The Controversy of Foreign
Agricultural Investment in the Yala Swamp, Kenya 77 (Aug. 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Sydney) (on file with University of Sydney).
151. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT], which requires a treaty interpreter to take into account "[a]ny relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties."
152. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
153. Kurtz, for example, suggests similar interpretative approach in the context of analysing
tribunals' ruling on Argentina's invocation of 'essential security interests' exception to justify its
regulatory responses to the economic crisis. See Kurtz, supra note 134, at 363-64.
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this case, export restriction) and that the measure is a necessary response that is
applied only until the condition demands so.
54
That said, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa-for example Ethiopia-
though, most of the BITs do not provide for exception clauses: Ethiopia's BITs
with Algeria, Austria, China, Iran, Libya, North Sudan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Spain,
Russia, Sweden, Yemen, The Netherlands, and Turkey, for example do not provide
for any general-public order and security-exception clause.1 55  And absent
express exception treaty clauses, it is unlikely that tribunals would seriously
engage with the task of rebalancing the interests of the investor and host state.
Indeed, as for example Dolzer contends, such an engagement would even be
inappropriate.156 Also, as noted before, even when the exceptions are envisaged in
BITs, the interpretative approach a given tribunal takes is far from certain,
although there is a general tendency for a pro-investor finding. The upshot is,
potential export restriction measures applied to transnational agricultural
investments in response to local food crisis-even when justified under the WTO
law-can nonetheless be challenged under international investment law (BITs)
which points to, inter alia, a limited policy space of host states as well as
incoherence between the two strands of international economic law (trade and
investment) in addressing the competing food (security) interests of host and
investor countries.
V. CONCLUSION
The convergence of global food, energy, and financial crises in recent years
has triggered a surge of interest in acquisitions of farmland in many parts of the
world, but most notably in sub-Saharan Africa, with important implications for,
among others, access to land, food and water. It is thus very important to examine
relevant laws that, at least along with other set of factors, are ordering this process
and its potential outcomes. This article has analysed how international economic
law-mainly WTO law and international investment laws-mediates the outcome
of transnational agricultural investments with a particular focus on export
restrictions which have been one of the push factors for these investments.
Although export restriction measures may not be a panacea to ensure food
availability and access, under certain circumstances these measures still remain
relevant policy options for host states of transnational agricultural investments,
such those in sub-Saharan Africa which are often themselves facing frequent food
insecurity (hunger) challenges. Nonetheless, as shown in this article, the WTO law
and international investment law seem to differ in terms of constraining host states'
ability to introduce and maintain export restriction measures.
154. See, e.g., Kurtz supra note 134, at 364-65; see also Vandevelde, supra note 125, at 456.
155. See also Vandevelde, supra note 125, at 451 (noting that a "majority of BITs do not yet
contain any general exceptions, albeit special exceptions applicable to the national and most-favored-
nation treatment provisions are extremely common.").
156. See Dolzer, supra note 121, at 28 (noting that: "BITs are drafted in a one-sided manner with
the aim to provide an investor-friendly climate and to attract foreign investors; absent a special treaty
clause, a rebalancing of interests in the case of a dispute by a tribunal would not be appropriate.").
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Although the WTO law generally prohibits quantitative restrictions, by way
of exception, it allows Members to introduce "[e]xport prohibitions or restrictions
temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other
products essential to the exporting contracting party"1 57 -in compliance with the
consultation and notification requirements under the AoA 1 58 In the light of the
indeterminate and subjective nature of the above key terms defining the conditions
that trigger the operation of this exception clause, procedural requirements of
consultation and notification that can easily be eschewed, and the absence of limit
to the use of export taxes (that otherwise have similar effect to quantitative
restrictions), the WTO law leaves Members with a considerable degree of
autonomy to introduce export restriction measures. Indeed, this remains the case
despite the increasing call for stricter disciplines on agricultural export restrictions
in recent years, both within the WTO-Doha Round of trade negations-and other
multilateral settings.
However, a different picture of host states' autonomy in terms of introducing
export restrictions emerges in the context of transnational national agricultural
investments which are further subject to international investment law. Although
no case involving export restriction measures relating to the recent transnational
agricultural investments has been reported yet-understandably because of the
incipient nature of these investments-a closer look at WTO law disciplines in the
light of international investment law and practice suggests that WTO flexibilities
on export restrictions on ground of food security may not stand up to foreign
investors rights under investment laws agreements. Indeed, some of the reviewed
farmland investment contracts do not envisage the possibility of export restrictions.
And absent such reservation, the introduction of export restriction-depending on
its impact on the property right of the investor-risks the breach of relevant BITs
between host and home states. This is particularly the case given the fact that most
of the host states such those in sub-Saharan Africa have signed at least one BIT
with an umbrella clause that potentially elevates the violation of farmland
commercial contract to breach of a BIT, which entails costly international
arbitration that these states hardly afford. Even more disconcertingly, this effect of
umbrella clause could be imported to host state's other BITs, without umbrella
clause, by virtue of the MFN clause which features in virtually every BIT. Neither
does the rebalancing of the interests of host state and foreign investor through BITs
exception clauses on ground of, for example, "essential security interests" of a host
state seem promising either because these clauses are not there, or even when there
is one, how investment tribunal interpret it is far from certainty. This suggests that,
even an export restriction measure that is prima facie justified under WTO law can
nonetheless be challenged under international investment law applicable to
transnational agricultural investments. Thus, while there might be near-consensus
on the claim that the WTO discipline on agricultural export restriction is loose,
transnational agricultural investments could be subject to stricter export restriction
157. GATT, supra note 30, at art. XI(2)(a) (emphasis added).
158. See AoA, supra note 31, at art. 12.
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disciplines in a manner that inhibits hosts states ability to respond even to local
hunger. Apart from undermining host states policy space, this also points to
international economic law's challenge to coherently mediate competing food
(in)security concerns.
